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PLATONIC THEOLOGY

VOLUME 2 ✦ BOOKS V–VIII

ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN

with John Warden

LATIN TEXT EDITED BY

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THEOLOGICA PLATONICA
DE IMMORTALITATE
ANIMORUM

Capitula librorum Theologiae
de immortalitate animorum
Marsilii Ficini Florentini
divisae in libros xviii

Quintus liber tractat de immortalitate animae per rationes communes.

Cap. i Omnis rationalis anima est immortalis. Prima ratio: quia per se movetur et in circulum.

Cap. ii Secunda ratio: quia stat per substantiam.

Cap. iii Tertia ratio: quia haeret divinis.

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The Theology on the Immortality of Souls

by Marsilio Ficino the Florentine

Divided into Eighteen Books:

Chapter Headings

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Chapter 1 Every rational soul is immortal. First proof: that rational soul moves of itself and in a circle.

Chapter 2 Second proof: that soul through its substance is unmoving.

Chapter 3 Third proof: that soul cleaves to things divine.

Chapter 4 Fourth proof: that soul rules matter.

Chapter 5 Fifth proof: that soul is independent of matter.

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LIBER QUINTUS[1]

: I :

Omnis rationalis anima est immortalis. Prima ratio: quia per[2] se movetur et in circulum.

1 Has omnes animas in ordine essentiae tertiae collocamus atque hac ratione communi esse volumus immortales, quod primo moventur et, quia moventur primo, moventur in circulum.

2 Quia igitur primo moventur, moventur et semper. Ibi enim perpetuus motus est, ubi primus. Nam si fons motus aruerit, nihil ultra movebitur in natura. Item quod primo movetur, sibi ipsi praebet motum internum atque externum. Internus motus vita est; itaque sibimet vitam suppeditat. Et quia numquam deserit se ipsum, cum in qualibet natura insit amor sui ipsius perpetuus, numquam desinit vivere. Si enim quod movetur ab alio, quamdiu adhaeret motori, tamdiu movetur, multo magis quod a se ipso movetur, quia idem est atque motor, numquam a motore desertum, moveri desinit numquam.[3]

3 Praeterea, si fingatur interire quandoque, aut prius esse desinet quam moveri aut contra aut simul. Non datur primum, quia motus non potest seorsum ab essentia remanere; non secundum, quia spontaneus motus assiduus comes est eius quod motum sibimet exorditur; non tertium, quoniam perniciosa mutatio non potest ipsi ab intrinseco umquam erumpere, ex quo motus vitalis vivificusque exoritur. Sed neque continget extrinsecus; non enim fons motionis aliunde movetur. Haec est utique essentiae tertiae proprietas, in qua cum sint animae omnes rationales ex communi

BOOK V

: I :

Every rational soul is immortal.

First proof: that rational soul moves of itself and in a circle.

We put all these souls at the level of the third essence[1] and hold them to be immortal on the general principle that they are the first to be moved; and because they are the first to be moved, they are moved in a circle. 1

Because they are the first to be moved, they are moved for ever. For where the first movement is, there is perpetual movement. For if the source of movement were to dry up, nothing else in nature would be moved. Again, what is moved first provides internal and external movement to itself. Internal movement is life; so it supplies life to itself. Because it never abandons itself (for perpetual love of itself is innate in every nature), it never stops living. For if what is moved by another clings to the mover as long as it is being moved, then *a fortiori* what is moved by itself, in that it is the same as the mover and is never abandoned by the mover, never stops being moved. 2

Furthermore, if we suppose it to die at some point in time, then either it will stop existing before it stops being moved, or vice versa, or both at the same time. The first is not possible, because movement cannot continue separated from essence; nor is the second, because spontaneous movement is the constant companion of anything that initiates its own movement. Nor is the third possible, because destructive change cannot ever erupt from within that which is the source of vital and life-giving movement; and it cannot happen from without, for a source of movement is not moved from elsewhere. This then is the particular property of the third 3

quadam definitione, illis quoque omnibus eadem convenit proprietas.

4 Sunt etiam ex eo immortales, quia per naturam essentiae tertiae primique motus circulo agitantur. Nam si moventur in circulum, numquam desinunt. Circuitus enim non effundit vires, sed sua quaeque recolligit in se ipsum et, cum deficere putatur, se renovat, ut rationem illam Pythagorae ad praesens praeteream quae ostendit nullum esse in sphaera principium aut finem, ideoque illum qui movetur in sphaeram neque coepisse moveri umquam neque desinere. Esse autem rationales animas sphaeras quasdam spiritales et circuitum in se ipsis facere[4] spiritalem, postquam corpora ipsa quae illarum umbrae sunt, figuram talem habent et motum. Ita ut sphaerae circuitusque visibiles sphaerarum et circuituum invisibilium umbrae sint; ac si umbrae sint perpetuae, multo magis substantias illas fore perpetuas, quae per virtutem termino carentem motionis actum peragunt sine termino. Nec est illis contrarium aliquid a quo perimantur, sicut et motui illarum, qui circuitus est, nullus est motus contrarius.

: II :

Secunda ratio: quia stat per substantiam.

1 Atque ita immortalem esse animam per motum eius ratio superior demonstravit; idem quoque per statum animae demonstratur.

2 Quando animam nominamus, rationalium animarum genus intellegi volumus. Nam irrationales[5] vitas non animas proprie appellamus, sed idola et simulacra animarum. Si essentia illa tertia, de qua tam multa diximus, licet per operationem moveatur, manet nihilominus per substantiam, sequitur ut anima, quae eadem est

essence. Since all rational souls are in that third essence from a general definition, the same property is also proper to them all.

They are also immortal because through the nature of the third essence and of prime movement they are moved in a circle. For if they are moved in a circle they never stop moving. For circular movement does not spend its force, but gathers whatever belongs to it into itself again, and just when it is thought to fail, it renews itself. At this point I will pass over Pythagoras' proof demonstrating that in a sphere there is no beginning or end, and thus that movement within a sphere never begins or ends, but that rational souls are what might be called spiritual spheres and complete a spiritual orbit within themselves in that the bodies which are their shadows have just such a figure and motion.[2] Hence the visible spheres and orbits are shadows of the invisible spheres and orbits; and if these shadows are perpetual, *a fortiori* will the substances be perpetual which by means of a limitless power enact a limitless motion; and nothing contrary to them exists by which they may be destroyed, just as no movement exists contrary to their movement which is circular. 4

: II :

Second proof: that soul through its substance is unmoving.

Just as the previous proof demonstrated the immortality of the soul through its motion, the same is also demonstrated through its rest. 1

When we speak of soul we mean the genus of rational souls. For we do not properly call irrational lives souls but rather the idols and simulacra of souls. If the third essence, which we have fully discussed, although it is moved in its activity nevertheless 2

quod essentia illa, per substantiam non mutetur. Quod tale est, esse desinit numquam.

: III :

Tertia ratio: quia haeret divinis.

1 Ac si duo quaedam in infimo naturae gradu locata, materia scilicet et quantitas, sunt passiva, et duo alia in supremo sunt activa, deus et angelus, anima et qualitas, quae mediam inter passiva et activa obtinent regionem, quomodo se habebunt? Sic profecto utraque particeps passionis evadit. Sed qualitas, quia patientibus inhaeret omnino, per operationem et essentiam suscipit passionem. Anima vero quae distat longius, etsi in operandi facultate corporalem aliquam percipit passionem, in essentia tamen passionis est expers. Et sicut corpus, ex materia et quantitate passivum, inhaerentem sibi qualitatem reddit subiectam corruptioni, ita deus et angelus activi animam sibi proximam et a corpore segregatam divinitate sua efficiunt immortalem.

: IV :

Quarta ratio: quia[6] materiae dominatur.

1 Sed et in hoc maxime immortalitas eius apparet, quod oportet primam ipsam rerum materiam, quae movetur et formatur ab anima, perpetuam esse.

rests in its substance, then it follows that soul which is the same as that essence may not be changed in substance. But what is such never ceases to exist.

: III :

Third proof: that soul cleaves to things divine.

But if the two essences located on the lowest level of nature, namely matter and quantity, are passive, and the other two located on the highest level, God and angel, are active, then what is the condition of soul and quality which occupy the middle level between the passive and the active? Each certainly emerges as a participant in passivity. But quality, because it inheres totally in its recipients, is subject to passivity in both activity and essence. Soul, however, which is further removed, although in its operative faculty it senses some bodily passion, yet in essence it is free from passion. Just as body, being passive since made from matter and quantity, renders the quality inherent in it subject to corruption, so God and angel, being active, take soul, which is the nearest essence to them and divorced from body, and with their divinity make it immortal. 1

: IV :

Fourth proof: that soul rules matter.

The immortality of soul is principally shown by the fact that nature's prime matter, which is moved and formed by soul, must itself be perpetual. 1

2 Naturam ars imitatur. Ars opera sua hoc facit ordine, videlicet in subiecta quadam materia formas alias et alias imprimit, quarum nullam sibi propriam habet materia. Nullam enim propriam vasis alicuius formam habet lutum, sed varias vicissim capit a figulo et fractis vasis superest lutum, ex quo alia reparentur. Ergo et ipsa natura, rerum artifex, subiectam quandam sibi materiam habet omnium expertem formarum, ad omnes suscipiendas pariter praeparatam. Quia sicut in gradu rerum summo deus est actus purus, nullius indigus, formarum omnium effector, ita in infimo esse aliquid debet quod sit pura potentia, omnium egena, et ipsa per se informis sit formarum omnium susceptiva. Sic universali artifici atque naturae subest universalis materia, formarum quarumlibet indifferens susceptaculum. Haec prima vocatur materia, quae elementorum aliorumque corporum formis aeque subiicitur, et modo hanc a vi naturali accipit, modo illam, neque ullam natura sua habet propriam. Non enim esset infima, si quam haberet perfectionem et agendi facultatem sibi ex forma propria naturalem, nec esset ad aliam formam formae suae repugnantem idonea. Nam si frigiditas materiae propria naturalisque sit, quonam pacto calorem suscipiet et, si[7] humiditas, quomodo siccitatem?

3 Animadverte mutuam elementorum commutationem, si cupis latentem hanc materiam invenire. Nam quando cernimus ubi prius terrae species fuit, ibi aquae postea speciem apparere, dicere non possumus aquae formam quae nuper advenit in terrae forma recipi. Hae namque oppositae quodammodo sibi invicem sunt, quippe cum terra siccitatem, humiditatem aqua contineat. Non igitur forma terrae formam suscipit aquae sed accedente aquaea specie abit in chaos. Forma autem aquae sine subiecto esse non potest, neque novum subiectum in aquae generatione accessit. Ea-

Art imitates nature. Art produces its artifacts in the following order: it imprints some or other forms in the material at hand, none of which the material has as its own. For clay does not possess the shape at all of any particular vase, but assumes different shapes one after another from the potter; and when the vases break, the clay remains, and other vases can be made out of it again. Therefore nature herself, the craftsman of the world, has subject to it a matter that is lacking all forms, but is equally ready to receive all forms. Just as God at the highest level of things is pure act, is in need of nothing, is the creator of all forms, so there must be something at the lowest level which is pure potentiality, which needs everything, and which in itself is without form yet capable of taking on all forms. Thus the universal matter, the indifferent receptacle of all forms whatsoever, is subject to the universal craftsman and to nature. What we call prime matter is subject equally to the forms of elements and of other bodies, taking on one form after another by a natural power, but not possessing any form of its own in its own nature. For it would not be at the lowest level if it possessed any perfection, or if any capacity for action were natural to it from its own form; nor would it be fit to receive another form contrary to its own form. If cold were a natural characteristic of matter, how would it receive heat; if wetness, how would it receive dryness? 2

If you want to find this hidden matter, take note of the reciprocal interchange of the elements. When we see that where the form of earth had been earlier afterwards the form of water appears, we cannot say that the newly-arrived form of water has been received in the form of earth. For in a way they are in opposition to each other, since earth contains dryness, and water, wetness. The form of earth therefore does not receive the form of water, but when the watery form approaches, vanishes into the chaos. But the form of water cannot exist without a substrate; and yet in the generation of water no new substrate presents itself. So the same matter 3

dem ergo materia, quae terrenae formae subiecta fuerat, aquae iam subit formam. Atque haec est argumentatio qua Timaeus Pythagoricus utitur.

4 Item, quando sol radiis suis mare percutiendo aquam in fumos extenuat et ex aqua generat aerem, aliquam certe aquaei corporis portiunculam ex aquae elemento detraxit. Quaerimus utrum portiunculam istam aquae in nihilum primo redegerit, postea genuerit aerem, an servaverit aquae nonnihil. Si aquam in nihil omnino deduceret, ad malum esset naturae intentio, quae tamen est semper ad bonum, cum a summa dei bonitate regatur. Atque esse ipsum, quod aeterni dei peculiare donum est, quandoque ex rebus a sequentibus post deum causis subtraheretur. Quod fieri non potest, cum deus semper quod semel dedit suo conservet influxu, cui nullius agentis opponitur violentia. Nam res deo inferiores, quia non habent esse absolutum omnino, sed esse aliquod, et tale esse vel tale, ideo non habent vim ad esse omnino auferendum, sed esse hoc modo potius aut illo. Sequeretur etiam ut sol novum illum aerem generaret ex nihilo, si totam aquae prioris portionem in nihilum consumpsisset. Ex nihilo aliquid facere agentia naturalia nequeunt. Facilius enim est ex qualibet re existente aliquid facere quam ex nihilo. Non possunt autem ex quolibet semine rem quamlibet generare; numquam ex tritico pira, ex milio ficus, ex hominis semine aquilam. Multo minus poterunt ex nihilo aliquid generare.

5 Hac ratione monstratur solem non potuisse portionem illam aquae mari detractam in nihilum vertere. Ergo in ea naturae prioris aliquid restat. Quid illud? Aqua certe illa frigida erat et humida. Abscessit frigiditas, humiditas restat, ut placet Platonicis, quae aeri et aquae est communis. Si restat humiditas, restat et ma-

which was the substrate for the form of earth now receives the form of matter. This is the argument used by Timaeus the Pythagorean.[3]

When the sun, by beating down on the sea with its rays, makes the water evaporate in mists and from the water gives birth to air, it has certainly extracted at least a small portion of water from the element of water. Our question is whether it first reduced that small portion of water to nothing and then produced air, or whether it preserved some of the water. If it reduced the water entirely to nothing, then nature's intention would be directed towards evil. Yet that intention always aims at the good, since it is governed by God's highest goodness. And existence itself, which is the peculiar gift of eternal God, would be stolen from things at some point by causes subsequent to God. This is impossible, since God preserves by His influence what He has once given; and no agent pits its force against that. Since things inferior to God do not possess absolute existence, but only qualified existence — such or such existence —, they do not have the power to abolish existence completely, but only a particular mode of existence. It would also follow that the sun would be generating that new air out of nothing if it had completely annihilated the portion of the earlier water. Natural agents cannot make something out of nothing. For to make something out of something existing is easier than to make it out of nothing. However, they cannot produce just anything from a given seed: pears never come from wheat, or figs from millet, or an eagle from a man's seed. Much less can they produce something out of nothing. 4

The argument shows that the sun cannot have reduced that portion of water it took from the sea to nothing. So some part of its former nature endures. What can it be? The water was certainly cold and wet. The cold has disappeared, but the wetness remains, say the Platonists, being common to both air and water. If the wetness remains, then the matter that is the substrate for wet- 5

teria aliqua humiditati subiecta. Humiditas enim non est forma a corporibus separata. Itaque materia quae prius sub aquae frigore latuerat, iam sub aeris calore eadem delitescit. Cum vero ex aere fit ignis, humiditatem quoque amittit et accipit siccitatem.

6 Materia huiusmodi, quae tantum extenuata rarefactione in formam ignis ascendit, vicissim densitate descendit, turgescit in aerem, postea densatur in aquam, denique gravescit in terram. Vides materiam unam omnes vicissim indui formas, dum et ascendit rarefactione et densitate descendit. Quae ideo una est, tum quia una *uni sufficit mundo*, tum quia cum sit informis, non habet quicquam per quod in se discerni possit in plura. Quod si universum in unum formabile desinit, consentaneum est ab uno quoque incipere formatore totumque illi subesse. Sed de hoc alias et diximus et dicemus.

7 Materia vero haec ideo numquam corrumpitur, quia totius naturae corporalis est fundamentum, quo diruto omnis mundi machina corruet. Neque in partes dissolvitur umquam, quia non est per naturam suam ex partibus constituta. Partes enim per quantitatem fiunt. Materia vero quantitati praecedit: est enim quantitatis qualitatisque subiectum. Subiectum vero semper rem illam quae in ipso iacet antecedat oportet. Neque per accessum alicuius contrariae qualitatis interimetur. Nulla quippe ipsi est contraria qualitas, quia aeque omnes suscipit per naturam atque nulla forma quae indiget materiae sustentaculo ipsi repugnat. Sibi namquemet repugnaret, si suum destrueret fundamentum. Neque indiget materia alia quadam sede, qua forte subtracta decidat in profundum. Ipsa enim est primum omnium sustentaculum.

8 Ac si qua violentia illam destruat, aut eam deducet in nihilum aut in aliquid aliud transmutabit. Primum fieri nequit. Nam quicquid agit aliquid, ex naturali appetitu perfectionis propriae propa-

ness also remains. For wetness is not a form separated from bodies. So the matter that was previously hidden under the cold of the water now lurks under the heat of the air. But since from air comes fire, this matter also loses its wetness and receives dryness.

Such matter, which rises to the form of fire simply by being refined through rarefaction, in turn sinks through condensation: it thickens into air, condenses into water, and lastly solidifies into earth. You witness one matter assuming all forms in turn as it rises through rarefaction and sinks through condensation. It is one, therefore, firstly because one matter suffices for one universe; secondly because, being without form, it does not have anything by means of which it can be divided internally into many. But if the universe ends in a single entity that receives form, it is appropriate that it also begin from a single agent that gives form and that it is totally subject to that agent. But we have talked about this elsewhere and will do so again. 6

However, this matter is never corrupted because it is the foundation of all of corporeal nature, and were it destroyed, the whole world structure would collapse. It can never be dissolved into parts because it is not naturally composed of parts. For parts are the result of quantity. But matter is prior to quantity: for it is the substrate of quantity and of quality. But the substrate must always precede the thing which resides in it. Nor can it be destroyed by the accession of some contrary quality. For no quality is contrary to it, since it naturally receives all qualities equally; and no form that requires a basis in matter opposes it. For truly it would be opposing itself if it destroyed its own basis. Nor does matter require anything else as its seat by whose removal perchance it would plunge into the abyss. For it is itself the prime foundation of all. 7

And if some force destroyed it, that force would either reduce it to nothing or change it into something else. The first is impossible. For whatever does something is led to act by the natural desire to propagate its own perfection, so that it generates something else 8

gandae inducitur ad agendum,[8] ut aliud quiddam sibi pro viribus simile generet, quod in elementis, plantis, animalibus est perspicuum. Ubi apparet appetitum naturalem ad bonum, videlicet ad vitam, ad esse atque similia, non ad contraria dirigi, quia a summo bono, ut diximus, omnibus sequentibus est insertus. Unde enim sunt, inde moventur et illuc feruntur omnia. Igitur omnis omnium appetitio operatioque a bono exoriens tendit reflectiturque in bonum. Quinetiam qui materiam funditus tollit e medio,[9] nequit novum[10] opus suum alicubi stabilire, cessante formarum omnium generabilium fundamento. Ita et perderetur illa et novi nihil generaretur. Id enim quod denuo faciendum est, si eget materia, iam fieri non poterit, illa sublata. Si non eget materia, ab ea liberum est. Quod est a materia liberum eamque supereminet ab auctore suo seorsum a materia procreatur. Itaque ipsius auctor, dum ipsum agit, quoniam fabricat ipsum ab illa longe semotum, nullam ex hoc illi violentiam infert, neque in ipsius generatione illam ullo modo movet, qua non indiget opus conficiendum. Igitur quod novam rem gignit, qualiscumque ea sit, sive materiae indiga sive aliena ab illa, materiam non perducit in nihilum.

9 An forte in aliquid aliud commutabit, ita ut pars una supersit materiae, pars vero perierit? Minime. Simplex enim illa est, quia neque ex materia et forma componitur, cum sit prima informisque potentia, neque certam quandam partium congeriem ad suam existentiam exigit, cum naturali origine praecedat quantitatis dimensiones. Praeterea, si illa ita mutetur, ut expleta mutatione supersit aliquid, quid istud[11] erit? Materiane? Si materia, nondum in aliud permutata videtur, cum supersit. Si quantitas aut qualitas,

as like itself as possible: this is clear in the case of elements, plants, and animals. Here it is obvious that natural desire is directed towards the good, that is, towards life, existence and so on, not to their opposites, because, as we said, desire has been implanted by the highest good in all that comes after it. For the source of all things' existence is the source of their movement and thither are they borne. So all the desire and activity of everything, since it springs from the good, is directed to and turns back towards the good. Moreover, whoever does away with matter completely cannot anchor his new work anywhere, the foundation of all forms that can be generated having disappeared. Thus matter would be destroyed and nothing new produced. For if something is due to be made afresh and it requires matter, with the matter removed it would be impossible now for it to be made. If it does not require matter, it is independent of matter. What is independent of matter and superior to it is brought into existence by its Creator separately from matter. So its Author, when He brings it into existence, because He fashions it in the absence of matter, does not accordingly exert any force on matter; nor does He move matter in any way in the generation of the work, as He has no need of matter to realize it. That which produces something new, whatever it may be, whether it requires matter or is alien to it, does not, therefore, annihilate matter.

But perchance will the matter be changed into something else, 9
so that one part of the matter survives and one part perishes? Not at all. For matter is simple, because neither is it composed from matter and form, since it is the prime and formless potentiality, nor does it require a specified mass of parts for its existence, since in its natural origin it precedes the dimensions of quantity. Moreover, if it were to change, such that once the change were completed something else was left over, what would that something be? Would it be matter? If so, then it does not appear to have changed into something else, since it is still there. Were it quantity

absurdum id quidem, quia non possunt haec absque illa manere. Si forma quaedam supersit materiam supereminens, quid opus erat materiam perdere[12] ut forma haec alienissima fieret, quae nullo modo ex ea fit et longe procul ab illa producitur? Immo vero quia omnino aliud est materia, aliud forma ab ea semota, nihil per hoc materiae reliquum est quod illa commutata forma semota restat.

10 Sic igitur colligamus. Materia nequit ex eo quod est aliter permutari quam si vertatur in nihilum. In nihilum verti aliquid natura non patitur. Materia ergo non interit. Multo minus interibit vis ipsa naturalis quae est materiae domina. Domina illius est vis ea efficiens quae format ipsam. Hanc format vis ea quae primum movet. Fons motionis est anima rationalis, cui qualitates ad movendam materiam serviunt ut instrumenta. Atque omnis anima rationalis per naturam essentiae tertiae universae materiae praesidet. Sed de hoc alias.

11 Materiam quidem producit unitque deus; firmat, ut Platonicis placet, et ordinat angelus; movet formatque anima immortalis. Unitas deus est, qui immortali materiae dat unitatem. Immortalis ordo est angelus qui immortali materiae ordinem[13] exhibet. Immortalis vita est anima quae movendo immortali materiae praebet vitam.

: V :

Quinta ratio: quia est a materia libera.

1 Quattuor naturalium rerum causae a physicis numerantur, efficiens, finis, materia, forma. Efficiens hominis causa est natura universalis et homo; finis humana felicitas; materia corpus; forma est

or quality, that would be absurd, since they cannot endure without matter. If it were some form superior to matter, why did one need to destroy the matter in order to make this completely unrelated form, which in no sense comes into existence from matter and is produced at a total remove from it? Or rather, since matter is completely one thing, and form separate from it another, nothing of matter remains simply because the changed and separate form endures.

We may conclude as follows. Matter cannot be changed from 10
what it is except by being changed into nothing. Nature does not permit anything to be turned into nothing. So matter does not pass away. Much less will that natural power which rules over matter pass away. Matter's ruler is the efficient power which gives it form. That power gives matter form which first sets it in motion. The source of motion is the rational soul, and qualities serve it as the instruments for moving matter. And every rational soul, by way of the nature of the third essence,[4] rules over universal matter. But more of this anon.

God creates and gives unity to matter. Angel, say the Platon- 11
ists, strengthens it and puts it in order. Immortal soul sets it in motion and gives it form. God is unity and He gives unity to immortal matter. Angel is immortal order, and angel produces order in immortal matter. Soul is immortal life and soul gives life to immortal matter by setting it in motion.

: V :

Fifth proof: that soul is independent of matter.

The natural philosophers list four causes of natural things: effi- 1
cient, final, material, and formal.[5] The efficient cause of a man is universal nature and a man; the final cause is human happiness;

anima. Quotiens aliquid per se esse dicitur, esse intellegitur sine causa. Quotiens esse per aliud, esse per causam. Solus deus ita per se existit, ut per nullam sit causam. Quocirca omnino per se est, quia quattuor excludit a se genera causarum. Corpus naturale omnino per aliud est, quia quattuor simul includit. Infra deum nihil esse potest quod efficiente careat atque fine. Quippe deus unus effector est omnium atque finis. Quare nihil praeter deum invenietur quod ita per se esse sit dicendum, ut efficientem causam finemque non habeat.

2 Non tamen omnia sub deo ita esse decet per aliud, ut sint omnino per aliud. Nempe duo haec, omnino per se et omnino per aliud, intervallo a se invicem distant longissimo. Quare inter haec aliquo utrisque similiore opus est medio. Cum enim omne agens ex sui agat natura, necesse est opus proxime ab ipso factum, quia statim ex agentis natura depromitur, illi quam simillimum apparere. Ergo quod proxime et principali, ut ita loquar, proposito fit a deo, deo dissimillimum non debet evadere. Sunt ergo inter deum et corpus aliqua quae non omnino per aliud esse dicantur.

3 Talis apparet qualitas, quae non per quattuor, ut corpus, causas fit, sed ex tribus solummodo pendet causis. Corpus materiam habet et formam ut sui causas, efficientem etiam atque finem; qualitas formam non habet, ut formalem causam. Ipsa enim forma quaedam est. Forma vero nulla, quantum est forma, formatur. Efficitur tamen ab aliquo qualitas et ad finem quendam ab agente dirigitur atque etiam a materia pendet ut causa, siquidem e praegnante materiae alvo talis foetus in lucem educitur et cum ipsa ex-

the material cause is body; the formal cause is soul. Whenever something is said to exist through itself, it means it exists without a cause. Whenever it is said to exist through another, it exists through a cause. God alone exists through Himself such that He exists without any cause. He exists entirely through Himself, therefore, in that He excludes from Himself the four genera of causes. Natural body exists entirely through something else, because it includes the four causes simultaneously. Below God nothing can exist which is without efficient cause and end, for the one God is the creator and end of all things. So nothing will be found other than God which can properly be said to exist through itself such that it has neither efficient cause nor end.

It is not fitting, however, that everything below God should be 2 through another such that all are totally through another. For being totally through oneself and being totally through another are two mutually distant extremes. There has to be some mean between them which resembles them both. Since every agent acts in accordance with its own nature, any product made directly from itself, in that it is produced immediately from the agent's nature, necessarily resembles it as much as possible. So what is created directly by God and in accordance with His principal design, if I may use the term, should not turn out to be very different from God. There must therefore exist between God and body something which cannot be said to exist entirely through another.

Quality might seem to be such a thing, being the result not of 3 four causes like body, but depending only on three. Body has matter and form as its causes, plus an efficient cause and an end. Quality has no form, being itself the formal cause. For it is itself a form. But no form, qua form, is formed. Yet quality is made by something else and is directed by an agent towards an end. It is even dependent on matter as a cause, since from matter's teeming womb it is delivered in to the light of day like a foetus, and is ex-

tenditur atque dividitur. Quapropter qualitas gradu uno superat corpus, quod aliquo modo per se dicitur, cum non formetur ab alio.

4 At cur non etiam essentia tertia quae qualitate sublimior est uno saltem gradu superet qualitatem, sicut qualitas uno superat corpus? Superat certe. Sed quomodo?[14] Non eo quod haec essentia efficiente careat aut fine, cum hoc deo soli conveniat. Non hoc etiam, quod essentia haec formam sui causam non habet, idem namque possidet qualitas. Solum ex eo restat ut superet, quod a materia non dependet, quod minime convenit qualitati. Ita oportet a quattuor oppositis in quattuor opposita per tria et duo gradatim procedere, ut sicut super quattuor corporis causas in tres causas qualitatis ascendimus, ita super tres causas qualitatis in duas essentiae tertiae causas ascendamus. Quapropter essentia haec solum efficientem et finalem habebit causam; formam vero et materiam non habebit. Denique angelus uno hanc essentiam superat, quoniam angelus neque a materia dependet neque ad materiam inclinatur, cum a deo proxime occupetur.

5 Essentia tertia, licet a materia non dependeat, tamen a deo facta longinquior et propinqua materiae, ad eam quodammodo inclinatur, ob quam inclinationem anima nuncupatur. Et licet inclinetur, non tamen ab ipsa dependet, quod multis rationibus demonstramus. Prima est, quam assignavimus. Secunda est, quia si haec essentia esset immersa materiae, numquam emergeret in divina, quae sunt a materia remotissima, atque ita non esset competens mundi nodus, quia non connecteret infima cum supremis. Tertia est, quia cum moveatur primo, necessario movetur per se libere in circuitum. Si per se movetur, per se utique operatur. Si hoc est, etiam per se ipsam, nullis addicta corporibus. Si movetur libere, non est alligata materiae. Si volvitur in circuitum, in se ipsam se

tended along with matter and divided. Quality then is one level above body in that it is said to be in some manner through itself, since it is not formed by another.

But doesn't the third essence, which is higher than quality, also excel quality by at least one degree, just as quality excels body by one degree? Indeed it does. But how? It is not because this essence lacks an efficient cause or end, since this is proper to God alone. And it is not because this essence does not have form as its cause, for the same goes for quality. The only remaining possibility is that it excels matter because it does not depend on matter (which is not true at all of quality). So we must proceed step by step from the four contraries to their four opposites by three and by two, so that, just as we rise from four causes for body to three causes for quality, so we may rise from three causes for quality to two causes for the third essence. Wherefore this essence will have an efficient and a final cause only, but not have form or matter [as causes]. Finally, angel excels this essence by one degree, since angel neither depends on matter [like quality], nor inclines towards matter [like soul], since it is directly possessed by God. 4

The third essence, though it is independent of matter and yet has been created far from God and close to matter, in a way inclines towards matter and on account of this inclination is called *anima*[6] [breath]. Though it may incline, yet it does not depend on matter. This can be shown by a number of proofs. The first is the argument we have just presented. The second is that if this essence were buried in matter, it would never rise to things divine, which are at the furthest remove from matter, and so it could not serve as the world's fitting knot, because it would not tie the lowest things to the highest. The third argument is that, since it is the first to be moved, this essence necessarily moves through itself freely and in a circle. If it moves through itself, it acts surely through itself. If this is so, it also [exists] through itself, not bound at all to bodies. If it is moved freely, it cannot be tied to 5

recipit, relicta materia. Quarta est, quia si materiae dominatur movendo illam primum atque formando, materiae non miscetur. Per haec apparet essentiam illam quae est animae sedes, quam etiam animarum pateram Plato nominat in *Timaeo*, nullam habere originem a corporibus atque etiam neque ex partibus quantitatis constitui. Partes siquidem huiusmodi solis corporibus et qualitatibus insunt, non autem in formis a corpore separatis. Non igitur ob id anima dissipabitur, quod in partes aliquas dissolvatur.

6 Sane nullam habet distantiam partium, quoniam in corpore non dividitur. Neque ex eo deficiet umquam, quod a suo aliquo sustentaculo deseratur, nullo quippe eget corporis fundamento essentia illa quae per naturam suam est domina corporum. Neque etiam per hoc interibit, quod contrariae atque inter se pugnantes elementorum vires aliquando eam turbent; hae siquidem in materia pugnant. Anima vero est adeo[15] super materiam ut eam non attingat elementorum procella et iniquitas certantium qualitatum. Numquam rursus ex eo inquinabitur quod alienam aliquam et naturae suae adversam quandoque suscipiat qualitatem, quae noxiam ipsi inferat passionem. Primum namque subiectum passioni expositum materia est, per quam et quantitas ipsi immersa et qualitas quantitati cohaerens exponitur passioni. Quocirca essentia illa quae est a materia separata, id est potentia separabilis, nullam habet in se ipsa potentiam per quam alienum quicquam et hostile suscipiat, unde passioni subiiciatur.

matter. If it revolves in a circle, it comes back to itself, and matter is left aside. The fourth argument is that, if the essence rules matter by moving it first and giving it form, it is not mixed with matter. It is obvious from this that the essence which is the abode of soul (Plato even calls it the souls' mixing bowl in the *Timaeus*)[7] in no way originates from bodies and is not even made up of the parts of quantity; for such parts are present in bodies alone and qualities, but not in forms separate from the body. Therefore soul will not be destroyed by being broken down into various parts.

Soul obviously has no diversity of parts as it is not divided up in body. Nor can it ever fail because it is abandoned by something supporting it, for this essence has no need of a body's foundation, being through its own nature the mistress of bodies. Nor will it perish because the contrary and mutually conflicting powers of the elements roil it at any time; for these are in conflict in matter. But soul is so far above matter that the tempest of the elements and the hostility of struggling qualities do not touch it. Never will it be contaminated by receiving at some point an alien quality inimical to its nature which might induce in it a harmful passion. For the first subject exposed to passion is matter, and through matter both quantity (which is embedded in matter) and quality (which cleaves to quantity) are exposed to passion. Wherefore this essence which is separate from matter, that is, this separable power, has no power in itself to sustain anything strange or hostile by way of which it might become subject to passion. 6

: VI :

Sexta ratio: quia est individua.

1 Praeterea, cum indivisibilis sit, divisibiles et corporeas non suscipit qualitates. Non enim quod divisibile est tangit indivisibile. Nam si indivisibile tangi ab eo quod divisibile est dicatur, quaeremus utrum res haec divisibilis puncto quodam sui ipsius tangat rem illam indivisibilem, an parte quadam sui dividua. Si primum admiseris, tunc punctum est dumtaxat quod rem illam tangit atque ita non res haec dividua, sed individuum aliquid tangit rem illam indivisibilem. Sin autem dixeris quod parte quadam sui dividua tangit, tunc ita ratiocinamur. Si res haec dividua tangit illam quam tu individuam vocas per partem sui[16] aliquam divisibilem, necesse est et illam per partem sui similiter divisibilem tangi. Quomodo enim haec illam tangit, nisi et illa tangatur, et quomodo per plures sui partes tangit haec illam, nisi illa quoque per partes sui ipsius tangatur, siquidem quatenus haec tangit, eatenus illa tangitur? Quapropter res illa quam tu indivisibilem affirmabas, tunc primum esse cogitur divisibilis, quando a re aliqua divisibili tangi conceditur. Itaque essentia illa animae individua numquam tangitur ab aliqua dividua qualitate. Non tangitur, inquam, per rectam lineam, neque etiam per reflexam. Non per rectam, quia ipsa anima qualitatem ex adverso occurrentem non excipit. Non per reflexam, quia cum a corpore sit exempta, ferventibus in corpore qualitatibus illarum impetu et furore[17] non rapitur, ideoque a nulla corrumpitur.

: VI :

Sixth proof: that soul is indivisible.

Moreover, since soul is indivisible, it cannot receive qualities which are divisible or corporeal. For what is divisible has no contact with what is indivisible. For if we said the indivisible is in contact with the divisible, we would want to know whether the divisible thing touched the indivisible with a particular point of itself or with a divisible part of itself. If the first case, then the point alone is what touches the indivisible object, and thus it is not the divisible thing, but something indivisible that touches the indivisible object. But if you say it is through a divisible part of itself that it makes contact, we will counter as follows. If this divisible thing makes contact with what you call the indivisible object by way of some divisible part of itself, then the indivisible object must be contacted by way of a similarly divisible part of itself. For how does the divisible make contact with the indivisible unless the indivisible is made contact with; and how does the divisible make contact with the indivisible by way of its many parts unless the indivisible is contacted by way of its parts, since to the extent the divisible makes contact, the indivisible is made contact with? Therefore the thing you declared indivisible has to be divisible as soon as you concede that some divisible thing makes contact with it. Hence the indivisible essence of soul is never touched by any divisible quality. By this I mean that it cannot be touched by either a straight line or a line bent back: not by a straight line, because the soul itself will not accept a quality that is rushing to meet it from the opposite direction; and not by a line bent back, because, since the soul is free from body, it is not swept up by the tumult and frenzy of qualities raging in the body, and so is not corrupted by any one of them. 1

2 An forte ab aliqua indivisibili, quam facile susceperit, corrumpetur? Minime. Susceptio namque indivisibilium qualitatum perficit illud quod suscipit, non corrumpit. Quod patet per eas indivisibiles rerum imagines, quae ab aqua, speculis, anima, tum per sensum, tum per rationem suscipiuntur. Proprie vero non alia ratione haec res agit in illam, nisi ut haec illi suam formam exhibeat, siquidem omnia propter suae naturae propagationem ducuntur ad operandum. Nulla vero res corporea potest aut nititur formam sui corporalem in animae essentia generare, quae ita est a materia segregata, ut in ea nullum habeant formae corporales ingressum. Sed numquid deus vel angelus formam novam inducunt in animam, per quam anima perturbetur? Nequaquam, quia si illi aliquam formam creant per se subsistentem, illam seorsum creant ab anima. Non ergo per illius creationem anima perturbatur. Sin autem vim aliquam infundunt in animam, vis huiusmodi benefica est, cum ab optimis causis venerit animae ipsius conservatricibus. Ergo per ipsam non interit anima, sed servatur.

: VII :

Septima ratio: quia esse suum habet in sua essentia.

1 Aliud essentiam vocamus, aliud esse. Essentiam quidem dicimus rationem rei quae definitione comprehenditur. Esse vero actum ipsius essentiae et quandam eius in rerum natura praesentiam. Exemplum accipe de crinita. Essentia crinitae est ratio haec ipsius et definitio, ut puta vapor siccus in aere summo accensus ab igne[18] perque aerem ordine circuens. Quae quidem definitio hodie vera est, etiam si nusquam hodie crinita effulgeat. Esse vero crinitae huiusmodi quiddam dicitur, ut videlicet talis illa natura crinitae,

Is it possible then for it to be corrupted by something indivisible, which it might readily accept? Obviously not. For the reception of indivisible qualities perfects what receives them and does not corrupt it. This is evident from those indivisible images of things which are received by water, by mirrors, and by soul, both through the senses and through the reason. Strictly speaking, one thing acts on another for no other reason except that the one supplies its form to the other; for all things are led to action in order to propagate their own nature. But no corporeal entity is able or strives to engender its corporeal form in the essence of soul, which is so divorced from matter that corporeal forms have no access to it at all. Are we to suppose then that God or angel introduces into soul a new form which perturbs the soul? Certainly not. For if they are creating some self-subsisting form, they are creating it separate from soul. So soul is not disturbed by its creation. But if they are instilling some power into soul, this power is beneficial, since it comes from the best causes which are the preservers of that soul. So soul of itself does not die but is preserved. 2

: VII :

Seventh proof: that soul has its existence in its essence.

We call essence one thing, existence another.[8] We call essence the rational principle of a thing which is comprised in its definition. But existence is the act of its essence, and its particular presence in the nature of things. Take the example of a comet. The essence of a comet is contained in its rational principle or definition: let us say it is a dry vapor in the upper reaches of the air, lit up by the fire, and circling through the air in due order. The definition is true today even if today there is no comet visible anywhere. But 1

quae per definitionem quotidie designatur, iam nunc alicubi luceat. Esse hoc absque certo loco et tempore non fit. Non aliter enim fit illa essentia praesens quam hic vel ibi, hac hora vel illa. Igitur esse naturalium rerum certo loco eget et tempore; essentia iis non indiget. Vera enim est crinitae ratio illa, etiam si ad praesens crinita nusquam caleat. Immo si definitio illa certum includeret tempus et locum, puta hodie hic aut cras ibi, in eadem utique hora eademque aerius plaga in qua una crinita existit, cunctae simul essent crinitae. In singulis enim crinitis inest communis crinitae essentia et ratio eadem. Quod si ratio haec certo sit loco temporique adstricta, ad eosdem terminos loci et temporis crinitae omnes adstringerentur, quemadmodum rationalis potentia cum in definitione hominis includatur, singulis hominibus convenit.

2 Essentia itaque et esse naturalium rerum hoc inter se differunt, quod esse certo loco temporique adstringitur; essentia vero, quantum in se est, ad omne tempus ferme omnemque locum aeque se habet, siquidem humanitas ipsa non minus saeculis aliis quam nostris, aut in Oriente minus quam Occidente potest consistere. Plato vero et Socrates hoc aut illo, ut sint et vivant, loco egent et tempore. In ipsa humanitate essentia designatur; in singulis istis hominibus esse conspicitur. Igitur essentia a singulis temporis et loci limitibus est exclusa. Quapropter ad sui conservationem per sui naturam nullo indiget loco, neque terminos habet temporis quibus aliquando excedatur, quandoquidem ab huiusmodi terminis est exempta. Ubique ergo viget et semper. Essentia igitur omnis secundum se ipsam dicitur immortalis. Talis autem est per naturam suam formae cuiusque essentia.

3 Verum cum omnium auctor formarum gignit essentias atque illas in esse perducit,[19] alias ad tale esse determinat, ut existant in corpore. Unde esse talis essentiae sive formae talis ad corporales

the existence of a comet is said to be such that the comet's nature, which is designated daily by way of definition, is somewhere visible at this moment. Such existence is impossible without a specific place and time. For that essence cannot be present otherwise than being here or there, then or now. Thus the existence of natural objects requires a particular place and time; their essence does not. That rational principle of a comet is true even if no comet is blazing anywhere at the present moment. Or rather, if the definition included a specific time and place—here today, there tomorrow—then at the same hour and in the same region of the air where there was one comet, all the comets would be simultaneously. For the common essence and rational principle of a comet is present in individual comets. If this principle were limited to a particular place and time, however, all comets would be subject to the same limitations of place and time, just as rational capacity, since it is contained in the definition of man, is common to individual men.

Thus the essence and existence of natural objects differ from each other in that existence is limited to a particular time and place, but essence, considered in itself, is equally disposed to just about every time and place, seeing that humanity in itself can exist no less in other centuries than in our own, and no less in the east than in the west. But Plato and Socrates, in order to exist and be alive, need this or that time and place. In humanity itself is designated essence, in these individual men existence. Essence then is excluded from the particular limitations of time or place. Wherefore by way of its own nature it needs no place to preserve itself, nor does it have temporal limits by which it could one day be exceeded, for it is free from such constraints. So it continues to flourish everywhere and forever. Thus all essence is said to be in itself immortal. But such by its nature is the essence of every form. 2

When, however, the Creator of all forms engenders essences and brings them forth into existence, He determines an existence for some of them such that they exist in a body. As a result, the 3

conditiones ab agente contrahitur. Quando esse ad corpus contrahitur, iisdem quoque essentia limitibus coarctatur. Conditiones naturalium corporum sunt ut locum impleant et tempore moveantur. Idcirco forma illa, quae per se super certum tempus locumque fuisset, tempus iam proprium subit et locum. Quia tempus subit, ideo incipit paulatim, mutatur et desinit; quia locum, ideo dum corpus ipsum in quo illa iacet contrarias quotidie suscipit qualitates, illa quoque qualitatum huiusmodi tempestate turbatur fitque mortalis. Tales sunt formae qualitatesque corporum.

4 Alias autem formarum essentias auctor ille ita in esse producit ut ipsum suum esse non in alia quadam re aut materia sortiantur, sed in se ipsis contineant. Tales sunt formae omnes a materiae commercio alienae. Esse namque suum in se ipsis habent, non in materia. Quicquid autem ab aliquo capitur pro captu eius quod capit accipi solet atque ad eius trahi proprietatem. Essentia vero quaelibet per se immortalis est. Ergo esse quod ab ipsa essentia capitur, quoniam a re immortali per modum capitur immortalem, efficitur immortale. Quapropter forma, quae est a materiae societate seiuncta, undique, id est, tam secundum esse suum quam secundum suam essentiam, est immortalis. Talis est essentia tertia, rationalium fons animarum.

existence of such an essence or form is restricted by the agent to corporeal conditions. When existence is confined to the body, essence too is constrained within the same limits. The conditions of natural bodies are such that they fill space and are moved in time. Therefore that form which on its own would be superior to any definite time or place is now subject to its own time and place. As it is subject to time, it comes gradually into existence, undergoes change, and comes to an end. As it is subject to place, as long as the body in which it dwells endures conflicting qualities from day to day, it too is perturbed by the tempest of such battling qualities and becomes mortal. Such are the forms and qualities of bodies.

4 But the Creator has brought the essences of other forms into existence such that their allotted existence is not in some other thing or in matter, but they contain it in themselves. Such are all forms which have no dealings with matter. For they have their existence in themselves, not in matter. But whatever is received by another is received normally in proportion to the capacity of its receiver, and it is drawn towards the proper characteristics of that receiver. But any essence of itself is immortal. So the existence which is received by the essence, since it is received by something immortal in an immortal way, is rendered immortal. Therefore form that is separated from the company of matter is immortal in all respects, that is, in its existence as in its essence. Such is the third essence, the source of rational souls.

: VIII :

Octava ratio: quia esse proprium habet et numquam a sua forma discedit.

1 Generatio et corruptio ita sibi invicem opponuntur, ut ad contradictoria tendant, et generatio via quaedam sit ad esse, corruptio via sit ad non esse. Unumquodque ex eo tendit ad esse quod certam quandam accipit formam, ad non esse vero[20] ex eo quod formam suam amittere cogitur. In artibus nullum opus tale aut tale est propter materiam, sed propter formam. Aeneus equus aut homo non propter aeris materiam talis dicitur, quippe cum aes ad omnium animalium figuras suscipiendas aeque sit praeparatum, sed propter equi aut hominis formam quandam similitudinemque ab artifice profectam. Haec pars aeris equus dicitur, illa homo. In natura similiter, materia quidem non illud est per quod Plato est homo aut ficus est arbor. Eadem quippe mundi prima materia hominibus, brutis, arboribus est communis ac multa ante Platonem saecula, multa etiam post Platonem materia illa eadem extat; Plato vero nequaquam. Igitur non propter materiam Plato humanam habet speciem, sed propter complexionem corporis talem atque animam, quae formae dicuntur. Similiter de aliis iudicandum ac summatim concludendum: quodlibet a forma habere proprium suum esse, naturam et speciem ab aliis differentem. Quapropter quicquid esse desinit, ipsum esse suum amittit ex eo quod a forma propria separatur, sicut esse antea coeperat, quando formam propriam fuerat consecutum. Ideo res ex materia formaque composita, puta ignis ex mole sua et naturali caliditate compositus, interit quando a sua forma seiungitur. Potest autem frigus aquae vel terrae se materiae ignis insinuare atque inde naturalem caliditatem, ignis formam, expellere. Qua expulsa, desinit esse ignis.

: VIII :

Eighth proof: that soul has its own existence and never departs from its form.

Generation and corruption are so opposed to each other that they 1
proceed in contradictory directions: generation is a way towards existence, corruption the way towards non-existence. Every single thing proceeds towards existence in that it acquires a particular form, but towards non-existence in that it is forced to lose its form. In the arts no work is such and such on account of the material, but on account of the form. A bronze horse or man is not so called on account of the matter being bronze, for the bronze is equally capable of taking on the shapes of all animals, but on account of the particular form or likeness of a horse or man which comes from the artist. This piece of bronze is called a horse, that piece a man. In nature similarly it is not the matter that makes Plato a man or a fig tree a tree. For the same prime matter of the world is common to men, animals, and trees; and that same matter exists many centuries before Plato and many centuries after Plato, while Plato does not. So it is not because of matter that Plato belongs to the human species, but because of the particular complexion of his body[9] and because of his soul, and both are called forms. Other examples must lead to a similar judgment and we should conclude briefly that from form everything has its own distinctive existence, nature, and species.[10] Therefore whatever ceases to exist loses its existence because it is separated from its own form, just as earlier it had begun its existence when it had acquired its own form. That is why something composed of matter and form, fire, for example, which is composed of its own mass and a natural heat, ceases to exist when it is separated from its form. But the cold of water or earth can insinuate itself into the

2 Sic ignis ille ex materia et tali quadam caliditate compositus esse amittit, quando suam amittit caliditatem — suam, inquam, substantialem formam cum eius proprietatibus, quam nunc, quoniam manifestum nomen non habet, caliditatem disputandi causa nominamus. Caliditas autem ipsa, quando esse suum amittit, cum sit forma et a forma sit esse? Quando videlicet ex materia illa depellitur. In rebus enim compositis naturaliter esse tribuitur toti, non partibus. Nempe esse ignis ipsius compositi est proprie, non materiae solius, neque caloris. Nam cum calor in ignis generatione ab agente naturali ex materiae semine eductus fuit, ea conditione fuit per omnem materiam ignis extensus, ut inde omnino penderet neque esse proprium sibi calor haberet, sed per ipsum commune esse totius ignis calor quoque esse diceretur. Esse autem illud commune tunc cessat, quando duae illae partes a se invicem disiunguntur. Quando esse commune cessat, perit et forma quae per esse commune vigebat. Materia vero non perit, quoniam subito aliam suscipit formam per quam existat, ita ut dum certum amittit calorem, esse igneum amittat; dum certam quandam frigiditatem accipit vel humiditatem, esse capiat terreum aut aquaeum. Conclude rem compositam, ut ignem et aquam, tunc interire quando a sua forma seiungitur; formam vero illam perdi quando a formantis lege discedit. Sol qui genuit ignem, ignis formator existit. Is ea lege calorem ex fomite materiae illius eduxit, ut in ea materia iacens sub esse compositi totius contineretur.[21] Hanc legem transgreditur quando ex illa abit materia. Abit, quando fugatur a frigore.

3 Quod ergo neque a sua forma neque a formantis lege discedit, quonam pacto interit, cum esse cuiusque a forma procedat et for-

matter of fire and drive out the natural heat, the form of fire. Once this is driven out, fire ceases to exist.

So the fire, compounded of matter and this natural heat, loses its existence when it loses its heat, I mean by this its substantial form along with its properties (which form, as it does not have an obvious name and for the argument's sake, I am now calling heat). But when does this heat lose its existence, since it is a form, and existence comes from a form? Obviously, when it is expelled from its matter. For in compound objects existence is naturally bestowed on the whole, not on the parts. Assuredly, the fire's existence is properly that of the compound, not that of matter or the heat alone. For when, in the generation of fire, heat was extracted by a natural agent from a seed of matter, it was extended throughout the matter of the fire. However its condition was such that it entirely depended on matter and did not have its own existence, but was said to exist through the common existence of the whole fire. That common existence ceases when the two parts are separated from each other. And when the common existence ceases, the form that flourished via the common existence also perishes. But the matter does not perish, since it immediately receives another form through which it may exist, so that, when it loses the requisite heat, it loses its existence as fire; but when it receives the requisite cold or wetness, it acquires existence as earth or water. You should conclude that a compound like fire or water ceases to exist when it is separated from its form, but that the form is destroyed when it departs from the law of the form-giver. The sun which gave birth to fire exists as the form-giver of fire. It extracted heat from the kindling of matter with the proviso that the heat residing in that matter would be contained in it subject to the existence of the compound as a whole. Heat breaks this law when it leaves the matter. It leaves when it is driven out by cold. 2

How then can something that leaves neither its form nor the law of the form-giver cease to exist, when the existence of every 3

mantis lege servetur? Anima vero propter tertiae illius essentiae proprietatem mera quaedam forma est, non composita ex materia et forma, neque recubans in materia. Ideo in se ipsa permanens, quicquid in se est, nihil est aliud praeter formam. Ipsa igitur sua essentia non formatur per aliud quicquam, sed sui ipsius est forma, id est, ipsamet[22] forma est. Nihil est autem quod per se a sua essentia separetur, quia nihil a se ipso discedit. Omnia siquidem naturali instinctu nixuque perpetuo se ipsa servant pro viribus sibique inhaerent. Igitur anima, si numquam a se disiungitur et ipsa sui forma est, numquam a sua forma disiungitur. Itaque numquam desinit esse, cum esse a forma semper hauriatur. Sua quidem sponte a se non separatur, ut diximus, sed neque etiam ab extrinseca violentia cogitur ut a se ipsa secedat, quoniam quicquid extrinsecus accipit, suo quodam accipit modo. Ipsa plane spiritalis est atque a loco et tempore absoluta. Ergo spiritali modo et absolute accipit omnia. Spiritalia vero et absoluta, quando ab aliquo capiuntur, nequaquam interimunt. Spiritalis namque susceptio, cum fit in corporibus, corpora ipsa, licet sibi dissimilia, non corrumpit, ut simulacrorum susceptio in aqua et speculo. Multo minus corrumpet rem spiritalem sibi persimilem.

4 Praeterea, cum absolutum illud, quod ab animae essentia suscipi fingebatur, aeternum sit, cur susceptaculum suum interimat? An ut ex illius materia se ipsum alat? Non, cum alimento non egeat illud quod est aeternum. An ut se ipsum propaget generetque ex illius materia sibi simile aliquid? Nequaquam. Non enim eget propagatione quod semper idem manet; neque etiam potest ex re corruptibili perpetuam generare. Non ergo corrumpit quicquam ut perpetuum aliquid sibi simile generet. Nullo itaque modo potest quicquam animae essentia capere a quo perdatur. Merito non potest capere omnino noxium quicquam, cum materia careat, quae primum et proprium passionum talium dicitur receptaculum.

object comes from its form and is sustained by the law of the form-giver? But soul, on account of the third essence's characteristic property, is a pure form: it is neither compounded from matter and form, nor does it recline in matter. Therefore, resting in itself, whatever is in it is nothing other than form. Thus its own essence is not formed via anything else, but it is the form of itself, that is to say, it is itself form. But there is nothing which can be separated via itself from its own essence, because nothing takes leave of itself. All things by a natural instinct and constant effort preserve themselves to the best of their ability and cling to themselves. Therefore soul, if it is never separated from itself and is itself its own form, is never separated from its form. And so it never ceases to exist, since existence is always plucked out of form. It is not separated from itself of its own accord,[11] as we said, but neither too can it be compelled by external force to take leave of itself, because whatever it receives from outside, it receives in its particular way. Soul is plainly spiritual and not bound to place and time. So it receives everything in a spiritual and unbound way. But things spiritual and unbound in being received by something do not perish. For a spiritual reception, when it occurs in bodies, does not corrupt the bodies, although they are unlike itself, as is the case too with the reception of simulacra in water or a mirror. Much less will it corrupt a spiritual thing very like itself.

Moreover, since this unbound something that was supposed to have been received by the soul's essence is eternal, why should it destroy its host? To feed off its host's matter? No! For what is eternal needs no nourishment. To propagate itself and bring forth a progeny like itself from the host's matter? No! For what always remains the same has no need of propagation, nor can it generate something eternal from something corruptible. So it does not corrupt something in order to generate something else eternal like itself. So in no way is the soul's essence able to receive anything by which it is destroyed. It cannot rightly receive anything entirely 4

5 Immo vero si ista essentia sui ipsius est forma, inter eam et formam suam nihil umquam intercidet. Nam si quid medium aliquando inter ipsam et formam suam caderet, fieret profecto illud ipsius formae propinquius quam ipsa eius essentia. Essentia vero ipsa est ipsamet eius forma. Ita fieret ipsi aliquid propinquius quam ipsa sibi, quod est omnium absurdissimum. Quapropter nihil se inter eam eiusve formam inserit medium. Si ita est, illa a sui forma nullo interveniente disiungitur. Sed neque etiam sponte seiungitur sua.

6 Quare nullo modo a se ipsa suique forma discedit, neque etiam a formantis discedit lege; ea siquidem lege creata est ut in se ipsa consisteret. Semper autem ita permanet. Ex eo enim statu a nullo deiicitur: non a se ipsa, nam res quaeque speciem et dignitatem suam pro viribus sibi conservat; non a superioribus causis, quia illae qua lege eam produxerunt in eadem et continent; non ab inferioribus: superius enim ab inferiori non vincitur. Quamobrem anima, quia mera forma est, ideoque neque a sui forma neque a formantis lege discedit, permanet procul dubio immortalis.

: IX :

Nona ratio: quia sibi per se convenit esse.

1 Quod alicui per se convenit numquam separatur ab ipso. Rotunditas suapte natura circulo inest atque ideo nullus umquam sine rotunditate est circulus. Ligno autem quandoque rotunditas inest, non quia lignum est (omne enim lignum rotundum esset), sed quia ab artifice figuram accipit circularem quam rotunditas comi-

harmful, since it lacks matter which is called the prime and appropriate receptacle of such harmful passions.

Or rather, if that essence is the form of itself, then nothing can ever intervene between it and its form. For if some mean were ever to intervene between itself and its form, the mean would have to be closer to its form than its own essence was. But the essence is the form itself. So something would be closer to itself than it is to itself. This is utterly absurd. Wherefore nothing is inserted as a mean between the essence and its form. If this is so, the essence is not separated from its form by anything intervening. But neither too is it separated of its own accord. 5

It follows then that in no way does it depart from itself and its form, nor too from the law of the form-giver, since it was created by that law to remain in itself. And it always remains thus. For it is not dislodged by anything from that condition: not by itself, for everything preserves for itself its own species and dignity to the best of its ability; not by higher causes, for with the same law they produced it they also maintain it; and not by lower causes, for the higher is never mastered by the lower. So soul, since it is pure form and therefore never departs either from its form or from the law of the form-giver, is indoubtedly everlasting and immortal. 6

: IX :

Ninth proof: that existence belongs to soul in itself.

What belongs to something in itself is never separated from it. Roundness is present in a circle by its very nature and so no circle ever exists without roundness. Roundness is present on occasion in timber, not because it is timber (for all timber would be round), but because it receives from a craftsman the circular shape which 1

tatur, ideo tunc rotunditatem capere cogitur. Desinit aliquando lignum esse rotundum, cum primum esse desinit circulare; deinde restat lignum, sed non rotundum. Figura vero circularis ita necessario rotunda est, ut si desiverit esse rotunda, esse etiam desinat circularis. Similiter calor igni per se convenit, humor aquae, soli lumen. Non aliter et formae esse per se convenit. Nam quicquid aliquid est in aliqua specie, id certe quod est a propria quadam forma sortitur ad talem speciem conducente. Quoniam igitur esse proprium cuique per formam propriam competit, sequitur ut esse communiter et simpliciter per genus ipsum formae conveniat. Unde oportet ipsam formam fontem dici essendi et per se esse.

2 Quod si per aliud esse dicatur ab aliquo, interrogabimus utrum illud per quod forma dicitur esse naturam formae habeat, an materiae. Non materiae, quia videmus in compositis singulis esse cuiusque proprium non sequi materiam. Ergo neque in hac ipsa forma per quam res compositae sunt illud per quod ipsa est vim habet materiae; ergo formae. Ita quaestio redit in idem. Utrum forma illa alia per quam forma est per se ipsam sit, an per aliud quippiam? Si per se, tunc constat formam fontem essendi dici debere. Sin per aliud, tunc quaeremus ut ante, atque in infinitum erit progressio. Quapropter formae per se convenit esse. At enim formarum conditor ad certum operis mundani finem integritatemque formas ea distinctione producit in esse, ut singulas naturaliter ad certum esse determinet, et alias quidem ad esse in corpore, alias ad esse in se ipsis absque materia.

3 Forma impressa materiae non proprie est neque proprium habet esse, sed dicitur id quo compositum ipsum est, et ipsa per

comes with roundness; and so it is forced to accept roundness. The timber stops at some point being round as soon as it stops being circular; at that point the timber remains but not as round. But a circular shape is necessarily round so that were it to cease being round, it would also cease being circular. Similarly heat belongs to fire in itself, wetness to water, and light to the sun. Likewise existence belongs to form intrinsically. For whatever is a member of some species is certainly allotted to be what it is by a form of its own conducive to that species. Because through its own form, therefore, existence is proper to each thing, it follows that existence belongs through the genus itself to form universally and absolutely. Whence form should itself be called the source of existence and self-existing.[12]

But if it is said to exist through another by another, we will then inquire whether that by which the form is said to exist has the nature of form or of matter. It is not of matter, because we see in particular compound objects that the existence peculiar to each object does not result from matter. In this form through which compound things exist, therefore, that through which it exists does not have the power of matter, so it has the power of form. So the question returns to the same issue. Does that other form through which the form exists exist in itself or through something else? If it exists in itself, then clearly form must be called the source of existence. If it exists through something else, then we will ask the same question as before, and so on to infinity. Therefore existence belongs to form in itself. But certainly the Creator of forms brought forms into existence for the particular end and integrity of the work of the world, but with this distinction: that He might determine particular forms naturally for a particular existence: some to existence in body, others to existence in themselves free from matter. 2

Form that is imprinted in matter does not exist in the strict sense, nor have its own existence. But it is said to be that by which 3

commune esse totius existit. Si esse formae per se congruit, haec certe forma, quae est in corpore, quia et ipsa forma est, id habet ut et ipsi esse per se conveniat. At quomodo, cum a materia pendeat et sub esse totius compositi contineatur? Attende: esse per se convenit illi, id est, per se sequitur illam. Sequitur, inquam, per se, id est, secundum naturam suam. Quid enim aliud 'per se' significat quam 'per sui naturam'? Natura sua talis est, qualem sibi suus opifex assignavit. Opifex autem statuit ut materiae inhaereret. Haec itaque natura suae est inhaerere materiae. Per hanc naturam esse eam sequitur. Ergo esse eam sequitur per se—eam, inquam, materiae inhaerentem. Ita prius quodammodo sibi competit materiae infigi quam existere. Quare tamdiu existit, quamdiu haeret materiae. Non haeret semper, quia materia omnibus parata formis locum saepe dat, formis contrariis priores formas inde pellantibus. Non ergo existit semper.

4 Forma vero illa quae ita a conditore est ad esse determinata, ut in se ipsa consistat seorsum a corpore, etiam[23] quia forma est, habet illud ut esse sibi per se conveniat—per se, inquam, per naturam suam. Natura ipsi assignata est sibimet ipsi haerere. Igitur esse suum eam sequitur quantum sibi haeret, id est existere suum eam sequitur ex subiecto minime pullulantem. Et quotiens dicis 'esse per se sequitur eam', totiens dicis 'esse eam sequitur sibi ipsi haerentem'. Nihil autem a se ipso discedit. Quid enim intercidit inter se et ipsummet quod separet ipsum a semetipso? Si quatenus haeret sibi eatenus est, quia haeret semper, est et semper. Talis quidem forma est anima. Est igitur immortalis.

5 Sed potest aliquis huic rationi sic obiicere, quod quemadmodum ignis qui per se calet, calet semper dum est, non tamen est

the compound itself exists: it exists by way of the common existence of the whole. If existence is in itself proper to form, certainly this form which is in the body, since it too is form, of itself has the ability to accord with existence. But, given that it depends on matter and is subject to the existence of the compound as a whole, in what way? Take note. Existence of itself accords with form, that is, of itself follows form, "of itself follows" meaning according to its own nature. For what else does "of itself" mean than "through its own nature"? Its nature is such as its Maker assigned it. But the Maker decreed it should inhere in matter. So its nature exists to inhere in its own matter: through this nature existence follows the form. Therefore existence of itself follows the form, the form, I repeat, inhering in matter. Thus this form is somehow capable of being imprinted in matter prior to existing. Therefore it exists just as long as it inheres in matter. It does not inhere forever, because matter, ready for all forms, often yields to contrary forms that expel the earlier forms from it. Therefore this form does not exist forever.

But that other form which has been so determined by the Maker for existence that it exists entirely in itself separate from body, and also because it is form, is such that its existence of itself accords with itself—of itself meaning of its own nature. The nature assigned to it is to inhere in itself. Therefore its existence follows insofar as it inheres in itself, that is, its existence follows its form without its sprouting from a substrate. Whenever you say "of itself existence follows the form," you are saying "existence follows the form inhering in itself." But nothing departs from itself. For what intervenes between self and self to the point of separating self from self? If it exists to the extent that it inheres in itself, then, because it always inheres, it always exists. Such a form is the soul. Therefore it is immortal. 4

Somebody could object to this argument on the grounds that just as fire which is hot in itself is always hot while it exists, and 5

semper, ex quo etiam non calet absolute semper, ita etiam animae essentia quia proprie et vere forma est in se ipsa subsistens, ideo per se est, et quia per se est; ideo est et semper, scilicet dum est. Non tamen semper est. Ergo non est semper.

6 Haec obiectio duabus de causis ridicula iudicatur. Primo sibimet ipsi repugnat, quando ita contexitur: 'forma illa per se est, ergo semper est, dum scilicet est. Non autem est semper'. Quattuor enim hic orationes sunt, quarum secunda illa, quae dicit 'ergo semper est', posteriori huic contradicit quae infert 'non autem est semper'. Deinde obiectio huiusmodi abundat superfluis, quando addit 'dum scilicet est'. Istud siquidem 'dum est' non potest dici aliud 'est' quam primum illud ubi dicitur 'semper est'. Sic enim esset eadem in re geminum 'est' et geminum 'esse', neque existeret res una quaedam, sed duae. Hinc sequitur ut illud 'est' quod ponitur quando additur 'dum scilicet est' sit illud idem quod iam erat positum quando prius dicebatur 'est semper'. Quae sunt eadem, eadem sunt ratione tractanda. Idcirco si primum 'est' absolute profertur, ita secundum 'est' absolute proferri debet absque illa dictione, 'dum scilicet <est>'. Ergo dici oportet: 'est', 'semper est', 'est', non autem addendum, 'dum scilicet est'. Vel si addis illi primo 'est', illud postea 'dum scilicet est', adde et huic secundo 'est' quod sequitur post[24] 'dum scilicet <est>', rursus illud 'dum scilicet est' et huic tertio 'est', rursus 'dum scilicet est', atque ita in infinitum. Neque usquam reperies primam essendi radicem, per quam competat illi rei quod sit sitque semper. Quod radicem essendi non habet, nihil est omnino. Age iam, siste pedem.

yet does not exist always and so is not hot always in the absolute sense, so the soul's essence too, since properly and truly it is form subsisting in itself, therefore exists of itself, and because it exists of itself, it too always exists, that is, as long as it exists. Yet it does not always exist. Therefore it does not exist always.

There are two reasons why this objection is ridiculous. In the 6 first place, it is self-contradictory when it is formulated in this way: "the form exists of itself, therefore it always exists—that is, as long as it exists. But it does not always exist." For there are four statements here, of which the second which says "Therefore it always exists" contradicts the one which asserts "But it does not always exist." Next, an objection like this is full of unnecessary repetitions when it adds "that is, as long as it exists." For the "exists" in "as long as it exists" cannot be declared different from the first "exists" in the assertion "it always exists." For existing in the same thing would be a twin "exists" and a twin "existence"; and one particular thing would not exist but two. It follows then that the "exists" in the addition "that is, as long as it exists" is the same as the "exists" which was used already when it was first argued "it exists always." What are the same must be treated in the same way. So, if the first "exists" is used absolutely, the second "exists" should be used absolutely without the clause, "that is, as long as it exists." So it ought to read "exists," "always exists," and "exists," whereas "that is, as long as it exists" should not be added. Or, if you add to the first "exists" the later "that is, as long as it exists," you should also add it to the second "exists" which follows on "that is, as long as it exists" and again add the "that is, as long as it exists" also to this third "exists," and again add "that is, as long as it exists," and so on to infinity. You will never find the first root of existing which is necessary for that thing to exist and to exist always. But what does not have the root of existing, is absolutely nothing. But let us call a halt at this point.

7 Forma illa separata qualis est anima per se est, ergo est semper. Quinetiam si idem prorsus existeret esse atque calere, quando ita componis: 'ignis quia per se calet, calet semper', adderes protinus: 'calere et esse idem est; ergo est et semper'. Nunc autem non potes eo modo concludere, quia non idem est esse atque calere, alioquin quaecumque sunt calerent, et quicquid calere desinit, desineret esse; quod non accidit. Itaque ignis semper dum est calet, quia prius quodammodo est et postea calet. Et quia esse est ante calere et aliud quam calere, ideo per aliquod medium videtur calor essentiae ignis inesse, ita ut primo ponatur[25] ignis essentia, secundo eius esse, tertio loco calere. Immo vero essentia ignis[26] sortitur esse per id[27] quod haeret materiae. Prius enim quodammodo latet in materiae sinu quam edatur in lucem. Et sicut latuit antequam existeret, sic etiam haeret postea, ut non cesset existere. Sortitur quoque calere per id quod possidet esse. Quapropter calere desinit, quando desinit esse; desinit esse, quando desinit inhaerere. Sed animae essentia, quoniam est forma soluta, esse sortitur per semetipsam et in ea ipsum esse est primus et proprius actus essentiae, nec ullum vinculum est per quod esse cum essentia connectatur, quo soluto, accidat dissolutio. At[28] licet tam calere quam esse per aliquam conditionem conveniat ignis essentiae, animae tamen essentiae non convenit esse per conditionem ullam, sed absolute. Idcirco licet ignis cum certa quadam conditione sit et caleat semper, anima tamen semper est absolute.

That separated form, like soul, exists in itself and therefore exists always. Moreover, if existing and heating were completely identical, then, when you wrote, "Fire, because it is hot in itself, is always hot," you would immediately add, "to be hot is the same as existing; therefore, fire always exists." But in actuality you cannot arrive at this conclusion, because to exist is not the same thing as to be hot, otherwise whatever exists would be hot, and anything which stops being hot would stop existing; and this does not happen. So fire is always hot while it exists, because in a way it exists prior to being hot. And because existence exists prior to being hot and is other than being hot, so heat appears to be present in the essence of fire by way of some mean; consequently, we posit first the fire's essence, then its existing, third its being hot. Or rather, fire's essence is allotted existence because it inheres in matter. For it lies hidden in a way in the bosom of matter before it is brought to light. And just as it was buried in matter before it existed, so it inheres in matter afterwards too, in order not to stop existing. It is allowed also to be hot because it possesses existence. Wherefore it stops being hot when it stops existing; and it stops existing when it stops inhering in matter. But the essence of soul, being unbound form, is allotted existence through itself: in it existence is the first and proper act of essence. Nor is there any bond which links its existence with its essence, and which, being broken, causes destruction. Although being hot and existing alike accord with the fire's essence, given a particular condition, still existing does not accord with the soul's essence conditionally but rather absolutely. Therefore, although fire always exists and is hot if a certain condition pertains, yet soul always exists absolutely. 7

: X :

Decima ratio: quia per se refertur ad deum.

1 Si qua tamen videatur esse conditio cuius virtute anima sit semper, ea non est per respectum aliquem ad corpora quorum adiumento non eget, sed per respectum ad causam primam, unde descendit. Sed et respectus huiusmodi quoniam per ipsammet animae naturam completur, nihil prohibet quin anima per se et absolute et absque conditione sit semper. Quod quidem hac ratione investigabimus.

2 Quoniam a prima rerum causa cuncta dependent, eatenus singula in suo esse permanent, quatenus ad primam causam referuntur. Respiciunt autem illam, ut aliquam ipsius similitudinem gerunt. Causa illa actus purissimus est, ab omni materiae proprietate alienissimus. Huic actui res inferiores non ex sua materia sed ex forma potius, quae actus quidam existit, similes[29] iudicatur. Quo fit ut per formam suam omnia primam respiciant causam. Quare quaecumque ex materia et forma composita sunt, ut elementa et mixta, non per se, neque per totam sui naturam, sed per partem illam sui dumtaxat quae forma dicitur, causam primam respiciunt.

3 Argumentare hunc in modum. Ut ad primum principium referuntur, ita sunt. Referuntur autem per aliud, ergo per aliud sunt. Quae sunt per aliud stabilia non sunt; in se ipsis enim relicta, in nihilum evanescunt. In se ergo sunt nihil quae sunt per aliud quicquid existunt. Talia profecto sunt naturalia corpora. Corporales vero formae quales? Certe similes. Forma enim corporibus insita excellentiam quidem amisit suam et corporalis prorsus evasit, siquidem omnes conditiones corporis iam subivit.

: X :

Tenth proof: that soul of itself returns to God.

Yet if there appears to be any condition by virtue of which soul exists forever, it is not with any respect to bodies, whose support it does not need, but with respect to the prime cause from which it derives. But this respect, since it is fulfilled by the nature itself of the soul, in no way prevents the soul existing in itself, absolutely, unconditionally, and forever. We shall examine this in the following argument. 1

Because all things depend on the universal first cause, individual things rest in their own existence to the extent that they refer to the prime cause. They look to it in order to bear some likeness to it. That cause is purest act absolutely removed from every property of matter. Inferior things are adjudged like this act, not because of their matter, but rather because of their form, which exists as a particular act. Hence all things look to the first cause through their form. Thus whatever things are compounded of matter and form, like the elements and compound objects, look to the prime cause by way, not of themselves nor of their nature as a whole, but of that part of themselves only which is called form. 2

Let us set up the proof thus. They exist in the same way as they are referred to the first principle. But they are referred through another, therefore they exist through another. Things that exist through another are not unchanging; for abandoned to themselves, they vanish into nothingness. So all things that exist and exist through another are nothing in themselves. Clearly natural bodies are like this. What about bodily forms? Obviously they are like this. For form implanted in bodies loses its excellence and becomes completely corporeal, since it has now submitted to all the conditions of body. 3

4 Conditiones corporis duae sunt: secundum locum extensio et secundum tempus mutatio. Forma vero immersa corporibus cum latitudine corporis dilatatur et mutatur corpore permutato. Quoniam igitur facta est penitus corporalis pristina excellentia destituta, per se quidem minime est, ut diximus alias, et esse nullum habet proprium, sed ita cum materia copulatur, ut unum sit esse totius. Si ergo per se non est, per se certe non agit. Ideo si referatur ad primam causam, per aliud aliquid referetur, per illud videlicet per quod est. Est autem per formam aliam sublimiorem a materia liberam, a qua etiam pendet in materiam continue, quemadmodum a vultu hominis imago in speculum, per quam ad primam causam assidue quoque refertur. Si omnino per aliud est forma corporea, cum etiam ad primum principium per aliud referatur,[30] quidnam est illud per quod tam corpus naturale quam eius forma refertur ad primum? Sane est[31] essentia illa tertia, quam supra corporum qualitates iampridem locavimus. Essentia vero huiusmodi eodem modo ad deum refert corporum qualitates, quo eas efficit in materia. Efficit autem operatione sua. Operatio sua est mobilis. Per agitationem igitur generat, per agitationem et refert. Itaque refert mutabiliter.

5 Hinc sequitur ut naturalia corpora eorumque formae, quia per aliud perque motum referuntur in deum, neque per se sint, neque stabilia, sed vacillent prorsus et pereant. Essentia vero tertia, quia sui ipsius est forma — immo ipsamet forma est et forma a materia libera — idcirco per se refertur in deum. Ut refertur, ita est. Ergo est etiam per se ipsam. Refertur autem per essentiam suam. Illa stabilis est. Quapropter ad stabilem deum, per stabilem sui ipsius essentiam relata, stabilis permanet. Nempe essentia haec relationis suae causa est, relatio perfectionis. Se ipsam vero numquam dese-

The conditions of body are two: extension in space and change in time. But form immersed in bodies is extended along with the body's magnitude and changes as the body changes. So, because it has been made entirely corporeal, having been deprived of its pristine excellence, of itself it is almost nothing, as we said above, and it has no existence of its own: it is so bound up with matter that there is only the existence of the whole. Therefore, if it does not exist of itself, it certainly does not act of itself. Therefore, if it is related to the first cause, it will be related via something else, namely via that through which it exists. But it exists through another higher form which is free from matter and on which it also depends continually in matter, just as the reflection in a mirror depends on a man's face. Through this higher form it is also continually related to the first cause. If the corporeal form is entirely through another, and since it is related to the first principle through another, then what is that other entity through which the natural body and its form alike are related to the first principle? Surely it is that third essence, which for a long time now we have placed above the qualities of bodies. But such an essence relates the qualities of bodies to God in the same way as it realizes them in matter. But it realizes them by its activity. Its activity is mobile. So it generates them through motion, and relates them through motion. Therefore it relates them in a changeable way. 4

It follows that natural bodies and their forms, because they are related to God through another and through motion, exist neither in themselves nor as unchanging things, but continually waver and perish. But the third essence, being the form of itself—or rather, being in itself a form, and a form free from matter—is related of itself to God. As it is related, so it exists. Therefore it exists of itself too, but it is related through its essence. This is unchanging. So, being related to unchangeable God through its own unchangeable essence, it remains unchanging. This essence is the cause of its relation and the relation is the cause of its perfection. But it 5

rit, numquam ergo desinit se ipsam referre, numquam se ipsam perficere referendo. Deus quidem semper exuberat; illa semper haurit. Igitur tum ex parte hausti, tum haurientis semper quidem esse ipsum bibit ac permanet immortalis.

: XI :

Undecima ratio: quia non componitur ex aliqua potentia in quam possit resolvi.

1 Sicut generatio fit per coniunctionem formae cum materia, ita per separationem formae a materia fit corruptio. Ubi non est harum rerum coniunctio, non accidit separatio. Talis autem compositio non est in anima. Sed rationem hanc latius prosequamur.

2 In corruptione cuiusque rei perditur ipse[32] rei actus, sed post illum superest aliquid quod suberat illi actui, veluti potentia aliqua susceptiva, ne fiat corruptio in nihilum, sicut non fit ex nihilo generatio. Res quidem ex forma materiaque composita resolvitur in materiam. Forma quoque illa, quae ex materiae fomite educta fuerat, reducitur in materiae fomitem.[33] In anima vero actus ipsius est ipsum suum esse; essentia vero et substantia eius est illa ipsa potentia quae essendi actui subest. Non enim est in formis[34] absolutis ferme alia compositio quam ex essentia atque esse aut similis. Essentia locum materiae et potentiae tenet; esse vero locum formae et actus. Si corrumpitur anima, perditur eius esse omnino. Sed numquid etiam essentia? Nequaquam. Nulla enim res in nihil resolvitur, quia res quae usque adeo est simplex ut non aliter re-

never abandons itself; therefore it never stops relating itself and never stops perfecting itself in relating. God's abundance always brims over; the third essence is always quaffing at this cup. From the viewpoint of drink and drinker alike, therefore, the soul always drinks in existence and remains immortal.

: XI :

Eleventh proof: that soul is not compounded from any potentiality into which it can be resolved.

Just as generation results from the joining of form with matter, so corruption comes from the separation of form from matter. Where no joining of them occurs, no separation occurs. No such compounding occurs in the soul.[13] But let us pursue this argument further. 1

2 In the corruption of each thing, its act itself is lost; but something survives after the act which underlies it, a sort of receptive potentiality. So corruption does not end in nothing, any more than generation begins from nothing. An entity composed from form and matter is resolved into matter. The form too which was ignited from the kindling of matter is reduced to that kindling. But in soul its act is its existence; but its essence and substance is that potentiality itself which underlies the act of existing. For in independent forms, virtually no compounding is found other than from essence and existence, or the like. Essence plays the part of matter and potentiality. Existence plays the part of form and act. If the soul is corrupted, its existence is utterly lost. But surely that is not true of the essence too? No! For no entity is resolved into nothing, because an entity which is so simple that it cannot be resolved except into nothing is also such as it was made by God

solvi possit quam in nihilum, etiam talis est, ut sit a deo facta per creationem ex nihilo. Quae talis est soli auctori suo subest deo. Dei vero influxus vitalis atque beneficus nihil interimit. Itaque si anima destruitur, licet amittat esse, eius tamen essentia remanet.

3 Quod etiam inde constat, quod quanto nobilior res est, tanto nobiliorem habet materiam, nobiliorem et formam. Animae sunt admodum praestantiores corporibus. Igitur sub illarum esse tamquam sub forma et actu latet materia quaedam et potentia — si qua latet — praestantior quam sub forma et sub esse corporis cuiuscumque. Quod autem tenet in animabus primae materiae potentiaeque locum ipsa earum essentia est. Itaque essentia illarum eminentior est quam materia corporum. Materia corporum incorruptibilis est. Ergo quid mirum, si esse potest incorruptibilis illa? Quo fit ut si quando anima esse suum fingatur amittere, supersit necessario adhuc essentia atque substantia. Haec si superest, est certe. Si est adhuc, esse nondum est amissum. Ita anima si corrumpi dicatur, etiam post corruptionem necessario superest. Immo etiam vivit. Esse namque animae nihil aliud est quam vivere.

4 Sed ne quis dicat ipsum animae esse resolvi in essentiam atque essentiam ulterius non existere, quia sit absque actu, quamvis potentia forte supersit alicubi, meminisse oportet essentiam illam non posse in materiam potentiamve materiae redigi, quia neque ex materia constat, tamquam parte sui, neque ex materiae potentia pullulat. Rursus, non posse resolvi in potentiam causae alicuius agentis, nisi forte in dei virtutem, qui solus animam procreavit. Non autem ob id moritur animus, quod in primam vitam resolvitur. Moreretur autem si reductus in deum desineret esse animus. Atque[35] sicut figura cerae a sigillo impressa, quando sigillo penitus adaequatur, non destruitur sed in speciem suam redintegratur, sic essentia animi, si quando ideae per quam deus eam in certa es-

through creation from nothing. What is such is under God as its sole author. But God's life-giving and benign influence does not destroy. So, if the soul is destroyed, though it loses its existence, yet its essence survives.[14]

This is clear too from the fact that the nobler the entity, the nobler the matter, and the nobler the form. Souls are greatly superior to bodies. So under their existence, as under their form and act, lies hidden a matter and potentiality — if any is hidden — which is superior to that under the form and existence of any possible body. But in souls what plays the part of prime matter and potentiality is their essence. Thus their essence is superior to the matter of bodies. The matter of bodies is incorruptible. So is it surprising if souls' essence is able to be incorruptible? Hence, if a soul can ever be imagined losing its existence, necessarily its essence and substance would still survive. If this survives, it certainly exists. If it still exists, then its existence is not yet lost. So, if the soul is said to be corrupted, it necessarily survives even after its corruption. Or rather, it even lives. For existing for the soul is nothing other than living. 3

But were someone to argue that the very existence of soul is resolved into essence, and that essence no longer exists because it is without act (though the potentiality perchance survives somewhere), we have to recall that the essence cannot be reduced to matter or to matter's potentiality because neither is it made from matter as from a part of itself, nor does it bud from matter's potentiality. Again, it cannot be resolved into the potentiality of any active cause, unless perchance into the power of God who alone created soul. But the rational soul does not die by being resolved into the first life. But it would die if, when it was led back to God, it stopped being rational soul. Just as the shape impressed by a seal in wax is not destroyed when it is matched to the seal but its form is renewed, so the essence of soul, whenever it is moved towards the idea which God used to allocate it to a particular species of ex- 4

sendi specie disposuerat admovetur, in esse pristino confirmatur. Maxime enim sequens actus roboratur a primo. Nam quomodo deus esse potest terminus in quem corruptio tendat, cum sit efficiens terminus unde et a quo omnis creatio generatioque deducitur? Aut quo pacto deus, qui actus est purus, nascente anima ad animae ipsius compositionem concurrit, ita ut quemadmodum ex materiae potentia et actu potentiae addito forma fit corporalis et in eam potentiam denique actus formae resolvitur, sic ex dei potentia quadam et adiecto quodam actu fiat animus, qui tandem in dei potentiam quasi materiam resolvatur? Non enim gerit umquam materiae vicem qui primus est actus.

5 Afferet[36] aliquis essentiam animae neque in materiam neque in deum resolvi, sed ipsam se statim in se recipere, esse priore sublato. Verum sicut materia corporalis absque actu corporali esse nequit, ita neque spiritalis seorsum a spiritali. Quapropter essentia, quae est materia spiritalium et ad esse spiritale quasi actum aliquem comparatur, numquam segregatur ab esse — ab esse, inquam, spiritali, nisi forte quis dicat essentiam animae, dum esse aliud exuit, aliud indui, ac tales in esse spiritali vices hanc essentiam variare, quales in formis suis materia variat. Absurdum id quidem dictu, tum quia essentia spiritalium stabilior est quam materia corporalium, tum quia essentia animae cum propria ipsius animae ratio sit, non esse aliud omnino et aliud respicit pariter, sed esse solummodo animale, secundum certam, videlicet animae, speciem. Materia quidem communis absque hoc actu vel illo esse potest; materia vero propria absque proprio actu, nequaquam. Quapropter essentia animae, quae in tali specie animarum est, numquam actum speciei alterius animarum suscipiet, neque migrabit rursus essentia in eadem specie de animo hoc in illum, ne mobilis aeque

istence, is confirmed in its pristine existence. The later act is immeasurably strengthened by the first act. For how can God be the goal towards which corruption aims when He is the starting point of activity from whom and by whom all creation and generation derives? How does God, who is pure act, at the soul's birth contribute to the composition of the soul such that, just as bodily form results from the potentiality of matter and from act added to that potentiality, and just as the form's act is eventually resolved back into that potentiality, so from a sort of potentiality of God and from an act added to it comes the rational soul, which is at last resolved into the potentiality of God as though into matter? For He who is the prime act never plays the role of matter.

Someone will allege that the essence of soul is resolved neither 5 into matter nor into God, but that, once its former existence is removed, it withdraws straightway into itself. But just as corporeal matter cannot exist without corporeal act, so spiritual matter cannot exist apart from spiritual act. So essence, which is the matter of spiritual beings and relates to spiritual existence as to some act, is never separated from existence, from spiritual existence, I repeat, unless perhaps there is someone who maintains that the essence of soul, when it doffs one existence, dons another, and that the essence introduces to this spiritual existence the same changes as matter introduces to its forms. But this is talking nonsense, both because the essence of spiritual beings is more stable than the matter of corporeal entities, and because the essence of soul, being the proper rational principle of the soul, does not look to different existences with complete indifference, but only to ensouled existence in accord with one particular species, namely that of soul. Common matter can exist without this or that act of existence; but particular matter cannot exist without its own particular act. So the essence of a soul in a particular species of soul will never receive the act of another species of soul, nor will it pass from one soul to another within the same species; otherwise it would be as

sit ac[37] materia corporalium. Immo si materia caeli eadem forma contenta est semper, ut placet quamplurimis, quid mirum materiam animi spiritalem eodem essendi actu semper esse contentam? Ea essentia vita est, hoc esse vivere. Semper itaque vivit.

: XII :

Duodecima ratio: quia non habet in se potentiam ad non esse.

1 Nulla res corrumpitur umquam nisi habeat in se potentiam ad non esse. Si enim nequiret non esse, numquam esse desineret. Anima nullam habet talem potentiam, quoniam anima nihil aliud est apud Platonicos nisi forma simplex per se subsistens, in essentia quidem sua perfecta et integra, ad speciem quoque animalis efficiendam conducens. Actus quidem existendi ibi est, in ipsa scilicet forma integra et perfecta, siquidem per formae integritatem est unumquodque. Igitur proprium subiectum ipsius esse ibi est sua forma atque essentia. Ubi autem erit potentia ad non esse, quod est ipsius esse oppositum? Numquid in ipso esse? At quomodo unum repugnans vim habet ad repugnans alterum capiendum? An in ipsa essentia? Neque hic quidem. Nam si essentia, ex eo quod simplex et integra forma est, proprium est ipsius esse subiectum, quomodo habet potentiam ad non esse, quod dicitur esse ipsius oppositum? Quo enim pacto propria substantia ignis, quae proprium caloris talis subiectum est, habet ad frigus suscipiendum potentiam aliquam, per quam et frigus accipiat et maneat ignis? Atqui in iis ipsis substantiis corporalibus mortalibusque non est potentia ad non esse, quantum sunt in specie sua completae substantiae formaque praeditae — secundum hoc enim existunt — sed

changeable as the matter of bodies. Or rather, if the matter of the heavens, as most people maintain, is satisfied with the same form forever, is it surprising that the spiritual matter of soul should be satisfied forever with the same act of existing? That essence is life and this existence is living. Therefore it lives forever.[15]

: XII :

Twelfth proof: that soul in itself has no potentiality for non-existence.

Nothing is ever corrupted unless it has the potentiality for non-existence in itself.[16] For if it were incapable of not existing, it would never stop existing. Soul has no such potentiality, since soul for the Platonists is nothing other than simple form, subsisting in itself, complete and perfect in its essence, and contributing to making the species of what has soul. The act of existing is there in the form, complete and perfect, since every single thing exists through the completeness of its form. So the proper subject of its existence there is its form and essence. But where will the potentiality for not existing be, which is the opposite of existing? Surely not in its existence itself? Then how does one opposite have the power to receive another opposite? Surely it does not receive it in its essence? No, not here. For, if the essence, insofar as it is form, simple and complete, is the proper substrate of its existence, how does it have the potentiality for not existing, which is said to be the opposite of existing? For how does the specific substance of fire, which is the proper substrate of heat as such, possess a potentiality for sustaining cold, a potentiality through which it both receives cold and remains fire? Yet in these corporeal and mortal substances the potentiality for not existing, is not to the extent 1

quantum illis subest materia prima, quae numquam sub tali aliqua forma quiescit. Haec vero abest ab anima. Nusquam igitur potentia ad non esse in anima reperitur. Est igitur immortalis. Sed hanc rationem planius exponamus.

2 In rebus iis quae ex forma et materia componuntur, id accidit ut materia opus ipsum quodammodo antecedat. Quis enim dubitet quin materia prius quodammodo sit quam formetur? Accipio materiam hanc operi faciundo quodammodo praecedentem atque interrogo utrum opus illud ex natura huius materiae fore necessarium sit, an impossibile, an forte possibile. Non necessarium, quia sic materiae vis statim per se ipsam operi necessitatem daret, neque praestantiore aliquo egeret formante. Nunc vero indiget, quia quod est informe formare se nequit. Igitur quantum ad materiam attinet, futurum opus non est necessarium. Numquid impossibile? Neque hoc quidem. Sic enim esset materia adeo ad opus illud inepta ut numquam ad illius formam atque effectum perduceretur. Si quantum ad materiam spectat, opus agendum neque necessarium est, neque etiam impossibile, restat ut sit possibile. Hoc enim inter duo illa est medium, possibile, inquam, esse atque non esse. Nam si ex natura materiae foret possibile esse solum, foret absque dubio necessarium; sin ex natura eiusdem foret solum possibile non esse, foret et impossibile.

3 Quapropter cum ex natura materiae opus ipsum possibile sit esse pariter et non esse, constat quod in ipsa materia, quantum ad faciundum opus, est potentia ad esse pariter atque non esse. Cum vero simplex materia sit ex naturis pluribus non composita, eadem natura materiae est potentia ad esse atque non esse, quoniam est indifferens ad utrumque, neque ex se ad alterutrum terminatur.

that, in their own species, they are complete substances endowed with form (for they exist precisely because of this), but to the extent that prime matter, which is never stable under such a form, underlies them. This matter is absent from soul. So nowhere in soul is found the potentiality for not existing. Therefore soul is immortal. But let us elaborate this argument.

2 In objects composed of form and matter, it happens that the matter in a way precedes the resulting work. For who doubts that matter has a kind of existence before it is given form? Accepting this matter as preceding in a certain sense the making of the work, I ask whether the work coming to be from the nature of this matter is necessary, or impossible, or perhaps possible. It cannot be necessary, because matter's power of itself would immediately bestow necessity on the work, and it would not need some higher form-giver. But in fact it does need one, because what is without form cannot form itself. So, as far as matter is concerned, the work-to-be is not necessary. Is it then impossible? Surely not. For then the matter would be so unsuited to the work that it would never be brought to its form and completion. If, as regards matter, the work awaiting completion is neither necessary nor yet impossible, it must be possible; for the possible is half-way between the two extremes, that is, between existence and non-existence. For if from matter's nature existence only were possible, indubitably the work would be necessary; but if from this same matter's nature only non-existence were possible, then the work would be impossible too.

3 Therefore, since from the nature of matter it is possible for the work equally to exist or not to exist, then it is evident that in the matter, insofar as it is there to make the work, dwells the potentiality equally for existence and for non-existence. But since matter is simple and not compounded from several natures, dwelling in the same nature of matter is the potentiality for both existence and non-existence, because it is indifferent to both and is not in it-

Superiori agente indiget, quod eam formando, ad esse determinet. Accipit ab illo formam leonis, unde fit leo, et materia ista leonis, quae ante habebat in se potentiam ad esse leonem atque non esse, iam nunc ad esse leonem determinatur. Sed numquid adhuc restat in materia prima eadem illa indifferens ad utrumque potentia? Si non restaret, cessaret protinus natura materiae, neque quicquam ex materia fieret et constaret, si statim cum fit aliquid, materia prima natura privatur sua peritque. Ergo cum restet leone iam genito potentia eadem illa secundum speciem in materia, non propinqua leoni secundaque,[38] sed prima—potentia, inquam, ad esse pariter atque non esse—id accidit ut quemadmodum per illam potentiam esse leo quandoque coepit, cum prius non fuisset, ita per eandem esse quandoque desinat, postquam fuit. Quoniam potentia ad extremum utrumque indifferens, vel ad neutrum vertitur vel aeque atque vicissim vertitur ad utrumque; et sicut ad esse ex non esse conversa est, ita vicissim ab esse vertitur in non esse. Atque hinc sequitur rerum corruptio corporalium.

4 Verum rationalis anima, cum sit forma simplex unde motus exoritur in compositis, non potest ex aliqua materia praecedente et subsequente forma facta fuisse, et cum sit forma in se subsistens, non innixa materiae, quia et supra et infra materiam progreditur iudicando, non est composita ex aliqua potentia materiae, velut animae incohatione, et actu potentiae addito, velut animae ipsius perfectione. Neque igitur ex materia constat neque extat. Si talis est, ex nihilo processit in lucem. Eius ergo solus deus est auctor, ut alias ostendimus.[39] Atqui haec nisi potuisset fieri, numquam profecto facta fuisset. Quapropter praecessit animam nostram nascendi potentia. Ubinam erat illa potentia? Non in anima, quae

self bound to the one or to the other. It needs the higher agent which, by forming it, can determine it for existence. From the agent it receives the form of lion and so becomes a lion; the matter of the lion, which had earlier possessed in itself the potentiality to be and not to be a lion, is now determined to be a lion. Does that same potentiality, indifferent to either possibility, still remain in the prime matter? If it did not, the nature of matter would cease at once. Nothing would come into existence from matter and stay in existence, if, as soon as it becomes something, prime matter loses its nature and perishes. Accordingly, once the lion is born, since the same potentiality with regard to the species remains not in the secondary matter pertaining to the lion, but in the prime matter — I mean the potentiality equally for existence and non-existence — then what happens is that, just as the lion through this potentiality began to exist at one point when it did not exist before, so through this same potentiality it may cease to exist at some point after it has existed. Since the potentiality is open to both extremes, either it resorts to neither or it resorts equally and in turn to both; and just as it is turned from non-existence to existence, so is it turned again from existence to non-existence. Hence derives the corruption of bodily things.

4 On the other hand, rational soul, since it is simple form from which motion arises in composite things, cannot have been made from some pre-existent matter and a subsequent form. Since it is form subsisting in itself independently of matter, and since it proceeds above and below matter in making judgments, it is not composed from some potentiality of matter, as if this were the soul's foundation, and then from an act added to the potentiality, as if this were the soul's perfection. So it is not made and does not exist from matter. If it is such, it came from nothing into the light. So God is its sole creator, as we have shown elsewhere. Yet if it could not have been made, certainly it would never have been made. So the potentiality for being born preceded our soul. Where was that

nondum erat; non in parte animae, quae est simplex et tota simul efficitur, non per partes; non in materia aliqua, quoniam anima a materia non dependet; non in nihilo, non enim potentia ipsa essendi fundatur in nihilo. Nam quo pacto alterum oppositum sit oppositi et contradictorii alterius fundamentum? Esse vero et non esse contradictoria sunt. Restat ut illa potentia in solo animae auctore fundetur deo.

5 Igitur potentia essendi per quam anima ad esse producitur, ipse solus immortalis stabilisque est deus. Potentiae vero secundum congruentiam respondet actus. Actus ergo illi potentiae divinae respondens est stabilis per essentiam. Talis actus est anima. Et quemadmodum in deo eadem potentia est per quam et deus potest facere animam et anima fieri, sic in anima idem actus est, id est nixus idem, per quem et anima subsistit in natura sua, et deus eam sistit in ipsa. Quo fit ut non minori desiderio deus animam in natura animae sistat quam subsistat anima in eadem. Quae cum soli subiiciatur deo, si perimenda est ab aliquo, ab illo est perimenda. Ab illo vero non potest. Quomodo enim causa alicuius effectrix et conservatrix erit quoque corruptrix eiusdem? Aut quo pacto cuiquam[40] ipsum bonum perniciosum est? Aut prima vita et infinita vita est alicui mortis origo? Dicet aliquis: non perimit deus animam vim novam aliquam inferendo, sed vim ante illi tributam auferendo, id est subtrahendo influxum suum, per quem anima vixerat, sicut qui intuitu imaginem suam creat in speculo, subtrahendo vultum desinit imaginem procreare. Sed contingere hoc ibi non potest, ut paulo ante ostendimus.

6 Rursus, si deus nunc infundit animae vitam, postea non infundit, mutatio ibi provenit ab infundendo in non infundendum. Quaero utrum anima desinat haurire vitam an deus infundere.

potentiality located? Not in the soul which was not yet; nor in a part of the soul, because it is simple and made all at one time and not in parts; nor in some matter, for the soul does not depend on matter; nor in nothing, for the potentiality for existence is not based in nothing. For how can one opposite serve as the basis of another and contradictory opposite? Existence and non-existence, however, are contradictories. The remaining possibility is that this potentiality is based in God, who alone is the creator of soul.

Therefore the potentiality for existing by means of which soul is brought into existence is God Himself, alone, immortal and unchanging. But act corresponds harmoniously to potentiality. So the act corresponding to that divine potentiality is unchanging in essence. Such an act is soul. Just as in God the potentiality by means of which He can create soul and soul can be created is the same, so in soul it is the same act, the same effort, by means of which soul subsists in its own nature and God plants soul in that nature. Hence it is with no less desire that God plants soul in soul's nature than soul subsists in that nature. Since the soul is subject only to God, if it has to be destroyed by something, it must be by Him. But it cannot be destroyed by Him. For how will the efficient and preserving cause of something also turn out to be the corrupting cause of it? Or how is the good itself destructive of anything? Or how is the first life, the infinite life, the origin of something's death? Someone will argue: God does not destroy soul by introducing some new power, but by withdrawing the power previously given to it, that is, by removing His influence by means of which the soul had lived. In the same way a man who creates his own image by looking into a mirror, stops creating the image when he turns his face aside. But in this case such cannot happen, as we showed a little while ago. 5

Again, if God pours life into the soul at one point and not at the next, then a change has occurred from pouring to not pouring. Is it the soul, I ask, which stops imbibing life, or God who stops 6

Non desinit anima haurire, quippe infusio vitae in essentiam animae fit, quoniam vita est primus actus essentiae, cum primum acceperit esse. Animae essentia est immobilis, quoniam a stabili deo sine medio pendet, quia stando et quiescendo perficitur. Turbatur motu, attingit stabilia, regit caduca, sistit mobilia, colligit dissipata, conciliat repugnantia. Nec est in ea potentia illa ad esse pariter atque non esse, qualis est in corporibus, quae est totius mutationis initium. Non igitur cessat animae essentia umquam vitae actum accipere. Non cessat deus eundem infundere. Solis namque illis significavit deus se vim suam aliquando infundere cessaturum, quibus ab origine inseruit proclivitatem illam ad non essendum.

7 Praeterea deus, naturae institutor, numquam rei cuiquam subtrahit quod rei illius est proprium. Propria animae vita est — vita, inquam, perpetua, quia quantum rationalis est (etiam absque disciplina et usu per solam eius naturae virtutem) quotidie in se parit species absolutas,[41] per quas proxime ad aeternas itur ideas. Si naturale est animo rationali ascendere ad ideas, naturale est ipsi quiescere in ideis. Ut sicut naturaliter illis vixit, ita naturaliter vivat in illis, et qui operabatur secundum naturam assidue ad perpetua, operetur quandoque secundum naturam perpetuo in perpetuis. Et quia idea quaeque aeterna vita est, qui secundum naturam suam ideam per ideae modum potest consequi, potest etiam per modum aeternum vitam consequi sempiternam.

pouring it in? The soul does not stop imbibing; for the pouring of life is into the very essence of soul, since life is the first act of the essence as soon as it has received existence. The essence of soul does not change, because it depends directly on God who does not change. Because it is perfected in stability and repose, it is troubled by movement: it lays hold on what is unchanging, governs what is fleeting, halts what is in motion, gathers together what is scattered, reconciles what is in conflict. That potentiality equally disposed to existence and non-existence, the kind that is in bodies and which is the starting point of all change, is not in soul. So the soul's essence never stops receiving the act of life. God never stops pouring it forth. For God has signified that at some point He will only cease to pour His power into those things alone wherein from the beginning He has implanted the proclivity for not existing.

Moreover, God, the founder of nature, never takes from anything what is its own property. Life is the property of soul; and by life I mean life everlasting, because insofar as it is rational, soul daily brings to birth (even without training or experience and simply through the power of its own nature) new and absolute species whereby it is led to the threshold of the eternal ideas. If it is natural for rational soul to ascend towards the ideas, then it is natural for it to find repose in the ideas. This is in order that, just as it has lived naturally by them, so it may naturally live in them; and that he who acts by nature continually with regard to eternal things may at some point act by nature eternally in eternal things. Because each idea is eternal life, he who can attain, ideally attain, by his own nature an idea, can also attain, eternally attain, eternal life. 7

: XIII :

Tertia decima[42] ratio: quia esse a deo accipit sine medio.

1 Quamquam Plotinus et Proclus aliique nonnulli Platonicorum animam fieri arbitrantur ab angelo, tamen Dionysium Areopagitam, Origenem et Aurelium Augustinum, Platonicos excellentissimos, sequor libentius, qui animam putant a deo unico procreari. Quod equidem hac ratione demonstrari posse confido.

2 Anima est forma ita simplex atque ita libera, ut neque ex pluribus partibus componatur, neque ex materiae visceribus eruatur. Quando igitur fit, non potest ex rebus ullis prius existentibus generari. Non enim ex rebus diversis procul ante positis deinde coactis in unum conficitur, cum careat partibus, neque ex materiae fomite prius informi, deinde formato, cum sit supra materiam. Igitur fit ex nihilo. Ex nihilo autem aliquid facere dei solius est proprium. Nam ex ordine operum ordo causarum investigatur; causis enim effectus accommodantur.[43] Quare oportet effectus proprios in proprias causas reducamus, atque id quod commune in omnibus effectibus propriis reperitur in communem omnium causam referamus.

3 Ita cum omnibus in rebus praeter proprias singularum conditiones ipsum esse commune cunctis inveniatur, singularum conditionum et qualitatum causas singulas afferre debemus, ipsius autem esse, quod unum omnibus est commune, unam causam omnibusque communem. Omnibus communis causa unus ipse est deus. Igitur essendi revera deus est causa. Essendi vero hoc aut illud, hoc modo vel illo, aliae quaedam praeter deum sunt causae. Ita ut sis, a deo solo habes. Ut sis homo, etiam ab homine, ut cali-

: XIII :

Thirteenth proof: that soul accepts existence from God without an intermediary.

Although Plotinus, Proclus, and several other Platonists believe that soul is created by angel, I more willingly follow Dionysius the Areopagite, Origen, and Augustine, the most excellent of the Platonists, who think that soul was created by God alone.[17] I am confident that their position can be proved by the following argument. 1

Soul is form so simple and so independent that it is neither composed from many parts nor wrenched from the entrails of matter. So when it comes into existence it cannot be generated from any previously existing things. For it is formed neither from different things that are first far apart and then forced together, since it lacks parts; nor from matter's kindling that was first unformed then formed, since it is above matter. Therefore it comes into existence from nothing. To make something from nothing belongs solely to God.[18] For the order of causes can be discovered from the order of effects; for effects are made conformable to their causes. Therefore we should lead the proper effects back to their proper causes, and what is found common in all the proper effects we should refer to the common cause of all. 2

Thus, since the existence common to all is found in all things besides the conditions proper to them individually, we have to adduce for the individual conditions and qualities individual causes, but for the existence (which is alone common to them all) one cause and one common to all. The cause common to all is the one God Himself. So God is truly the cause of existence.[19] But there are causes other than God for existing as this or that, in this way or that way. That you exist, you have from God alone. That you 3

dus sis ab igne. Deus operibus esse dabit, aliae causae inter se diversae diversos essendi modos, et eos quidem virtute dei.

4 Esse quidem illud quod post nihilum sequitur esse dicitur absolutum. Statim enim post nihil sequitur esse simpliciter. Post esse simpliciter sequitur esse hoc aut illud, aut tale esse vel tale, puta hominem esse vel equum, album esse vel nigrum. Non enim potest quicquam fieri hoc et illud et tale, nisi sit prius quod hoc et illud et tale fiat. Quapropter esse tale et hoc et illud, haud e vestigio post nihilum sequitur, sed post esse ipsum simplex et absolutum. Cum igitur dei proprium sit esse ipsum commune et absolutum cunctis tribuere, id vero esse ante[44] omnes essendi modos sequatur post nihilum, solius dei officium erit aliquid ex nihilo in esse perducere, ut primum quod datur omnibus, ipsum scilicet esse, a prima sit causa, a sequentibus causis munera secunda vel tertia.

5 Profecto quod naturae alicuius est particeps, non potest eam naturam producere absolutam, quia cum id quod est tale aliquid secundum participationem, necessario sequatur id quod est absolute tale. Immo etiam sit per illud quicquid ipsum est, si hoc illud gigneret, certe quod est posterius rem se ipso priorem atque etiam sui ipsius causam gigneret, ubi gigneret et se ipsum. Igitur Ariston, quia non absolutus homo fuit, sed hic homo in tali materia constitutus, humanitatem ipsam non genuit absolutam, sed hominem hunc, Platonem scilicet, et in materia tali. Quoniam vero quantum pertinet ad essendi naturam, quicquid sub deo est, esse ipsius est particeps, et esse non habet simpliciter, sed tale esse vel tale in quadam essentia specieque determinatum, sequitur ut res nulla subiecta deo ipsum esse producat, sed talem quendam es-

are human, you owe to a human being too; that you are warm, to a fire. God gives existence to His works, while other causes, differing among themselves, contribute the various modes of existence, and even these by the power of God.[20]

The existence that comes after nothing is called absolute existence. For immediately after nothing comes existence in its simplicity. Succeeding it is this or that existence, such or such an existence, being a human being, for instance, or a horse, being white or black. For something cannot become this or that or such unless it exists prior to becoming this or that or such. So this or that or such an existence does not follow immediately upon nothing, but comes after simple and absolute existence. Therefore, since it is God's alone to give to all creatures this common and absolute existence, but since this existence comes after nothing and before all modes of existing, then it will be the office of God alone to bring something into existence from nothing in order that what is given first to all things, namely existence itself, may derive from the first cause, and the gifts that are second and third from the causes that follow.[21] 4

Certainly, what participates in some nature cannot produce that nature in an absolute sense, since what has some quality by participation necessarily follows what has it absolutely. Or rather, it is whatever it is through that absolute, and were this participant to generate that absolute, what is later would certainly generate a thing prior to itself, and would even generate the cause of itself when it generated itself. Thus Ariston, because he was not the absolute man but this man Ariston made in a particular kind of matter, did not beget humanity in an absolute sense, but rather begot this man, Plato, and in a particular kind of matter.[22] But because, insofar as it pertains to the nature of existing, whatever is below God participates in His existence and does not possess it absolutely but is determined for a particular existence in a particular essence and species, then it follows that nothing that is subject to 5

sendi modum tali cuidam materiae tribuat. Quo fit, ut ad opus suum priori semper egeat fundamento.

6 Praeterea tam ars quam natura quicquid agit, ex potentia quadam producit in actum. Sculptor ex lapide ita praeparato ad statuam, ut quodammodo habeat statuam in potentia, statuam actu fabricat; homo ex semine in cuius virtute homo est generat hominem. Materia illa ex qua ars et natura aliquid faciunt, interdum oboediens multum et apta ad opus existit, interdum ineptior, ita ut materiae potentia alias minus, alias magis distet ab actu operis fabricandi. Parum distat aeris potentia[45] ab ignis effectu; longe vero ab hoc aquae potentia. Facile itaque est ex aere, difficile ex aqua ignem accendere. Unde apparet tanto potentiorem esse oportere eum qui agit, quanto longius intervallum est inter potentiam illam et actum, a qua in quem opus suum est deducturus. Distantia vero inter nihil et esse est infinita, tum quia in nihilo nulla est proportio ad esse, tum quia nulla distantia maior hac esse aut excogitari potest. Distantiam vero proportione et fine carentem sola illa vis potest transcendere, quae nullam habet ad alias vires proportionem, nec habet finem. Virtus huiusmodi solus est deus. Omnia enim alia[46] a[47] dei potentia exceduntur. Solus itaque deus aliquid ex nihilo in esse perducit.

7 Praeterea res omnis praeter ipsum deum creatura dicitur a theologis et ex quattuor quibusdam componitur necessario. Ideo Pythagorici non solum in corporibus, verum etiam in spiritibus quodammodo ponunt quattuor elementa, quia utraque constant[48] ex essentia, esse, virtute et actione. Nempe aliud in eis essentia est, aliud esse; est enim esse actus essentiae. Quod si praeter hunc actum non esset illic essentia cui talis actus haereret, esset actus purus et infinitus, quia non circumscriptus ab ullo. Hic autem solus

God can bring forth existence itself, but rather gives a certain portion of matter a particular mode of existing. That is why it always needs an earlier foundation for its work.[23]

In whatever it does, moreover, art like nature brings forth from 6 a certain potentiality into act. A sculptor takes stone prepared to become a statue (in that it contains somehow the statue in potentiality) and fashions the statue in act. A man begets a man from the seed in whose potentiality is a man. The matter from which art and nature fashion something is sometimes very malleable and ready for the work, sometimes less well suited, such that matter's potentiality is sometimes less, sometimes more distant from the act of the work to be accomplished. The potentiality of air is not far from the effect [or act] of fire, but the potentiality of water is a long way from it. Hence it is easy to light fire from air but difficult from water. It is obvious, then, that the agent has to be the more powerful the further the distance between the potentiality and the act — the distance from the one to the other which is the goal of his work. The distance between nothing and existence is infinite, because in nothing there is no ratio at all to existence, and because no greater distance than this can exist or be thought to exist. The only power that can transcend the distance without ratio and limit is that which has no ratio to other powers and no limit. This power is God alone. For all other things are exceeded by the power of God. God alone brings something from nothing into existence.[24]

Furthermore, every thing other than God Himself is called a creature by theologians, and is created necessarily from four com- 7 ponents. This is the reason the Pythagoreans attribute four elements not only to bodies but also in a way to spiritual beings, since both consist of essence, existence, power, and action. In them certainly essence is one thing, existence another; for existence is the act of essence. But if, in addition to this act, no essence were there to which such an act could cling, it would be pure and infinite act, because not circumscribed by anything. But this is

est deus. Rursus, esse ipsum ab omni esset participatione alterius absolutum. Omne vero tale unicum est in natura. Soli igitur deo convenit. Merito creatura non est ipsum esse suum, quia ipse suus actus esse nequit, cum habeat in se potentiae passivae nonnihil immixtum, quia subest deo.[49] Potentia vero opponitur actui. Quoniam vero operatio differt ab essentia magis quam esse ipsum (prius enim est essentia quam operetur), ideo ubi est essentiae et ipsius esse distinctio, multo magis est distincta operatio ab essentia. Operatio quidem ita est virtutis essentialis actus, sicut esse est actus essentiae. Quia vero creata essentia non est suus actus, ideo nec est operatio sua, alioquin operatio talis esset per se subsistens ab omni participantis limite penitus absoluta. Quod tale est unicum diximus et infinitum existere.

8 Sed numquid operatio differt ab esse, sicut ab essentia differre monstratur? Procul dubio. Duplex enim est operatio, una effluit extra operantem, ut calefactio, altera manet intus, ut cognitio et voluntas. Quae effluit sine controversia distat ab esse, quod a re ipsa non effluit. Quae manet ob id etiam discrepat, quia esse creaturae certa quadam rerum specie clauditur. Operatio talis per genera multa vagatur, immo vero intellegentia ipsa atque voluntas per infinita. Illius enim obiectum est ipsum verum, huius ipsum bonum. Verum autem et bonum saltem tam late patent, quam ipsum quod ens vocatur. Operatio vero ab obiecto trahit speciem. Ergo operatio talis omnibus rerum omnium speciebus induitur. Sed num differt operatio a virtute et virtus ab essentia atque esse? Certe. Primo enim quia actus potentiae semper opponitur, operatio, quae est actus, a virtute discrepat et essentia, quae potentiae quaedam sunt, et virtus ab esse, quod est actus, et ab essentia, quia potentiae per suos actus distinguuntur, cum propria potentia pro-

God alone. Again, the existence would be free from another's participation entirely. But all that is such is unique in nature. So it is proper to God alone. A creature rightly is not its own existence, because it cannot be its own act, since it has in itself, in that it is subject to God, some admixture of passive potentiality. But potentiality is the opposite of act. But since activity differs from essence more than existence does (for essence exists before it enacts something), then where essence is distinct from existence, activity is even more distinct from essence. Activity is the act of the essential power, as existence is the act of the essence. But since the created essence is not its own act, so neither is its own activity, otherwise such activity would be subsisting in itself completely free of the participant's every limit. What is such, we have argued, exists as something unique and infinite.

But does activity differ from existence just as it differs demonstrably from essence? Without a doubt. There are two sorts of activity: one flows outside the agent, like heating; another remains within, like knowledge and will. It can hardly be disputed that the activity which flows outside is distinct from existence, which never flows out from the thing itself. The activity which remains within also differs from existence in that a creature's existence is confined to a definite natural species. [But] such internal activity ranges through many genera; or rather, the intelligence and will range through infinite genera. For the object of the first is truth itself, and of the second, goodness itself. The true and the good extend at least as far as what is called being. But activity derives the species from the object. So internal activity of this kind is clothed with the species of all things. But does activity differ from power and power from essence and existence? Yes. Firstly, because act is always opposed to potentiality, activity which is act differs from power and essence which are kinds of potentiality; and power differs both from existence which is act and from essence (because potentialities are distinguished by their acts, since a proper poten- 8

prium respiciat actum. Essentiae actus est esse, virtutis actus est operatio. Igitur tanto inter se distant essentia atque virtus, quanto esse distat et operatio.

9 Quorsum haec tam multa? Ut intellegas operationem cuiuslibet creaturae virtuti haerere, virtutem et esse essentiae, ac nullam creaturam per substantiam proxime operari, sed per virtutem operatricem quae est qualitas sive accidens, cum a substantia undique distinguatur. Quotiens ergo aliquid operatur, qualitates quasdam proxime generat et esse dat quale habet ipsa, id est haerens alteri semper. Talia vero praecedente indigent fundamento. Quae fundamento indigent ex nihilo non creantur. Ergo nulla creatura creat aliquid. Nec iniuria. Operatio enim eius et virtus, quia haerent alteri (et quicquid haeret, non restat liberum atque integrum, sed pro facultate suscipientis accipitur) subiecti sui limitibus finiuntur. Creatio vero operatricem virtutem exigit infinitam. Itaque anima a solo creatur deo.

10 Sed forsitan putabit quispiam animam ita a deo fieri, ut per angelum tamquam medium efficiatur atque deus in ea creatione sit opifex, angelus instrumentum. Quae quidem opinio ideo videtur absurda, quoniam instrumentum hanc habet naturam, ut ipsum ab alio motum moveat aliud, afficiat subiectum aliquod formamque principalis agentis traducat in subiectum per temporis intervallum. Creatio autem neque subiectum exigit, neque fit motu vel tempore. Rursus, si creationis opus virtutem requirit immensam, quid absurdius quam ad id exsequendum virtutem ipsam quae in deo immensa est, prius in angelo, cuius natura terminata est, terminari, deinde opus illud quod ad immensam virtutem spectat peragere? Ex supradictis concluditur animam a deo summo sine medio procreari.

tiality looks to its proper act). The act of essence is existence; the act of power is activity. So essence and power are as different from each other as existence and activity.

9 To what end these many arguments? So that you may understand that the activity of any creature inheres in its power, and the power and existence inheres in its essence; and that no creature acts through its substance directly, but through the active power which is a quality or accident, since it is completely distinguished from the substance. So whenever it does something, it gives birth to certain qualities directly and gives them the existence it has itself, that is, existence always inhering in another. But such things need a pre-existent foundation. Things needing a foundation are not created from nothing. No creature, therefore, creates anything. Properly so. For its activity and power, since they inhere in another (and whatever inheres does not stay free and whole, but is received according to the capacity of the receiver), are bounded within the limits of their subject. But creation requires an infinite active power. Therefore the soul is created by God alone.

10 Maybe someone will suppose that the soul is made by God in such a way that it is accomplished with an angel acting as intermediary and that in this creation God is the craftsman and the angel the instrument. This view is obviously absurd because the nature of an instrument requires: a) that having been moved by another it moves another; b) that it affects some subject; and c) that it introduces the form of the principal agent into the subject over an interval of time. Creation, however, requires no subject, and occurs without motion or time. Furthermore, if the work of creation requires unlimited power, what could be more absurd than to have the power necessary to do this, which in God is unlimited, first be limited in an angel, whose nature is limited, and then enact the very work which requires unlimited power? The conclusion from the foregoing is that soul is created by God on high without an intermediary.

11 Cur non perfectione pares inter se sunt angelus atque anima, cum utraque a deo absque medio pendeant? Quia sub alia idea et ratione deus angelum producit, sub alia animam, illum sub altiori idea, istam inferiori. Quemadmodum ab eodem pictore homo et equus picti non aeque sunt pulchri (pulchrior enim hominis figura quam equi), quia pictor ad pulchrius suae mentis exemplar hominis picturam expressit quam equi.

12 Sed finem iam sic rationi huic imponamus. Si animae essentia proxime a deo fit, nihil inter eam et deum ipsius conservatorem intercidit medium quod ipsam a conservante disiungat. Ac si solo deo eget ut fiat, solo etiam eget ut maneat, et quia deus per eandem vim servat creata per quam creavit, ideo, sicut ex infinita dei bonitate anima ex nihilo ad esse processit, ita per eandem in esse permanet procul a nihilo, ut vita deo proxima divinae vitae simillima sit. Quod ita demum erit, si anima aut principio et fine caruerit sicut deus, aut si habuerit principium, finem saltem nullum sit habitura.

13 Timaei Platonisque sententia est deum mundi opificem per ideas, id est exemplares absolutasque rationes sua opera procreare, proinde quicquid per talem aut talem proxime creatur ideam, semper tale perseverare; quod vero deinceps, non necessario semper, sed aliquando tale. Oportere enim effectum proximum causae prodire simillimum, remotiorem vero minus similem atque deinceps dissimiliorem semper evadere. Adeo ut idea sit virtus et in se ipsa simul et sempiterna; virtus vero quae inde fit proxime, non in se, immo in aliquo sit, sed semper; quae autem fit deinceps, neque

Why aren't the angel and the soul together equal in perfection, since both depend on God without an intermediary? The answer is that God produces angel under one idea and rational principle, but soul under another: angel under a loftier idea, soul under a lower one. Similarly, a man and a horse painted by the same painter are not equally beautiful (for a man's shape is more beautiful than a horse's). This is because the painter painted the man's picture according to the model in his mind which was more beautiful than that of the horse. 11

Let us now draw this discussion to a close as follows. If the essence of soul is made directly by God, no mean intervenes between it and God who preserves it, nothing that can separate it from its preserver. And if it needs God alone to be created, it needs Him alone to remain, because God preserves the things He has created through the same power He uses to create them. Therefore, just as soul has proceeded from God's infinite goodness out of nothing into existence, so it remains through that same goodness far from nothing in existence. This is in order that the life closest to God may resemble the life divine; and it will be such at last, if the soul has no beginning or end (like God); or at least has no end. 12

The view of Timaeus and Plato is that God, the world's artificer, creates His works by way of ideas,[25] that is, models and independent rational principles, and so whatever is created directly by way of such or such an idea always remains such, whereas what is created subsequently is not necessarily such for always but only for a time. For the effect closest to the cause must emerge, they say, most like the cause, while the remoter effect must always turn out to be less like and in the end completely unlike. By the same measure the idea is the power simultaneously and eternally in itself; the power which immediately succeeds is not in itself but in another, though forever; and the power which succeeds in turn 13

in se, neque semper per naturam suam vel eadem vel similis perseveret.

14 Cum igitur rationalis quidem anima per ideam vitae absque medio fiat, tali quadam proximae originis potestate forma est semper vivens. Irrationalis autem cum inde per rationalem proficiscatur, secundum se aliquando vivens. Quod enim ab idea sola creatur, actione fit penitus stabili stabilemque inde habet essentiam. Quod autem ab idea per animam quasi mediam nascitur, quoniam actione mutabili gignitur, mobilem secundum se inde naturam ducere cogitur. Secundum se, inquam, quia vitam ab anima aethereo impressam vehiculo, tamquam speculo sempiterno, existimant semper imprimentem animam comitari; impressam vero vitam composito corpori et caduco, non semper. Nempe arbitrantur ab animae substantia semper vivente aethereum corpus sibi proximum perpetuo animari, elementale vero corpus ab ea per illud aliquando vitam accipere. Sed de his alias.

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Quarta decima ratio: quia est per se vita.

1 Anima est essentia; est et vita. Superioribus rationibus ostendimus eam esse immortalem, quia sit essentia per se existens; in praesentia vero eiusdem immortalitatem ostendimus, quia sit vita per se vivens.

2 Porro anima ex ipsa sui essentia vita est, quia totum quod est in ea est vita. Si quid enim esset in ea quod vita non esset, illud quidem non pars esset animae, et totum ipsum animatum quiddam

will remain neither in itself nor of its own nature forever the same or similar.

Since, therefore, the rational soul is created from the idea of life without an intermediary, it is an ever-living form with a power like that of its immediate source. But the irrational soul, since it originates from the rational soul, lives in itself only for a period of time. For what is created by the idea alone is made by an entirely unchanging action and derives an unchanging essence from it. But what is born from the idea by way of the soul as intermediary, because it is generated by a changing action, is forced to derive from it what is in itself a changing nature. I say "in itself" because Timaeus and Plato suppose the life imprinted in the aetherial vehicle, as in an eternal mirror, always accompanies the soul that is imprinting it, while the life imprinted in the composite and fallen body does not always accompany it.[26] Certainly, they think that the aetherial body immediately proximate to the soul is perpetually animated by the ever-living substance of the soul, while the elemental body receives life from it at a point in time and by way of the aetherial body. But more of this elsewhere. 14

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Fourteenth proof: that soul of itself is life.

Soul is essence; it is also life. We have shown in our earlier proofs that it is immortal because it is an essence existing in itself, but that it is immortal because it is a life living in itself is the topic of our present argument. 1

Soul from its very essence is life, because all that is in it is life. For if anything that was not life were in it, that would not be part of soul, and the whole would be called an ensouled something 2

potius quam anima diceretur. Fateamur igitur totam animae essentiam esse vitam. Si tota est vita, per se certe secundum formam vita dicenda est. Nam quod per aliud vivit, ipsum per se non vivens, ex duabus componitur partibus: ex natura, inquam, sui propria secundum se non viva atque ex vita illa aliunde accepta. Ita conclude: Si res illa quae per aliud vivit non tota vita est, sequitur ut res quae tota est vita per se vivat. Ergo anima quae tota est vita per se vivit, praesertim cum per se moveatur. Si ita est, per se est vita. Est igitur animae essentia vita. Cuius rei signum est, quod cuicumque advenit praestat vitam, quasi per se sit hoc ipsum quod tribuit alteri. Unde abeunte illa desinit corpus vivere ac dum adest corpori, nullum momentum cessat vitae opera exercere, corpus vivificando. Quare perennis animae actus vivificatio est. Perennis actio propria est rei actio. Propria igitur est animae actio vivificare. Vivificare autem vitae ipsius est proprium, sicut caloris est calefacere. Igitur essentia animae vita est.

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rather than soul. So let us admit that the entire essence of soul is life. If it is life entire, it must certainly be called life in itself, life formally.[27] For what lives through another, and is not living through itself, is compounded from two parts: from its own nature which in itself is not alive, and from that life it has received from elsewhere. Hence if what lives through another is not life entire, it follows that what is life entire lives through itself. Therefore soul which is life entire lives through itself, especially since it is moved through itself. If this is so, it is life in itself. The essence of soul is therefore life. One sign of this is that to whatever it is present it gives life, as though it were in itself the very thing it is giving to another. Hence, when it is not present, the body stops being alive, but as long as it is present to the body, it never ceases for a moment to perform the works of life by giving life to the body. Wherefore the eternal act of soul is giving life. Eternal action is a thing's proper action. Therefore the proper action of soul is to give life. To give life is proper to life itself just as to heat is proper to heat. Therefore the essence of soul is life.

Here is another conjectural inference. Soul gives a body life immediately it is ready for it. So it gives life from either its existence, or desire, or knowledge and deliberation. If soul were to give life to the body by its knowledge and deliberation, then everybody would know at any moment what the soul was begetting and nourishing in its innermost parts, and about the internal workings of the body. And unless they were conscious of them, they would not happen. Does the soul give life by its desire? Again the answer is no, otherwise the rational soul would remain in the body just so long as it wanted to be there, and one that hated being familiar with the body would immediately depart from the body. It remains then for soul to give life to the body by its existence, in other words by its natural power. If it gives life by its existence, then through its essence it is life or living, just as what gives heat by its existence is heat or heating through its essence or power. 3

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Quod si non libeat eam vocare vitam per se viventem, quemadmodum soles dicere calorem per se calentem, saltem per superiora cogeris confiteri animam esse substantiam propria vita vitalem, quemadmodum dicis ignem substantiam proprio calore calentem. Utrum horum acceperis, minime curo. Utrinque enim sequitur idem quod quaerimus.

4 Sed ego superioribus rationibus adducor ut animam per se vitam appellem — vitam, inquam, naturalem formamque vitalem. Vitae autem formaeque vitali contraria mors quodammodo dicitur, seu aliqua mortifera qualitas ferme,[51] sicuti caliditati frigiditas, humiditati contraria siccitas. Ea vero est contrariarum natura formarum, ut neque aliqua earum aliam capiat — ut calor non[52] suscipit frigus — neque substantia cui una illarum formarum est propria etiam suscipiat aliam formam suae[53] formae contrariam, ut ignis, cui calor est proprius, frigus non accipit ut simul sit et ignis et frigus,[54] sed abit potius aut perditur tam calor quam ignis frigore veniente,[55] quam aut calor aut ignis fiat frigidus. Est ergo uterque, ut ita loquar, infrigescibilis, cum frigoris particeps evadere nequeat. Similiter anima, quoniam aut vita ipsa naturalis est aut vitam habet tamquam naturalem sui pedissequam, mortem, ut dixi, ipsius contrariam non admittit. Si non admittit mortem, ita ferme immortalis est, sicut ignis, quia non suscipit frigus, infrigescibilis. Si idem foret infrigescibile quod imperdibile, ignis, sicut non frigescit, ita neque etiam perderetur; nunc autem perditur potius quam frigescat. Verum cum idem sit immortale quod imperdibile, anima, quae non admittendo mortem dicitur immortalis, est etiam imperdibilis. Ideo abit veniente morte, non perditur. Tota superior disputatio his verbis Zoroastris comprehenditur:

ἀθάνατός τε μένει, καὶ ζωῆς δεσπότης ἐστί

id est: "Immortalis manet, ac vitae domina est." Quasi dicat: ideo

Conclude then that the essence of soul is some kind of life. But if you are reluctant to call it life living through itself, as you normally speak of heat as heating through itself, then at least you might be compelled by the arguments above to admit that soul is a vital substance with its own life, just as you call fire a substance on fire with its own heat. It is of no concern to me which of these views you accept. For the same sought-for conclusion follows from either.

From the above arguments I myself am led to call the soul in itself life, and I mean natural life and living form. But death in a way is said to be the opposite of life and living form, or to be some sort of death-bringing quality, just as coldness is the contrary to heat and dryness to humidity. But it is the nature of opposite forms that one of them cannot accept the other — for instance, heat cannot accept cold — and that the substance to which one of the forms is proper cannot also accept another form opposite to its own form. For instance, fire, to which heat is proper, does not accept cold in order to be simultaneously both fire and cold; but heat and fire alike depart or are destroyed at the onset of cold rather than the heat or fire becoming cold. So each is "uncoldable" — to coin a word — since neither can have any part in cold. Similarly soul, because either it is natural life itself or has life as its natural attendant, does not admit death, its opposite, as I said. If it does not admit death, it is quite deathless, just as fire, because it does not accept cold, is uncoldable. If uncoldable were the same as indestructible, then fire, just as it cannot become cold, would also not be destroyed: it is destroyed rather than becoming cold. But since deathless is the same as indestructible, the soul, which is said to be deathless in not admitting death, is also indestructible. Therefore when death comes, the soul departs but is not destroyed. The whole of the above discussion is epitomized in these words of Zoroaster: "It remains immortal and is the mistress of life."[28] It is as though he were saying that the soul remains immor- 4

immortalis manet, quia vitam habet pedissequam, sicuti sol lucem, crinita comam.

Hic pugnabit sic Strato vel Epicureus aliquis. Sane mortem non suscipit anima,[56] quia veniente mortifera qualitate abit anima et desinit esse. Si esse desinit, suscipit certe nihil. At nos, o Epicuree,[57] non ita desipimus ut ignoremus non posse mortem ab aliquo suscipi, tum quia ipsa nihil est (quod vero non est, non capitur), tum quia neque viventes eam capiunt neque defuncti: illi, quia dum vivunt, a morte absunt; isti, quia si non sunt, ut ipse putas, nihil suscipiunt, et si supersunt, ut nostri volunt, etiam absunt a morte. Desistamus ludere verbis. Audi quid velimus, quando dicimus animam non suscipere mortem: intellegimus eam non admittere in se ipsa ullam mortiferam qualitatem, per quam desinat vivere. Profecto, contrariae qualitates se invicem non suscipiunt, nam se vicissim et fugant et fugiunt. Ideo calor natura sua non modo non suscipit frigus, sed neque loco etiam illi propinquat. Longissime namque sese fugant et fugiunt quae per naturam longissimo discrepant intervallo. Postquam natura sua hae formae tales sunt, si in mera sui et sola natura consisterent essentque ita, ut modo sunt, contrariae invicem, numquam sibi invicem propinquarent. Natura enim illas dissociaret neque adesset medius aliquis illarum conciliator. Tales profecto forent, si calor in se ipso subsisteret a materia separatus ut nihil praeter calorem haberet admixtum, atque frigus similiter. Nunc iacet calor in materia, quae suapte natura non minus ad frigus parata quam ad calorem; advenienti frigori sinum pandit suum. Quem ingressa frigiditas calorem inde detrudit, qui inde depulsus extinguitur, cum ab auctore suo ea lege fuerit ad esse productus, ut tamdiu maneret quamdiu a tali sinu

tal because it has life as its attendant, just as the sun has light, and a comet its tresses.

Here some Strato[29] or some Epicurean will object: Surely soul does not receive death because, when a death-dealing quality approaches, soul departs and ceases to exist. If it ceases to exist, then patently it receives nothing. But we are not so stupid, my Epicurean, as to be unaware that death cannot be sustained by anything, both because death itself is nothing (and what does not exist cannot be received), and because neither the living nor the dead can receive it: the living, because as long as they live they are absent from death; and the dead, because if they do not exist, as you yourself suppose, they sustain nothing, and if they survive, as we believe, they are also absent from death. Let us stop playing with words. Listen to what we mean when we declare that the soul does not sustain death: we mean that it does not admit in itself any death-dealing quality by which it might cease to live. Clearly, opposite qualities do not mutually receive each other; for they put each other to flight and flee in turn. So heat in its own nature not only does not sustain cold, it does not even approach where cold is. For things that naturally differ by the widest margin repel and flee from each other by the widest margin. Given that these forms are naturally such, then if they existed in their pure and natural state alone and were thus each other's opposites as they are now, they would never approach each other. For nature would keep them apart, and no intermediary would be there to act as their reconciler. Such would surely be the case if heat subsisted in itself, apart from matter, such that it had nothing else mingled with it except heat; and cold likewise. In actual fact heat resides in matter, which in its own nature is no less ready for cold than for heat; when cold approaches, it opens its bosom. Cold enters its embrace and banishes heat; and once heat is driven out it is extinguished, since it was brought forth into existence by its author on condition that it would remain only as long as it were cherished in the

materiae foveretur. Quapropter formae quae a materia sustinentur, licet formas sibi contrarias non suscipiant, illarum tamen impetu et propinquatione perduntur. Quae vero in se ipsis permanent et si quando materiae haerere videntur,[58] illam sustinent potius quam ab illa sustineantur; contrariam sibi vim non possunt admittere. Verum si qua vis advenit materiae gremio, qualitates et formas inquinat astrictas materiae, formam vero illam, quae materiam supereminet, non attingit.

6 Talis est anima. Anima, inquam, rationalis quae, cum fons motionis sit corporumque motrix, non potest a corporibus e suo statu mutari. Cumque speciei suae ingenitam habeat vitam, utpote propriam, vivit semper absque labore vivendi, praecipue quamdiu secum ipsa vivit. Propinquans vero corpori, irrationalem,[59] ut platonice loquar, ex se fundit vitam velut umbram. Ipsa quidem vera est anima animalisque vitae fons, talemque vitam non modo ad tempus suppeditat corpori, sed multo magis sibi ipsi semper, cum numquam deserat semet ipsam, neque ad se deserendam compellatur a corpore, cuius qualitas in formam non transit incorporalem; rursus neque ad idem cogatur ab animabus, quarum officium est vivificare, non perdere. Talis procul dubio rationalis anima iudicatur.

7 Irrationalis autem non vera est anima, quia neque essentia vera est, neque vera vita. Non vera essentia est, quia non existit per semet ipsam, siquidem per se non operatur, quandoquidem nihil agit absque corporis instrumentis. Non vera vita est, quoniam motionis libertate privatur. Non enim ducitur a se ipsa, sed vi trahitur ab iis rebus quae sensibus offeruntur. Ideo Platonici multi aiunt animam rationalem esse et animam et vitam subsistentem atque ex se corpus vivificantem. Sed irrationalem formam potius animationem vivificationemque corporis esse putant, quam etiam esse immortalem Xenocrates,[60] Speusippus, Numenius, Plotinus

bosom of matter. Thus forms which are sustained by matter, even if they do not sustain forms opposed to them, are nevertheless destroyed by those opposing forms' impetuous motion and proximity. But the forms which remain in themselves, even if they seem to inhere in matter, sustain matter rather than being sustained by it; they cannot admit a power contrary to themselves. But if some power arrives in the lap of matter, it defiles the qualities and forms bound to matter, but does not touch the form which towers above matter.

Such a form is soul. And I mean rational soul, which, since it is the source of motion and is the mover of bodies, cannot be changed by bodies from its own state of rest. And since it has the life innate to its species as its own, it lives forever and without the labor of living, especially as long as it lives on its own. But when it comes close to body, then irrational life, if I may speak Platonically, streams out of it, like a shadow. Rational soul is the true soul and the source of animate life, and it supplies such a life not only for a time to the body but to a much greater degree forever to itself. This is because it never abandons itself: it is not compelled to abandon itself by the body, whose quality does not cross over into incorporeal form; nor again is it compelled to the same by souls, whose office is to give life, not to take it away. Such indubitably is adjudged the rational soul. 6

The irrational soul, on the other hand, is not a true soul, as it is neither a true essence nor a true life. It is not a true essence because it does not exist in itself, since it does not operate on its own and does nothing without the body's instruments. It is not a true life because it is robbed of liberty of movement. For it is not led by itself, but forcibly dragged by the objects presented to the senses. For this reason many Platonists say that the rational soul is both a soul and a subsisting life giving life from itself to the body. However, they think that the irrational soul is a form rather, an animation and vivifying of the body. Xenocrates, Speusippus, 7

existimant, Porphyrius autem et Proclus et alii quamplurimi negant.

8 Neque mirari debemus si animas alias veras, alias falsas esse multi Platonici arbitrantur. Rerum siquidem varietas decentibus nectitur intervallis. Deus verum bonum est; angelus imago quidem est bonitatis, sed intellectus est verus; rationalis anima, imago intellectus, anima vera; irrationalis anima, imago animae, natura vera; qualitas, quae dividitur in materia, naturae imago est, verum naturalium agentium instrumentum. Sed meminisse oportet eos qui animas nostras[61] inferiores esse sempiternas existimant, etiam plantarum animas, secutos esse Aegyptios Pythagoreosque, existimantes animas humanas esse mentes delapsas in rationem atque sensum, animas vero brutorum esse nostras in sensum generationemque omnino prolapsas, plantarum denique animas esse easdem lapsas omnino in generandi potentiam, posseque omnes iterum ad superiora converti. Quod quidem Empedocles, Timaeus Locrus, Origenes, Plotinus significasse videntur. Sed haec ipsi viderint. Nos autem propositum prosequamur.

: XV :

Quinta decima ratio: quia vita est praestantior corpore.

1 Rationalis anima vera naturalis vita est. Vera vita per se corporis est formatrix et rectrix, ideoque corpore est longe praestantior. Corpus, quamvis in varias vertatur qualitates aut etiam millies dividatur in partes, numquam tamen desinit esse corpus; semper enim restat natura corporis divisibilis, cum dividantur partes in particulas sine fine. Ergo multo magis anima rationalis, quae vera

Numenius, and Plotinus suppose this form is also immortal, but Porphyry, Proclus, and many others deny it.[30]

We should not be surprised if many Platonists believe some souls are true, others false, since the diversity of things is linked by appropriate intervals. God is the true good; angel is the image of goodness but true intellect; rational soul is the image of intellect but true soul; irrational soul is the image of soul but true nature; quality, which is divided up in matter, is the image of nature but the true instrument of natural agents. We should remember that those who think that our lower souls are eternal, and the souls of plants too, are following the Egyptians and Pythagoreans who suppose: a) that human souls are [angelic] minds fallen into the reason and sense, b) that souls of beasts are our human souls fallen entirely into sense and generation, and finally c) that souls of plants are these same souls which have fallen completely into the power of generation. They also suppose that all these souls can be returned to the higher levels. This is what Empedocles, Timaeus of Locri, Origen, and Plotinus seem to have meant.[31] But that is their concern. Let us pursue the matter in hand. 8

: XV :

Fifteenth proof: that life is superior to body.

The rational soul is true, natural life. True life in itself gives form to and rules the body, and is therefore far superior to the body. However much the body shifts from one quality to another or is even divided up into a thousand parts, it never stops being body; for the nature of body always stays divisible since its parts are endlessly divided into smaller parts. Therefore *a fortiori* rational soul 1

est corporis vita, quantumcumque mutetur, numquam desinit esse vita.

2 Huius argumentationis vim in eo potissimum consistere arbitramur, quod tertia essentia, quae est sedes rationalium animarum, tres habet dotes, ex eo quod omnium medium obtinet. Primam, quod in ea refulgent verae imagines divinorum. Secundam, quod ipsa format continetque totam machinam corporalem. Tertiam, quod divina et corporalia conciliat invicem. Omnes hae dotes esse ostendunt animam sempiternam. Prima, quia si in genere corporum aliqua sempiterna sunt, in quibus umbrae sunt divinorum, multo magis animae rationales, animarum omnium praestantissimae, in quibus sunt divinorum imagines sempiternae. Prior enim in divinis vita est quam splendor, quoniam splendor eorum est tum reflexio, tum effusio vitae. Quapropter inde prius manat in animam vitae immortalis ubertas quam divinarum splendor imaginum. Secunda, quia si rationalis anima principium est formandi et continendi, neque formam suam neque constantiam naturalem potest amittere. Nempe cum totum animale genus sit toto genere corporali praestantius, et in omnibus mundi membris sint aliqua corporalia sempiterna, probabile est ut in omnibus his sint animae sempiternae. Quis enim negaverit animarum genus caput habere perpetuum, in quo rationales animae sunt, postquam corporalis mundus membra quaedam habet ubique perpetua? Tertia, quia si anima conciliationis universalis et vinculi fons est, distrahi et dissolvi non potest. Si enim universorum vinculum resolvatur, quid ulterius vincietur?

3 Platonica haec mysteria ita deinceps Aurelii Augustini sententia confirmabimus.[62] Si anima rationalis interiret corpore pereunte, necessario mutaretur corpore permutato. Non mutatur autem a

(which is the true life of the body), however much it changes, never stops being life.

2 We think that the strength of this argument consists mainly in the fact that the third essence, which is the abode of rational souls, has three special gifts, since it occupies the universal intermediary position. The first gift is that the true images of things divine are resplendent in it. The second is that it gives form to and preserves the whole corporeal machine. The third is that it mutually reconciles things divine and corporeal. All three gifts show that the soul is eternal. The first gift does so, because, if within the genus of bodies some are eternal — those in which dwell the shadows of things divine —, *a fortiori* rational souls are eternal, being the most outstanding of all souls in whom dwell the eternal images of things divine. For in things divine, life comes before splendor, because their splendor is both a reflection and a pouring forth of life. So the rich stream of immortal life flows from them into soul before the splendor of the divine images does. The second gift shows that soul is eternal, because, if the rational soul is the principle of both forming and preserving, it can lose neither its own form nor natural constancy. Given that the genus of animate things as a whole is superior to the genus of body as a whole, and that in all the world's members some corporeal entities are eternal, it is surely probable that in all these dwell eternal souls. For who will deny that the genus of souls has an eternal "head" in which dwell rational souls, seeing that the corporeal world everywhere has some eternal members? The third gift shows the soul is eternal, because, if the soul is the source of the reconciling and bonding of all things, it cannot be undone or pulled apart. For if the bond of all is unbound, what can be bound further?

3 We will confirm these Platonic mysteries by citing Aurelius Augustine's view as follows.[32] If the rational soul died when the body perished, then necessarily it would change when the body changed. But it cannot be changed by the body, for it is itself the

corpore; ipsa enim motionis principium est. Ideo cum a corpore mutari videtur, tunc ipsa et corpus mutat et se ipsam ducit ut libet. Si anima movet saepissime corpus, immobilis perseverans, longe magis ex eo quod sistit continetque corpus, se ipsam sistit et continet. Quod enim stat plurimum in movendo alio, stare potest semper in sistendo se et continendo. Quis autem nesciat, quando corpus (vel proprium vel alienum) movetur ab animo, tam motionem ipsam quam rem motam non habere sua omnia simul, sed labi prorsus a futuro in praesens atque praeteritum, in animo autem tunc esse simul propositum operis totius immobile: intentionem praesentis operis, memoriam praeteriti expectationemque futuri? Illic intentio animi circa ea quae non sunt est ipsa, dum tam ea quae nondum sunt quam ea quae non sunt amplius ipsa connectit in unum. Circa temporalia est supra tempus; circa mobilia est immobilis. Cur ergo substantia eius circa mortalia non sit immortalis? Immo cur in perpetuis attingendis non fiat ipsa perpetua, quandoquidem in tractandis mobilibus manet immobilis?

4 'Praeterea, si non tam id quod in mole est corporis quam id quod est in specie facit esse corpus — corpus enim tanto magis est quanto speciosius est atque pulchrius, tantoque minus est quanto foedius atque deformius, quae defectio non praecisione molis, sed speciei privatione contingit' — putandum est animum illum — a quo tamquam principio datur corpori forma per quam est corpus et connexio partium per quam consistit — numquam vel forma propria vel unione privari per quam est et permanet animus, quandoquidem corpus numquam omni forma et unione per quam est permanetque corpus orbatur. Neque tamen transire de specie in

principle of motion. So when it seems to be changed by the body, then it is itself changing the body and guiding itself as it wills. If the soul most often moves the body while remaining itself unmoved, then *a fortiori,* since it arrests and contains the body, it arrests and contains itself. For what remains completely unmoved in moving another is always able to remain unmoved in arresting and containing itself. For who is unaware that when a body (our own or another) is moved by the rational soul, both the movement and what is moved alike do not simultaneously possess all that is theirs, but slip directly from the future into the present and into the past; but that in the soul the purpose or plan of the whole work is then simultaneously present and unchanging: [that is,] the conception[33] of the present work, the memory of the past work, and the expectation of the future work? The intention of the soul is concerned with things which do not yet exist when it unites those that are not yet with those that are no longer. With regard to things temporal it is above time, and with regard to things movable it is immobile. So with regard to things mortal why is its substance not immortal? Or rather why, in attaining eternal things, does it not itself become eternal, since in treating of things mobile it stays immobile?

"Moreover, it is not so much what is in the mass of the body 4
that makes it a body as what is in the form. For it is more a body to the extent it is better formed and more beautiful, and less so to the extent it is more hideous and deformed, a defect which is the result not of the diminution of the mass but of the removal of the form."[34] If this is so, we must suppose that the rational soul—by which the form through which a body exists, as does the connection of the parts through which it exists, is given as a principle to the body—can never be deprived of its own form or of the unity through which it exists and stays a rational soul. This is because a body is never stripped of all form and unity through which it exists, and stays a body. Nor yet can a soul shift from species to spe-

speciem animam sicut corpus. Mutatio enim ab anima descendit in corpus et stabilior est illa quam istud. Ergo si hoc semper in genere corporali permanet, illa permanet semper in specie animali, neque in ipsa specie animali de alia in aliam animam commutabitur, non enim subest materia per quam fiat huiusmodi commutatio. 'Si non accidit mutatio talis neque animus esse, nisi vivat, potest, numquam profecto[63] animus moritur'.

5 'Quod si quisquam non eum interitum dicat formidandum animo quo efficitur ut nihil sit quod aliquid est, sed eum quo dicimus ea mortua quae vita carent, attendat quod nulla res se ipsa caret. Est autem animus vita quaedam. Unde quod animatum est vivere, omne autem inanime quod animari potest, mortuum, id est vita privatum, intellegitur. Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus verus, sed animatum aut aliquod animi simulacrum est. Quod si absurdum est, multo minus hoc genus interitus timendum est animo, quod vitae certe non est timendum. Nam prorsus si tunc moritur animus cum eum deserit vita, illa ipsa vita quae hunc deserit multo melius verus intellegitur animus, ut iam non sit animus quicquid a vita deseritur, sed ea ipsa vita quae deserit. Quicquid enim a vita desertum mortuum dicitur, id ab anima desertum intellegitur. Haec autem vita, quae deserit ea quae moriuntur, quia ipse est animus, et se ipsam non deserit'.

6 'Non moritur animus, nisi forte veram vitam, temperationem aliquam corporis aut aliquid eam sequens, ut Aristoxenus et Dicaearchus opinabantur, debemus credere. Quibus profecto numquam hoc visum esset, si ea quae vere[64] sunt et incommutabilia permanent, eodem animo a corporum consuetudine alienato atque purgato videre valuissent. Quis enim bene se inspiciens, non expertus est tanto se aliquid intellexisse sincerius, quanto longius re-

cies like a body. For change descends from soul to body, and soul is more stable than body. So if body always remains within the genus body, then soul always remains within the species soul; and within that species of soul, it will not shift from one soul to another, for the matter through which such change could occur does not underlie it. "If such change does not occur and no rational soul can exist unless it lives, certainly the rational soul never dies."[35]

"But[36] if someone were to say that the rational soul has to fear, not this sort of death which makes what is something become nothing, but the sort which makes us describe as dead those things that are without life, let him note that nothing lacks itself. But rational soul is a sort of life. So what is ensouled is alive, but all without soul that could be ensouled is understood as dead, that is, as devoid of life. Therefore rational soul cannot die. For if it can lack life, it is not true soul, but an ensouled entity or some imitation of soul. But if that is absurd, much less should rational soul fear the genus of death, because it certainly should not fear the genus of life. In short, if soul dies when life leaves it, then the life which leaves it is much better understood as the true soul inasmuch as whatever is left by the life is not now the soul; rather the soul is the life itself which leaves it. For whatever has been left by life is said to be dead, meaning it has been left by soul. But the life which leaves the things which die, because it is rational soul itself, does not leave itself. 5

"Rational soul does not die, unless perchance we are forced to believe that the true life [is] some tempering of the body or something following that tempering, as Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus supposed.[37] To be sure, they would never have entertained such a view if they had been able to evaluate the things that truly exist and endure as unchangeable realities with that same rational soul, one separated from contact with bodies and purged. For who, upon reflection, has not found that he has understood the more 6

movere atque subducere intentionem mentis a corporis sensibus potuit? Quod si ad temperationem corporis animus pertineret, non utique id posset accidere. Non enim ea res quae naturam propriam non haberet neque per se subsisteret, sed in subiecto corpore tamquam corporalis forma inseparabiliter esset, ullo modo se ab eodem corpore ad intellegibilia percipienda conaretur avertere, et quantum id posset tantum illa posset et intueri, eaque visione melior et praestantior fieri. Nullo quippe modo forma talis vel ipsa etiam corporis temperatio, quae certa commixtione efficitur earum quattuor naturarum quibus idem corpus consistit, avertere se ab eo potest, in quo subiecto est inseparabiliter'. Quinetiam cum humorum consonantia accidens quoddam compositum sit, si anima vel consonantia esset vel ab ipsa dependens, nullo modo substantiarum rerumque simplicium rationes cognosceret, affectaret et caperet.

7 'Ad haec, ea quae intellegit animus, cum se averterit a corpore, non sunt profecto corporea,[65] et tamen sunt maxime quae sunt, nam eodem modo sese semper habent. Nihilque absurdius dici potest, quam ea esse quae oculis videmus, ea non esse quae intellegentia cernimus, cum dubitare dementis sit intellegentiam incomparabiliter oculis anteferri. Haec autem quae intelleguntur, eodem modo sese habentia, cum ea intuetur animus absque aliquo instrumento, satis ostendit se illis esse coniunctum miro quodam eodemque incomparabili[66] modo, scilicet non secundum locum. Nam aut in illo sunt, aut ipse in illis, aut utrumque per se subsistit'.

8 Si primum illud est, non est harmonia corporis animus aut harmoniae mancipatus. Quicquid enim tale est a corpore tamquam subiecto separari non potest, propterea quicquid in illo est cor-

clearly to the extent he has been able to subdue and completely divert his mind's attention from the body's senses? But if soul pertained to the tempering of the body, this could not happen. For this tempering thing, which neither had its own nature nor subsisted in itself, but existed in a corporeal substrate inseparably as a corporeal form, would try neither to turn itself in any manner away from that same body in order to perceive the intelligibles, nor to gaze upon them to the extent it was able to gaze upon the body, nor to become better and more noble because of that vision. In no way can such a form, or even the tempering itself of a body which is the result of a mingling of the four natures that make up the same body, turn itself away from the substrate in which it inseparably exists." Furthermore, since the harmony of the humors is an accidental compound, if the soul were such a harmony or something dependent on it, in no way would it understand, or desire, or attain the rational principles of substances and of uncompounded things.

"Furthermore,[38] the objects which the rational soul understands 7
when it turns away from body are clearly not corporeal; yet they exist to the fullest possible degree, for they always exist in the same manner. And nothing could be more absurd than to say that what we see with our eyes exists, but what we see with our intelligence does not exist, since it is insane to doubt that the understanding is preferred, incomparably so, to the eyes. But when the soul sees these objects which are understood and which exist in the same manner, and sees them without some instrument, it sufficiently shows that it has been joined to them in a wonderful and similarly incomparable way, that is, without regard to place. For either the intelligibles are in the rational soul, or the soul is in them, or both subsist in themselves."

If it is the first option, the rational soul is not the body's har- 8
mony nor delivered over to that harmony. For whatever is such cannot be separated from the body as from its subject, and there-

pori aeque atque illud adstringitur. Mutabile autem est corpus humanum, mutabiles igitur erunt rationes illae rerum quae sunt in animo contemplante, si animus mutabili corpori alligatur. Mutabiles autem esse rationes illae non possunt. Semper enim eodem modo verum est, quod duo et quattuor sex conficiunt, quodve quae comparatio est duorum ad quattuor, eadem quattuor est ad octo ceteraque generis huius quamplurima. Rationes huiusmodi inseparabiliter insunt animo qui semper et subito iis utitur pro arbitrio. In quibus ars consistit ratiocinandi, quae ab animo rationali minime separatur. Nam si ab eo ratio illa artificiosa vel ars rationalis quae rationum coetus est separabitur, aut nusquam erit aut in re aliqua non vivente aut in re vivente. Nusquam esse non est dicendum perpetuas et immutabiles rationes. Esse quoque in re non vivente rationes veras impossibile est, siquidem vita rationis est fundamentum. Si autem artificiosa ratio de vita transit in vitam, numquam id facit commodius quam cum docet quis alios. Cum vero id non contingat (nemo enim docendo alios obliviscitur), non fit transitus. Ars igitur inseparabiliter inest animo. Inesset quoque corpori, si animus esset corporis harmonia. Quapropter mutabilis esset, sicut corpus, tam ratio ipsa quam animus. Cum vero ratio talis sit immutabilis, ideoque et animi essentia immutabilis, cui illa tamquam subiecto inest, non est animus corporis temperatio. Atque ita disputasse sufficiat ex[67] primo illo divisionis superioris membro, quo concessum sit animo rationes inesse.

9 Praeterea, si quis secundum illud membrum admiserit, scilicet illis inesse animum, sequitur idem. Quo enim pacto animus est corporis temperatio, si in ratione rerum a corpore separata est tamquam subiecto, cum non possit esse alibi quam in corpore cor-

fore whatever is in the soul is as tied to the body as it is. But the human body is mutable, so those rational principles of things which exist in the contemplating soul will be mutable, if the soul is tied to the mutable body. But those rational principles of things cannot be mutable. For it is always true in the same way that $2+4=6$ and that the ratio of 2:4 is the same as that of 4:8, and the rest of the countless examples of this kind. Such rational principles are inseparably present in the soul which uses them always and at a moment's notice when it chooses to.[39] The art of reasoning, which can in no way be separated from the rational soul, depends on them. For if artful reasoning or the rational art, which is the union of all the rational principles, is going to be separated from the soul, it will exist either nowhere or in something that is not living or in something living. One cannot say that the eternal and unchangeable rational principles exist nowhere. And it is impossible too that true rational principles should be in some nonliving thing, for life is the basis of reason. But if artful reasoning were to migrate from one life to another, it would never do this more conveniently than when someone teaches other people. But since this does not happen (for no one forgets in teaching others), this migration does not occur. Therefore the art of reasoning is inseparably present in the soul. It would be present too in the body, if the soul were the body's harmony. For then the reasoning and the soul alike would be mutable, like the body. But since such reasoning is unchanging, and so the essence of a soul in which it inheres as in a subject is unchanging, soul is not the tempering of body. Enough for the first of the above options where one concedes that the rational principles are present in soul.

Furthermore, if someone grants the second option, namely that the rational soul is present in the principles, the same conclusion follows. For how is soul the tempering of body if it is in things' rational principle and separated from body as from its subject, since a body's tempering cannot be anywhere but in the body? If you 9

poris temperatio? Si tertium divisionis illius membrum concesseris, scilicet utrumque substantiam per se subsistentem esse, tam animum, quam ipsam[68] rationem rerum, per se subsistet animus, neque temperationi corporis adstringetur. Denique quodcumque membrum divisionis acceperis, una haec summopere ratio persuadet animum in complexione corporis tamquam origine non iacere, quia non tam avide, tam facile, tam assidue, dum philosophamur, mutabili posthabito corpore, immutabilibus rationibus sese misceret, neque melius esset cum est in illis quam cum est in corpore. Est autem in illis tanto melius quam in corpore quanto praestantius vivit in illis quam in ipso. Tanto autem vivit praestantius quanto perfectius operatur. Operatur vero in illis perfectius, quia intellegit verius, desiderat pacatius, fruitur dulcius, plenius atque securius. Et cum saepe consonante secum corpore, animus ipse dissonet secum tum speculatione, tum moribus atque contra consonet dissonante, qui non viderit animum non consistere in corporis consonantia, is dissonat veritati.

10 Sed ut revertamur ad Aurelium, 'Hic forte oboritur nonnulla quaestio: utrum sicut non interit animus, ita nec in deteriorem commutetur essentiam. Videri enim cuipiam potest neque iniuria id effectum esse ratione hac, ut animus ad nihilum pervenire non possit, converti autem in corpus forsitan possit. Si enim quod erat ante animus corpus fuerit effectum, non utique omnino non erit. Sed hoc fieri non potest, nisi aut ipse id velit aut ab alio cogatur. Neque continuo tamen animus sive ipse id appetierit, sive coactus fuerit, poterit corpus esse. Illud enim sequitur ut, si sit, necessaria velit aut cogatur. At illud non sequitur ut, si velit aut cogatur, sit. Numquam autem volet, nam omnis eius appetitus ad corpus aut ut id possideat est, aut ut vivificet, aut ut quodammodo fabricet,

grant the third of the options, namely that both entities, the soul and the rational principle of things alike, are each a substance subsisting in itself, then soul will subsist on its own and will not be tied to the tempering of body. Lastly, whichever of the three options you accept, this one overriding argument persuades us that soul does not rest in the body's complexion as in its origin, namely that when we philosophize, the soul would not mix so eagerly, so readily, so assiduously with the unchanging rational principles, ignoring the changeable body, nor would it be better when it is in them than when it is in the body. But it is better in them than in the body to the degree that it lives more nobly in them than in the body. It lives more nobly to the degree it operates more perfectly. But it operates more perfectly in the principles, because it understands more truly, desires more peacefully, and enjoys more sweetly, fully, and imperturbably. And since often, even as the body is in harmony with itself, the soul is untuned by contemplation or moral virtue, or, conversely, the soul is in harmony even as the body is out of tune, the person who does not see that the soul is not the body's harmony is not himself in harmony with the truth.

10 But to return to Augustine. "At[40] this point a question may arise. Granted that the rational soul does not die, is it also impossible for it be changed into an inferior essence? For someone could suppose and not unjustly that it has been proved by this argument that soul cannot be reduced to nothing but can perhaps be converted into body. For if what was previously soul has become body, it will not entirely cease to exist. But this cannot happen unless soul itself wishes it or is forced by another. Yet it does not immediately follow that a soul, whether it has itself desired it or been subject to compulsion, could be body. For it is a logical necessity that, if it is body, it either wishes or is compelled to be body. But it does not follow, if it wishes or is compelled, that it is body. But it will never wish it; for all its desire for body is either to possess it,

aut quolibet pacto ei consulat. Nihil autem horum fieri potest, si non sit corpore ipse melior. At si erit corpus, melior corpore profecto non erit. Non igitur esse corpus volet, neque ullum huius rei certius argumentum est quam cum se ipsum hoc interrogat animus. Ita enim facile comperit appetitum se non habere nisi agendi aliquid aut sciendi aut sentiendi aut vel tantummodo vivendi, quantum sua illi potestas est'.

11 'Si autem cogitur corpus esse, a quo tandem cogitur? Num a quolibet? Certe a potentiore. Non igitur a corpore potest. Nullo enim modo ullo animo ullum potentius corpus. Potentior autem animus non cogit in aliquid, nisi quod suae potestati subditum est. Nec ullo modo animus potestati alterius animi, nisi suis cupiditatibus subditur. Cogit ergo ille animus non magis quam quantum eius cupiditates sinunt, quem cogit. Dictum est autem cupiditatem non posse animum habere ut corpus sit. Illud etiam manifestum est, ad nullam suae cupiditatis expletionem pervenire, dum amittit omnem cupiditatem, et amittit dum corpus fit. Non ergo potest ab eo cogi ut fiat, qui potestatem cogendi nisi per subditas cupiditates non habet.[69] Deinde quisquis animus alterum animum habet in potestate, magis eum necesse est velit in potestate habere quam corpus, et ei vel bonitate consulere vel malitia imperare. Non ergo volet ut corpus sit'.

12 'Postremo iste animus cogens aut animal est aut caret corpore. Sed si caret corpore, in hoc mundo non est, sed si ita est, summe bonus est, nec potest velle alteri tam turpem commutationem. Si autem animal est, aut animal etiam est ille quem cogit, aut non est. Sed si non est, nihil cogi ab alio potest. Non enim habet potentiorem qui in summo est, id est, non cogitur qui est solutus. Si autem in corpore est, ab eo rursus qui in corpore est, per corpus

or to give it life, or to fashion it in a way, or to look after it in some manner. But none of this can ensue if it is not itself better than body. But if it is going to be body, it will obviously not be better than body. So it will not wish to be body, nor is there a more convincing argument for this than when the soul asks itself about the issue. For then it easily discovers that it has no desire except for doing something, or knowing, or feeling, or simply living as much as lies within its power.

"But[41] if it is forced to be body, by what, pray, is it forced? By just anything? Surely by something more powerful. So it cannot be by body. For in no way is any body more powerful than any soul. But a more powerful soul does not compel anything unless it has been subjected to that soul's power. In no way is one soul subject to another soul's power except by its own desires. So one soul compels but no more than is permitted by the desire of the other soul it compels. But we have declared that a soul cannot have the desire to be body. It is also clear that it cannot reach the fulfillment of its desire while it is losing all desire, and it loses desire when it is made body.[42] So it cannot be compelled to become body by a soul which does not have the power of compelling except by way of these subjected desires.[43] Next, any soul that has another soul in its power necessarily prefers to have it rather than body in its power, and either to look after it with goodness or to rule over it with evil. So it will not want it to be body. 11

"Finally,[44] the rational soul that compels is either a living creature or it lacks a body. But if it lacks a body, then it is not in this world, and if this is so it is supremely good, nor can it wish on another a terrible change for the worse. But if it is a living creature, then the soul too which it compels is either a living creature or it is not. But if it is not, it cannot be compelled by the other. For the soul which is in the highest rank does not have a more powerful soul than it; in other words, the soul which is free is not compelled. But if it is in a body, then it is again compelled by a soul in 12

cogitur ad quodcumque cogitur. Quis autem dubitet nullo modo per corpus fieri tantam commutationem animo? Fieret enim si esset illo corpus potentius. Quamvis quicquid illud est ad quod per corpus cogitur, prorsus non per corpus, sed per cupiditates suas cogitur de quibus satis est dictum. Quod autem rationali anima melius est omnibus consentientibus divinum est, quod profecto consulit animae, et ideo non ab eo cogi anima potest, ut convertatur in corpus'.

13 'Si igitur nec propria voluntate nec alio cogente id anima patitur, unde id pati potest? An quia invitos nos plerumque opprimit somnus, metuendum est ne quo tali defectu animus convertatur in corpus, quasi vero quoniam somno membra nostra marcescunt, idcirco animus fiat ex parte ulla debilior? Sensibilia tamen non sentit, quia quicquid illud est quod somnum facit e corpore est atque in corpore operatur. Corporeos enim sensus sopit et claudit quodammodo, ita tamen ut tali commutationi corporis cedat anima cum voluntate, quia secundum naturam est talis commutatio quae reficit corpus a laboribus. Non tamen haec adimit animo vel sentiendi vim vel intellegendi. Nam et imagines sensibilium praesto habet tanta expressione similitudinis, ut eo ipso tempore discerni nequeant ab iis[70] rebus quarum imagines sunt. Et si quid intellegit, aeque dormienti ac vigilanti verum est. Nam verbi gratia, si per somnum disputare sibi visus fuerit verasque rationes secutus in disputando didicerit aliquid, etiam expergefacto eadem incommutabilia manent, quamvis falsa reperiantur cetera, veluti locus ubi disputatio et persona cum qua disputatio fuisse visa erat,

a body and by way of body to do whatever it is compelled to. But can anybody doubt that it is impossible for such a great change to come about in the soul through the agency of a body? For it would only happen if the body were more powerful than it. But whatever it is compelled to do through the body, it is not, strictly speaking, compelled to do it through the body but through its own desires (concerning which enough has been said). But everybody would agree that what is superior to the rational soul is divine and certainly looks after the soul, and so the soul cannot be compelled by it to be changed into body."

"If[45] then the soul does not submit to this through its own will 13 or through the compulsion of another, what does make it submit? Because sleep often overcomes us against our will, should we be worried that the rational soul is changed into body during this time of weakness, as though indeed, because our limbs go limp in sleep, our soul were to become more feeble in any part? Yet the soul is not perceiving sensibles then, because whatever it is that provokes sleep comes from the body and operates in the body. Sleep lulls the bodily senses, in a way closing them off, yet in such a manner that the soul accedes voluntarily to this change of the body, because such a change, which refreshes the body from its labors, is natural. Yet sleep does not destroy in the soul its power of perceiving and understanding. For soul has images of sensible objects at hand with such an expressive likeness that at the time they cannot be distinguished from the objects of which they are images. And whatever soul understands is as true for the sleeping soul as for the waking. If, for example, it appears to the soul that during sleep it has been in a discussion, and in the discussion, having pursued true reasons, it has learned something, then the same unchangeable [truths] remain even when it has woken up and although the rest of the context may be found to be unreal: the setting of the discussion, the person with whom the discussion appeared to have taken place, the words themselves which relate to

et verba ipsa quae ad somnum attinent quibus disputari videbatur, et alia huiuscemodi quae ipsis sensibus sentiuntur aguntur que a vigilantibus. Praetereunt tamen, nec ulla ex parte sempiternam praesentiam verarum rationum assequuntur. Ex quo colligitur tali commutatione corporis quae somnus est,[71] non vim ipsius animae,[72] sed vitam corporis posse minui'.

14 'Postremo, si quamvis locum occupanti corpori anima tamen non localiter iungitur, summis illis aeternisque rationibus quae incommutabiliter manent nec utique continentur loco, prior afficitur anima quam corpus, nec prior tantum, sed etiam magis. Tanto enim prior quanto propinquior, et eadem causa tanto etiam magis quanto etiam corpore melior, nec ista propinquitas loco,[73] sed naturae[74] ordine dicta sit. Hoc autem ordine intellegitur a summa essentia speciem corpori per animam tribui, qua est quantumcumque est. Per animam ergo corpus subsistit, et eo ipso est quo animatur, sive universaliter ut mundus, sive particulariter ut unumquodque animal intra mundum'.

15 'Quapropter consequens erat ut anima per animam corpus fieret, nec omnino aliter posset. Quod quia non fit — manente quippe anima in eo quod anima est, corpus per illam subsistit, dantem speciem, non adimentem — commutari in corpus anima non potest. Si enim non tradit speciem quam sumit[75] a summo bono, non per illam fit corpus, et si non per illam fit, aut non fit omnino aut tam propinque speciem sumit quam anima. Nec etiam fit corpus, quia sit tam propinque sumeret speciem, idem esset quod anima. Nonne eo ipso est anima melior quo sumit propinquius? Tam propinque autem etiam corpus sumeret, si non per

the dream and which the soul appeared to be using in the discussion, and other matters of this sort which are perceived by the senses and discussed by people awake. Yet the unreal aspects pass away and do not attain in any way the eternal presence of the true rational principles. We infer from this that it is not the power of the soul, but the life of the body which can be diminished by such a change of the body as occurs in sleep."

"Finally,[46] if, though body is occupying place, soul is not joined to it spatially, then soul is affected by the highest and eternal rational principles, which immutably remain and are not spatially confined; and it is affected prior to body, and not only prior, but to a much greater degree than body. For the closer it is, the earlier it is affected, and, for the same reason, the better it is than body, the more it is affected. We are not talking here of closeness in space, but in the order of nature. In that order, it is understood that form is bestowed on body by the highest essence through soul, and body is as big as it is by this form. So body subsists through soul, and it exists in that by which it is given life, whether universally as the universe, or particularly as an individual creature within the universe." 14

"Hence the conclusion [of the earlier discussion] was that soul might become body by means of soul, but otherwise it could not happen at all. But because it does not happen—while soul remains in that which is soul, body subsists through soul giving it form, not destroying it—soul cannot be changed into body. For were soul not to bequeath the form it assumes from the highest good, body would not be made through that form; and were it not to become body through that form, either it would not become at all, or it would assume the form directly just as soul does. Nor would it even become body, because if it assumed the form as directly, it would be the same as soul. Isn't soul better precisely because it assumes a form more directly? But body too would assume it as directly if it did not assume it through soul. For if 15

animam sumeret. Etenim nullo interposito tam propinque utique sumeret. Nec invenitur aliquid congruens medium inter summam vitam, quae sapientia et veritas est incommutabilis, et id quod ultimum vivificatur, id est corpus, nisi vivificans anima. Quod si tradit speciem anima corpori, ut sit corpus quantum est, non utique speciem tradendo adimit. Adimit autem speciem in corpus animam transmutando. Non igitur anima sive per se ipsam corpus fit (quod per eam fit) quia non nisi manente anima corpus per eam fit, sive per alia, quia non nisi traditione speciei fit corpus per animam et ademptione speciei anima in corpus converteretur, si converteretur'.

16 'Hoc et de irrationali anima vel vita, quod nec in eam rationalis anima convertitur dici potest. Et ipsa enim, nisi inferiori ordine rationali subiiceretur, aeque speciem sumeret et talis esset. Tradunt ergo speciem a summa pulchritudine acceptam potentiora infirmioribus naturali ordine. Et utique cum tradunt non adimunt, eoque sunt quae infirmiora sunt quantum sunt, quod species qua sunt eis a potentioribus traditur, quae quidem potentiora etiam meliora sunt. Quod his naturis datum est, quae non mole maiore plus possunt minoribus molibus, sed sine tumore ullo localis magnitudinis eadem specie potentiora sunt, qua meliora. In quo genere est anima corpore melior et potentior'.

17 'Quapropter cum per illam, ut dictum est, corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus converti nullo modo potest. Corpus enim nullum fit nisi accipiendo per animam speciem. At anima ut corpus fieret, non accipiendo speciem sed amittendo fieri posset. Et ideo fieri nullo modo potest'.

nothing interposed, it would surely assume it as directly.[47] And nothing else is found as an appropriate mean between the highest life, which is unchangeable wisdom and truth, and the last thing to be given life, namely body, except soul that gives life. But if soul bequeaths form to body so that it might exist as body to the extent it does exist, at least it is not taking form away in the process of passing it on. But in changing soul into body, soul is taking form away. So soul does not become body, which is made through soul, either through itself—since only by soul remaining [soul] is body made through soul—or through others—since body is made through soul only by the passing on of form, and only by the destruction of form would soul be changed, if it were changed, into body."

"Of[48] the irrational soul or life too it can be said that the rational soul is not changed into it. For unless in its inferior status it were subject to rational soul, it would take form in equal measure as and be like the rational soul. The stronger take the form they have received from the highest beauty and pass it on to the weaker in the natural order. And when they pass it on, they do not destroy it. What enables the weaker to exist to the extent that they do is that the form which gives them existence is passed down by the stronger, which, being the stronger, are also the better. This has been granted to those natures which are not more powerful by being bigger than smaller things, but which, without any enlargement of spatial magnitude, are more powerful because of the same form that makes them better. Soul is better and more powerful in this genus than body." 16

"Wherefore, since body subsists through soul, as has been said, soul cannot in any way be changed into body. For no body is made except by receiving form through soul. But in order to become body, soul would have to be in the position not of accepting form but of losing it. And so in no way can it become body." 17

LIBER SEXTUS[1]

: I :

Reductio opinionum de anima in quinque capita.

1 Haec olim in agro Regnano apud Ioannem Cavalcantem, unicum amicum nostrum, kalendis Martiis sub Lauro disputaveram. Quibus disserendis interfuerunt praecipui familiares nostri tres, Christophorus Landinus, Bernardus Nuthius, Georgius Antonius Vespuccius, viri probitate et doctrina clarissimi.

2 His autem Ioannes summa cum attentione auditis: 'Marsili Ficine', inquit, 'dici non posset quantum superiori disputatione fuerim delectatus. Sed hoc insuper cupio ut, postquam de communi animarum rationalium immortalitate disseruisti, deinceps, si placet, diligentius de animae nostrae immortalitate propriis rationibus disseras. Assentior equidem quinque esse rerum gradus, quemadmodum superiori disputatione disposuisti, atque horum medium obtinere tertiam illam essentiam quae a materia soluta sit ac perpetua. Praeterea caelestes animas in illius essentiae gradu collocari non dubito. Opinor etiam probabile esse ut ibidem noster animus collocetur. Arbitror tamen non prius id posse penitus affirmari quam omnes opiniones philosophorum de hominis anima ad quinque capita reducantur et quattuor confutatis ultima teneatur'.

3 'Aut enim anima corpusculum aliquod est tenuissimum corpori huic crassiori suffusum, sive igneum id sit ut Democritus, Leucippus et Hipparchus existimant, sive aereum ut Anaximenes, Diogenes Apollionates et Critias, sive aquaeum ut Hippias, sive terreum

BOOK VI

: I :

Summary of opinions on soul under five heads.

On the first of March and under a laurel,[1] I had once discussed the foregoing matters at Regnano in the country, at the house of Giovanni Calvacanti,[2] our incomparable friend. Three of our distinguished friends, Cristoforo Landino,[3] Bernardo Nuzzi,[4] and Georgio Antonio Vespucci,[5] men of probity and exceptional learning, participated in the discussion. 1

After listening to these men most attentively, Giovanni said: "Marsilio Ficino, I cannot tell you how much I enjoyed the foregoing discussion. But, having treated of the general immortality of rational souls, it is also my wish that you next treat, I beg you, in greater detail and with specific proofs, of the immortality of our soul. I agree there are five levels of being as you have established in the preceding discussion and that the third essence which is apart from matter and everlasting occupies the middle of these. Moreover, I do not doubt that the celestial souls are situated on the level of this essence. I also think it probable that our soul is situated there. However, I do not think it can be completely affirmed before we have taken all the views of the philosophers concerning the soul of man and reduced them to five, and, having confuted four of the views, accepted the last. 2

"First alternative: the soul is a very fine miniature body spread throughout our grosser body, whether it be fiery (the view of Democritus, Leucippus, and Hipparchus[6]), or airy (the view of Anaximenes, Diogenes Apolloniates[7] and Critias[8]), or watery (the view of Hippias[9]), or earthy (the view of Hesiod and Pronop- 3

ut Hesiodus et Pronopides, sive ex igne constet et aere ut Boethus et Epicurus, sive ex aqua et terra ut Xenophantes'.

4 'Aut melius aliquid est anima, id est non moles ipsa corpusculi proprie, sed qualitas illius aliqua per partes corpusculi sparsa, puta calor vel complexio calida, quod voluisse videntur Zeno Citieus,[2] Cleanthes, Antipater, Posidonius'.

5 'Aut purius aliquid, veluti punctum aliquod lucidum qualitatis illius in quadam ipsius qualitatis et corpusculi parte potiori, puta cordi[3] vel cerebro assignatum, ibi residens, inde reliqua membra gubernans, ut est apud Chrysippum, Archelaum et Heraclidem Ponticum'.

6 'Aut liberius adhuc quiddam, ceu punctum aliquod nulli parti affixum, sed ab omni determinato situ seclusum, ac totum parti corporis cuique praesens, sed tale ut sit ab ipsa corporis natura dependens. Dependens, inquam, duobus modis scilicet, vel quia corporis complexio ipsum genuerit, vel quia licet complexio ipsum non genuerit, tamen genitor suus, quicumque sit ille, ipsum ex materiae potentia eiusque visceribus eduxerit, id est ex aliquo semine sive incohatione seu proportione materiae ipsius in lucem eruerit atque ipsi materiae, tamquam naturali gremio, prorsus addixerit. Quam sententiam Xenophanes Colophonius, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus Critolausque[4] sequuntur, apud quos anima est vel vis quaedam corporis agilis ad movendum vel partium corporalium harmonia'.

7 'Aut postremo divinum quiddam est hominis anima, id est aliquid individuum, totum cuique parti corporis adstans et ab incorporeo auctore ita productum, ut ex agentis virtute solummodo, non ex materiae incohatione aut capacitate aut fomento dependeat, sicut nos docent prisci theologi: Zoroaster, Mercurius, Or-

ides[10]), or a combination of fire and air (the view of Boethus[11] and Epicurus), or of water and earth (the view of Xenophan[t]es).[12]

"Second alternative: the soul is something better than body, that is to say it is not itself strictly speaking the actual bulk of the miniature body, but some quality it possesses which is spread through its parts such as heat or a warm complexion[13] (this seems to be what Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Antipater and Posidonius had in mind[14]). 4

"Third alternative: the soul is something purer, like some bright point of the quality in a better part of the quality and miniature body, a point assigned to the heart say or the brain. Residing there it thence governs the other members (the view of Chrysippus,[15] Archelaus,[16] and Heraclides of Pontus[17]). 5

"Fourth alternative: the soul is something freer still, like a point that is not attached to any part but cut off from any particular location; it is present in its entirety in every part of the body, but is such that it depends on the nature of the body. It depends, I say, in one of two ways: either the body's complexion has produced it, or else, though the complexion has not produced it, yet the progenitor of it, whoever he may be, has led it forth from the potentiality, from the vitals, of matter; drawn it out in other words from some seed, whether an inchoate foundation or proportion of matter itself, into the light of day, and then awarded it completely to matter, to its natural bosom so to speak. Xenophanes of Colophon,[18] Asclepiades, Aristoxenus and Critolaus[19] agree with this view and for them soul is either a swift-moving power of the body or a harmony of bodily parts. 6

"Final alternative: man's soul is something divine, that is, something indivisible, wholly present to every part of the body and produced by an incorporeal creator such that it depends only on the power of that agent, not on the inchoate foundation or capacity or kindling of matter. The ancient theologians teach us this: Zoroaster, Mercury, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, and Plato,[20] 7

pheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras, Plato, quorum vestigia sequitur plurimum physicus Aristoteles'.

8 'Praeter has quinque opiniones aliae nullae inveniuntur. Tu vero tunc demum immortalitatem ad nos pertinere monstraveris, quando reprobatis quattuor superioribus opinionibus approbaveris ultimam. Sic enim constabit animam nostram in tertiae essentiae ordine collocari. Id vero non mihi solum videtur, sed etiam, cum superioribus diebus apud Bernardum Bembum tuum, clarissimum equitem atque hoc tempore Veneti senatus oratorem, convivio discumberemus, meministi, ut arbitror, idem Antonio Chronico Veneto ac Demetrio Attico disputatoribus argutissimis visum fuisse, mox etiam a Ricciardo Angellerio Angliariensi et ab Oliviero Arduino Florentino, insignibus Peripateticis, similiter esse conclusum, ubi affuerunt tres amici, Naldus Naldius, Bartholomaeus Fontius, Ioannes Baptista Boninsegnius, viri doctissimi. Eandem esse sententiam nosti[5] Petri Leonis Spoletini qui platonica peripateticis praeclarissime iunxit.' Haec ille. His ego ita respondi.

: II :

Plebei philosophi non ratione aliqua persuasi, sed prava decepti consuetudine corporalem animam posuerunt.

1 Principio plebeos philosophos qui corporalem esse animam arbitrantes opinionem ex illis quattuor aliquam secuti sunt, non ratione aliqua persuasos, sed longa quadam et infelicissima consuetudine in hanc sententiam compulsos existimo.

whose footsteps Aristotle, the natural philosopher, for the most part follows.

8 "No other views can be found except these five. But you really will have shown that immortality belongs to us, when, having disposed of the first four views, you have given proof of the last. It will be established then that our soul is located in the order of the third essence. This is not only my view. When were dining a few days ago with your friend Bernardo Bembo,[21] a distinguished aristocrat and, at that time, an ambassador of the Venetian senate, you remember, I think, that Antonio Chronico of Venice[22] and Demetrius of Attica,[23] a pair of skilled debaters, were of the same opinion; and that Riccardo Angelleri of Anghiari[24] and Oliviero Arduini the Florentine,[25] two well known Peripatetics, soon thereafter came to a like conclusion in which [our] three friends, Naldo Naldi,[26] Bartolomeo della Fonte,[27] and Giovanni Battista Boninsegni,[28] highly educated men, supported them. You know too that this is the view of Pierleone of Spoleto,[29] who has done a brilliant job of combining Platonic with Aristotelian doctrines." This is what he said, and I replied thus.

: II :

Those who posit that soul is corporeal are vulgar philosophers not persuaded by any reason but beguiled by perverse custom.

1 To commence at the beginning, I think that those vulgar philosophers who, in supposing that the soul is corporeal, have adopted any of the first four views have not been persuaded by some reason but been forced into this opinion most unfortunately by long usage and custom.

2 Tria potissimum animae nostrae officia esse videntur. Siquidem agit in corpore, agit per corpus, operatur etiam per se ipsam. In corpore per eam potentiam quam vegetatricem vocant Peripatetici, Platonici vero nostri naturam, quando generat corpus nutritque et auget. Per corpus agit secundum sensum tum exteriorem, quando videt, audit, olfacit, gustat et tangit, tum interiorem, quando eorum corporum quae sensit extrinsecus imagines quasi reliquias sensuum secum ipsa resolvit. Per se ipsam agit, quando neque corpora per sensus exteriores attingit, neque imagines corporum per interiorem sensum recolligit, sed ipsa mera vis animae incorporeaque incorporeum aliquid investigat et invenit, quod neque corpus sit neque corporis alicuius imago, quam quidem actionem intellegentiam nominamus. Habes igitur actionem naturalem, sensum, intellegentiam.

3 Actione naturali utitur anima in ipso foetu statim corpus ingressa; sensu paulo post, homine videlicet statim nato; intellegentia pura vix tandem adulto iam corpore. Magna vero pars hominum fere numquam, illi praesertim qui etiam trigesimo aetatis anno sunt pueri. Si potentiam illam naturalem, quid anima sit interroges, corpus esse procul dubio respondebit, ea siquidem vis nihil attingit aliud nisi corpus. Si sensum exteriorem rogaveris, corpus similiter respondebit.[6] Oculi figuram quandam et colorem animae adscribent, aures vocem, olfactus odorem, saporem gustus, pondus soliditatemque et calorem et similia tactus. Quod si sensum interiorem, qui reliquiis externorum sensuum pascitur, de anima fueris percontatus, ipse quoque animam corporum pinget simulacris; nihil enim habet aliud quod adhibeat. Infelix adolescentia nostra sub indoctis praeceptoribus his nutrita cogit nos per omnem aetatem stulte sentire de anima, dum eam opinamur esse

The main offices of our soul are apparently three: it acts in the body, it acts through the body, and it acts too through itself. It acts in the body through that power which the Aristotelians call the vegetative power, but our Platonists call nature, when it generates and nourishes the body and makes it grow. It acts through the body both by means of external sensation when it sees, hears, smells, tastes, and touches, and by means of internal sensation when it takes the images of those bodies it has perceived externally, the left-over images so to speak of the senses, and resolves them in itself. It acts through itself, not when it makes contact with bodies through the external senses or collects the images of bodies through the inner sense, but when the soul's pure and incorporeal power tracks down and discovers an incorporeal something which is neither a body, nor the image of some body—and this action we call understanding. So you have natural [or vegetative] activity, sensation, and understanding. 2

The soul uses natural activity in the foetus directly it has entered the body; it uses sensation a little later, directly a child is born; it uses pure understanding, but barely, when the body has already reached maturity. Indeed the majority of human beings almost never use understanding, especially those who are still children even at the age of thirty. Were you to ask that natural power what soul is, it would doubtless reply that it is body, since that power has no contact with anything else except body. Were you to ask external sensation, it would similarly answer that it is body: eyes would assign a shape and color to the soul; ears, a voice; smell, an odor; taste, a savor; touch, a weight, solidity, heat, and so on. But were you to question inner sensation, which feeds on the left-overs of the external senses, about the soul, it would depict the soul with the images of bodies; for it does not have anything else to bring to bear. Our wretched adolescence, nurtured by these ignorant tutors, compels us to think about the soul our whole life like fools as long as we believe the soul is corporeal—we who have 3

corpoream, ab his docti magistris qui sola sentiunt corporalia. Maxime vero hic error inde videtur exortus, immo vero potius confirmatus, quod si quando tribus his praeceptoribus tamquam sophistis omnino dimissis ad mentem illam sapientiae magistram confugimus et ab ea quid sit anima sciscitamur, illa talem esse respondet qualem et ipsa videt. Illa vero, heu, qualem videt? Quam foedam! Quam miserabilem! Profecto non talem[7] qualis olim caelo descenderat, sed potentiam illam animae naturalem corporis fabricatricem cernit quattuor humorum, in quibus ipsa mergitur, tabe pollutam et membrorum pinguedine suffocatam. Sensus quoque externos inspicit undique declinantes ad corpora,[8] agentes per corpus, a corporibus[9] quodammodo patientes. Sensum etiam interiorem, quem nominant phantasiam, variis diversorum corporum figuris et qualitatibus quasi per sensus haustis cernit opertum. Dum igitur animam corporali veste aspicit involutam, per appetitum eius proclivem esse ad corpora animadvertit, certe respondet eam esse corpoream, non aliter ac si puer aliquis statim natus luto oblitus ita fuisset ut undique per omnem pueritiam lutea testa esset obductus, ac postea rogaretur: Quale tuum est, o puer, corpusculum? Nonne esse luteum responderet? Ablue, puer, corpus, absterge carnem[10] a glebis: carneum te videbis, non luteum.

4 Dimittite sensus, o miseri, impios nimium praeceptores. Piam dumtaxat mentem interrogate, eo tamen pacto ut animam illi puram, qualem accepistis, non corpori mancipatam, non vitiorum maculis sordidam ostendatis. Mens protinus respondebit non incorporalem esse animam solummodo, sed divinam.[11] Magnum quiddam es, o anima, si te parva non implent; optimum quoque, si displicent tibi mala; pulcherrimum, si horres turpia; sempiternum,

been schooled by these teachers who perceive corporeal things alone. What particularly seems to give rise to this error, or perhaps I should say reinforces it, is the fact that if at some point, having sent these three teachers packing as sophists, we turn instead to the mind, the true teacher of wisdom, and if we ask her what soul is, she will reply that soul is such as she sees it. But how, alas, does she see it? How revolting! How miserable! Certainly, it is not as it once was after it had descended from heaven, but the mind sees the soul's natural power, the fashioner of the body's four humors in which it is itself immersed, as defiled with putrefaction and smothered under the greasy fat of the limbs. It sees the external senses too turning aside towards bodies everywhere, acting through the body, and in a sense being acted upon by bodies. It sees the inner sense too, which they call the phantasy, overwhelmed by the various shapes and qualities of different bodies which have, so to speak, been gulped down through the external senses. So as long as mind sees the soul swathed in its bodily clothing and observes its desire drawn down towards bodies, it is sure to reply that the soul is corporeal. It is as though a boy were smeared with mud at birth so that he has gone through boyhood covered over with a layer of mud, and were he subsequently asked, "Boy, what is your little body made of?" wouldn't he answer, "Isn't it made of mud?" "Wash your body, child, cleanse your flesh of these clods. You will see that you are made of flesh, not mud."

Dismiss your senses, unhappy men, for they are ungodly tutors. 4
Ask only your reverent mind, but be sure you show it the soul as you first received it, not when it is enthralled to the body, not when it is soiled with vices' stains. The mind will answer forthwith that the soul is not just incorporeal but divine. Soul![30] you are something mighty if you do not fill yourself with the petty; something supremely good if the evil displease you; something beautiful if you shun the ugly; something sempiternal if you scorn the temporal. Seeing that you are like this, if you wish to find yourself,

si temporalia parvipendis. Postquam talis es, si invenire[12] te cupis, quaere, obsecro, ibi te ipsam ubi sunt talia. Magna vero ibi sunt solum, ubi nullum locus imponit limite finem; optima, ubi nihil contingit adversi; pulcherrrima, ubi nihil est dissonum; sempiterna, ubi defectus est nullus. Quaere te igitur extra mundum, verum ut et quaeras te et invenias extra, extra vola, immo extra respice: es enim extra, dum mundum ipsa complecteris.

5 Sed esse te putas in infimo loco mundi, quia te ipsam quidem non cernis super aethera pervolantem, sed umbram tuam, corpus, vides in infimo, perinde ac si puer aliquis super puteum constitutus esse se in fundo putei arbitretur, dum in se ipsum aciem non convertit, sed suam[13] in fundo prospicit umbram. Aut si avis in aere volans credat se in terra volare, dum umbram suam videt in terra.

6 Ergo relictis umbrae huius angustiis, revertere in te ipsam. Sic enim reverteris in amplum. Immensam esse scito in spiritu amplitudinem, in corpore vero infinitam, ut ita loquar, angustiam. Quod[14] ex hoc licet perspicere,[15] quod numeri, qui spiritali naturae propinquant, cum et situ careant, et metiantur numerentque secundum formam tam incorporea quam corporea[16] et nihil aliud sint quam quaedam unitatis ipsius replicationes, unitas autem sit incorporea, quia omne corporale sit multiplex — numeri, inquam, qui spiritales[17] sunt,[18] sine fine crescunt, non tamen sine fine decrescunt. Magnitudo,[19] contra, terminum quidem habet augmenti quamvis non habeat terminum decrementi.[20]

7 Cur tanti facitis sensuum iudicium, infelices, qui falsis imaginibus ita decipiuntur, ut visus solem, qui terra longe est amplior vix bicubitum iudicet; caelum quod rapidissime currit, quiescere; rectum in aqua remum fractum videat et obliquum; currere littus,

seek for yourself, I beseech you, the place where such things dwell. But the mighty only dwell there where place imposes no end as a limit; the best, where nothing unpropitious occurs; the most beautiful, where nothing is discordant; the sempiternal, where there is no defect. So seek yourself there beyond the world. But to seek and find yourself beyond it, take wings and fly beyond it. Nay, return your gaze and look beyond it. For when you yourself embrace the world, you are beyond it.

But you think you are at the lowest point in the world, because you are not looking at yourself flying up above the upper air, but gazing upon your shadow, your body, in the depths below. You are like a child leaning over a well who thinks he is at the bottom of the well as long as he is not turning his gaze upon himself, but looking at his image at the bottom; or like a bird flying in the air that thinks it is flying on the earth when it sees its shadow on the earth. 5

Therefore, having abandoned the confines of this shadow, turn back to yourself. For you will have then returned to breadth. Know that an immense breadth dwells in the spirit, but in the body a sort of infinite narrowness. One can see this clearly from the fact that numbers—which are close to the spiritual nature in that a) they have no location, b) they measure and number things in terms of form whether they are incorporeal or corporeal, and c) they are nothing other than replications of the number one (but one is incorporeal because everything corporeal is multiple)—numbers, I say, which are spiritual, do increase endlessly but do not decrease endlessly. Magnitude, to the contrary, has indeed an end of augmentation although it has no end of diminution. 6

Unhappy men, why do you make so much of the judgment of the senses when they are deceived by false images? Doesn't sight tell us that the sun, which is far larger than the earth, is scarcely two cubits wide; that the heavens which are moving with the greatest rapidity are at rest; that a straight oar looks broken and 7

dum navis ipsa movetur? Auditus vocem aliunde quam mittatur, saepe venire significet? Gustus saepenumero quae dulcia sunt, amara, et infinita generis eiusdem? Sensuum errata quis corrigit? Ratio. Nobilius autem quod emendat et perficit quam quod perficitur. Idcirco diligentior et veracior ratio est quam sensus. Ratio iudicat inveniri posse aliquid incorporeum semperque circa huiusmodi quiddam ipsa versatur. Est ergo verum per iudicium rationis esse alicubi aliquid incorporeum, sicut verum est per iudicium sensuum esse multa in mundo corporea. Horum tamen iudicium in eo fallitur quod nihil affirmat aliud nisi corpus. Sic etiam falleretur iudicium rationis, si forte asseveraret non esse in rebus aliquid corporale. Nunc vero tantum abest a falso ut etiam fallaciam sensus emendet.

8 Sentiendi autem vires usque adeo fallaces sunt ut non modo emendentur a ratione, verum etiam a se invicem ipsae damnentur. Si visui te soli committas, nihil in mundo esse aliud dices quam quae videntur in lumine; voces autem et odores et reliqua quae non videntur omnino non esse. Si auribus solis confidas, colores esse negabis. Si olfactui, solos esse in mundo putabis odores. Atque ita de aliis est putandum. Sicut autem quisque sensuum negat esse alicubi aliud quicquam praeter id quod est suum, et tamen per alium sensum damnamus alium et esse aliquid aliud invenimus praeter id quod unius sensus est proprium, et recte invenimus, ita cuncti sensus una conspirantes negant esse posse aliquid in natura quod non sit corpus. Nihilominus ratio, cunctos redarguens, esse etiam aliquid incorporale vaticinatur, et vere vaticinatur, et multo verius quam sensus qui et a se invicem damnantur et redarguuntur ab illa.

bent in water; that the shore is moving when the ship itself is moving? Doesn't hearing often tell us that a sound is coming from somewhere other than where it is being uttered? Doesn't taste frequently tell us that what is sweet is bitter? And there are infinite examples of this kind. Who is it, then, who corrects the errors of the senses? It is reason. Now what corrects and perfects is more excellent than what is perfected. So reason is more diligent and more truthful than the senses. Reason judges that an incorporeal entity can be found and it concerns itself always with this entity. So it is true in the reason's judgment that somewhere something incorporeal exists, just as it is true in the senses' judgment that many corporeal objects exist in the world. Yet the senses' judgment errs in claiming that there is nothing else except body. Reason's judgment would err too in this way if it were to insist perchance that there is nothing corporeal in things. In point of fact, it is so far from error that it even corrects the sense's deceit.

Indeed, the powers of sensation are so prone to error that not 8 only are they amended by reason but they are censured in turn by themselves. If you trust yourself to sight alone you will say that nothing exists in the world except the things which are visible in light; but sounds, smells, and so on, which are not visible will not exist at all. If you trust your ears alone, you will deny that colors exist; if your smell, you will think that only smells exist in the world. And so on with the other senses. But just as each of the senses denies that anything else exists anywhere except what pertains to it, and yet we condemn one sense by means of another and discover, and discover correctly, that something else exists over and beyond what pertains to one particular sense, so all the senses conspiring together deny that anything can exist in nature which is not body. Nevertheless, reason refutes them all, prophesying that something incorporeal exists too, and prophesying truly and far more truly than the senses which are condemned in turn by each other and refuted by reason.

9 Quid enim stultius est quam concedere nos bestiis ratione praestare atque ea quae sensu percipimus existere aliquid confiteri, quae etiam nonnullae bestiae acutius sentiunt; id autem quod rationis oculo intuemur, nihil esse contendere? Nullum enim animal esset insipientius homine, si ea vis animi, quae hominis propria est, magis quam sensus, qui communis est bestiis, falleretur. Nefas est autem animalium regem dicere omnium dementissimum. Dementissimus autem is erit solus qui non fatebitur tanto praestantius esse mentis obiectum sensus obiecto, quanto mens est sensu praestantior, ac propterea incorporeas naturas in excellentiore substantiae genere revera inveniri quam corporea. Praesertim quia si obiecta mentis eam movent, sicut obiecta sensus movent sensum, oportet ea ipsa mentis obiecta aliquam per se habere substantiam, ut mentem movere queant. Sin autem dicatur intellectum a suis obiectis minime agitari, iam satis probatum erit, saltem intellectum ipsum esse naturam incorporalem, postquam, dum fabricat sua, non movetur ab alio et aedificia fabricat incorporea. Meminisse vero oportet, quemadmodum puer qui natus est caecus difficile credit colorum varietatem lucemque esse, cum tamen ceteris hominibus nihil sit luce clarius, sic animum, nuper tenebris corporis circumfusum, vix adduci ut existimet lucem aliquam incorporalem existere, cum tamen nihil sit illa in rerum ordine angelis manifestius. Hoc Plato in septimo *De republica* longe conqueritur; hoc Aristoteles in secundo *Divinorum* confirmat, dicens humanum intellectum ad ea quae sunt per se in ordine rerum manifestissima, non aliter se habere quam ad solis lucem noctuae oculum.

What is more stupid than to grant that we are superior to the beasts in reason, and to concede that what we perceive with our senses (and which some beasts perceive more clearly than we do) in some degree exists, and yet to contend that what we see with the eye of reason has no existence? For no animal would be more foolish than man if the power of the rational soul, which is properly man's, were more subject to error than the senses he shares with the beasts. It is impious to say that the king of the animals is the most witless of them all. But the most witless will be he who will not admit that the object of the mind is as much superior to the object of the sense as mind is superior to sense, and therefore that incorporeal natures will actually be found in a more excellent kind of substance than corporeal substance. This is especially because, if the objects of mind move mind as the objects of sense move sense, then the objects of mind must in themselves possess some substance in order to be able to move mind. But if you say that the intellect is not moved by its objects, then that constitutes sufficient proof already that at least the intellect itself is an incorporeal nature, since, when it creates its own edifices, it is not moved by another, and the edifices it builds are incorporeal. But remember that, just as a child who is born blind finds it difficult to believe in the existence of a variety of colors and of light, although for other men nothing is clearer than light, so likewise a rational soul surrounded until now by body's darkness can scarcely be brought to accept that an incorporeal light exists, although to angels nothing within the whole universal order is more manifest. Plato laments this at length in the seventh book of the *Republic*[31]; and Aristotle confirms the point in the second book of the *Metaphysics*,[32] when he says that the human intellect, when confronted with the things which are in themselves most manifest in the whole universal order, blinks like an owl's eye turned to the light of the sun. 9

10 Resipiscant igitur quandoque minuti philosophi qui, sensuum iudicio freti, incorporalem divinamque esse animam cogitare non possunt. Animadvertatur[21] aliquando ex diuturna cum corpore consuetudine se factos esse usque adeo corporales ut merito nihil noverint nisi corpus, aut rem corpore natam. Puri fiant, et pura percipient. Experiantur aliquando in se ipsis — possunt enim, modo velint — quod iamdiu in universo desiderant. Percipiunt certe composita, percipiunt et formas plurimas in compositis. Formas insuper desiderant aliquas extra composita segregatas. Ipsi ex anima et corpore compositi sunt. Habent vitam ab anima corpori traditam; habent et vitam animae ipsius in se ipsa vigentem. Illam ergo despiciant, hanc aspiciant. Vitam intellectualem agant a corpore separatam; separati statim separatas formas attingent Socraticamque mox sententiam re ipsa probabunt super formas quae in subiectis formatis iacent, quoniam imperfectae sunt, esse formas in se ipsis atque perfectas, unde informia subiecta formentur; atque unicam ad incorporea non attingenda solum sed etiam possidenda viam esse, se ipsum videlicet incorporeum reddere, hoc est mentem a motu, sensu, affectu, imaginatione corporali pro viribus sevocare. Sic enim experientia ipsa constabit, primo quidem qualis sit purus animus, id est ratio secum ipsa vivens, seque circa ipsum veritatis lumen avide versans. Secundo qualis angelus, id est intellectus purus, infuso iam veritatis lumine gaudens. Tertio, quando animus ipse tamquam angelus pleno veritatis gaudebit lumine, deum esse persentiet tum veritatem ipsam[22] se ipsa lucentem atque gaudentem, tum ipsam lucem veritate gaudentem propria, tum ipsum gaudium veritate propria lucens.

It is time they learned to see reason, those petty-minded philosophers, who, relying on the judgment of the senses, cannot think of the soul as being incorporeal and divine. Through daily intercourse with the body, we can see that they have made themselves so corporeal that, appropriately, they recognize nothing but body or what is born of body. Let them become pure and they will see what is pure. Within themselves let them at sometime experience — for they can do this if only they wish to — what for so long they have sought in the universe. They certainly see composite objects, and they perceive numerous forms in the composite objects. Moreover, they long for some forms that exist separately from the composite objects. They are themselves composed of soul and body. They possess the life given the body by the soul; and they also possess the soul's own life flourishing in itself. Let them scorn the former and look to the latter. Let them lead the intellectual life separate from the body; and once they are themselves separate they will immediately attain the forms that are separate. And straightway they will be able to test in reality Socrates' opinion[33] a) that above the forms embedded in formed objects and hence imperfect are forms which are independent and perfect, whence unformed substrates are formed; and b) that there is just one way, not only of reaching, but of possessing incorporeal entities, which is to make oneself incorporeal: to withdraw one's mind to the best of one's ability from corporeal motion, sense, feeling, and imagination. Experience itself will then reveal firstly what the pure soul is like, namely it is reason living on its own, hovering eagerly around the light of truth; secondly what the angel is like, namely it is pure intellect rejoicing in the light of truth that has suffused it already; and thirdly, when the soul itself, like the angel, comes to rejoice in the full light of truth, it will clearly perceive that God is truth itself shining and rejoicing in itself, is light itself rejoicing in its own truth, is joy itself shining in its own truth. 10

11 Esse vero plebeiorum errorem a corporea consuetudine natum nosse incipiemus aliquantum, si saltem contrariam illius educationem aliquam cogitemus, qualem in sexto *Naturalium* excogitat Avicenna. Creetur a deo homo aliquis subito, inquit Avicenna, in aetate perfecta constitutus, sed ita dispositus, ut nihil per aliquem quinque sensuum apprehendat. Sic affecti hominis mens aliquid cogitabit, cum sit in aetate adulta, in qua corporis fabrica intellegentiam non perturbat, neque sit ad opera sensuum occupatus, quae mentis operationem impediunt, ac etiam adsit aliquid quod possit intellegi. Adest enim ipsa animae substantia menti. Mens igitur a nullo turbata praesentem sibi animae substantiam cogitabit. At qualem cogitabit? Num coloratam, longam aut amplam? Minime. Caecus enim similia non apprehendit. Num sonantem vel bene olentem atque similia? Neque ista quidem. Nondum enim talia quaedam per sensus accepit, ut possit talem naturam animae assignare. Igitur nihil poterit corporale anima illa sibi tribuere. Quid tandem de se ipsa asseverabit? Profecto id saltem, quod sibi primo offeretur intuitu. Est autem hoc ipsius essentia. Quapropter affirmabit esse se ipsam, neque tamen corporale quicquam in se ipsa perspiciet. Itaque affirmabit esse se prorsus incorporalem. Neque fingere quidem poterit esse se corpus, sicut plebis animae nunc aliter creatae atque educatae nequeunt se ipsas incorporales considerare.

12 Quod si quis dixerit animam illam nihil de se ipsa affirmare horum corporum quae per quinque sensus accipimus, sed aliud quiddam corpus diversae naturae, vanum hoc nimium. Nam si ne nunc quidem, cum tot varia corpora perceperimus, possumus novi aliquid machinari, quod non vel in his insit vel ex his saltem aut componatur aut eliciatur, quomodo in eo statu horum corporum

However, we shall begin to recognize somewhat the vulgar error born from habitual intercourse with the body if we at least suppose an education opposite to the body's, such as that Avicenna devised in the sixth book of his *Natural Problems*.[34] Imagine a man instantly created by God, Avicenna says, made fully mature but so disposed that he apprehends nothing through any of his five senses. Now the mind of a man in this condition will think about something since he is mature (meaning the body's workshop does not interfere with understanding) and not consumed by the activities of the senses (which impede the operation of the mind); and since too there is something there which he can understand. For the soul's substance itself is present to the mind. So with nothing to distract it, the mind will think about the substance of the soul which is present in it. But how will it think about the soul? As being of a particular color, length, or breadth? No! For a blind man does not perceive these. As melodious or fragrant or such like? Again no! For the mind has not yet received such qualities through the senses that it could ascribe a nature having them to the soul. So that soul will not be able to assign itself anything corporeal. So what then will it assert of itself? Certainly what is obvious at first sight at least. But that is its essence. So it will affirm that it exists, but it will not see anything corporeal in itself. So it will affirm that it is completely incorporeal. Nor will it be able even to imagine that it is body, just as the souls of the vulgar, created and brought up in different circumstances as they are, cannot think of themselves as incorporeal. 11

But if someone were to maintain that this soul does not affirm it has anything of the existing bodies we receive through the five senses, but is some other body of a different nature, the argument is entirely void. For if even here and now, when we perceive so many different types of body, we cannot even fabricate something new which is not either already present in existing bodies, or at least can be put together or extracted out of them, how could the 12

ignarus posset animus novi corporis naturam effingere? Ac etiam si possibile esset eam aliquod sui corporis membrum excogitare, illud nullo modo putaret ad propriam substantiam pertinere. Affirmabit igitur animus ille de se ipso esse, tamen corporeum aliquid non affirmabit. Diversa vero inter se sunt duo haec: id quod affirmatur et id quod minime affirmatur. Igitur essentia animi in ea consideratione erit aliquid praeter corpus. Iudicium vero considerationis illius ideo verum fore putamus, quia meram prorsus naturam animae sequeretur, non imagines acceptas extrinsecus. Esset ergo iudicium naturale admodum ideoque verissimum. Itaque si deinde expergiscatur, ut nos nunc, et sentiat, non erit, ut nos, ad inquisitionem spiritalium[23] ineptissimus, sed viam aliquam habebit commodiorem per quam ita quandoque ad sui ipsius considerationem se comparet, ut pronunciet se esse aliquid praeter corpus. Qua quidem via carent nunc animae miserae, quae per naturam et sensus corpora tum propria tum aliena prius attigerunt quam se ipsas considerarent. Unde miserabilis ille profectus est error, ut nequeant se ipsas seorsum a labe corporis pervidere.[24]

13 Hactenus educationem fictam ab Avicenna narravisse sufficiat. Deinceps qualem Plato noster educationem in septimo *De republica* libro describit breviter perstringamus.[25]

14 Finge, inquit, quandam sub terra speluncam. In ea homines nutritos a pueritia, ita cervices[26] et manus a tergo pedesque columnis quibusdam alligatos, ut neque moveri[27] usquam neque alia, nisi quae e conspectu imposita[28] speluncae parte apparent, aspicere[29] possint. Post tergum vero superne lampas accensa sit, atque inter lampadem et illos qui ligati sunt alii multi deambulent loquanturque invicem, ferentes manibus varia arborum animaliumque si-

rational soul in the condition described, being quite unaware of existing bodies, imagine the nature of a new body? And even if it were possible for the soul to think about some part of its body, in no way would it think it pertained to its own substance. So the rational soul will affirm existence of itself, yet it will deny it is anything corporeal. What is affirmed and what is not affirmed are two quite different things. In this consideration therefore the essence of soul will emerge as something other than body. We think this consideration's judgment is going to be true because it follows the soul's absolutely pure nature and not images received externally. It will thus be a wholly natural judgment and hence completely true. If, therefore, the soul were then to wake up and use its senses, as we do now, it will not be, as we are, totally unskilled at seeking out spiritual things. Rather, it will have an easier path by which at some point it can arrive at the consideration of itself and so declare it to be something other than body. This path is wanting to our present miserable souls who first make contact through their nature and their senses with bodies, whether their own or alien ones, before they consider themselves. And this is the source of that miserable error which prevents them from seeing themselves as free from the corruption of body.

That is as far as I will take this account of our upbringing as imagined by Avicenna. Now let me briefly touch on the kind of upbringing our Plato describes in the seventh book of the *Republic*.[35] 13

Imagine, he says, a cave beneath the earth. Inside this cave men are brought up from childhood, with necks and hands tied from behind and with feet chained to pillars so that they cannot ever move or see anything else except what appears on the wall of the cave in front of them. But on raised ground behind them a lamp has been lit, and between the lamp and the bound men are lots of other people walking up and down and talking to each other, and carrying in their hands various effigies of trees and animals. Those 14

mulacra. Qui igitur ita vincti sunt, numquam revera vel se ipsos vel alia eorum quae narravimus ulla videbunt, sed solas vel sui umbras vel aliorum quae propter ignem a tergo accensum tantum ante suos oculos in adversam partem speluncae resultant. Quamobrem nihil aliud aut se esse quam sui umbras, aut alia aliud esse quam[30] umbras illorum existimabunt, aut lumen ipsum esse aliud quam exiguum illud, quod ibi reflexum apparet, opinabuntur. Si quis autem horum qui vincti sunt forte solvatur subitoque lampadem et alia sub illa, quae sequuntur a tergo, retroversus intueri cogatur, caligabit protinus et dolebit, ac propter splendorem intueri non poterit illa quorum umbras paulo ante cernebat. Multoque magis id illi malum continget, si a spelunca sursum ad caeleste diurnumque[31] lumen repente trahatur. Quare non subito, sed paulatim convenientibus gradibus ab umbris rerum ad res ipsas, item a luminis imagine ad lumen ipsum est perducendus, ita ut quae in spelunca sunt apud illos, prius illic in aqua videat quam ibidem in se ipsis inspiciat. Rursus, quae extra speluncam apud nos sunt, primo nocte[32] hic ad lunam in aqua similiter, deinde in se ipsis terrena haec, similiterque in caelo caelestia nocte[33] itidem solum intueatur. Postea vero die tam solem ipsum quam quae sub sole videntur, prius in aqua, post in se ipsis illa, demum solem in caelo suscipiat. Hac potissimum ratione singula sincere facileque discernet atque existimabit se caecum deceptum miserumque fuisse, quando sub specu vinctus exiguis rerum umbris fuerat occupatus.

15 Proinde quae comparatio est speluncae illius ad hunc mundum, quem visibilem nominamus, eadem ferme mundi huius ad illum quem invisibilem divinumque vocamus, siquidem hic animae miserae moribundi corporis 'clausae tenebris et carcere caeco', neque

in chains, therefore, will never truly see either themselves or anything else of the things we have described, but only their own shadows or those of others projected before their eyes onto the cave's opposite wall by the fire lit behind them. So they will suppose that they are nothing else but their own shadows, or the other things are nothing else but their shadows; or they will opine that light itself is nothing else but that dim light which appears reflected there. But if one of the prisoners perchance is released and suddenly forced to turn around and look at the lamp and the other things in front of it which were behind his back, he will be at once dazzled, and his eyes will hurt, and because of the brightness he will be unable to gaze at the things whose shadows he was looking at moments earlier. And he will suffer even more if he is suddenly dragged up from the cave to the heavenly light of day. Not all of a sudden, therefore, but little by little and by appropriate stages he should be brought up from the shadows of things to things themselves and from the light's reflection to the light itself. So he should gaze at the things in the cave below with the prisoners first in reflection,[36] then in themselves. Again he should gaze at what are outside the cave with us: first, at night, at the moon, similarly in reflection, then at the things of earth in themselves. Likewise in the heavens, he should similarly gaze up at the celestial bodies which are only there at night, but later, by day, he should look at the sun and at what are visible under the sun, first in reflection, then in themselves, and finally at the sun itself in heaven. By this means he will be best able to distinguish between individual objects clearly and easily and will realize what a blind deluded wretch he was when he was bound in the cave and wasting his time on the insubstantial shadows of things.

Therefore the relationship of that cave to this world, which we 15 call the visible world, is more or less the same as the relationship of this world to the world we call invisible and divine, since in this world wretched souls in a dying body, "in darkness and blind dun-

se ipsas umquam,[34] neque alia ulla revera, neque verum solem, immo sui aliorumque umbras et exilem quandam veri solis imaginem intuentur. Verae enim mentes, verae res quaeque,[35] verus sol in mundo solum sunt invisibili. Quae si absque congruis educationis disciplinarumque gradibus repente intueri conemur,[36] caligamus protinus et dolemus. Convenientibus vero tum morum tum doctrinarum tum temporis perducti gradibus sincere discernimus iudicamusque caecos illos et miseros, qui falsis mundi huius umbris imaginibusque falluntur, occupantur atque premuntur. Verumtamen quando animus ab immenso invisibilis mundi lumine in corpus obscurum regendum movendumque descendit, novis suaeque naturae contrariis obrutus tenebris, caecutire[37] diu et[38] titubare compellitur. Adde et propter repentinam maximamque in deterius mutationem diu cogitur aegrotare atque ferme sic affici, ut ii qui propter phrenesim[39] vel somnum vel ebrietatem falsis imaginibus illuduntur atque vexantur. Aut certe non aliter se habere, quam si quis a solis lumine in cavernam illam quam descripsimus repente praecipitetur. Adeo enim novis tenebris offundetur[40] ut aut nullo modo, aut vix tandem sub exiguo illo cavernae lumine umbras illas tantum quas[41] narravimus discernere possit. Praeterea ob subitam[42] illam et in peius mutationem, in morbos tam sensus quam corporis varios incidet. Haec a Platone in libro *De republica* septimo.

16 Sed redeamus tandem ad ea quae ab initio statueramus. Emergite, obsecro, mortalium animae nunc immersae corporibus; naturam vestram supra corporis fines statim reperietis. Corpus siquidem longum est, latum atque profundum. Quoniam vero nullum corpus est infinitum, ideoque finem habet profunditatis, finitur in superficiem non profundam. Habetis iam superficiem longam quidem et latam sicut corpus, sed profunditate carentem atque ex una

geon pent,"[37] never see themselves or anything else truly or the true sun, but see rather their own and others' shadows and a pale reflection of the true sun. For true minds and individual true objects and the true sun exist only in the invisible world. If we try to look at them too suddenly without the appropriate stages of education and training, we are straightway dazzled and our eyes hurt. But if we proceed by appropriate stages in our conduct, learning, and timing, then we see clearly; and we adjudge them poor blind fools who are deluded, seized, and obsessed by the false shadows and images of this world. But when the rational soul comes down from the measureless light of the invisible world to guide and move this dingy body, it is overwhelmed by the unfamiliar darkness so alien to its nature, and compelled for a long time to stagger and stumble about like a blind man. Furthermore, the sudden extreme change for the worse induces a prolonged period of sickness and the soul is afflicted rather like those who are abused and troubled by the false images resulting from delirium, sleep, or drunkenness. Certainly it behaves just like someone suddenly plunged from the sunlight into the cave we have described. For it is wrapped around by the unfamiliar darkness so that it can distinguish either not at all or just barely in the dim light of the cave the shadows only I have described. And because of this sudden change for the worse it succumbs to various diseases of the senses as well as of the body. This comes from Plato in the seventh book of the *Republic*.

But let us return at last to the subject which we settled on at the beginning. Come forth, I beg you, souls of mortals immersed as you are in bodies. Beyond the limits of the body you will straightway discover your nature, for body has length, breadth, and depth. But since no body is infinite and its depth accordingly is finite, it terminates in a surface (or plane) without depth. Now you have a surface with length and breadth like body, but lacking depth; and in this one respect it is rising towards the incorporeal. 16

hac parte surgentem ad incorporea. Superficiei quoque latitudo finita ad longam lineam terminatur, neque profundam neque latam. Habetis lineam duabus partibus ad spiritum accedentem. Sed haec ipsa lineae longitudo, quia finita est, ad punctum ducitur, non profunditate solum et latitudine privatum, sed etiam longitudine. Habetis punctum tribus partibus ad naturam vergens incorporalem. Sed hoc quoniam lineae terminus est, ideo certum habet situm in corpore, neque implet totum, neque vivificat. Separate, si placet, ipsum a linea. Potest autem cogitatione saltem a linea separari quod est lineae terminus et prius in se ipso est quodammodo quam terminet lineam. Quod autem prius est, licet ab eo quod est posterius separare. Habetis punctum quodammodo, id est cogitatione, solutum a linea, quarto iam gradu discedens a corpore. In hac ipsa solutione assequitur, ut omnes partes corporis aeque respiciat, fundatur per omnes et moveat. Hic irrationalis anima sedem habet. Et quoniam rationalis cogitatio non fallitur ascendendo, ideo sicut invenit punctum a corpore cogitatione liberum, sic revera inveniet punctum, id est individuum aliquid re ipsa solutum a corpore, quod non modo impleat corpus et moveat, sed ipsum libere moveatur et tollatur ad supera, quod iam unitatis nomine appellatur. Hic anima viget rationalis, quinto gradu a mole corporis aliena. Si tanto quid impurius est quanto eget partiturque[43] magis, corpus impurius est quam superficies. Pluribus enim, ad hoc ut sit, dimensionibus eget atque ex partibus dividitur pluribus. Superficies simili ratione cedit lineae, linea puncto, punctum denique unitati, quae neque dimensionibus indiget, neque situ. Si horum perfectissima substantialis unitas est (et quia perfectissima, ideo potentissima et verissima) atque haec sunt aliquid existuntque, quis negaverit vere existere unitatem?

17 Ergo quid prohibet animam esse aliquid, et id quidem virtute magnum, licet non sit magnum aliquid quantitate? Agite igneam

The breadth of a surface is also finite, and it terminates in a long line with neither depth nor breadth. Now you have a line which is approaching spirit in two respects. But the length itself of the line, because it is finite, terminates in a point which not only lacks breadth and depth but also length. Now you have a point which is converging on incorporeal nature in three respects. But since this point is the end of the line and so has a specific location in body, it does not fill the whole of it and does not give it life. Now, please, separate the point from the line. Conceptually at least, that which is the end of the line (and exists on its own in some manner prior to ending the line) can be separated from the line. But it is permissible to separate what is prior from what is posterior. Now you have a point which is in some manner, conceptually that is, free of the line, and distant from body in the fourth degree. In this freeing itself it is able to relate equally to all parts of body, to extend itself through them all, and impart motion. Here the irrational soul resides. Since rational thought when it is ascending is not deceived, and as in thought it found a point free of body, so in reality it will find a point, something in other words that in reality is indivisible and free of body and that not only fills body and gives it motion, but is itself freely moved and raised to what is above it, to what is now designated unity. Here the rational soul flourishes, five degrees removed from body's mass. If the greater an object's needs and the more divisible it is, the more impure it is, then body is more impure than surface. For to exist it needs more dimensions and is divided into more parts. By the same token, surface gives way to line, line to point, and finally, point to unity, which needs neither dimensions nor location. If the most perfect of these is substantial unity (and since it is most perfect it is also the most powerful and the most true), and if the others exist and exist as something, then who will deny that unity truly exists?

In which case what is there to stop soul from being something, 17
and something indeed with great power even though it may not be

formam quae in corpore vestro tricubito tricubita est, colligite totam in cordis centrum. Hinc tantum virtute crescat quantum creverit unione, non aliter ac solis radii in concavi aeneique[44] speculi collecti centro, qui usque adeo roborantur, ut inde resilientes durissima quaeque accendant subito atque consumant. Subtrahite portiunculam illam cordis, qua forma ignis illa deprimitur, restet forma individua, agilis, calens, lucens et aliter quam prius et mirabilius. Quia individua agilisque est secundum se totam, corpus totum aeque collustret. Quia fervet incredibiliter, vitalis sit atque vivifica. Quia mirifice fulget, sentiat. Intellegat insuper, si reflectitur in se ipsam sursumque attollitur. Hactenus per ea quae tanguntur, pedetentim progredientes invenistis animam, quando a solido corpore ad quiddam quasi punctum omnino liberum processistis.

18 Rursus per ea quae cernuntur oculis animam perscrutemini. Cur, quaeso, diffiditis esse spiritale aliquid in natura, cum ipsis etiam oculis spiritum quodammodo videatis? Scitis lumen id solis oculo manifestum ideo corpus non esse, quia momento se fundit in omnia, infusum non frangit corpora, nec inficitur. Ecce videtis spiritum. Quid negatis? An forsitan illum negabitis esse quem non cernitis? Si ita est, sphaeras aeris ignisque et caeli, aqua et terra praestantiores, quia non videantur, nihil esse dicetis. Itaque pars maxima et praestantissima mundi, quia non sit visibilis, nihil erit. Sed redeamus ad lumen. Ita lumen esse negabitis in sphaera ignis, quoniam oculis non prospicitur. Sed et ipse solis fulgor, etiam si non videretur, existeret, quandoquidem existit nunc et non videtur a noctuis, atque ipsius splendor aliquis mixtus vaporibus potius

great in size? Take the fiery form which is three cubits long in your three cubit long body and collect it all in the center of your heart. The greater the increase in its unity, the greater its strength, like the rays of the sun focused on the central point of a concave bronze mirror which grow so hot that reflecting back they instantly ignite and burn up the toughest materials. Now remove that little portion of heart within which the form of fire is compressed and you are left with a form which is indivisible, active, giving heat and light; and doing so in a different, more remarkable way than it did before. Because it is indivisible and active in its entirety, it can light up the whole body equally. Because it burns in a manner beyond belief, it is full of life and life-giving. Because it shines forth in an astonishing way, it can perceive. It has understanding too if it reflects upon itself and lifts itself upward. Thus far, by way of objects that can be touched, and moving forward step by step, you discovered soul when you proceeded from the solid body to something completely independent like a point.

Now let us again examine soul by way of objects that are seen 18 by the eyes. Tell me, why do you doubt that something spiritual exists in nature, when you can see spirit in a way even with your own eyes? You know that the light of the sun which is visible to the eye is not body, because in a moment it pours over into all, and having poured over it does not shatter the bodies nor is it tainted itself. What you are looking at is spirit. Why deny it? Perhaps you are going to deny the existence of that which you do not see? In that case you will say that the spheres of air, fire, and the heavens, which are more outstanding than water and earth, because you cannot see them, do not exist. So the greatest and best part of the world, because it is invisible, will not exist. But to return to light. You will claim that no light exists in the sphere of fire since it is not visible to the eyes. But the sunlight would still exist even if no one saw it, given that it exists now and is not seen by owls; and it

quam ipse videtur a nobis, sed ipsum esse alicubi ex hoc eius splendore coniicimus.

19 Sic etiam inesse lumen caelestibus animis spiritale, ex ipso siderum lumine, quod illius imago est, coniectamur. An nescitis lucis actum nihil esse aliud quam lucere, ac tanto clarius rutilare, quanto longius a crassis corporibus separatur? Secernite ipsam ab omni materia, mirabilius rutilabit. Vivet quidem tunc maxime, si quando victura sit. Ubi enim crescit actus, augetur et vita, praesertim cum per eius calorem haec omnia vivant. Sentiet quoque, ut ita dixerim, quando per eius radios haec omnia sentiunt; ipsa tamen minime sentietur, nam et tenuitate subterfugiet aciem oculorum et ubertate fulgoris intellegibilis superabit terreni visus capacitatem. Scitis in sphaeris elementorum ignem infimum usque adeo ad naturam supremi aeris declinare; aerem vero contra supremum ita ad ignem illum attolli, ut et ignis ille nihil ferme aliud videatur esse quam tenuis aer et aer ille crassior ignis. Adeo ut quicumque aerem illum cernit, vidisse se ignem possit absque mendacio affirmare.

20 Eadem comparatio est mentis infimae qualis est anima rationalis ad sublime corpus, quod est caelum. Ergo et anima quodammodo est tenue caelum, et caelum est crassior anima. Et qui caelum suspicit, prospicit animam. Cogitate punctum aliquod geometricum, quod quia aeque respicit quamlibet loci partem circumdantis ipsum, si quando movetur per quamlibet, movetur in orbem; unde quod erat punctum, circumferentia videtur evadere, ubi sane circumferentia est punctum circumcurrens evolutumque foras; punctum vero est circumferentia stabili quodam cardine convoluta. Cogitate rursus scintillam quandam luminis invisibilis quae, quoniam super omnem existit locum, aeque in partem loci quamlibet sese fundat ac, dum movetur in gyrum, flammeus orbis evadat — orbis, inquam, oculis manifestus. Ubi scintilla est flamma

is its glow we see mingled with clouds rather than the sun itself, yet we infer from the glow that somewhere the sun exists.

In the same way we infer that spiritual light dwells in the heavenly souls from the light of the stars which is its image. Don't you realize that the act of light is nothing else but to give light, and the further away it is from gross bodies the brighter it shines? Separate it completely from matter and it will shine in an even more marvelous way. If it is ever going to be alive it will then be most alive. The greater its activity, the greater its life, especially since all things live through its heat. It too will perceive, in a manner of speaking, since through its rays all things perceive. Yet it will not itself be perceived, for its tenuity makes it too fine for eyes to see and the profusion of its intellectual light overwhelms the power of earthly vision. You are aware that in the spheres of the elements the lowest fire sinks to the natural level of the highest air, while the highest air rises to the level of that fire, so that the fire seems hardly distinct from the fine air and the air from the denser fire. Consequently, anyone who ever saw the fine air could declare without lying that he had seen the fire. 19

The same comparison can be made between the lowest mind which is rational soul and the highest body that is heaven. So soul in a way is a rarefied heaven and heaven is a denser soul. He who looks up at heaven sees soul. Think of a geometrical point. Because it has equal regard for any part of the space surrounding it, whenever it is moved through any part, it is moved in a circle. So what was a point seems to become a circumference, and here a circumference is a point in circular motion that has run its outer course, but a point is a circumference coiled up on an unmoving base. Again, think of a spark of invisible light which, because it exists above place, spreads equally in any direction and when it is moved in a circle becomes a flaming wheel, and I mean a wheel visible to the eye. The spark is the flame compressed; the flame is the spark expanded. The soul is such a spark, and the aetherial 20

compressa, flamma est scintilla profusa. Scintilla huiusmodi anima est; flamma corpus aethereum. Et quanta est in animabus rationalibus varietas luminis spiritalis, tanta est in propriis earum caelestibusque corporibus visibilis luminis varietas. Atque id lumen ita lucem sequitur spiritalem, ut lunae lucem pallidus orbis in nubibus. Ea vero[45] est inter rationales animas differentia, quod animae fixarum stellarum planetarumque solum lucido corpore circumdantur, ceterae corporibus geminis, lucido et opaco, aut certe altero lucidissimo, altero minus lucido. Eadem quasi lux esse videtur quae, dum scintilla manet, sentit quidem, sed non sentitur, cum vero explicatur in flammam, sentitur iam, sed ipsa nil sentit amplius. Et sicut sensu careret quicumque flammam videns, scintillam se videre negaret, ita carebit anima, qui dum globos aethereos suspicit quasi quosdam circuitus animarum, animas inesse illis quasi centra non senserit, neque concesserit animas esse globos luminum implicatos, globos autem esse animas explicatas. Quod ita significavit Heraclitus, Ἀυγὴ ξηρὴ, ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη, id est: 'Lux sicca, anima sapientissima'. Hinc efficitur ut nihil animo aut gratius aut mirabilius sit quam lumen, neque possit alibi[46] quam in lumine spirituum habitare, dum colit terras.

21 Iam igitur et hic invenistis animam esse tamquam lucem invisibilem, vivificam, sentientem, intellegibilem, intellegentem. Et paulo ante tamquam punctum a corpore liberum, agile per se ipsum, calens, vivificum, sentiens, capax superiorum, quod substantialis quaedam unitas appellatur. Atque haec prima quaedam excursio sit et quasi praeludium, quo infelix diffidentia illa tollatur quae longissime a spiritalium confessione abducit animos plebeorum.

body a flame. And however great the variety of spiritual light in rational souls, the variety of visible light in their own and heavenly bodies is just as great. Visible light depends on invisible light just as the pale halo in the clouds depends on the light of the moon. In truth, rational souls differ from each other in this one respect: the souls of the fixed stars and the planets are encircled by only a transparent body, whereas the rest of the souls by two bodies, a transparent and an opaque one, or at least by one that is very bright and another that is less bright. It seems to be the same quasi light that, as long as it remains a spark, perceives but is not perceived, but when it develops into a flame is perceived now but no longer itself perceives. And just as someone who sees a flame and denies he sees a spark would lack sense, so he lacks a soul who looks up at the globes of heaven — particular orbits so to speak of souls — and neither realizes that souls are present like centers in them, nor admits that the souls are enfolded spheres of light whereas the spheres are unfolded souls. That is what Heraclitus meant when he said, "dry light, the wisest soul."[38] That is why nothing gives the soul more pleasure and wonder than light; nor, during its stay on earth, can it live anywhere else than in the light of spiritual beings.

At this point you have now found that the soul is invisible like 21
light, life-giving, sentient, intelligible, intelligent, and a few moments earlier you found that it was independent of body like a point, active of its own accord, heat-giving, life-giving, sentient, capable of attaining things above, what is called a substantial unity. Let this stand as the first foray, a sort of prelude whose purpose is to dispel that wretched lack of trust which completely seduces the rational souls of the vulgar from acknowledging the realm of the spirits.

: III :

Anima non est corpus aut forma divisa in corpore, ut ostenditur per virtutem animae naturalem.

1 Propositae quaestionis ordo requirit, ut in prima sequentis disputationis parte ostendamus per virtutem animae naturalem hominis animam potissimum quidem non esse corpus, partim etiam non esse formam divisam in corpore; in secunda parte per virtutem sentiendi monstremus idem, scilicet animam esse formam indivisibilem, ac insuper illud adiiciamus eam videlicet non alicui corporis membro affigi, sed totam per singula fundi; in tertia vero parte per virtutem intellegendi eadem confirmemus, scilicet eam esse formam impartibilem ubique totam, et illud adiiciamus, quod nullam trahat originem a materia. Sic enim anima hominis ad tertiam illam essentiam, quae est perpetua, pertinebit et immortalis merito iudicabitur.[47]

2 Iam vero primam disputationis partem, divino numine invocato, in hunc modum aggrediamur.

: IV :

Prima ratio: quia anima est principium nutriendi et quomodocumque aliter operandi.

1 Animantes et plantae virentes corpora sunt; corpora etiam sunt ligna et saxa ex terra convulsa. Corpora illa coalescunt, haec vero nequaquam. Quid autem est in illis principium alimenti? Non materia corporalis, quoniam alia etiam corpora nutrirentur, quibus talis materia est communis. Cum ergo vis illa per quam adolescunt

: III :

Soul is neither body, nor form divided in body, the proof being its natural power.

The order of the investigation we have undertaken requires that we demonstrate in the first section of the following discussion, and by way of soul's natural power, chiefly that man's soul is not body and partly too that it is not form divided in body; that we establish the same argument in the second section, and by way of its sentient power, namely that soul is indivisible form, adding moreover that soul is not attached to any particular part of the body but extended in its entirety through all the single parts; and that we confirm the same arguments in the third section, and by way of its intelligible power, namely that it is indivisible form everywhere complete, adding moreover that it does not owe its origin in any way to matter. For thus man's soul will belong to the third essence, which is eternal, and be duly judged immortal. 1

Let me embark on the first part of the discussion in the following way, having called upon the divine power. 2

: IV :

First proof: that soul is the rational principle of nourishing and of all other activity.

Animals and living plants are bodies; lumps of wood and stone torn out of the earth are also bodies. The former grow; the latter do not. What is the basis of nourishment in the former? It cannot be corporeal matter, because the other bodies to which the matter is common would be nourished also. Since the power, therefore, 1

aliud quiddam sit praeter materiam corporalem, et illa non sit aliud quam anima nutritiva, sequitur ut talis anima non sit corpus.

2 Si quis autem obiecerit ita: 'Immo vero est corpus, non corpus quodlibet, sed tale quiddam et sic affectum, qualis natura plantis et animantibus propria sit, saxis vero et lignis aridis non communis', quaeremus ab illo de huiusmodi tali certoque corpore, quod vocat animam, utrum duo quaedam in se contineat, corporalem scilicet molem atque insuper certam quandam affectionem, per quam tale vocatur et certum fit propriumque corpus, an nihil habeat ultra materiam corporibus omnibus ubique communem. Si nihil respondeatur habere praeter communem hanc molem, vana fuerat nimium obiectio illa, per quam dicebatur non quodlibet corpus esse animam, sed corpus tale et certo modo dispositum. Non enim fit corpus tale et certo modo dispositum, nisi per qualitatem ipsam et propriam quandam affectionem ipsi corpori superadditam, per quam non modo sit corpus, sed et tale; per quam etiam a quolibet alio differat corpore. Itaque si nihil aliud est ibi praeter molem solam communemque corporis, cum illa etiam aridis lignis insit et saxis, haec quoque habebunt animam per quam alentur. Quod quia falsum esse constat, necessarium est corpus illud tale quod adversarius animam appellabat, non materiam corporis solam, sed qualitatem etiam sive formam aliquam continere. Atque illud non propter materiam ipsam corporis anima nominatur, quia materia omnibus etiam vita carentibus corporibus competit. Restat ut propter formam — formam, inquam, vivificam. Id enim est animae proprium. Formam ipsam vivificam vocabimus animam; materiam vero illam cui adiuncta est, quia inde vitae fit particeps, neque animam neque animae partem, sed animatum quiddam esse dicemus.

3 Praesens autem ratio maxime per eam sententiam confirmatur quam induximus a principio, quando disserebamus corpus ex se agere nihil posse, quippe cum videamus[48] anima corporibus accedente multas inde operationes proficisci, quae et ante animae ac-

that makes them grow is something other than corporeal matter and is nothing other than the nutritive soul, it follows that such a soul is not body.

But someone might object, "Nay, it is body, not just any kind of body, but such a body that is properly disposed to the nature of plants and animals, but not common to stones or dry timber." In which case, let us ask him about this special sort of body he calls soul, whether it contains in itself two distinct things, corporeal mass and then in addition a certain disposition by which it is called soul and becomes a certain body of its own; or whether it possesses nothing except the matter everywhere common to all bodies. If the answer is that it has nothing except the common mass, then fruitless is the objection which declared that soul was not just any body, but of a particular kind disposed in a particular way. For it would not become a particular kind disposed in a particular way except through quality itself and a specific disposition added to the body by way of which it is not only body but body of a particular kind, and differs too from any other body. If nothing else is there, accordingly, except the single mass common to all bodies, and since it is present in dry timber and rocks, these too will possess soul through which they are nourished. But because this is agreed to be false, the body our opponent called soul must necessarily contain not only body's matter but also some quality or form. It is not called soul because of the matter itself of body, since matter belongs to all bodies, even those lacking life. So it must be called soul because of a form, a life-giving form. For this is the property of soul. That life-giving form we shall call soul, but the matter to which soul is joined, because it shares in life through soul, we shall not call soul, or part of soul, but rather an entity possessing soul. 2

The present argument is strongly supported by the view introduced at the onset, when we established that body is incapable of acting on its own, since we see that directly soul arrives in bodies 3

cessum et post eius discessum minime fiunt. Quapropter animam quae huiusmodi operationum principium est, corpus non esse concludimus.

: V :

Secunda ratio: neque corpus animatum est, neque inanimatum.

1 Quale corpus esse vis animam? Animatumne an inanime? Inanime non dices quod alteri vitam tribuit animalem. Quomodo enim, si anima inanime corpus sit, vivificat corpora? Neque animatum corpus eam potes dicere quia, si anima animatum corpus dicatur, certe illud corpus postquam animatum dicitur, per aliquam animam dicitur animatum. De illa anima rursus interrogo, corpusne sit an non? Si corpus, utrum animatum vel inanime? Si inanime respondetur, absurdum quidem. Si animatum, iterum de anima illa quaeram per quam dicitur animatum. Atque procedere cogeris in infinitum quamdiu corpus esse animam asseres ac semper respondere compelleris absurde. Utraque enim responsio delira videtur, tum animam esse animatam, tum inanimem,[49] quemadmodum de sapientia tum esse illam sapientem, tum etiam insipientem, aut de lumine, tum esse illud illuminatum, tum obscurum. Sicut enim neque obscurum est lumen quod alia illustrat, neque ab alio illuminatum quod ipsum est primum lumen, sic anima neque est inanimis, quia dat vitam, neque etiam per aliud animata, cum ipsa illud proprie sit per quod revera quodlibet animatur. Ac si ad aliud illam[50] retuleris per quod animetur, ego similiter illud aliud rursus ad aliud referam aliudque rursus ad aliud. Neque cessabo umquam aut, si cessabo, in eo ipso certe quiescam,

many activities thence proceed which do not occur before the soul's arrival or after its departure. Therefore we conclude that the soul which is the source of such activities is not body.

: V :

Second proof: that soul is not animate or inanimate body.

What sort of body do you want soul to be? Ensouled or soulless, animate or inanimate body? You cannot call something that gives animate life to others soulless. For how can soul, if it is soulless body, give life to body? Nor can you call soul ensouled body, for, if soul is called ensouled body, then the body subsequently said to be ensouled is called ensouled through some soul. I repeat the question about that soul. Is it body or not? If body, is it animate or inanimate? If the reply is inanimate, we have an absurdity. If animate, then again I ask the question about that soul through which body is said to be ensouled. And as long as you assert that soul is body, you will be forced to go on forever, and forever you will be obliged to reply with an absurdity. For both answers — that the soul is ensouled and that the soul is soulless — seem to be those of a madman. It is like affirming of wisdom that it is both wise and unwise, or of light that it is both lit up and dark. For just as light is neither dark in that it lights others, nor lit up by another in that it is the prime light, so soul is neither soulless because it gives life, nor ensouled by something else, being properly that by which anything is truly animated. And if you refer the soul to something else by which it is animated, then I will similarly refer that something again to something else, and that again to something else. And I shall never stop, or if I do I shall certainly find rest only if I 1

ut dicam aut illud ipsum quod primo ponebatur aut aliquid sequens, neque animatum neque vivificatum esse ab aliquo, sed ipsum proprie per se esse quod animat aliud atque vivificat. Tale quiddam animam et vitam proprie, non quodvis aliud, appellabo.

2 Tu forsitan ut infinitum illum progressum et responsiones deliras iam devites, et tamen animam corpus esse asseras, inferes eam esse corpus, non quidem animatum sed corpus animale, non vivificatum sed vivens. Si ita est, revolveris eodem. Equidem percontabor, utrum illud ea ratione qua corpus est anima sit, an alia quadam ratione novae alicuius additionis per quam animale dicatur et vivens. Certe non ea ratione qua corpus, omnia siquidem corpora essent animae ac vitae operationes[51] prae se ferrent. Sequitur ut alia quaedam illic insit natura praeter corporis rationem, per quam animale corpus illud vivensque dicatur. Illam ego vitam proprie et animam nuncupabo.

: VI :

Tertia ratio: neque crassum corpus est, neque subtile.

1 Numquid crassum corpus est anima, puta vel aqua vel terra atque similia? An potius subtile rarumque, ut ignis et aer? Primum dici non potest, quoniam animae officium est penetrare facillime corpora, implere, movere. Huic operationi crassa corpora sunt ineptissima. Secundum vero illud esse fortasse videbitur probabilius ut rarum sit corpus anima, ut ignis aut aer. Verum si ignis dicatur esse, utrum ignis ille, qua ratione ignis, anima est aut quadam alia ratione? Si qua ratione ignis est esse dicatur anima, profecto quilibet ignis anima erit et omnia ignita viventia. Igitur alia ratione. Ita

say that what we posited first, or something subsequent to it, is not animated or given life by something else, but is itself properly speaking what animates and of itself gives life to another. Such an entity and no other I shall properly call soul and life.

To avoid that *ad infinitum* argument and the answers of a madman and yet to maintain that soul is body, maybe you will proffer the argument that soul is body, not indeed just animated body but animate body, not just body given life but living body. If so, you will revert to the same dilemma. For my question will be: Is it soul for the same reason it is body or for another reason, a new and additional reason by virtue of which it is called animate and living body? Obviously it is not for the reason it is body, since all bodies would be souls and display the activities of life. It follows that some other nature over and beyond the body's rational principle is present there by virtue of which that body can be called animate and living. I am going to designate that nature properly life and soul. 2

: VI :

Third proof: soul is neither dense nor rarefied body.

Is soul a dense body like water, earth, and suchlike, or rare and subtle like fire or air? One can hardly maintain the first, because it is the duty of soul to penetrate bodies, fill them, and set them in motion, all with the utmost ease. Dense bodies are absolutely unfitted for this operation. Perhaps the second hypothesis seems more likely: that soul is a rarefied body like fire or air. But if it is said to be fire, is fire soul for the reason it is fire or for some other reason? If it is called soul for the reason it is fire, then obviously any fire will be soul and all things on fire will be alive. So it must be for some other reason. One should ask the same question 1

de aere percontandum concludendumque animam semper esse ultra naturam corporis requirendam.[52] Neque adducat quisquam quintum aliquod tenuissimumque[53] corpusculum praeter quattuor elementa, quod crassioribus infusum corporibus illorum sit anima. Eadem namque redibit quaestio, utrum corpusculum illud per materiam suam sit anima an per vim aliquam materiae superadditam? Si primum detur, omnia corpora erunt animae quia omnibus subest materia; si secundum, assecuti erimus iam quod cupimus, ut anima sit ad aliquam vim quodammodo incorpoream referenda.

2 Afferuntur hic a nonnullis breves quaedam persuasiones huiusmodi. Si anima dicatur esse divisibilis, quaeritur numquid partes eius vivant ut totum, necne. Si vivunt, tota anima in singulis est suis particulis, quo fit ut non egeat quantitate, quandoquidem per divisionem non diminuitur. Si non vivunt, ex non viventibus vita consistet: quod est impossibile.

3 Rursus, omne corpus alicui quinque sensuum innotescere potest; anima nulli. Omne corpus figura aliqua vel termino circumscribitur; anima minime. Omne corpus operationem suam necessario peragit temporis intervallo — cum enim divisibile sit in essentia, multo magis in actione — anima saepe momento temporis operatur. Corpus per quantitatem potius quam per essentiam est in loco, quia propter quantitatem implet locum; anima per essentiam adest corpori: ut enim adest illi, dat illi esse. Esse per essentiam datur, sicut per sapientiam sapere, adest igitur per essentiam. Corpus ita in alio est, ut contineatur ab eo in quo ponitur atque excedatur. Anima in corpore est non comprehensa, sed comprehendens. Ipsa enim corpus perficit, continet atque ducit. Anima denique quolibet corpore et toto corpore praestantior est, quare lineis punctisque quae in corporibus sunt ut in subiecto est praestantior. Indivisibile divisibili excellentius est; animus igitur magis indivisibilis est quam aut linea aut punctum.

about air and conclude we must always look for soul beyond the nature of body. Nor should someone posit over and beyond the four elements any fifth superlatively rare mini-body that, having permeated the denser bodies, serves as their soul. For the same question will recur: Is the mini-body soul through its matter or through some power added to the matter? If we grant the first, then all bodies will be souls because matter underlies them all; if the second, then we will now have the answer we want: that soul must always be referred to some power which is in a way incorporeal.

Here some commentators offer the following brief supporting arguments. If the soul is said to be divisible, do its parts live as the whole does, or not? If they do, then the whole soul exists in its individual parts, and hence does not need quantity since it is not diminished through division. If the parts do not live, life consists of things that are not alive; and that is impossible. 2

Again, all body can become known to any of the five senses; but the soul to none. All body is circumscribed by some shape or limit; soul is not. All body of necessity performs its activity over the course of time — being divisible in essence, it is even more so in action. Soul often acts in an instant. Body occupies place by way of quantity rather than by way of essence, because it fills place up with its size. Soul is present in body by way of essence. For as it is present to body, it gives existence to it. Existence is given through essence, just as being wise comes through wisdom; therefore soul is present through essence. Body is so located in another that it is contained by, and exceeded by, that in which it is placed. Soul is in body: not contained by, but rather containing it. For soul perfects, contains, and guides body. Soul finally is superior to any and all body; therefore it is superior to the lines and points which are in bodies as in a subject. The indivisible is more excellent than the divisible; therefore rational soul must be more indivisible than a line or a point. 3

: VII :

Quarta ratio: corpus ex materia et forma componitur.

1 Corpus naturale ex materia et forma componitur. Animal est naturale corpus. Materia itaque in eo est et forma. Constat autem ex anima atque corpore. Corpus quidem non est forma naturalis, quia forma naturalis alicuius est forma et in aliquo est tamquam subiecto quodam atque formato. Corpus autem nullius forma est, neque in aliquo est subiecto, sed loco. Restat ut anima forma sit, ob hoc potissimum, quod est proprium internumque operationum motionumque principium; immo etiam essendi principium est animali. Totum hoc ad formam spectat. Est igitur anima forma. Quod si ipsa quoque esset corpus, opus esset adhuc alia quadam forma tam animae quam corpori, per quam ambo simul unum animal vocarentur, quam quidem formam aliam proprius animam vocaremus. Nam per animam, quasi per formam, corpus quod ante potentia quadam est vivens, actu fit vivens et animal actu. Anima igitur solum est forma, praesertim quia si duas haberet partes, materiam scilicet atque formam, tria sequerentur absurda. Primum quod non secundum se totam formaret corpus, quia non formaret ipsum per partem[54] eius quae est materia. Oportet tamen propriam formam secundum totam sui essentiam totam perficere materiam propriam. Secundum quod pars illa animae quae forma dicitur duarum materiarum rationis eiusdem perfectio foret, quod natura non patitur, sicut neque patitur formas duas rationis eiusdem eandem formare materiam. Tertium quoniam anima in corpora haec inferiora commutaretur atque vicissim, si communem cum iis materiam possideret; quod ideo nefas est, quia si fiat corporum animarumque mutua commutatio, multo magis fiet quarumlibet animarum in quaslibet animas transmutatio, rursusque quorumlibet corporum in corpora quaelibet.

: VII :

Fourth proof: body is composed of matter and form.

A natural body is composed of matter and form. A living creature is a natural body. So matter is in it and form. But it consists of soul and body. Now body is not natural form, because natural form is the form of something and it is in something as in a particular formed substrate. But body is not the form of anything, nor is it in something as in a substrate but rather in space. The remaining possibility is that soul is form, especially in view of the fact that it is the proper internal principle of activities and movements, nay, for a living creature it is the principle of being. All this pertains to form. So soul is form.[39] But if soul were body too, then for both soul and body we would still need some other form through which they could together be called a single living creature, and that other form we would more properly call soul. For through soul, as through form, body which was beforehand potentially alive becomes actually alive, actually a living being. So only soul is form,[40] especially because if soul had two parts, matter and form, three absurd consequences would result. First, it would not inform body according to its whole self, because it would not form body through the part of itself which is matter; but an appropriate form must perfect all its own matter according to its whole essence. Second, the part of soul which is called form would be the perfection of two matters having the same rational principle; but nature does not permit this, just as it does not permit two forms having the same rational principle to inform the same matter. Third, soul would be changed into these inferior bodies and vice versa, if it possessed a common matter with them. But this is unthinkable, because if a mutual change-over of bodies and souls were to occur, *a fortiori* a transformation of any souls into any 1

2 Sit igitur anima solum forma — forma, inquam, non accidentalis, sed substantialis. Nam cum anima ipsa sit rectrix motrixque corporis, ita ut contineat ipsum, sistat et torqueat, corpore praestantior est. Corpus substantia est; nullum vero accidens nobilius est substantia. Rursus, motor, quantum est principium motionis, non pendet secundum esse suum ex eo quod movetur. Igitur anima ipsa, quae revera est motrix corporis, a corpore non dependet quasi pedissequa corporis. Itaque non est corporis accidens. Praeterea quicquid vicissim opposita suscipit atque ipsum interim permanet idem substantia est; anima, dum permanet eadem, recipit tum opinionem hanc, tum illam inter se contrarias, tum scientiam, tum ignorantiam et repugnantes affectus. Anima igitur est substantia — substantia, inquam, ut forma, quaedam substantialis. Forma autem non est corpus quia omne corpus forma aliqua designatur; forma vero qua ratione forma est formari non potest. Hinc fit ut anima non sit corpus. Missas facio in praesentia rationes quibus ostenditur animam nostram accidens esse non posse, quia si necessitate quadam haereret subiecto, non posset illi repugnare, neque in se umquam reflecteretur, neque super accidentium genus ad substantiae genus ascenderet ipsumve proprie definiret, vel discernere posset ab accidentibus, vel quanto intervallo accidentia superat rite metiri.

other souls would occur, and again of any bodies into any other bodies.

Let us accept then that soul is form alone; and I do not mean by this accidental but substantial form. Since the soul is the ruler and mover of body such that it contains, stops, and turns it, it is superior to body. Body is substance. But no accident is more excellent than substance. On the other hand, the mover, insofar as it is the source of motion, does not depend for its existence on what is moved. So the soul which in truth is the body's mover does not depend on the body, as if it were the body's lackey. So it is not an accident of the body. Moreover, whatever sustains opposites one after the other while itself remaining the same is a substance. Soul, while remaining the same receives now one opinion, now another, opinions which are mutually opposed, now knowledge, now ignorance and conflicting emotions. So soul is a substance, and by substance I mean a substantial form. But form is not body, because all body is defined by some form and form qua form cannot be formed. Hence it follows that soul is not body. For the time being I shall overlook those arguments which prove that our soul cannot be an accident, because, if it were embedded in a substrate by some necessity, it could not oppose it, nor ever turn back on itself, nor rise above the genus of accidents to the genus of substance, nor define this genus properly, nor be able to distinguish it from accidents, nor measure correctly by how great an interval substance excels accidents. 2

: VIII :

Quinta ratio: corpus natura sua dispersum est.

1 Corpus natura sua dispersum est penitus. Primo quia distantiam partium patitur, ita ut semper in alio loco sit alia. Secundo quia continue transmutatur. Nam si subiicitur tempori, sicut varia momenta succedunt in tempore, sic affectiones momentis singulis variantur in corpore. Quae quidem varietas, cum fiat in caelis, multo magis fit raptu caelorum in elementis. Tertio quia contrariis subiicitur qualitatibus, calori et frigori et similibus. Unde fit ut contra naturam corporis sit coire in unum, manere simile et sibi ipsi constare. Extensio namque ipsa quantitatis partes corporis disiunctas manere compellit. Motus perennis cogit mutare naturam, neque sua simul habere, sed aliud amittere, quaerere aliud. Qualitatum contrarietas impellit ut altera fugiat alteram, per quam fugam corpus ipsum compositum dissipatur.

2 Quamvis autem per haec appareat corpus natura sua nullo modo posse firmiter in unitate consistere, tamen corpus quodlibet aliquo modo in suis partibus nectitur, cunctis in unam totius corporis copulam conspirantibus. Est igitur in corpore aliquid ultra corporis naturam quod ipsum unit, sistit et continet — unit, inquam, distantiam partium; sistit fluxum perennem; continet invicem per suam simplicem consonantiam dissonas corporis qualitates.

3 Quid hoc est? Corpusne? Si corpus est, eget similiter alio connectente. Quid aliud illud? Num corpus? Si corpus, eget et alio. Quocirca fatendum est nullam esse posse in corporibus unitatem, nullam constantiam nullamve concordiam, nisi illis insit vis aliqua incorporea. Ergo si et anima corpus dicatur esse, eget ipsa

: VIII :

Fifth proof: body by its nature is dispersed.[41]

Body by its nature is completely dispersed [for three reasons]. 1 Firstly, it endures distance between its parts, such that one part is always in one place, another in another. Secondly, it is continually changing. For if it is subject to time, then just as various moments succeed each other in time, so do the feelings in the body vary at various moments. This variation, since it occurs in the heavens, will occur even more in the elements which are in the grip of the heavens. Thirdly, it is subject to opposing qualities (heat and cold and so on). Hence it is contrary to the nature of body to come together into a single whole, to remain the same, and to be stable in itself. For quantitative extension in itself compels the parts of the body to remain separated. Continuous motion forces its nature to change, never to have all its possessions at the same time, but to lose one and seek another. The opposition of qualities forces one to flee another, and because of this flight the compounded body itself falls apart.

But although it is evident from all this that the body in its own 2 nature is incapable consistently of staying together in unity, yet it is true that any body in some way is linked in its parts, which all unite together to form the bond of the whole body. Therefore there must be something in the body beyond the body's nature which unites it, arrests it, and contains it: unites the separated parts, arrests the unending flux, mutually contains by its own simple harmony the body's discordant qualities.

What can this something be? Is it body? If it is body, it like- 3 wise requires another to bind it together. What is this other? A body? If a body, then it too requires another. This is the reason we have to admit that there can be no unity in bodies, no stability or

etiam aliqua copula. Vim autem huiusmodi copulantem nos animam vel virtutem animae potius quam illud copulatum asseverabimus, cum videamus esse animae proprium humores contrarios membraque diversa in unam animalis compagem devincire, qua abeunte diffluunt omnia. Igitur anima neque est corpus, sed copula corporis intima vel substantia copulatrix.

4 Neque forma divisa per corpus. Talis enim forma, ut Platonici putant, simplicitatis et constantiae naturam amittit in corpore, unde ipsa, aeque ut corpus, eget alio continente, quod unum in se ipso consistat, ad divisionem corporis minime dissipatum.

5 Si quis autem quaerat unde saxa et ligna sortiuntur suarum partium unionem, respondebunt Platonici, illa quamdiu affiguntur terrae, ab anima[55] terrae sortiri et unionem et augmentum. Postquam vero avulsa sunt, non augmentum amplius, sed unionem.

: IX :

Sexta ratio: duo corpora non sunt in eodem loco.

1 Duo corpora in eodem loco penitus invicem aequari non possunt. Nam si eodem in loco penitus esse debeant, oportet illa primum in partes dividi, deinde partes suas vicissim partibus iungere. Quae quidem partes, si indivisibiles sunt, iam corpora illa in individua resoluta sunt, et quoniam ex iisdem composita fuerant in quae dissolvuntur, sequitur ut ex individuis quibusdam corporis magnitudo concreverit. Quod ideo fieri non potuit, quia individua congregata simul numquam conficiunt magnitudinem. Sin autem

harmony unless some incorporeal power is present in them. So, if we say soul too is body, it also needs something to bind it together. But our contention is that soul (or a power of soul) is this binding power rather than that which is bound, since we see that it is a property of soul to bind together conflicting humors and diverse parts into the unitary structure of the living organism, and that they all ebb away when the soul departs. Thus soul is not body, but the body's inner bond or binding substance.

Nor is it form divided up through the body. For such a form, 4 according to the Platonists, loses in body its natural simplicity and stability, and so, like body, requires something else to hold it together, something that remains one in itself and is not scattered along with the division of the body.

But should someone inquire whence stones and timber are al- 5 lotted the unity of their parts, the Platonists will respond that, as long as they are attached to the earth, they derive both unity and growth from the earth's soul. Once they have been uprooted, however, they no longer grow, but they do retain their unity.

: IX :

Sixth proof: two bodies do not occupy the same place.

Two bodies cannot both occupy exactly the same place at the same 1 time. For if they had to be in exactly the same place, they would first have to be divided into parts and then their parts in turn joined to parts. Now if the parts are indivisible, then the two bodies have already been reduced to their indivisible components; and, being compounded from the same materials into which they are broken down, it follows that corporeal magnitude has congealed out of indivisible entities. But this is impossible, because the aggregation of indivisible entities never produces a magnitude. Con-

partes illae divisibiles fuerint, quaelibet per se erit corpus ac situm proprium seorsum habebit ab alia. Itaque non erunt corpora duo in loco uno; immo in multis loculis multa corpuscula. Si ergo corpora duo eodem in loco aequari invicem nequeunt, anima quae corpori vivo sese ubique infundit et per omnia se porrigit corporis puncta, non est corpus.

2 Quod autem ubique in corpore sit, ex eo in praesentia patet quod nihil magis intrinsecum essentiae est quam esse, ideoque forma per quam esse substantiale tribuitur tum corpori toti, tum partibus, toti partibusque est intima. Et quia sicut res se habet ad esse sic et ad unum, anima quae per se dat esse, per se absque medio unitur[56] corpori universo. Quod autem esse substantiale tribuat, inde patet quod ea sublata omnia membra mutant speciem. Quoniam vero ab essentia fluit esse, a virtute operatio, anima, quae singulis membris esse operationemque largitur, singulis quoque essentiam suam virtutemque communicat. Ita enim esse operationemque praestat, sicut unitur. Quare si illa praestat singulis, unitur et singulis. Nonne, si corpus quodlibet naturale carens anima unum quiddam est per formam unam in toto et partibus existentem, multo magis animatum corpus unum erit per animam toti partibusque praesentem? Quod si anima in uno solum membro sit, illius solius erit forma, reliquorum aliae erunt formae. Unde non conficietur ex membris omnibus naturale corpus revera unum, sed congregatum quiddam, tamquam domus ex parietibus. Neque erit in qualibet animalis parte consensio et concordia ad quamlibet, qualis modo est, nisi per unam animam varia membra conglutinentur, sicut neque ad tractum nervi omnes articuli contrahuntur, nisi idem sit nervus in omnibus.

trariwise, if the parts are divisible, then each of them in itself will be a body and have its own location separate from another part. So two bodies will not be in one place, but many little bodies in many little places. If then two bodies cannot occupy exactly the same place, soul which everywhere diffuses itself through a living body, and extends itself through all a body's points, is not body.

That the soul is present throughout the body is immediately evident from the fact that nothing is more intrinsic to essence than being, and so the form by which substantial being is given both to the whole body and to its parts is deep within the whole and its parts. Because a thing's relationship to unity is the same as its relationship to being, soul, which on its own gives being, on its own is united to the entire body, without the help of an intermediary. That it does in fact give substantial being is clear from the fact that, once the soul is removed, all the parts of the body change shape. But since being flows from essence and activity from power, soul, which gives being and activity to the individual parts, also imparts its essence and power to those parts.[42] For it confers being and activity insofar as it is united with them. So if it confers them on the individual parts, it is united too with the individual parts. If any inanimate natural body is one single thing because of a single form existing in the whole and its parts, isn't it more true that an animate body will be one because of the presence of soul in its whole and its parts? But if soul were only in one part, it would be the form of that part alone, and the other parts would have other forms. So it would not be a truly single natural body that is created from all the parts, but an aggregation, like a house made up of walls. No harmony or mutual accord such as now exists would exist among any of the animate body's parts, unless the different parts were cemented together by a single soul, just as all the joints are not subjected together to the pull of a sinew unless that same sinew is present in them all. 2

3 Adde quod in quavis quantumcumque minima corporis portiuncula[57] inest vita, et in plurimis motus et sensus. Hae animae vires operationesque intimae sunt. Vis actioque agenti alicui intima sine agentis substantia non existit. In illis ergo est anima, si in illis viget et agit. Quae quando suo modo movetur, corpus non dissipat, quia non fit dolor aliquis ex animae motu per corpus. Fieret autem perpetuus in corpore dolor, si ad motum animae partes eius dissiparentur et turbarentur. Dissiparentur autem procul dubio, si anima esset corpus, cum ipsa per corpus suo quodam motu perpetuo moveatur. Quonam pacto anima corpus erit, quae est ubique per corpus et sine ulla corporis offensione totum undique implet et penetrat? Porro, si solidum corpus esset vel totum corpus non impleret neque viveret inde totum vel, si impleret, penetrando frangeret frangereturque, et dolor in nobis perpetuus proveniret.[58] Sin autem corpus esset fluxum et labile, anima corpus animantis neque devinciret neque firmiter solidaret, sed et ipsa alio quodam vinculo, ut supra diximus, indigeret, cuius stabilitate firmaretur regereturque et moveretur. Illud vero vinculum libentius animam, immo virtutem animae appellabimus, siquidem animae virtus in corpore idem ferme est quod vel coaguli virtus in lacte quod inde coagulatur, vel vis magnetis in ferro quod inde trahitur et suspenditur, vel temperatio artis in horologio quod inde ordine mirabili regitur, movetur et sonat. Ipsa vero anima non est virtus temperatiove humorum, sed forma quaedam substantialis, simplex, indivisibilis, quae virtute et arte naturali spiritus, humores membraque temperat.

Additionally, life is present in every little portion of the body, 3
however small, and movement and sense are in most of them. These are the inner powers and activities of the soul. The power and activity internal to an agent do not exist without the agent's substance. So soul is present in them if it exerts its power and is active in them. When it is moved in its own way, it does not break up the body, because no pain is caused by the movement of soul through the body. But continuous pain would occur in the body if its parts were broken up and thrown into disarray because of the soul's movement. And they certainly would be broken up if soul were body, since it is moving through the body with its own perpetual movement. So how can soul be body, when it is present throughout the body and everywhere fills and penetrates it totally without causing it any harm? If it were a solid body, either it would not fill the whole body, and so the whole would not be alive, or if it did fill it, then in the act of penetration it would smash it or be smashed itself, and produce in us continuous pain. But if the body were fluid or liquid, the soul would neither bind fast the body of a living thing nor give it stability, but it would itself require some other bond as I said above by whose stability it might be strengthened, governed, moved. But it is that other bond we would more willingly call soul, or rather, the soul's power, since the soul's power in a body is almost the same as the power of a coagulant in milk to curdle the milk, or of the power of a magnet over iron to attract or suspend it, or the fine-tuning in a clock which regulates it, sets it going, and makes it chime in such a wonderfully orderly way. But the soul itself is not a power or a tuning or tempering of the humors, but rather a substantial form, simple, and indivisible, which through its power and natural art tempers the body's spirits, humors, and limbs.

: X :

Septima ratio: corpus non est simul totum in pluribus.

1 Neque corpora neque formae divisae per corpora possunt omnino esse simul in pluribus partibus aut locis. Vis seminaria tota est in qualibet particula seminis. In quot enim particulas semen dividitur totidem animalia oriuntur, quod maxime in piscium ovis apparet. Si ex quacumque guttula seminis totum pullulat animal, tota illic delitescit seminaria virtus. Haec vero est animae instrumentum generationi subserviens. Quapropter multo magis tota anima est in qualibet seminis corporisque particula. Postquam tota est in singulis animae virtus, nonne virtus vegetatrix tota est in quolibet plantae semine, cum plantam integram producat ex quolibet? Vegetativa quoque anima exigua primum radice vel germine capitur, deinde crescente arbore per omnes se fundit ramos. Siccatis denique ramis vel amputatis, rursus sese contrahit in radicem. Hanc animam quantitate carere Plotinus Porphyriusque existimant, quae aeque clauditur minimis, implet amplissima.

: XI :

Octava ratio: anima est vita aut fons vitae.

1 Animam esse putamus naturam quandam quae aut vita quaedam sit aut vitam ceu comitem habeat et pedissequam, postquam corpora vitam per animam sortiuntur. Corpus necessario in plures partes dividitur. Nam corpus aliud est ex pluribus elementis com-

: X :

Seventh proof: body is not simultaneously and wholly in many places.

Neither bodies nor forms divided in bodies can ever be in a number of parts or locations at the same time. The power of a seed is present in its entirety in every part of the seed. For the number of births corresponds to the number of parts the seed is divided into (this is especially obvious in the case of fish eggs). If a whole animal spawns from each little drop of seed, then the whole power of the seed is hidden away there. This power is the soul's instrument for procreation. It follows then *a fortiori* that the whole soul must be present in every little particle of seed and body. Inasmuch as the whole power of soul is present in the individual parts, isn't the whole vegetative power present in any seed of a plant, since it can produce a complete plant from any seed? The vegetative soul too is originally taken in by a tiny little root or seed, and then, as the tree grows, spread through all the branches. When the branches finally decay or are cut off, it shrinks back again into the root. Plotinus and Porphyry think that this soul, which equally is enclosed in the least parts and fills up the greatest, lacks quantity.[43] 1

: XI :

Eighth proof: soul is life or the fountain of life.

We believe that soul is a certain nature which either is a life or possesses life as its companion and faithful attendant, inasmuch as bodies acquire life through soul. Body of necessity is divided into many parts. For one body is compounded from several elements; 1

positum, aliud elementum ex elementis aliis minime congregatum, sed ex forma et materia constitutum. Si animam dixeris esse corpus constructum ex pluribus elementis, sciscitabimur numquid illa elementa quaelibet per se seorsum ab aliis vitam habeant, aut nulla, sed congregata simul vitam pariant, aut unum quiddam illorum possideat vitam. Si quodlibet illorum per se habet vitam, tot ibi sunt animae quot elementa, neque ibi est anima una ex multis conflata partibus, sed animae multae sedem eandem colentes. Si nullum illorum habet vitam, numquam concursu mutuo vitam creabunt. Ac si in eorum concursu vita nascatur, non quidem ipsorum vi, cum ipsa vita careant, sed vi potius alicuius concursum illum ordinantis vita illa nascetur, praesertim cum sit fatendum, etiam si concursione multorum vita confletur, non tamen quomodocumque concurrant, verum si certa ratione viaque concurrant, vitam in illis gigni. Ita illius certae concursionis intimus ordinator anima ipsa erit, vitam suo modo confluentibus exhibens. Sin dixeris unum aliquod[59] e multis elementis habere vitam, illud solummodo anima ipsa erit, neque opus erit praeter istud aliis elementis ut anima generetur. Quamobrem anima nullo modo putanda est esse corpus ex elementis pluribus constitutum. Sed neque elementum unum, quia elementum quodlibet ex materia et forma componitur. Si istud viveret, non per materiam viveret, cum informis materia nequeat vitam aut alicui aut sibi ipsi praebere. Igitur talis viveret per formam. Forma igitur esset anima.

2 Quinetiam si anima est corpus, sive elementum sit sive simile quiddam et seu simplex seu compositum, certe, ita ut dicam, vel similiter erit affectum, scilicet calidum vel frigidum, siccum vel humidum, leve vel grave, rarum vel densum, fluxum, solidum, album, nigrum atque similia. Si calidum, calefaciet solum; si leve, alta petet, et omnino qualecumque corpus sit, secundum naturam pro-

another is an element not compounded from other elements, but constituted from form and matter. If you said that soul was a body made from several elements, let us ask whether all those elements possess life of themselves separately from the others; or whether none does but assembled together they do produce life; or whether just one of them possesses life. If any element possesses life on its own, there are as many souls as elements; and you will not have a single soul thrown there together from many parts, but many different souls occupying the same abode. If none of the elements possesses life, they will never create it by crowding together. But if life is born in this crowd of theirs, it will not be through their power that this life is born, since they lack life, but rather through the power of whatever brings order to the crowd. This is especially since we have to acknowledge that, even if life were ignited by the crowding together of many things, nonetheless life is not produced in them if they assemble haphazardly but only if they assemble in a definite rational order and way. Thus the orderer from within of this planned assembly will be soul itself, in its own way furnishing life to the elements as they flow together. But if you said that any one of the many elements has life, then that alone will be soul; and to produce soul, you will need none of the other elements except this one. So there is no way we can accept that soul is body made up of several elements. However it is not a single element either, because any element consists of matter and form. If the element is to be alive, it could not be alive through its matter, since formless matter cannot give life either to anything else or to itself. So such would be alive through its form. So the form would be soul.

Furthermore, if the soul were a body, whether an element or 2 something similar, simple or compound, then it would certainly, if I may use the term, or similarly be affected, that is, be hot or cold, dry or wet, light or heavy, rare or dense, fluid, solid, white, black, and so on. If hot, it would only make things hot; if light, it would fly upward; and generally speaking, whatever sort of body it were,

priam operabitur, et effectum naturae suae oppositum numquam aget. Non enim frigidum calefacit. Est autem cuiuslibet corporis certa et determinata natura ac forma, sicut locus terminatus est et certum tempus et finita potentia. Igitur cuiusque corporis determinata operatio est et ad effectus contrarios non extenditur.

3 Anima vero ad contraria quaelibet vim habere videtur. Nam et in diversis corporibus animalium et in eodem multa inter se efficit repugnantia. Sistit, movet, contrahit, extendit, rarefacit, condensat, acuit, obtundit, aperit, claudit, fundit et solidat. Contrarios odores, sapores atque colores, oppositas vires et figuras humoribus membrisque tradit, leves spiritus deorsum movet ad pedes, graves humores sursum ducit ad caput: quod fit contra corporum naturam. Agitat corpus in omnem partem sursum contra gravium elementorum pondera, deorsum contra levium sublimitatem, in latus et in circuitum contra omnem corporis facultatem. Cum ergo omnes ferme effectus inter se contrarios faciat et ad repugnantes motus ita sit compos, ut praeter corporum ordinem moveat, quis adeo demens erit ut aut corpus aut eius qualitatem sive qualitatis aliquid esse animam fateatur?

: XII :

Nona ratio: corpus se ipsum non movet.

1 Quod vere et primo est per se ipsum mobile, ita ut ipsum omnino idem sit et fons et receptaculum motionis, secundum se totum per se mobile debet esse, sicut in ceteris omnibus apparet, quaecumque per se et primo sic talia quaedam dicuntur esse vel talia. Sicut

it would act in accordance with its particular nature and never produce an effect in conflict with its own nature. For cold does not make things hot. But the nature and form of every body is specific and determined, just as its place is determined, its time fixed, and its power finite. Thus the activity of any body is determined and does not extend to contrary effects.

Soul, however, seems to have power to do various contrary things. For it produces in animals' different bodies and in the same body many mutually conflicting results. It can halt, set in motion, contract, expand, rarefy, condense, sharpen, make blunt, open, shut, liquify, and solidify. It gives contrary smells, tastes, and colors, and opposite powers and shapes to the body's humors and parts; it drags light spirits down to the feet and lifts heavy humors up to the head. And all this happens contrary to the nature of bodies. It makes the body move in every direction: upwards in spite of the weight of the heavy elements, downwards in spite of the buoyancy of the light, sideways and in a circle in spite of body's every natural power.[44] Since it can produce practically all mutually contradictory effects and is so much in control of conflicting movements that it can move bodies in ways contrary to the laws governing them, who would be so foolish as to claim that soul is either body or a quality of body or some aspect of quality? 3

: XII :

Ninth proof: body is not self-moving.

What is truly and primarily self-moving in that it is entirely the same and both the source and the recipient of motion must be self-moving wholly in respect of itself, just as it is clearly the case with anything else described as possessing in itself and primarily 1

quod ita est clarum, secundum se totum est clarum; quod ita bonum, totum bonum est; quod ita intellectum, intellectuale est totum. Nam essentia quae primo effundit qualitatem aliquam et amplectitur suscipitque primo, quia perfecte agit utrumque, efficit utrumque per totum. Oportet autem in natura alicubi reperiri essentiam illo modo per se sive ex se mobilem, atque animam esse talem,[60] ut libris superioribus demonstravimus.

2 Corpus autem, etiam si fingatur per se primoque esse mobile, nondum tamen secundum se totum poterit esse tale, quoniam oporteret quamlibet eius partem a se ipsa moveri et partium partes atque particulas. Nam si una particula sit in corpore quae se non moveat, non erit corpus illud secundum se totum ex se mobile, atque ita non vere et primo erit tale, sed alterius cuiusdam primo talis participatione atque praesentia. Quare ad hoc ut perfecte per se mobile sit, concedendum esset quaslibet eius particulas a se ipsis moveri. Illae dividuntur in infinitum, unde innumerabiles erunt illae particulae, quae se movebunt. Quod movet agit, quod agit existit actu. Erunt igitur infinitae partes in actu sese agitantes, et infiniti in quovis corpore mundi motores. Immo vero non erunt partes illae alterius corporis ex eo ipso quod actu erunt suo, sed quaelibet per se tota consistet atque erit infinita quaedam multitudo corpusculorum existens actu. Impossibile autem est talem esse multitudinem in natura. Quoniam igitur nequeunt esse corporis partes actu infinitae, immo vero neque actu quidem revera esse omnino (quando nullum habent esse proprium, sed sub ipso esse totius compositi continentur), sequitur ut partes corporis sese non moveant, ne propter hoc actu cogantur esse et actu penitus infinitae. Concludamus igitur corpus non posse vere primoque per se mobile esse, cum ipsi secundum se totum id competere nequeat, quando partes eius assequi id non valent, ut se moveant.

some one or other qualities. For instance, what is thus brilliant is wholly brilliant in respect of itself; what is thus good is wholly good; what is thus intellect is wholly intellectual. For an essence which pours out some quality and primarily so and primarily embraces and receives it, in that it does both perfectly, does both through the whole of itself. But somewhere in nature an essence must be found which is mobile of or from itself; and soul must be such, as I have proved in earlier books.

But body, even if we were to suppose that it is self-moving and 2 primarily so, would not yet be such wholly in respect of itself, because each of its parts and the parts of the parts and the particles would have to be moved. For if there were one little segment in the body which was not self-moving, then the body would not be self-moving wholly in respect of itself and thus would not be truly and primarily such, but only through the participation and presence of some other thing which was primarily such. So for the body to be perfectly self-moving, one would have to concede that all its little parts were self-moving. But they are infinitely divisible, so the number of little parts which were self-moving would be infinite. What moves acts; what acts exists in act. So infinite self-moving parts would be in act, and there would be infinite movers in every body in the world. Or rather, they would not be the parts of another body because they existed in their own act; but any part would exist wholly on its own, and there would be an infinite multitude of tiny bodies existing in act. But such a multitude cannot exist in nature. Since the parts of the body cannot be infinite in act, therefore, or rather since they do not really even exist in act at all (given that they possess no being of their own but are included in the being itself of the whole compound body), it follows that the parts of body are not self-moving lest they be required because of this to exist in act and to be absolutely infinite in act. Our conclusion then is that body cannot be truly and primarily self-moving, because this characteristic cannot belong to body wholly

3 Ad idem rursus alia via progrediamur. Quando aliquis corpus asserit movere se ipsum, ex iis quattuor unum aliquid potissimum compellitur confiteri: aut partem corporis alteram moveri ab altera, aut totum a parte, aut a toto partem, aut totum a toto, id est ab omnibus partibus partes omnes. Si primum affirmetur, cum aliud quiddam sit pars altera, aliud altera, non idem movebit se ipsum sed aliud potius aliud. Neque ex hoc corpus illud compositum vere movebit se ipsum, cum sit ex aliquibus partibus constitutum quae se non movent, sed duo quaedam habebit in se distincta invicem, quorum alterum moveat alterum. Si secundum illud divisionis membrum acceperis, scilicet quod pars movet totum, vel tertium, scilicet quod totum movet partem, nondum vere compositum illud sese agitat. Aliud namque partem, aliud totum esse volumus. Atque illa pars quae movet totum, movet utique omnes partes, ideoque in numero aliarum partium etiam se ipsam mutat. Similiter si totum movere partem dicatur, per omnes partes unam commovet partem. Ergo unam quandam solummodo agitat quodammodo per se ipsam. Vides in iis[61] duobus divisionis illius membris non posse aliter dici totum illud movere se ipsum, nisi propter[62] partem illam sui quae sese agitat, per alias minime. Atque ita non totum illud revera erit per se mobile, sed pars forsan illa totius, quae etiam pars eius non erit, cum per se aliquid operetur. Quod si quartum concesseris, scilicet totum a toto moveri, cum totum fortasse non sit aliud quam cunctae simul partes, fateberis partes omnes ab omnibus permutari. Ubi compositum illud non aliam ob causam affirmari debet movere se ipsum, nisi quia pars quaelibet eius agitat semetipsam. Quapropter ad partem semper confugere cogeris per se mobile corpus affirmaturus.

in respect of itself, given that its parts are incapable of achieving the goal of self-movement.

Let us approach the same point again by a different path. 3 When someone claims that body is self-moving, he is for the most part obliged to accept one of the following four hypotheses: either one part of the body is moved by another, or the whole by a part, or a part by the whole, or the whole by the whole (all the parts, in other words, are moved by all the parts). If you assert the first, since one part is one thing, another part another, the same thing will not move itself but one thing will move another. Hence the compound body will not really be self-moving, since it consists of some parts which are not self-moving; but it will possess in itself two mutually distinct entities, one of which moves the other. If you accept the second of the four hypotheses, that a part moves the whole, or the third, that the whole moves a part, the compound is not yet really moving itself. For we are supposing that the part and the whole are different things. And the part that moves the whole obviously moves all the parts, and thus in the number of the various parts it moves itself too. Similarly, if the whole is said to move the part, it moves that one part by way of all the other parts. So it only moves just one part and in a way through itself. In these two of the four hypotheses you see that the whole cannot be said to be self-moving in any other way than thanks to the agency of that part of itself which is self-moving, and not through the other parts. So it will not truly be the whole that is self-moving, but perchance that part of the whole which will not even be a part of the whole because it will be doing something on its own. But if you accept the fourth hypothesis, that the whole is moved by the whole, since the whole perchance is nothing other than all the parts taken together, you will be saying that all the parts are moved by all the parts. At this point one is obliged to state that the compound is self-moving only because every part of it is self-

4 Quod in primis idcirco damnamus, quia corpus illud compositum non erit proprie per se mobile, postquam id ab alio, id est a partibus mutuatur, nam ratione partium dicitur per se mobile. Licet enim corpus illud quodammodo cunctas simul partes esse constet, tamen motum huiusmodi mutuari videtur a singulis, sicut et substantiam suam a singulis accipit. Responde, quaeso, de illa parte vel partibus illis quarum ratione totum asseritur sese movere: ex eo quod illae se movent, suntne individuae? Si sunt, profecto quod sese movet non corpus est, sed individuum quiddam in corpore, cuius impulsu etiam corpus sponte sua ferri videtur. Sin dividuae, illas[63] similiter partiemur, ut et totum iam secuimus, atque eadem ratione comperiemus, nullo modo affirmari posse de illis partibus quod per se moveantur, nisi ratione particularum quae se moveant. De particulis similiter perscrutabimur. Quae, quoniam in infinitum distribuuntur, novos semper et plurimos motores inveniemus, neque umquam perveniemus ad unum, cum dividendo semper plurimos habeamus, neque umquam ad primos aut primum, cum dividamus similiter infinite. Nusquam igitur est in substantia corporis unus ac primus ipsius motor. Quamobrem nullam in se habet sui motus originem, per quam revera asseri valeat ex se ipso moveri, sed ad impartibile aliquid compellimur devenire, unde nascatur omnis corporalis agitationis origo.

5 Internus autem corporis agitator est anima. Qua praesente, corpora sua sponte quodammodo et in omnem partem feruntur, absente vero anima, externo indigent[64] commovente. Si ista quoque sit corpus, eget ipsa quoque movente — movente, inquam, intrinseco, siquidem absque impulsu externo viventia quaeque moventur. Ille quidem motor intimus anima ipsa erit, quam per se opor-

moving. So you will continually have to resort to a part if you are going to maintain that body is self-moving.

We reject this in the first place because it will not strictly be the 4 compound body that is self-moving seeing that it is being moved by another, namely by the parts, for it is called self-moving by reason of the parts. For although we would agree that the body is in a sense the sum of its parts, yet it seems to borrow this self-motion from the individual parts, just as it accepts its substance from them. Answer me, I beg you, one question about the part or parts by reason of which the whole is said to be self-moving. Are they indivisible in that they move themselves? If they are, what moves itself is not body, but some indivisible thing in body by whose impulse even body seems to be borne along spontaneously. If they are divisible, then we will split them up in the same way we have already divided the whole body, and by the same argument we will discover that in no way can it be affirmed of the parts that they are self-moving except by reason of the particles which are self-moving. And we shall similarly examine these particles. As they are infinitely divisible, we will discover new and ever more movers. Nor will we ever arrive at one mover, since we can always produce more by division, and we will never reach the first movers or mover, since similarly we can keep dividing to infinity. Nowhere, then, in the body's substance is there a single prime mover of it. In which case, it has no source for its motion within itself which would allow us to claim in truth that it moved itself. But we are compelled to resort to some indivisible entity from which all bodily motion derives its origin.

But body's internal mover is soul. When it is present, bodies 5 are borne in every direction as though of their own accord; but when it is absent, they need an outside agent to move them. If soul is body too, then it too needs a mover—I mean an internal one, since all living things move themselves without external impulse. That internal mover will be the soul, which must be self-

tet moveri, quandoquidem corpora per animam vim sese movendi habere videntur. Omne autem tale ad naturam aliquam vere suimet agitatricem est reducendum. Ita anima proprie per se movetur, si eius participatione facultatem cetera nanciscuntur, ut per se quodammodo moveantur. Haec igitur non est corpus. Sed neque etiam forma in corpore dissipata. Nam haec etiam per rationes superiores se movere[65] non valet, iisdem subiecta quibus et corpus conditionibus, ut apparuit.

6 Ubi cavillatio illa excluditur qua nonnulli contendunt ostendere corpus aliquod per se moveri, dicentes ipsum ex materia et forma vel ex quattuor elementis ita componi ut alia quaedam natura praeter materiam et formam et quattuor elementa proveniat, quae sit totius integritas, quae se ipsam moveat, quia per formam habet hoc ut moveat, per materiam ut moveatur. Talis obiectio adversus Platonicos nihil valet: tum quia in alia essentia erit radix per quam movere, in alia per quam moveri videbitur. Oportet tamen ad aliquam essentiam pervenire quae sit et fons et receptaculum motionis et vitae, quemadmodum ad aliquam pervenitur quae lucis et ad aliquam quae caloris radix est simul et fundamentum. Tum quia natura illa quae est totius integritas, si quantitate protenditur, non magis poterit ex se ipsa moveri quam moles ipsa corporea, ut supra monstravimus. Sin autem indivisibilis est, iam, ut cupiebamus, ad naturam pervenimus incorpoream, in qua sit sui ipsius agitandi potestas, non quod in se ipsam agat et patiatur. Motio enim in ea non transitum significat ab agente in patiens, sed naturalem essentiae illius vicissitudinem, qua suarum affectionum variat vices atque ita per se discurrit, non agitante alio, ut per se calet ignis, neque alio calefaciente, neque parte sui alia in aliam fundente calorem.

moving, because it is through soul that bodies appear to have the power of moving themselves. But all such must be reducible to some nature which is genuinely self-moving. So soul properly is self-moving, if other things acquire the power to be in a certain sense self-moving by the participation of soul. Therefore soul is not body. But neither is it form dispersed through body. For as previous arguments have demonstrated, form too is incapable of moving itself, being subject to the same conditions as body.

That disposes of the specious claim of those who attempt to 6 show that body is self-moving by declaring that body is so compounded from form and matter or from the four elements that, besides matter and form and the four elements, some other nature emerges which is the unity of the whole [and] which moves itself, since via form it has the power to move, and via matter to be moved. Such an objection cannot prevail against the Platonists, in the first place, because the origin of its moving will appear to lie in one essence and the origin of its being moved in another. But one has to arrive at some essence which is source and receptacle alike of motion and of life, just as one arrives at some essence which is light's origin and ground simultaneously, and at another essence which is heat's. The objection cannot prevail in the second place, because, if that nature which is the integrity of the whole is quantitatively extended, it will be no more self-moving than the body's bulk, as we demonstrated above. But if it is indivisible, then we have already arrived as we wished at an incorporeal nature wherein exists the power of moving itself, and not because it acts on itself and is acted upon. For motion in it does not signify a passage from agent to patient, but a natural alternation of its essence by means of which it varies the succession of its affective dispositions and goes to and fro of itself[45] without anything else moving it, just as fire is hot by itself without anything else heating it or one of its parts radiating heat to another.

7 Motus igitur animalis, cum non sit a corpore quod est sua natura pigrum, neque sit a solo composito in quo non erit vis ulla movendi, si ex partibus talibus sit conflatum in quibus nulla vis sit ad motum, necessario est ab anima quae, si vim migrandi ex otio in actum tribuit animali, multo magis priusque tribuit ipsa sibi. Quicquid enim boni actusque vitalis a causa traducitur in effectum, prius explicatur in causa. Sic enim calor calet fervetque secum ipse prius quam materiam aliam calefaciat, et animata corpora turgent seminibus foetusque concipiunt in se ipsis prius quam partus edant. Dum igitur anima vitalem a potentia in actum progressionem explicat in se ipsa, dicitur a se ipsa moveri. Motum quidem in anima proprie actionem Platonici nominant, quoniam in fonte suo sit formetque corpus et agitet; in corpore vero motum nominant passionem. Cumque molem corpoream etiam universi oporteat moveri ab alio, concludunt universi corporis motum passionem esse a motu animae universalis tamquam ab actione quadam illatum. Et quemadmodum in quolibet genere imperfecta semper ad perfecta reducunt, ita motum corporis imperfectum ad animae motum tamquam perfectum in ipso motionis genere referunt.

8 Proinde cum quaeritur quonam motu praecipue anima moveatur, respondent, non corporali (est enim incorporea), non imaginabili (caret enim figura), non cognitivo (ignorat enim se ipsam), sed motu secundum essentiam vitalem. Sicut enim essentiae actus est esse atque intellectus ipsius actus est intellegere, sic vitae actus est vivere. Non enim[66] adventitiam, sed ex se ipsa possidet vitam atque, ut illorum verbis utar, anima est vita se generans et producens. Vita vero omnis est motus. Quare si omne vivens movetur, etiam quod per se vivit, per se quoque movetur, atque quod vivit semper, movetur et semper, non intellectuali videlicet modo, sed

Therefore, since animal motion does not derive from body 7 which is naturally sluggish, nor from the compound alone (in which no power of moving will exist if it is made up of parts in which no power to move exists), then it must derive from soul; and soul, if it gives a living being the power of passing over from inactivity to act, must *a fortiori* give to itself first. For whatever good or vital activity is transmitted from cause to effect is first unfolded in the cause. Thus heat heats and boils in itself before it heats up another material, and living bodies grow big with seed and conceive foetuses inside themselves before they give birth to offspring. So when the soul unfolds within itself the vital progression from potentiality to act, it is said to be self-moved. Platonists say that movement in the soul is properly action, because it is in its source and because it forms and moves the body; but movement in the body they call passion. And since even the corporeal mass of the universe must be moved by something else, they conclude that the movement of the universal body is a passion and that it is brought about by the movement of the universal soul as by an action. And just as they always reduce the imperfect members in any genus to the perfect, so they refer the body's imperfect motion to that of the soul's motion since it is perfect within the genus itself of motion.

So to the question, What is the principal sort of motion in the 8 soul? the Platonists respond that it is neither of the body, for the soul is incorporeal, nor of the imagination, for the soul has no shape, nor of the understanding, for the soul does not know itself; but rather it is movement in accord with its vital essence. For just as the act of essence is to be, and the act of understanding is to understand, so the act of life is to live. For the life it possesses comes not from without but from itself, so that the soul, if I may use the Platonists' words, is life generating and producing itself. But all life is movement. So if everything living is moved, then what is alive of itself is also moved of itself, and what always lives

vitali. Quapropter semper movetur et non semper, nam mens quidem secundum potentiam est; vita vero secundum actum. Denique essentia semper vivit perpetuumque intrinsecus exercet motum, quoniam essentialis vita semper est mobilis. Vires autem et actus quae tam circa vitam quam circa intellectum contingunt, vel intermitti vel aberrare quandoque possunt. Sed regrediamur iam unde digressi sumus.

9 Idem nobis tertia haec sequens ratio persuadet. Motus omnes hi sunt: alteratio, generatio, corruptio, augmentum, decrementum, condensatio, rarefactio, progressio. Numquid secundum alterationem se ipsum movet corpus? Nequaquam. Si enim se debeat calefacere, calorem habeat oportet quem sibimet tribuat. Oportet etiam ut non habeat, si modo[67] sit accepturum. Non enim accipit quisquam quod possidet. Ergo ut calefacit, calidum iam est, ut calefit, nondum est calidum. Dictu quidem ridiculum, istud habere aliquid simul et non habere, nisi forte quis aquam dicat frigiditatem quandam secundum virtutem habere quam retineat etiam postquam igne fuerit calefacta, per quam remota ab igne ad frigiditatem secundum actum iterum revertatur. Huic Platonici respondebunt: vel aquam illam ab elementis extrinsecis frigefieri vel, si qualitas eius secundum actum (quae aliquantum[68] ad naturam vergit incorporalem) pullulat ex intrinseca illa virtute qualitatis productiva[69] (quae quidem virtus etiam multo magis naturae incorporali propinquat), sequi ut virtus huiusmodi rursus a substantia quadam scaturiat, quae penitus incorporalis existat. Substantia vero huiusmodi erit principium motus in corpore. Nullum igitur corpus alteratione se ipsum movet.

10 Sed neque etiam se ipsum generat, quia quod generat aliquid generato dat esse. Habet igitur genitor esse quod tribuit genito. Quod generatur aliunde accipit esse quod ipsum non possidet. Ni-

is always moving, not in an intellectual way, that is, but a vital one.[46] So soul is and is not always moving, for it is potentially mind, but actually life. Finally, its essence is always alive and exercises unceasing internal movement, because essential life is always in motion. But the powers and acts which concern life and intellect alike can be interrupted or can go astray from time to time. But let us return now to the point from which we digressed.

The following third argument leads us to the same conclusion. All the motions are these: alteration, generation, corruption, growth, diminution, condensation, rarefaction, and progression. Is the body self-moving with respect to alteration? No! For if it were required to make itself hot, then it would have to possess the heat it gives itself. It would also have to not possess it, if it were going to accept it at a particular moment. For someone does not accept what he possesses. Therefore to heat it is hot already, to be heated it is not yet hot. To say that it does and does not possess something at one and the same time is obviously absurd, unless perhaps someone were to say that water has a sort of coldness potentially which it retains even after it has been heated up by fire, and by means of this potentiality, once it is away from the fire, it actually reverts to the coldness again. To this the Platonists will reply that either the water becomes cold from external elements, or if its quality (which somewhat tends towards an incorporeal nature) actually gushes forth from that internal power which is productive of quality (and which is much closer still to an incorporeal nature), then it follows that this internal power in turn gushes forth from a substance which is entirely incorporeal. This substance indeed will be the principle of motion in body. Therefore no body is self-moving by alteration. 9

Neither does body generate itself, because what generates something gives being to what is generated. So the parent has the being which it gives to its offspring. What is generated receives from elsewhere the being it does not possess itself. So nothing can 10

hil igitur sibi potest esse tribuere; haberet enim ipsum simul et non haberet. Et cum genitor genitum antecedat, qui sui ipsius secundum finitam naturam genitor est et genitus, se ipso simul prior est atque posterior; quod in natura finita nemo utique finxerit.

11 Atque neque corrumpit etiam se ipsum corpus. Quippe cum res quaeque prolem suam ex natura propria generet atque ideo sibi convenientem proferat, non contrariam, sequitur ut naturalis rei cuiusque instinctus, qui proles quaedam est essentiae atque ipsius esse, contra essentiam et esse non surgat. Nulla ergo res instinctu suo ducitur ad non esse, nedum sui, sed neque alterius cuiusque.[70] Immo cum rei cuiusque nixus ad se ipsam servandam proficiscatur, in contrarium non flectetur.

12 Sed neque auget se ipsum corpus aut minuit. Non enim fieri id sine alteratione contingit ac etiam generatione quadam et corruptione, nam per qualitatum alterationem crescimus et decrescimus. Et dum crescimus, novae in nobis partes corporis generantur. Dum decrescimus, veteres corrumpuntur. Si ergo incrementum et decrementum alteratione generationeque et corruptione indigent,[71] corpus quod per alterationem, generationem, corruptionem se non movet, neque augendo quidem movet se ipsum vel minuendo. Neque etiam condensat se ipsum vel rarefacit, quoniam sine alteratione ista quoque non fiunt.

13 Dixerit forte quispiam corpus saltem per se loco mutatur per transitum vel circuitum. Hoc quoque impossibile dictu. Si enim ad superiores illos motus qui interni sunt est impotens, multo magis erit impotens ad externos. Motus quidem externos voco circuitum atque transitum, qui ad terminos remotiores tendunt quam motus interni. Itaque si corpus non valet per se moveri ad terminos proprios, quonam pacto poterit ad terminos alienos?

give being to itself; for it would have it and not have it at the same time. And since parent precedes offspring, what is with respect to [its] finite nature both the parent and the offspring of itself would be simultaneously before and after itself; and this for something of a finite nature is inconceivable.

Also, body does not corrupt itself. Since each thing generates 11 its offspring out of its own nature, and so brings forth an offspring compatible with and not opposed to itself, it follows that the natural instinct of each thing, which is in a sense the offspring of its essence and being, does not rebel against its essence and being. So nothing is led by its instinct towards non-being, to its own much less but also not to anything else's. Or rather, since each thing's tendency is to preserve itself, it will not be turned around in the opposite direction.

Body does not increase or diminish itself either. For that can- 12 not come about without alteration, and also a sort of generation and corruption; for we increase and decrease through the alteration of qualities. And when we grow, new parts of the body are being generated in us. When we shrink, old parts are being corrupted. So if growth and diminution require alteration, generation, and corruption, body which is not self-moving through alteration, generation, and corruption, does not move itself by increasing or decreasing. It does not make itself denser or rarer either, because these too do not occur without alteration.

Perhaps someone will claim that body of itself at least changes 13 place by going straight or in a circle. But this too is impossible to maintain. For if body is incapable of the aforesaid motions which are internal to it, still more will it be incapable of movements external to it. I call moving in a circle or straight ahead external movements, which aim towards ends at a further remove from those which are the goal of internal motions. And so if body cannot move of itself towards ends proper to itself, how will it be able to move towards ends outside itself? And so let us now conclude.

Quamobrem sic iam concludamus. Nulli apparent in corporibus alii motus praeter illos octo iam numeratos. Per nullum illorum ex se ipsis aguntur. Ergo nullo modo ex se corpora agitantur.

14 Moventur tamen ut cuique constat a natura quadam intrinsecus agitante, etiam sine externis impulsibus. Hanc animam esse platonicus nemo negaverit, quam moveri per se possibile est, quia in ea alii quidam praeter octo illos alterius naturae motus reperiuntur. Quantum ad partem spectat qua regitur corpus, reperitur in anima temporalis vicissitudo seminum alias aliter in ea emergentium ad corporalia generanda. Quantum vero ad partem animae pertinet, quae in cognitione versatur, inest ipsa de cognitione affectioneque alia in aliam discursio temporalis: ab effectibus naturae ultimis in superna principia per causas medias[72] temporalis ascensio, ac vicissim a supernis principiis per medias causas ad ultimos effectus descensio. Hae discursiones motiones quaedam sunt, et naturae animi propriae, ut alias declaravimus. Non enim deo vel angelis congruunt, qui simul omnia possident atque vident. Non corporibus competunt, quae per se nihil agunt; non formis corporeis, quae ad incorporalia[73] non moventur. Huiusmodi vero discursiones ad divina nos ducentes, supra naturam corporis elevant. Efferri vero supra naturam suam neque corpus, neque aliud quicquam per se ipsum valet. Igitur revolutiones tales quae sunt a corporibus alienae, animo tamen insunt, testantur animam vel corpus vel formam divisam in corpore esse non posse; praesertim cum anima secundum illas per se, id est per naturam ac vim propriam agitetur, ideoque per se moveatur: quod nequit corpus.

15 Praeterea apparent in anima motionum corporalium exemplaria: generationis, quando divinis haeret; corruptionis, quando

No other movements appear in bodies apart from the eight already mentioned. Bodies are set in motion by themselves through none of these movements. So bodies are not moved in any way by themselves.

14 Nevertheless, everyone agrees that bodies are moved by the action of a nature[47] within, even without external impulses. No Platonist denies that this inner nature is soul. It is possible for soul to move itself, because in it we find certain other motions over and beyond the eight movements of the other nature. With regard to the part that controls body, in soul one finds the temporal interchange of seeds for generating bodily effects emerging in it now this way, now that. But with regard to the part of soul which is concerned with cognition, temporal discursive motion is present in soul when it goes from one cognition and affective disposition to another: temporal ascent via intermediate causes from the nature's furthermost effects to the highest principles, and in turn, temporal descent via intermediate causes from the highest principles to the furthermost effects. These discursive motions are particular motions, and they are proper to the rational soul's nature, as we have stated earlier. For they are not fitting for God or for angels, who possess and see all things simultaneously. Neither are they appropriate for bodies, which do nothing through themselves, nor to corporeal forms, which are not moved towards incorporeals. But such discursive motions, which lead us towards the divine, lift us beyond the body's nature. Neither body nor anything else is able on its own to rise above its nature. So these revolutions or cycles which are alien to bodies but present in soul show that soul can be neither body nor form divided in body; and especially because soul moves in these cycles on its own, that is, through its own nature and power, and is thus self-moving, which body cannot be.

15 Moreover, the models of the [eight] corporeal movements appear in soul: of generation when it cleaves to the divine, of corrup-

mortalibus; augmenti, quando reminiscitur; decrementi, quando obliviscitur; alterationis, quando variat vices affectionum; condensationis, prout subito aliquid intuetur vel sese colligit; rarefactionis, prout discurrit vel circa multa distrahitur; progressionis in rectum, cum primum attingit externa; circuitus autem, cum vel in rebus ipsis effectum resolvit in causam et a causa deducit effectum vel in se ipsam considerandam reflectitur. Moveri rursus videtur in rectum, quando ad corpus sensumque declinat; in obliquum, quando in se angelumve reflectitur; in circulum, quando in deum principium finemque suum. Sursum ad universalia, deorsum ad particularia; ad dexteram quoque atque sinistram, in oppositas videlicet generis differentias; denique ante et retro quando ad causas naturales effectusve se vertit.

16 Quis neget animam motionum fontem esse, cum in ea proprii motus sint et motionum corporalium exemplaria, in quibus contra corporis naturam ipsa sese generat quodammodo, vel, ut ita dixerim, quasi corrumpit, auget minuitque et transfert et reliqua? Merito igitur per eius praesentiam corpora viventia facultatem hanc adipiscuntur, ut sese alterent, nutriant, augeant, dum ex se aliquid generant in se ipsis, ac rursus ut ex se gradiantur, quocumque iudicaverint gradiendum. Quorum nihil efficiunt quae non vivunt, quasi spontaneus motus vitae sit proprius.

tion when it cleaves to the mortal, of increase when it remembers, of diminution when it forgets, of alteration when it passes from one mood to another, of condensation when it suddenly grasps something or collects itself, of rarefaction when it circles around and is distracted by many things, and of progress in a straight line when it first makes contact with things outside. But the model of circular movement appears either when, in the world of objects, it resolves an effect into its cause and deduces the effect from the cause, or when, in introspection, it turns to consider itself. Again, soul seems to move in a straight line when it sinks down to body and sensation, obliquely when it turns back towards itself or to angel, and in a circle when it turns to God, who is its beginning and end. It moves itself upwards towards universals, downwards towards particulars, right and left also towards the opposing differences of a genus, and forwards and backwards towards natural causes or effects.

Who would deny that soul is the source of motions, since in it are both its own motions and the models of bodily movements, wherein, unlike the nature of body, in a way it generates itself, or in a way corrupts itself, if I may say so, and makes itself larger or smaller, moves itself from one point, and so on? We should not be surprised then that it is through the soul's presence that living bodies acquire the capacity to change, nourish, and increase themselves when they generate something out of themselves in themselves; and again the capacity to walk of their own accord wherever they see fit to walk. Things that do not live do none of these things, which makes it seem that spontaneous movement is the special property of life. 16

: XIII :

Decima ratio: anima non crescit ad corporis huius augmentum.

1 Si anima corpus est, implet certe corpus istud quod vides solidum, ut vivat totum, et ipsa tenue atque agile corpus est, quod animi celeritas indicat. Quare si corpus animalis partiaris in membra, sicut frusta omnia corporis corpora sunt, ita corpuscula illa quae in membris sectis supersunt, sunt animae, praesertim cum anima unius sit tota naturae, ut diversa coniungat. Vivent igitur, movebuntur et sentient ad tempus brachia et crura a corpore separata, et anima quae in reliquo restat corpore, quae saepe brachiis et cruribus amputatis vivit decennium, multo erit minor quam antea, ideo pusillanimis erit, hebes, obliviosa. Immo etiam sic argumentemur.

2 Si anima corpus est, manifesti huius corporis magnitudinem quantitate sua penitus aequans, crescente ipso crescet, decrescente decrescet. In vasto corpore magnificentior erit et divinior animus. Atque in eodem homine quando adolescente corpore adolescet et anima, oportebit ut per adiunctionem corporis sibi similis adolescat. Alimentum huiusmodi vivitne in se antequam ab anima capiatur, an non? Si non vivit, quonam pacto vitam animae praestat et auget quod et vita caret? Et antequam vitam animae mutuet, oportet ipsum vitam ab anima mutuari. Si vivit, iam habet animam; novae igitur quotidie animae a nobis hauriuntur ad nostrae huius animae nutrimentum. Transit autem semper alimonia in eius naturam quod alitur. Itaque multae quotidie animae a natura perdentur, ut una servetur anima. Quod bonitas naturae non patitur.

: XIII :

Tenth proof: soul does not grow with the growth of this body.

If soul is body, it will certainly fill this visible solid body so that the whole of it will live, and it will itself be a slender and active body as the rational soul's speed of movement shows. If you dismember the body of a living creature, therefore, just as all the body's pieces will be bodies, so all the tiny little bodies that remain in the amputated limbs will be souls, especially since the soul is all of one nature so it can unite different things. So the arms and legs which have been sundered from the body will live, and move, and experience feeling for a period of time, and the soul that remains in the rest of the body, which often goes on living for ten years or so after the arms and legs have been amputated, will be much smaller than before and so will be weak, dull, and forgetful. Let me add the following proof. 1

If the soul is a body in all respects equaling in its quantity the magnitude of the visible body, then it will grow as the body grows and diminish as it gets smaller. In a huge body the rational soul will be more noble and more divine. When the soul increases as the body increases in the same man, it must be that it is growing by the addition of body like itself. Now is nourishment of this sort alive in itself before soul ingests it or not? If it is not alive, how can that which lacks life give life to the soul and increase it? And before it can borrow the soul's life, it must borrow life from the soul. If it is alive, then it already has soul; in which case we are ingesting new souls every day to nourish this our own soul. Now nourishment always changes into the nature of what is being nourished. So a large number of souls will be destroyed by nature every day in order to preserve one soul. But the goodness of nature does 2

Immo vero neque prior anima nostra servabitur, si substantia sua assidue subterfugiat; unde novas animas cogatur sibi semper asciscere, per quas anima iugiter innovetur.

3 Verum quonam pacto recens anima cum priori consentit? Quomodo, si continue effluit aliquid ab anima nostra et influit in animam alimentum, sicut fieri in carne videmus, manet voluntas eadem in plerisque semper? Idem mos, opinio eadem et scientia perpetuaque eiusdem rei memoria? Quomodo post decennium agnoscimus illa statim visa quae ante decennium videramus, nisi earundem rerum nobis acceptae quondam incolumes adhuc serventur imagines? Quis eas servat, nisi idem qui acceperat et iudicaverat animus? Quo pacto servat, si non servatur? Qua ratione, non stante animo, stabunt imagines et scientiae?

4 Neque dicat quisquam stare diu animum, si corpus fuerit. Quod enim corpus sub caelo manere in eodem statu potest diu, caelo ipso tam celeriter percurrente? Proinde si corpus aliquod tale sit, ut maneat aliquantum, corpora tamen subtilia et agilia minime omnium permanebunt. Anima vero si corpus sit, tenuissimum sit oportet, ut visceribus suffusa facillime cuncta vivificet. Ideo et ossa et nervi diutius consistent quam anima, immo etiam caro, quae tamen brevi tempore labitur et renovatur in dies. Erit autem anima flatus alicuius instar, instabilis prorsus et momentis singulis evanescens, quapropter neque diem quidem unum scientias rerum imaginesque servabit. Idem quoque patietur si anima qualitas sit et complexio aliqua humorum atque membrorum. Pariter enim qualitas fluit et humor, atque in ipsa nutritione anima effluet refluetque sicut corpus. Neque constabit animal secundum formam magis quam secundum materiam propriam, neque servabitur innumeralis unitas animalis, neque continuatio motionis nutrimenti

not permit this. Or rather, even our original soul will not be preserved if its substance is always slipping away, so that it is forced to perpetually acquire new souls for itself through which it is perpetually renewed.

Why should the new soul be in accord with the previous one? 3 If something is continually emptying out of soul and nourishment being taken in, as we see happening in the case of the flesh, how does our will remain in most respects always the same, our customary behavior the same, our opinion and knowledge the same, our memory of the same thing the same? How do we at once recognize a decade later things we had seen a decade earlier, unless the images of these same things we once received are still preserved intact? Who preserves them unless it is the self-same rational soul that first received and judged them? How can it preserve them if it is not itself preserved? If our rational soul has no stability, how will our images or knowledge retain their stability?

Nor can anyone say that the rational soul lasts for a long time if 4 it is a body. For what body beneath the heavens can remain in the same state for a long time when the heavens themselves are in such rapid motion? Consequently, even if there is such a body that can endure for some while, yet subtle and active bodies will do so least of all. Yet if soul is a body, it must be of the subtlest kind, so that it may without difficulty permeate the inward parts and give them all life. So bones and muscles will last longer than soul, or rather, flesh will—flesh which decays in a brief while and is renewed every day. But soul will be something like a breath of air, completely unstable and vanishing every instant; in which case it will preserve neither the knowledge nor the images of things for a single day. Soul will also suffer the same fate if it is a quality, or some complexion of the humors and limbs. For quality and humor likewise flow away, and, in the course of nutrition, soul will flow in and out again like body. The living being will have no more stability as regards its form than it has as regards its own matter; nor will its

aut augmenti. Neque erit in animali vis aliqua horum motuum ordinatrix, quae ita sibi ipsa constet, ut et ordinem ipsis progrediendi et terminum imponat progressioni quousque nutriri oporteat vel augeri. Necesse est enim rectorem illum in se consistere qui ordinat sistitque mobilia.

5 Obiiciet forte aliquis: 'Ita videmus in corpore nostro figuram eandem diutissime permanere, licet caro labatur et refluat. Similiter[74] quid prohibet in anima easdem rerum cognitarum imagines permanere, licet animae substantia ex vetere mutetur in novam?'

6 Respondemus, neque eandem prorsus manere figuram neque penitus similem, sed priorem frequenter abeunte carne abire et in carne recente novam priori quodammodo similem refici. Idque fieri a quodam artifice stabilissimo interius fabricante. Qui, cum maneat semper idem habeatque in se membrorum familiaris corporis disponendorum rationes et semina, potest novis humoribus quotidie influentibus complexionem similem ac prioribus tradere et recenti carni similem ac veteri praebere figuram, non aliter quam vultus qui flumen superne despiciens, fluentes undas novasque quolibet momento novis imaginibus sui depingit, ita ut idem in variis undis vultus persistere videatur. Intimus autem ille faber corporis atque stabilis anima est. Quae, si et ipsa fluat, certe neque similes corpus prae se diu feret effigies et figuras, neque anima scientias similes retinebit, quia tunc neque ipsa vi sua tenebit, neque aderit illi aliquis qui aut stabiliat illas in animo aut similes prioribus alias generet.

numberless, living unity be preserved, nor the continuity of the motion of its nutrition or growth. Nor in this living being will there be any power ordering these motions, a power sufficiently stable in itself to impose both an order on their progressing and a limit on their progression to the point necessary for nourishment and growth. For the controller who gives order and stability to what is in motion must be stable in himself.

Someone will perhaps offer the following objection: "In our own body, we see the same outward appearance endures for a long time, even though the flesh perishes and is renewed. Similarly then in the soul what prevents the same images of things known remaining, even though the substance of the soul changes from old to new?" 5

Our answer is that the outward appearance does not remain entirely identical or entirely similar; but that when the flesh departs the earlier appearance disappears too, and a new one similar in a way to the previous one is created in the new flesh. This is brought about by a craftsman of the utmost constancy working from within. Since he always remains the same and retains within himself the rational principles and the seeds for arranging the parts of his own body, he is able to transmit to the new humors daily streaming past a complexion such as the previous humors possessed, and to provide the new flesh with an appearance like the old. It is as though a face gazing down from above at a stream were to paint the fresh flow of the ripples at any moment with new reflections of itself such that the same face apparently stayed there in the changing ripples. But this constant inner craftsman of the body is the soul. If it were itself in flux, certainly the body would not display the same traits and features for any length of time; nor would the soul retain the same items of knowledge, because then it would not retain them by its own power, and nobody else would be present there who could keep the items stable in the rational soul or produce later ones like the earlier ones. 6

7 Non enim dicendum est, quando anima imaginem rei possidens effluit, eandem influenti animae imaginem se ipsam insinuare, quia nequit qualitas ulla in subiectum novum de vetere subiecto transire neque etiam evanescens illa prior anima imaginem aliam suae similem in anima veniente figurat. Figurare quidem[75] cum sit actio, perfectum requirit agentem. Illa vero anima dum interit, deficit quidem ipsa neque potest tunc animam novam perficere. Formare vero se ipsam anima nova nequit, eo praesertim ipso momento quo nascitur, quia ipsa etiam tunc est imperfecta. Quocirca nullo modo potest anima rerum earum quas olim novit imagines scientiasque tenere memoriter, si corporis et qualitatis instar effluat paulatim et influat.

It is impossible to maintain that, when a soul possessing an image of something ebbs away, the same image insinuates itself into a [new] soul flowing back in. This is because a quality cannot pass from an old subject into a new one; nor does the earlier soul, even as it fades away, fashion another image similar to itself in the arriving soul. For to fashion, since it is action, requires a perfect agent. But that earlier soul, while it is passing away, is itself defective and cannot then bring a new soul to perfection. But the new soul cannot form itself, especially at the moment of its birth, because it too is imperfect then. So there is no way soul can retain in the memory the images and knowledge of things it once knew, if like body and quality it gradually ebbs and flows away. 7

LIBER SEPTIMUS[1]

: I :

Anima non est corpus aut forma divisa in corpore aut talis formae punctum aliquod, sed est forma in qualibet parte corporis tota, ut ostenditur per potentiam sentiendi. Prima ratio: corpus non capit imagines aptas ad sensum.

1 Nescio quo pacto in superiori argumentatione incidimus in secundam disputationis huius partem, in qua probaturi sumus propositum nostrum per potentiam sentiendi. Sic igitur hanc[2] partem ulterius prosequamur.

2 Corpus, si quando suscipit quicquam, modo suscipit corporali, partes videlicet rei in suis partibus, neque potest rem maiorem quam sit ipsum capere, quemadmodum cera a sigillo figuram suscipiens, numquam ampliorem figuram quam ipsa sit accipit. Quod si haberet cera sensum, quo figurae magnitudinem iudicaret, tantam plane iudicaret quantam haberet. Neque potest aliam rursus figuram accipere nisi vel amittat priorem, vel utrasque ita in se confundat ut vix invicem discernantur. Sic anima, si corpus sit, per oculum corporum imagines modo suscipiet corporali, ita ut imago Platonis in oculo Socratis non maior sit quam Socratis oculus. Ita Socratis anima non maiorem putabit esse Platonem quam suus sit oculus, vel certe non maiorem quam sit cerebrum in quod ab oculo transferetur imago; tandem non maiorem quam sit socratici corporis magnitudo. Anima enim Socratis, si magna est, non est suo[3] corpore maior. Ideo si in se tota Platonis imaginem suscipit, non

BOOK VII

: I :

Soul is neither body, nor form divided in body, nor some point of such a form, but a form present in its entirety in any of the body's parts. We can see this via its capacity for sense-perception. First proof: body does not receive images appropriate to sensation.

In the course of the preceding argument we strayed somehow into the second part of this discussion, where we are going to prove our thesis by turning to the capacity for sense-perception, the sensitive power. So let us pursue this part of the discussion further. 1

Whenever body receives something, it receives in a corporeal manner: that is to say, it takes the parts of an object into its own parts and cannot take on an object larger than itself, just as wax, when it accepts an imprint from a seal, never receives an imprint larger than it can be. Now if the wax possessed a faculty to judge the size of the pattern [on the seal], it would obviously judge it to be the same size as the imprint it received [in itself]. And it can not take on any other imprint until either it loses the earlier one or it confounds the two in itself such that they are scarcely distinguishable from each other. In just the same way soul, if it were body, would receive images of bodies through the eye in a bodily way, such that Plato's image in the eye of Socrates would be no bigger than Socrates' eye. Thus Socrates' soul will think that Plato is no bigger than its own eye, or no bigger certainly than the brain into which the image is transferred by the eye; or no bigger at any rate than the size of Socrates' body. For if Socrates' soul is big, it is 2

maiorem suscipit quam sit ipsa. Quapropter nihil umquam maius existimabit esse Socratico corpore. Quinetiam quando Xenophontis et Alcibiadis et Phaedri imagines accipit, tunc vel amittit Platonis imaginem, vel ita habet cunctas deinde confusas ut alium illorum ab alio non discernat.

3 Conclude etiam ita: anima vel solidum corpus est vel fluxum. Si solidum, vix a corporibus figuratur peritque docilitas et acumen, atque una unius rei accepta figura vel alias non capit, vel si alias post alias ceperit, cunctae invicem obfuscantur. Si labile corpus est, nullas tenet figuras nullamque prorsus habet memoriam.

4 Praeterea, nonne constat rem eandem in specillo parvulo parvam videri, in maiori maiorem? Ceu si vultum tuum in mea pupilla prospexeris, deinde in speculo, hic exiguum, illic ingentem pronuntiabis, ubi pro speculorum ipsorum magnitudine et parvitate maiora vel minora corpora iudicantur. In anima hominis corporum paene omnium lucent imagines, per quas anima corpora quanta sunt iudicat. Nullum est tam ingens, tam immensum corpus, quod ipsa vel intueri vel excogitare non possit semperque aliud corpus ultra excogitato corpore maius. Ex quo apparet nullum esse animae praescriptum magnitudine[4] terminum, tum quoad illa quae comprehensura est, tum quoad propriam spectat animae ipsius substantiam. Si quam enim haberet in se propriam magnitudinem, tanta esset praecipue quanta est proprii corporis magnitudo. Unde in tam pusillo animali speculo non possent res tam variae, tam perspicuae, tam immensae lucere, cum pro diversa speculorum quantitate maiores minoresve soleant apparere.

not bigger than his body. So if it receives Plato's image in the whole of itself, it will not receive an image larger than it can be itself. So it will never believe that there is anything larger than Socrates' body. Furthermore, when it receives images of Xenophon and Alcibiades and Phaedrus, then it will either lose Plato's image or else have them all so mixed up thereafter that none of them is distinguishable from the other.

One can also argue as follows: soul is either solid or fluid body. 3 If solid, then it can hardly be given shape by bodies, and its malleability disappears as does its acuity; and once it has assumed one thing's one shape, either it does not take on other shapes, or if it does take them on one after another, they all become blurred together. If it is fluid body, then it retains no shapes and has absolutely no memory at all.

Moreover, isn't it well-known that a thing seems small in a 4 small mirror and larger in a larger one? Similarly, if you look at your face first in the pupil of my eye and then in a mirror, you will say it is tiny here and big there,[1] for it depends on the largeness or smallness of the mirrors themselves whether bodies are adjudged large or small. But the images of practically every sort of body are reflected in the human soul, and it is through these images that the soul judges how large the bodies are. No body is so huge, so unlimited in size, that the soul cannot look upon or think about it, and there is always another one even larger than the one being thought about. It is obvious from this that there is no limit as to size imposed on soul either with respect to what it will be able to grasp or with respect to its looking at the proper substance of soul itself. For if it did have its own size in itself, it would be as big, at the most, as its own body. Hence so many diverse things, so perspicuous, so immense could not be reflected in so tiny a living mirror, given that normally things appear larger or smaller in proportion to the differing sizes of mirrors.

5 Non tamen putare debemus spiritales colorum imagines vel a corporibus fieri vel suscipi in speculis[5] atque cerebro. Ipsae enim nihil aliud sunt quam splendores luminis corpora verberantis. Id autem visibile lumen, licet emicet in corporibus, fit tamen atque servatur ab invisibili lumine caelestium animorum, quod ex ingenti copia exuberat foras evaditque perspicuum; corporibus quidem nullis affigitur. Potest tamen luci nostri spiritus, quae a nostra anima pendet, coniungi eique suos splendores offerre. Significationes praeterea vocum ad auditum pervenientes, quae ipsae quoque spiritales sunt, neque a corpore fiunt neque figuntur in corpore, sed ab anima transmittuntur in animam atque animarum virtute fiunt et conservantur.

6 Verum superiorem disputationem hac divisione breviter concludamus. Si anima sit aliquid corporale, vel simulacra corporum eius faciem attingent sicut speculum, vel eorum qualitates in profundam animae substantiam penetrabunt sicut in aquam sapores atque odores. Si primum contingat, corpora forsitan praesentia sentiemus, sed non poterimus absentia cogitare, nam simulacra non servabimus; sin alterum fiet, sensus gradatim semper et cum corporis passione, similiterque memoria et qualitates sine discretionis iudicio invicem confundentur.

Yet we should not suppose that the spiritual images of colors are either made by bodies or received in mirrors or the brain. They are nothing but the splendid effects of light striking bodies. But this visible light, although it glitters on bodies, is brought into being and kept in being, nevertheless, by the invisible light of celestial souls, which brims over from its limitless abundance and becomes externally visible; and it is not attached to bodies at all. But it can be joined with the light of our spirit, which comes from our soul, and it can lend it its rays. Moreover, the meanings of words reaching our hearing, which are also spiritual and are neither made by body nor attached to body, but are transmitted from one soul to another, come into being and are kept in being through the power of souls. 5

Let us briefly conclude the preceding discussion with the following dilemma. If soul were something corporeal, either the reflections of bodies would make contact with its surface as in a mirror, or their qualities would penetrate deep into the soul's substance as flavors and smells do in water. If the first happened, we might perhaps perceive bodies when they were present, but we would not be able to think about them when they were absent, for we would not retain the reflections. If the second occurred, the senses would gradually and always be confounding each other along with the body's passion, and likewise the memory and the qualities; and our judgment would be unable to distinguish them. 6

: II :

Secunda ratio: oportet quinque sensus ad unum centrum conduci.

1 Visus colores attingit, non voces; auditus voces dumtaxat; olfactus odores. Animus colorem, vocem, odorem, ita invicem comparat ut[6] aliud colorem esse quam vocem et alia similiter iudicet. Illa vis per quam ita iudicat animus, cognoscit tum colores, tum voces et alia quae invicem comparat. Quomodo enim diceret colorem aliud esse quam vocem, nisi simul utrumque cognosceret? Quaenam ista vis est? Visusne? Minime. Non enim voces agnoscit. Ita neque auditus, qui colorum ignarus est, neque unus aliquis omnino quinque sensuum. Quisque enim illorum unum quiddam nuntiat solum neque potis est plura invicem comparare. Vis una certe illa est interior animae ad quam, velut centrum, a quinque sensuum instrumentis circumpositis undique varia nuntiantur. Illa una omnia illorum quinque sensuum obiecta et operationes diiudicat.

2 Neque dicas duas aut plures esse animae vires internas, per quas anima illa comparet. Sint,[7] si vis, geminae vires. Responde igitur: quotiens anima colorem ad vocem comparatura est, utrum per utramque vim apprehendat utrumque, colorem scilicet atque vocem, an per alteram alterum? Si utraque vis apprehendit utrumque, quid opus est viribus geminis, cum una sufficiat ad comparationis opus et tantundem faciat una quantum ambae? In necessariis rebus natura non deficit, supervacuis non abundat. Sin

: II :

Second proof: the five senses must converge on one center.

Sight perceives colors but not sounds, hearing only perceives sounds, smell only odors. The rational soul mutually compares color, sound, and odor and concludes that color is different from sound and so on with the rest. The power through which that soul makes this judgment has knowledge of colors, sounds, and all the other things it is comparing together. For how could it say that color is something other than sound if it did not have knowledge of both at once? What then is this power? Is it sight? No! For sight does not recognize sounds. Nor is it hearing, which knows nothing of colors. Nor is it any one of the five senses at all. For each of them tells about one thing only and is incapable of comparing a number of them together. That single power is clearly internal to the soul, to which, as to a hub, various sensations are reported by the organs of the five senses which ring it round on every side. It alone sorts out all the objects and activities of the five senses.[2] 1

Do not say that internal to the soul there are two or more powers through which the soul compares these objects and activities. For grant the twin powers if you will, then answer me this: Whenever the soul is going to compare color to sound, does it apprehend both of them, that is color and sound, by means of each power, or one of them by means of one power? If either power apprehends either, why require twin powers when one is sufficient for the job of comparison and one can do just as much as two? Nature is not lacking in necessary things and not abounding in superfluous. But if the soul knows just one of them [color or sound] by way of one power, via neither power will it compare 2

per alteram vim alterum tantum noscit, per neutram invicem comparabit utrumque; tamen per vim aliquam comparat. Est igitur alia quaedam vis praeter geminas illas ante confictas, per quam anima plura illa comparat invicem.

3 Utrum vis illa una indivisibilis sit, an corporis instar in plures partes divisa? Puta, utrum sit vis illa tamquam punctum aliquod individuum, quod *a* vocetur, an linea quaedam ab *a* in *b* protracta? Si dixeris eam esse lineam ab *a* in *b*, talem *a b*, quaeram abs te hunc in modum. Quotiens anima colorem ad vocem per huiusmodi lineam comparatura est, certum est quod utrumque istorum eam tangit lineam. Utrum igitur color solum caput lineae quod est *a* attingit, ad *b* non pervenit? Et vox solum *b* lineae finem tangit, ad *a* non transit? An potius ambo, tam color quam vox, ad ambo simul, tam scilicet ad *a* quam ad *b* veniunt? Si primum concesseris, scilicet quod alterum tantum venit ad terminum lineae alterum, profecto duo illi termini duae a se invicem erunt distinctae vires, quarum utraque quod suum est agnoscet, alterum ignorabit. Ideo per neutram vim illa animus comparabit. Sin concesseris ambo illa ad terminos ambos concurrere, ita ut vis utriusque termini ambo persentiat, una illarum sufficit, vacat altera, quandoquidem nihil plus vires ambae quam alterutra faciunt; immo vero duae vires erunt indivisibiles ambae.

4 Ita cogimur confiteri vim illam animae unam per quam plura diiudicat non esse partibilem. Igitur vis illa, magistra sensuum, neque corpus est neque qualitas diffusa per corpus. Si talis est animae vis, quid prohibet animam esse talem? Nisi forte putes substantiae alicuius vim substantia sua esse nobiliorem.

them together. Yet the soul does compare them via some power. So there is some other power, besides the twin powers we have just dreamed up, via which the soul compares those many objects and activities of the senses with each other.

This power, is it one and indivisible or, like body, divisible into many parts? Is it, for instance, like an indivisible point, which can be called A, or like a line drawn from A to B? If you say it is a line from A to B, the line AB, then I will put these questions to you. As often as the soul is going to compare color to sound by means of such a line, both of them must touch the line. So is it that color only arrives at the beginning of the line at A and does not arrive at B? And does sound only touch B at the end of the line and not pass on to A? Or rather, do both color and sound come to A and B together? If you concede the first—that each reaches only one end of the line—then the two ends of the line will be mutually distinct powers and each will recognize what is its own end but be ignorant of the other. So via neither power will the soul compare color and sound. But if you grant that color and sound reach both A and B together, such that the power at each end perceives both, then one of the powers is sufficient and the other useless, for both powers do nothing more than each does on its own, or rather, the two powers will both be indivisible. 3

We are thus obliged to admit that the one power in the soul through which the soul judges between many things is indivisible. So that power, being the mistress of the senses, is neither body nor quality spread through body. If the soul's power is like that, what stops the soul itself from being like that, unless you think perchance that the power of some substance is more excellent than its very substance? 4

: III :

Tertia ratio: quo angustior sensus est, eo est perspicacior.

1 Profecto oportet imaginem visibilis corporis ad aliquid impartibile colligi. Quod et in ipsis fit pupillis. Alioquin ingentia corpora atque caelum ipsum per tam minimam pupillam non cerneremus. Quod si quantum ad oculum spectat, ut cernat acutius, ampliore quantitate opus non est (immo parvissimi oculi acrius inspiciunt quam amplissimi, ut oculi aquilae quam bovis, quasi visum non modo non iuvet sed impediat magnitudo) — si, inquam, exterior acies magnitudine ad percipiendum minime indiget, quid de illo interiori visu et communi sensu dicemus, qui quanto singulis sensibus est praestantior et acutior tanto etiam debet sufficientior esse? Erit autem sufficientior, si nulla indigeat corporis quantitate. Denique et ipsa animae substantia, sensuum fundamentum, erit omni sensu sufficientior, si quantitate non egeat. Quis eam dixerit quantitatis dimensionibus indigere, cum neque conducat ad animi dotes corporis magnitudo neque noceat? Si conduceret necessario, non esset apis ove solertior, vulpes[8] astutior sue, simia ingeniosior asino, leo bove audentior. Sin necessario noceret, non esset elephas prudentior equo, canis agno sagacior. Quod si ad has animae vires quae versantur circa corporum quantitatem, nihil valet corporis quantitas, multo minus eam valere putandum est ad eam vim animi quae transcendit corporum quantitatem, ad rationem scilicet, quam suo loco tractabimus.

: III :

Third proof: the more concentrated the sense, the sharper it is.

Clearly the image of a visible body has to be reduced to something indivisible. This is what happens in the pupils. Otherwise, through such a diminutive pupil we would not see immensities and the sky itself. But if, as far as the eye is concerned, there is no need for greater size in order for it to see more clearly (indeed, very small eyes see more acutely than very large eyes — contrast an eagle's eyes with a cow's — it is as though size not only does not help vision but hinders it), if, I say, the outer glance does not need size in order to see, what shall we say about that inner vision, the common sense,[3] which is superior to and sharper than the individual senses and should in the same measure be more self-sufficient? It will be more self-sufficient, if it has no need of bodily quantity at all. Finally, the soul's substance itself, the foundation of the senses, will be more self-sufficient than all the senses, if it has no need of quantity. Who would claim that soul needs quantity's dimensions, when the body's size does not in any way improve or impair the soul's gifts? If it improved out of necessity, then a bee would not be smarter than a sheep, a fox more cunning than a pig, a monkey more intelligent than an ass, and a lion braver than a cow. But if it impaired out of necessity, then an elephant would not be more prudent than a horse, a dog more sharp-nosed than a lamb. If body's quantity does not prevail on these powers of the soul which are concerned with the quantity of bodies, then we have to conclude that it prevails still less on that power of the soul which transcends the quantity of bodies, namely reason, which we will discuss in its proper context. 1

: IV :

Quarta ratio: si sensus dividuus[9] sit, in eo imago sensibilis dividetur.

1 Esto, si vis, intimus ille visus corporea mole distentus; quid inde sequatur, attende. Cum coloris externi capit concipitve imaginem,[10] suo modo accipit atque corporeo. Imago huiusmodi per partes huius visus dividitur et alia pars visus aliam coloris aspicit partem; nec erit in nobis aliquid quod totum colorem visibilem comprehendat. Oportet tamen unam rei unius comprehensionem ab uno fieri comprehendente. Ac si dixeris unum ipsum comprehendens esse formam quandam totius compositi, cunctis communem partibus, quaeremus numquid dividua sit, unde quaestio redibit eadem, an individua, unde comprehensionem in vi individua collocabimus. Oportet igitur sensum esse magnitudinis corporalis expertem; praesertim quia si magnus sit, parvis non congruet neque sentiet illa totus, sed pars eius ipsa quae parvis aequatur. Si parvus, magna non capiet; si medius, non quadrabit extremis.

2 At tu, si vis sensibilem colorem una cum sensu partiri, quonam pacto distribues? An aequalem aequali aptabis? Sed non potes. Non enim aequalis est sensus rei cuilibet sentiendae. In quot autem partes utrumque distribues? Num in quasdam partes numero quidem terminatas et naturali ordine minimas? Quod si feceris, non invenies unam rei unius comprehensionem. Sed more mathematicorum in omnes quas habent puto te partiturum. In particulas igitur infinitas tam visum quam colorem secabis et visus partes singulae singulas coloris sentient portiones. Itaque innumerabiles

: IV :

Fourth proof: if the sense is divided, then the sensible image in it is divided.

Let us accept, if you will, that the inner sight is distended by corporeal bulk. Then consider the consequences. When it perceives or conceives of the image of an external color, it does so in its own corporeal way. Such an image is divided through the different parts of this sight, and one part sees just one part of the color. There will be nothing in us to comprehend the visible color as a whole. Yet a single comprehension of a single object must be done by a single comprehending power. But were you to claim that this single power is a form of the whole compound, a form common to all its parts, then we would inquire whether the form is divided (in which case the same question recurs) or undivided (in which case we will be locating comprehension in an undivided power). So sense must be independent of corporeal size. This is especially the case since, if sense were big, it would not be adapted to small objects, nor would the whole sense perceive them but rather that part of sense which equals the small objects in size. If it were small, it would not take in large objects. And if it were in between, it would not adapt itself to the extremes. 1

If you wish to divide sensible color along with dividing the sense, how will you divide it? Will you match equal part to equal part? But you cannot. For the sight is not equal [in size] to everything it has to perceive. In how many parts would you divide each? Surely not into a limited number of parts, the smallest in the natural order? If you did that, you would not find yourself with a single comprehension of a single object. But I suppose, in the manner of the mathematicians, you are going to divide them into all the parts they have. So you will chop both sight and color into an 2

ibi erunt visus, innumerabiles visi colores, innumerabiles visiones. Atque ita numquam poterit color unus visum incurrere, quin eodem illo momento infiniti visus infinitos colores videant infinite. Quod ne fingi quidem potest. Forsan, ut haec monstra vitemus, subiiciemus totum illum visum sentire, partes eius nequaquam. Sed hoc etiam temerarium. Quo enim modo quae sensu carent sentientem substantiam generabunt? Nullo. Igitur neque partes illae sentiendi expertes sensum ipsum constituent.

3 An dicemus singulas partes visus sentire, sed per eandem totius visus et integram visionem ac sentire speciem totam partesque cum tota? Non. Primo, quia species non videtur, sed color ipse per[11] speciem. Deinde quia operatio quae fit ex congregatione partium distinctarum fit quoque per congregationem momentorum ac transigitur paulatim. Sensus autem fit subito, quod significat sentiendi vim esse indivisibilem. Denique si pars quaeque visus per se sufficit ad videndum, quid opus est pluribus? Si non sufficit, ex non sentiente fit sentiens, nisi forte partes illae congregentur in unum a superiore aliquo sentiente. At illud erit anima potius quam[12] sensus. Quapropter numquam deliras responsiones effugiemus, quamdiu sensum esse partibilem affirmabimus. Sit ergo impartibilis sensus. Sit et anima talis, quae fons est indivisibilis virtutis atque subiectum.

infinite number of particles and the individual parts of sight will perceive individual portions of color. Thus there will be innumerable acts of seeing, innumerable colors seen, innumerable sights. A single color will never be able to come into contact with the sight without at the same time infinite acts of seeing gazing at infinite colors in an infinite manner. This cannot even be imagined. Maybe, to avoid these monstrous possibilities, we might suggest that the whole of the sight sees, not its parts. But this is equally rash. For how will parts that lack sense generate a sentient substance? Impossible. So parts that lack sensation cannot constitute the sense itself.

Shall we say then that the individual parts of sight do see, but 3 via the same whole vision of the whole sight; and that they see the complete form and the parts together with the whole? No! Firstly, because the form is not seen but the color itself through the form. Secondly, because an action which results from the assembling of distinct parts also results from the piling up of moments, and it occurs little by little. However, sense perception happens instantaneously, which means that the power of perceiving is indivisible. And lastly, if each part of sight suffices of itself for seeing, why do we need many parts? If it does not suffice, then the sentient is coming from the non-sentient, unless perhaps the parts are assembled into one by a higher sentient something. But that will be a soul rather than the sense. Therefore we shall never escape these witless responses as long as we are going to insist that sense is divisible. So let sense be indivisible and let the soul be such too, which is the source and the subject of indivisible power.

: V :

Quinta ratio: anima sentit ubique tota.

1 An ignoras partem corporis alicuius ipsi toti aequalem esse non posse atque ideo formam, quae talis est ut per diversas partes corporis protendatur, in qualibet corporis parte totam existere non valere? Alioquin toti pars foret aequalis. Admitto ista; quid tum? Nempe anima cuilibet parti corporis adest tota, quia tota sentit cuiuslibet corporalis particulae passionem. Nam si aliquo offensus casu pes doleat, statim illuc advertitur oculus, admovetur e vestigio manus, os clamat et reliqua membra ferme similiter. Quod certe numquam fieret, nisi id quod ipsius animae inest partibus corporis omnibus etiam in pede sentiret, atque[13] sentire quod ibi factum est absens non posset. Neque enim nuntio aliquo credendum est id fieri non sentiente quod nuntiat, quia quod non sentit non nuntiat. Neque passio, quae fit per continuationem molis, semper potest occurrere, ut ceteras animae partes quae alibi sunt latere non sinat, quia non semper fit dolor ubique, sed illud tota sentit anima quod fit in pedis particula, et ibi tantum sentit ubi fit. Tota igitur singulis partibus simul adest, quae tota simul sentit in singulis. Formae autem sparsae per corpus, puta albedini, idem in hoc accidit quod et corpori, ut videlicet passio unius partis non necessario reliquas partes omnes commutet. Quid enim prohibet unam corporis albedinisque partem infici et foedari, reliquis non

: V :

Fifth proof: wherever the soul perceives it does so as a whole.

Are you unaware that a part of some body cannot be equal to the whole of that body, and thus a form, which is such that it extends through the body's different parts, cannot exist as a whole in any one part of the body? Otherwise the part would be equal to the whole. Very well, I admit that; what then? The soul as a whole obviously is present in every part of the body because it perceives in its entirety whatever is experienced in any corporeal part however small. If, by some mischance, you injure your foot and it gives you pain, straightway your eye turns in that direction, your hand immediately moves towards it, your mouth cries out, and the rest of your members react in much the same way. This clearly would never happen unless the soul, or that aspect of it which is present in all parts of the body, also felt sensation in the foot. But it could not feel what happened there if it were absent. For we should not believe it is the work of some messenger who does not perceive what he reports, because what he does not perceive he does not report. Nor can the pain which occurs through the continuity of the mass always occur, just as it cannot be hidden from the soul's other parts, those elsewhere. This is because pain does not always occur everywhere, yet the whole soul feels what happens in the particular part of the foot, and it feels it precisely at the spot where the pain occurs. So the whole soul which simultaneously feels in the individual parts is simultaneously present in them. But what happens to a form scattered through the body — whiteness, say — is what also happens to the body, namely, what affects one part does not necessarily affect all the other parts. For what stops one part of the body and of whiteness becoming stained and dirty while the other parts remain clean? But nothing can happen to 1

pollutis? Ceterum nihil in una quavis particula animalis accidit, quin id ad totam mox pertineat animam.

2 Mysterium hoc Platonicum Augustinus noster ita confirmat: 'Anima per totum corpus quod animat, non locali diffusione, sed quadam vitali intensione porrigitur. Nam per omnes particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, nec in maioribus maior, sed alicubi intensius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter quicquid[14] in corpore etiam non in toto sentit, tamen tota sentit. Nam cum exiguo puncto in carne unum[15] aliquid tangitur, quamvis locus ille non solum totius corporis non sit, sed vix in corpore videatur, animam tamen totam non latet. Neque id quod sentitur, per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit. Unde ergo ad totam mox pervenit quod non in toto fit? Nec ut tota ibi sit, cetera deserit. Vivunt[16] et illa ea praesente ubi nihil tale factum est. Quod si fieret utrumque simul, utrumque totam pariter non lateret'. Haec Aurelius.

3 Verum dices fortasse animam quidem ita per universum corpus porrectam ut pars eius in pede sit, pars in crure, alia in femore, pectore, collo, summa in cerebro, ubi fiat iudicium principale. Ac dolorem pedis non ideo iudicari a vi animae quae sedet in cerebro, quia illa vis adsit et pedi, sed quoniam successione quadam altera pars animae alteri ad cerebrum usque passionem pedis enuntiat. Profecto non negabis partes istas animae inferiores sentire, cum evidenter appareat in membris illis percipi passionem. Si enim pe-

any part of a living creature without it soon concerning the whole soul.[4]

Our Augustine confirms this mystical Platonic doctrine as follows: "The soul is extended through the whole of the body to which it gives life not by spatial diffusion but by a sort of vital intensifying. For it is present at the same time in its entirety in all the parts: not less in the lesser parts or more in the greater ones, but rather more intensely in some parts, less intensely in others, and it is whole in them all and whole in each one. For it does not sense in different ways whatever is in the body even if it is not in the whole body: it senses with the whole of itself. When some one thing is touched at a tiny point in its flesh, though that point not only does not belong to the whole body but hardly seems in the body, yet the fact is not hidden from the whole soul. The sensation does not traverse the whole of the body; it is felt only where it occurs. How does it happen that what is not in the whole body immediately reaches the whole soul? The soul does not abandon the rest of the body so as to be wholly in that one place. For the parts where nothing has happened continue to live, thanks to the soul's presence. But if sensation occurred in two places simultaneously, the whole soul would be aware of both."[5] Thus Augustine. 2

Perhaps you will maintain that the soul is spread through the whole body in such a way that part of it is in the foot, part in the leg, and the remaining parts in the thigh, the breast, the neck, with the most important part in the brain where judgment principally occurs. The reason, you will say, that the pain in the foot is judged by the soul's power residing in the brain is not that the power is also present in the foot, but because one part of the soul brings the news about the foot's pain in a succession to another part and so to the brain. Certainly, you will not deny that those lower parts of the soul have sensation, since it is clearly in those parts of the body that the experience is felt. If the foot's feeling has 3

dis passio sit[17] cerebro nuntianda, vel ex eo nuntiatur quod gradatim membra intermedia patiuntur, vel ex eo quod licet non patiantur, sentiunt tamen dolorem pedis eumque cerebro referunt. Certe non semper totum patitur aeque nec est idem in mediis membris, qui in pede est cruciatus, sed molesta quaedam cruciatus illius persensio.[18] In omnibus igitur molestia quaedam inest et sensus.

4 Quid hinc sequatur adverte. Pars animae quae in pede est cruciatum sentiet pedis, pars quae in crure non pedis sed cruris molestiam sentiet. Ibi enim sentit solum ubi est, et passionem sentit solummodo quae in eam incurrit. Pars quae in genu praesentem similiter tantum percipiet passionem ceteraeque similiter. Post omnes vis illa iudiciaria cerebri praesentem sibi solum molestiam animadvertet. Partes animae a pede ad cerebrum, sicut et corporis, ferme innumerabiles sunt, si et ipsa sit corporalis. Ergo semel offenso ad lapillum pede, non fiet unus sentiendi actus et subitus, sed multi gradatim et innumerabiles paene contingent dolores, sicut perceptiones innumerabiles. Post omnes autem animae partes, quod nefas est, sentiet illa in qua principalis est sensus. Sentiet etiam non pedis passionem, sed suam solummodo. Neque iudicabit umquam ubi sit laesio, ubi sit succurrendum; neque per eius imperium membra corporis convertentur ad pedem.

5 Ut haec absurda vitentur, fatendum est totam vim illam iudiciariam animae, una cum tota animae ipsius substantia, singulis membris esse praesentem, ut quicquid ubique fit[19] statim sine internuntio tota persentiat, tota sibimet compatiatur et consonet cunctas animae vires, cunctas etiam partes corporis imperio subito ad medelam laesae partis adhibeat. Atque ita quicquid et quan-

to be announced to the brain it is either because the intermediate bodily parts undergo the experience one by one, or because, although they do not experience anything themselves, they nevertheless sense the pain of the foot and transmit it to the brain. Now clearly the whole body is not always suffering in equal measure, nor is the pain which is in the foot the same in the intermediate parts, but there is an uncomfortable awareness of that pain. A discomfort and perception is thus present in all the parts.

But consider the consequences of this. The part of the soul which is in the foot feels the foot's pain; the part which is in the leg feels not the foot's pain but the leg's discomfort. For it feels only where it is and it feels only the sensation that comes to it. Likewise the part in the knee will be aware only of its present sensation, and so on with the rest [of the parts]. At the end of the process the faculty of judgment in the brain will be aware only of the discomfort present to itself. The parts of the soul intermediate between the foot and the brain, like the parts of the body, are almost numberless if the soul too is corporeal itself. So the minute the foot strikes against a stone there will not be a single immediate act of sensation; but a succession of many, indeed almost numberless, pains will occur one after another like numberless perceptions. Only subsequent to all the [other] parts of the soul—and this is horribly wrong—will the part in which the principle sensation occurs feel pain. And it will feel not the pain of the foot, but only its own pain. It will never decide where the injury is and where help is needed, nor will the limbs of the body be directed by its command to help the foot. 4

To avoid these absurd consequences, one has to admit that the whole of the judging power of the soul, together with the soul's whole substance, is present in the body's individual parts, so that in its entirety it can immediately perceive without a messenger whatever happens anywhere, and in its entirety experience it and respond in harmony, issuing immediate orders to direct all the 5

tumcumque animae est in membris ullis, ab alio quovis membro non abest, quia in quovis ad quodlibet admovet quaelibet. Corpus et forma per ipsum fusa eiusve punctum talia non sunt, ut in multis sint tota simul, et secum ipsis in suis partibus absque mora prorsus compatiantur atque concurrant. Est igitur anima ab iis longe diversa.

6 Neque nos turbent animalia multa quorum corpora cum secantur, utraque frusta moventur et sentiunt, quasi anima ita longa fuerit sicut corpus, postquam dum corpus secatur in corpora, anima quoque secari videtur in animas. Non enim dividitur anima primo[20] sed interit, cum primum illa ipsa corporis compago resolvitur cui fuerat attributa. Fiunt autem subito novae animae a vita mundi in frustis illis ad animam suscipiendam idoneis. Talis enim illorum natura est qualis fuerat et totius. Et quia animae tales ita viles sunt ut paucissimas vires operationesque habeant ideoque paucissimis egeant instrumentis, factum est ut corpus illis sufficiat, etiam si non sit variis instrumentis instructum.[21] Quod non sufficit perfectioribus animabus, quae ob hoc in singulis membris non vivunt. Si lignum aliquod secetur in puncto, punctum hoc, licet indivisibile sit,[22] perit tamen ac in duobus frustis duo extrema videntur puncta renasci. Si speculum fregeris in quo tui vultus apparebat imago, non conciditur imago primo sed abit, ac duae a te pro una imagines in duobus speculis recreantur. Si nomen hoc Lucifer, in quo vox locum tenet corporis, significatio animae, in duo membra diviseris, quasi animal, 'luci' et 'fer', cessat primo illa significatio per quam Venus designabatur. Non tamen dividitur: est

powers of the soul and all the parts of the body to the task of healing the injured part. And so any aspect of the soul that is present in any degree in any of the body's parts is not absent from any one part, because in each it moves all to some purpose. Body and form extended through body or through a point of it are not such that they can be totally and simultaneously in many things and be capable in their parts of instantaneously and absolutely sharing the same experience and agreeing together. So the soul is far different from body and extended form.

6 Nor should we be confused by the many animate things whose bodies, when severed, have segments which move and feel as though the soul were as long as the body, inasmuch as, when the body is cut into bodies, the soul also seems to be cut into souls.[6] For the soul is not divided in the first place, but ceases to exist as soon as the structure itself of the body to which it was assigned is destroyed. But new souls are immediately made by the life of the world in those segments which are capable of receiving soul. For their nature is the same as the whole's. And because the souls in question are so lowly that they possess very few powers and operations and therefore need very few instruments, it happens that even a body not equipped with different organs is adequate for them. This body would not be adequate for higher souls which on this account do not live in the body's individual parts. If you cut a piece of wood at a certain point, that point, though it is indivisible, ceases to exist, and in its place you can see two end points emerge, one in each segment. If you break a mirror in which the image of your face is reflected, the image is not cut in two; first it disappears and then in place of the one image two images are recreated by you in the two mirrors. If you take the word "LUCIFER" where sound plays the role of body and meaning of soul, and split it into two parts as we did animal, into "LUCI" and "FER," then first the meaning disappears (it signified Venus).[7] Yet the meaning is not divided, for the meaning of a name is

enim indivisibilis significatio nominis, ut alias ostendemus. Adhuc tamen duae quaedam sunt in duabus partibus significationes per quas, tamquam animas, dictiones huiusmodi supervivunt, 'luci', per lucis significationem, 'fer', per significationem aliquam lationis. Quid igitur prohibet quo minus reptilia animam habeant secundum Platonicos individuam, quamvis membra divisa vivant?

: VI :

Sexta ratio: anima non necessario patitur sentiendo.

1 Anima ipsa, ut vera philosophia docet, cum sit purissima, crasso huic et terreno corpori ab ea longe distanti non aliter quam per tenuissimum quoddam lucidissimumque corpusculum copulatur, quem spiritum appellamus, a cordis calore genitum ex parte sanguinis tenuissima, diffusum inde per universum corpus. Huic anima sibi cognatissimo facile se insinuans, primo quidem per hunc totum se fundit spiritum, deinde hoc medio per corpus penitus universum; vitam primum huic praestat et motum facitque vitalem perque hunc regit movetque corpus. Et quicquid a corpore in hunc spiritum permanat, anima ipsi praesens continuo percipit. Quam perceptionem sensum cognominamus. Deinde hanc perceptionem animadvertit et iudicat. Quam animadversionem phantasiam esse volumus. Quorsum haec? Quando secat medicus cutem corporis extimam, frangitur caro, dissolvitur et contrahitur spiritus. Sentit haec omnia tactus, qui per omnia membra universalis est animae sensus; iudicat haec et condolet phantasia. Quomodo potest discindi caro, quin spiritus illi suffusus partim cum

indivisible[8] as we shall demonstrate elsewhere. Yet two separate meanings dwell still in the two parts, and through these meanings as through souls, the two utterances live on: "LUCI" lives on through the meaning "light," and "FER" through the meaning "carrying." So what prevents reptiles from having according to the Platonists an undivided soul although their segmented members live on?

: VI :

Sixth proof: in perceiving, the soul is not necessarily passive.

As true philosophy teaches us, the soul, since it is most pure, is linked to this gross and earthy body, which is so different from it, only by means of a superlatively fine, transparent, diminutive body which we call the spirit. It is generated by the heart's heat out of the finest part of the blood and thence spread through the whole body. Since it is closely akin to the soul, the soul has no difficulty in entering into this spirit and first permeates the whole of it, and then with it as a mean it totally permeates the whole body. Initially it gives life and movement to the spirit and makes it vital and then uses it to control and move the body. Anything from the body that presses into this spirit the soul immediately perceives since it is present there. This act of perception we call sense. Next the soul takes note of the perception and forms a judgment. This taking notice we call phantasy. What does all this lead to? When a surgeon makes an incision in the outer skin of a body, the flesh is broken and the spirit is weakened and contracted. All this the touch feels, the touch being the sense of the universal soul present through all the limbs; and the phantasy judges and shares in the pain. Now how can the flesh be torn unless the spirit which per- 1

soluta carne solvatur, partim etiam in se ipsum fugiens contrahatur? Quo etiam pacto solutio et contractio spiritus latere suam animam poterit? Ac si non latet, cur non moleste ferat anima operis sui perniciem? Spiritus quidem et corpus opus est animae. Opus vero proprium omnia diligunt. In carne quidem passio; cruciatus in spiritu; sensus in tactu; compassio et condolentia, ut ita loquar, in phantasia.

2 Complectere paucis. Tam in carne quam[23] spiritu perniciosa quaedam fit substantiaeque corruptrix solutio vel contractio. Hanc vocemus noxiam laesionem. Numquid etiam in animam laesio transit huiusmodi? Minime. Haec enim substantiam perdit; perdit igitur substantiae ipsius virtutem; perdit deinceps virtutis operationem. In qualibet igitur carnis et spiritus vel levissima laesione, animae substantia illis praesens similiter laederetur, laederetur et virtus multo magis, laederetur et operatio. Sensus et phantasia vires animae sunt; sentire et iudicare per sensum harum virium actiones. Ergo si discissio illa in animae substantiam pertransiret, neque sentiremus eam neque qualis sit et unde et quomodo succurrendum iudicaremus, sed vel lateret animam penitus vel minimum quid perciperetur et falso iudicaretur ab anima. Et cum anima sit ubique tota, si ipsa in parte corporis secta patitur, tota patitur. Eadem vero tota anima quae ibi est, est et per totum corpus. Per totum igitur corpus patitur. Si ubique patitur, non potest percipere et nuntiare passionem illam in parte una animalis magis quam in alia esse. Quinetiam cum aliud sit passio, aliud iudicium passionis, et passio semper iudicetur ab alio, si in ipso iudicio insit

meates it is in part dissolved with the dissolving flesh and in part shrinks into itself in flight? And how can that dissolving and shrinking of the spirit be hidden from its soul? But if it is not hidden, why would the soul not be appalled by the destruction of its own work? For the spirit and the body are the work of the soul. But all things delight in their own work. So pain occurs in the flesh, suffering in the spirit, sensation in the touch, and sharing the experience of pain, or condolence I might call it, in the phantasy.

Let us put the matter in brief. A harmful and destructive process of dissolving and contracting the substance occurs in both the flesh and the spirit. This we might describe as a dangerous injury. Now does this injury pass into the soul too? Certainly not. For then the injury destroys this substance, and so destroys the substance's power, and so destroys the power's activity. Thus in the case of even the slightest injury to the flesh or the spirit, the substance of the soul present in them would suffer similar injury; and even more so would its power and operation be injured. Sense and phantasy are powers of the soul; and to sense and via sensation to form judgments are these actions of the powers. So if that gash in the flesh were to become a gash in the soul's substance, then we could neither sense the gash nor form judgments about its nature, its origin, or how to heal it: either the gash would be hidden entirely from the soul or it would be perceived as something slight and judged falsely by the soul. Since soul is everywhere in its entirety, if it suffers in the cut part of the body, then the whole of it will suffer. But the same whole soul which is in the cut part is present throughout the rest of the body too. So the soul suffers throughout the body. If it suffers everywhere, it cannot perceive and announce that the suffering is more in one part of the living being than in another. Moreover, since the suffering and the judgment of the suffering are two different things, and the suffering is 2

passio, opus est ulterius alio quodam iudicio quo passivum iudicium iudicetur. Si illud quoque sit passivum, rursus opus est alio. Quapropter veniendum denique est ad iudicem quendam liberum passione. Hic dum iudicat corporis passiones, si accipit inde qualitatem aliquam corporalem, procul dubio patitur. Si non accipit, non formatur a corpore. Sit ergo oportet talis iudex, ut neque passiones accipiat a corporibus neque formas. Non posset autem anima talis esse, si ipsa vel corpus esset tenuissimum in hoc corpore mersum vel aliqua corporis huius affectio, sive punctum quoddam affectionis.

3 Platonica haec ita Augustinus Plotinusque comprobant. 'Videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere. Et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. Sed iste sensus, qui etiam dum nihil sentitur,[24] inest tamen quasi per instrumentum est corporale,[25] quod ea temperatione agitur ab anima, ut in eo sit ad passiones corporis cum attentione agendas paratior, similia similibus ut adiungat repellatque quod noxium est. Agit porro, ut opinor, luminosum aliquid in oculis, aereum serenissimum et mobilissimum in auribus, caliginosum in naribus, in ore humidum, in tactu terreum et quasi lutulentum. Agit autem haec omnia[26] cum quiete, si illa[27] quae sunt in animali[28] in unitate valitudinis familiari[29] quadam consensione cohaeserint.[30] Cum autem adhibentur ea quae nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus

always judged by the judgment, and if the suffering is present in the judgment, then we need another source of judgment to judge the affected judgment. If this too is affected, then again we need another. Eventually, therefore, we must reach a judgment unaffected by suffering. In judging the body's sufferings, if it thence acquires some corporeal quality, then doubtless it suffers. If it does not acquire such a quality, then it is not formed by the body. So the agent of judgment must be such that it accepts from bodies neither their sufferings nor their forms. But the soul could not be such if it were itself a superlatively thin body immersed in this body, or were an affection of this body, or some particular point of the affection.[9]

Augustine and Plotinus offer proof of these Platonic doctrines 3 thus. "It seems to me that the soul when it senses in the body is not affected at all by it. Rather, amidst the body's passions it pursues the more attentively its own actions; and whether these actions are performed easily because they are appropriate, or with difficulty because less well-suited, they are not hidden from the soul. And this whole is what is called sensation. But the sense itself, even when it senses nothing, is still there by way as it were of the corporeal instrument which is moved and tempered by the soul in such a manner that in it the soul is better prepared to deal attentively with the body's passions, to join like with like and to repel what is harmful. In my view, the soul acts on something luminous in the eyes, on something serenely airy and quick in the ears, on something misty in the nostrils, on something wet in the mouth, on something earthy and clayey so to speak in our sense of touch. But the soul does all this in repose if the parts in the living being are bonded in the unity of health in a sort of domestic harmony. But when it encounters those passions which afflict the body with otherness (so to speak), then the soul responds with more attentive actions, those adapted to its particular places and organs, and then it is said to perceive. In these actions it gladly al-

afficiunt, agit[31] attentiores actiones, suis quibusdam locis aut[32] instrumentis accommodatas et tunc sentire dicitur. Quibus actionibus congrua libenter associat et moleste obsistit incongruis. Has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere. Cum aereus auris spiritus verberatur sono, anima, quae ante percussionem huiusmodi in silentio corpus aurium vegetabat, vegetat tunc attentius; idque facere est, non pati. Attentior operatio non latet animam operantem. Non latere sentire est. Summatim sensus est aut animadversio operationis illius attentioris aut iudicium corporeae passionis et qualitatis, excitatum ab attentiore illa animae actione.

: VII :

Septima ratio: rationes propriae per naturalem et sensitivam animae vim, quod anima non sit forma dividua, quia qualitatis opus unum est.

1 Et si superioribus rationibus non modo animam corpus non esse probavimus, verum etiam neque sparsam per corpora formam, tamen propriis argumentationibus secundam hanc partem ostendendam fore putamus. Atque ut commodius hac de re loquamur, formam talem, ut diximus alias, tum qualitatem, tum affectionem corporis Platonicorum more vocabimus.

2 Si anima esset qualitas corporalis, vel esset simplex qualitas vel complexio vel forma istis astricta. Simplex esse non potest. Quaelibet enim simplex qualitas aut forma illam sequens, ut alias declaravimus, unum quiddam facit dumtaxat, ad opposita non extenditur; anima, plurima et contraria. Neque etiam erit complexio aut

lies itself with what is congenial and stubbornly resists what is not. I think that when it perceives, the soul causes these actions in the body's passions: it does not undergo the said passions."[10] When the airy spirit of the ear is struck by sound, the soul, which was silently giving life to the body of the ears before it was struck, now does so the more attentively; and this is activity, not passivity. The acting soul is not unaware of its heightened activity; and not to be unaware is sensation. So, to sum up, sensation is either the awareness of that heightened activity, or the judgment of a bodily passion or quality aroused by that heightened activity of the soul.

: VII :

Seventh proof: specific proofs (based on the natural and sensory power of soul) that soul is not a divisible form because the work of quality is undivided.

Even though the previous arguments have proved not only that soul is not body, but also that it is not a form extended through bodies, yet we believe this second part of the discussion should be demonstrated by its own proofs. And to enable us to discuss the matter more conveniently, in the Platonic manner we shall call this extended form, as we have done elsewhere, both a quality and the body's affective disposition [or complex of qualities]. 1

If soul were a corporeal quality, it would either be a simple quality, or [the body's] complexion, or the form attached to them. It cannot be a simple quality, for a simple quality, or the form following it, as we have shown elsewhere, does only one thing and does not extend to opposites; but soul does many and contrary things. Nor will soul be the complexion, or the form following the complexion, because in the complexion one quality always domi- 2

forma sequens complexionem, quoniam in hac semper una quaedam prae ceteris qualitas dominatur, cuius operatio ante alias viget in corpore. Anima nulli qualitati, nulli proprio motui est astricta.

: VIII :

Octava ratio: complexio agit per vim qualitatum.

1 Actio complexionis eiusque formae semper per qualitates ex quibus ipsa est conflata peragitur, ideoque numquam aliquid tam sublime complexio operatur quin ad illud qualitatum se vires extendant. Caloris opus est penetrare atque dissolvere. Animae[33] autem nutritiva potentia per calorem tamquam instrumentum non dissolvit tantum cibos, quod ipsius caloris est proprium, sed etiam concoquit digeritque et ad formam vivae carnis et figuram humanam perducit. Quae quidem actio caloris excedit potentiam. Augmentum quoque animalis a calore provenire non potest tamquam causa principali. Non enim fit nisi per nutrimentum, et cum ad certum terminum magnitudinis perducatur certamque figuram. Calor autem, si detur materia, sine certo termino vel figura se fundat, cumve oporteat terminum figuramque operi a principali agente praescribi, constat principalem augmenti fabrum calorem esse non posse; immo vero neque aliam ullam accidentalem formam id posse facere, si non potest calor, qui est omnium praestantissimus. Fit tamen augmentum ab anima.

2 Ex quo concluditur animam non esse formam accidentalem, quod saepissime nobis est probandum. Concluditur etiam non esse eam ex formis accidentalibus constitutam, quia non posset qualitates quae absque certo termino, gradu, proportione, figura vagantur, ad haec ipsa rationaliter ordinare. Concluditur postremo

nates over the others and its activity flourishes in the body before the others. Soul, however, is tied to no one quality and to no one movement of its own.

: VIII :

Eighth proof: the complexion acts through the power of its qualities.

The action of a complexion and its form is always performed via the qualities from which it is compounded, and so the complexion never does anything so sublime without the powers of its qualities extending themselves up to it. The function of heat is to penetrate and break down. But soul's nutritive power uses heat as an instrument not only to break down foods, which is heat's proper role, but also to cook and digest them and to bring them to the form of the living flesh and to the human figure. This action goes well beyond the power of heat. The growth of the living being cannot derive from heat as its chief cause. For growth never occurs except through nourishment, and because it is brought to a particular limit of size and to a certain shape. But heat, if bestowed on matter, spreads out without a fixed limit and with no particular shape to it; and since a work's limit and outline have to be prescribed by the principal agent, it follows that the principal craftsman of growth cannot be heat; or rather, that no other accidental form can do this if heat cannot do it, heat being the most outstanding of all accidental forms. Yet growth is the result of soul. 1

We conclude then that soul is not an accidental form, a fact that cannot be proved too often. We also conclude that it cannot be made up of accidental forms, for it could not take qualities which drift around without specific limit, degree, proportion or 2

animam non esse substantialem aliquam formam elementi vel mixti. Talis enim formae motus ad unicum dirigitur terminum, sicut diximus, augmentum vero in quamlibet partem aeque porrigitur.

: IX :

Nona ratio: complexio est accidentalis forma.

1 Complexio natura quaedam est ex contrariis quodammodo qualitatibus constituta, quae inter eas quasi medium obtinet. Ex quo fit ut forma substantialis esse non possit, quia non in se subsistit, sed in eo corpore quod est contrariarum illarum qualitatum subiectum, quae, quia invicem pugnant, sese invicem non suscipiunt; verum susceptae a materia et invicem mixtae complexionem generant. Haec igitur complexio, tum ex eo quod dixi substantia non est, tum ex eo quod aliquid sibi habet contrarium, puta, excessum alicuius extraneae qualitatis conflationem suam dissociantis. Praeterea suscipit magis ac minus. Intenditur enim ac remittitur natura, vis operatioque complexionis. Substantia vero neque habet proprium sibi contrarium, cum consistat in alio genere quam substantiae ipsa rerum contrarietas, hoc est in genere qualitatis. Neque in natura sua aut in magis intenditur aut in minus remittitur, ut nunc magis, nunc minus haec aut illa substantia sit, quod est semel substantia, hoc est magis minusve lapis iste[34] quam ille. Cum igitur complexio non sit substantia, anima, si substantia sit, non est complexio.

2 Quod anima sit substantia, hinc etiam patet quia per eam animal certam aliquam et substantialem sortitur speciei generisque

shape, and order them rationally according to such criteria. We conclude finally that soul is not some substantial form of an element or of a compound, for the motion of such a form is towards a single goal, as we said, but growth extends equally to every part.

: IX :

Ninth proof: the complexion is an accidental form.

The complexion is a particular nature made up of contrary qualities in a way, occupying a sort of middle ground between them. It follows from this that it cannot be a substantial form, because it does not subsist in itself but in the body which is subject to those contrary qualities, qualities which do not tolerate each other, being in mutual conflict. Rather, having been received by matter and mingled together, they produce the complexion. This complexion is not a substance, both for the reason I have stated and because it has something opposite to itself, namely the excess of some extraneous quality which is destructive of its composite nature. Furthermore, the complexion sustains more and less. For its nature, power and activity are intensified and remitted. But a substance does not possess a property contrary to itself, since this opposition of things depends on a genus other than that of substance, namely on the genus of quality.[11] In its nature a substance is neither intensified more nor remitted less, so that it is now more, now less this or that substance, because it is a substance once and for all (for example, more or less this stone rather than that one). Therefore, since the complexion is not a substance, soul, if it is a substance, is not the complexion. 1

That soul is a substance is obvious from the fact that it is through soul that a living creature is allotted the particular and 2

naturam atque cognomen. Per hanc animam hoc quidem canis est, per illam illud equus, per aliam illud homo. Illa quidem qualitas, quae accidens est, subiecto suo advenit postquam illud in specie sua iam est perfectum. Anima vero suum ipsa sibi fabricat corpus; factum servat; et dum deficit, reficit; pugnantia elementa connectit in unum. Anima abeunte, labitur corpus neque prior complexio aut species retinetur. Talis quidem necessario est anima nutritiva.

3 Neque dicendum est animam illam, quae solum nutritiva est, corpus ita construere cui postea iam perfecto anima sensitiva tamquam accidens quoddam adveniat. Nam corpus animae sensitivae congruum instrumenta sentiendi et progrediendi oportet habere. Anima quidem nutritiva, quantum talis est, sola instrumenta faciet nutriendi; alia vero instrumenta faciet anima alia propter eas vires quarum usui instrumenta sunt servitura. Neque sunt in eodem corpore duae quaedam animae quarum una instrumenta fabricet alteri, siquidem quae nutrit est eadem et quae sentit. Quippe sensuum perturbationes opus impediunt nutriendi vel augent. Tristitia enim phantasiae illud debilitat, laetitia roborat, quasi sit una anima in homine, cuius utraque sint officia. Quae ideo substantia est, quia est artifex corporis, non pedissequa. Igitur non est complexio.

substantial nature and name of a species and a genus. Because of this soul this animal is a dog, because of that soul that animal is a horse, because of another soul that animal is a man. The quality which is accidental comes to its subject only after the subject has already been perfected in its species.[12] But the soul fashions its own body for itself, protects it once it is made, restores it if it grows weak, and unifies its conflicting elements. When the soul leaves, the body fades away, and its former complexion or species is not preserved. Such necessarily is the nutritive [vegetative] soul.

One cannot declare that the soul which is only nutritive fashions the body in such a way that, once it is complete, the sensitive soul enters it as an accident. For a body to be suitable for a sensitive soul it must be equipped with the organs of sensing and of moving forward. A nutritive soul as such will produce only the organs required for nourishment. Another soul will produce the other organs by means of those very powers whose functioning the organs are going to serve. There are not two souls in the same body, one of which will fashion organs for the other, since the same soul is responsible for both nourishment and sense-perception. Indeed, the perturbations of the senses either impede or further the work of nourishment. For the sadness of the phantasy enfeebles it, while gladness strengthens it. It is as if there were one soul in man performing both these functions. It is therefore a substance because it is the maker, not a servant, of the body. Therefore it is not the complexion. 3

: X :

Decima ratio: harmonia complexionis nihil agit in corpus.

1 Neque liceat Aristoxeno aut musicis aliis somniare animam esse harmoniam quandam ex ipsa complexione progenitam. Sic enim anima similiter esset non substantia quaedam, sed accidens. Nonne harmonia totam vim suam trahit a fidibus? Neque quicquam ipsa per se existit neque[35] quicquam valet omnino in chordis efficere. Quippe non movet ipsa chordas, sed iis aliunde motis nascitur harmonia. Anima ergo si sit harmonia humorum certo modo compositorum, tota pendebit ex illis. Neque ipsa illos movebit, sed illis ab alio agitatis anima orietur, neque illos reget, sed ipsam illi regent et sustinebunt. Non erunt igitur motus in corpore aliqui praeter humorum conditionem, non opera ulla super illorum imperium, sicuti modo sunt, ut in superioribus enarravimus. Non figura artificiosa, non dispositio. Non repugnabit umquam animus affectibus corporalibus, neque se vel in se reflectet vel disiunctum a corporeis incorporeis copulabit, neque per se aliquid operabitur, si nullo modo extiterit[36] per se ipsum. Sed de hoc alias diximus et dicemus.

: X :

Tenth proof: the harmony of the complexion does not act on the body.

Nor can we dream with Aristoxenus and other musical theorists that soul is a kind of harmony born from the complexion.[13] For in that case, similarly, soul would be an accident, not a substance. Surely harmony derives all its force from the lyre? It has no independent existence whatsoever and is incapable of having any effect at all on the strings. Harmony does not move the strings itself, but emerges only when the strings have been set in motion from elsewhere. So if soul were a harmony of the humors arranged in a particular way, it would be totally dependent on them. It would not move them, but only when they had been set in motion by another would it come into being; and it would not rule them, but they would rule and sustain it. So there would be no motions in the body at all besides the conditioning of the humors, no works at all exceeding their command (as indeed there are now, as we described in detail above). There would be no shape fashioned by an artist's skill, no orderly arrangement. The rational soul would never combat the corporeal emotions, nor return into itself, nor, having severed itself from things corporeal, join with the incorporeal, nor do something independently if it had no sort of independent existence. But we have discussed this matter elsewhere and will do so again. 1

: XI :

Undecima ratio: in omni corpore composito est harmonia.

1 In omni corpore ex multis composito est aliqua suarum partium harmonia, per quam conspiratione mutua concinunt. Itaque si harmonia ipsa sit anima, corpora quaelibet composita vivent et coalescent. Dices forsitan animam esse quidem harmoniam, id est concinnitatem et consonantiam, sed non quamlibet harmoniam, verum aliquam certo et proprio modo contemperatam. Vides non eandem esse rationem animae atque consonantiae, postquam non ex eo dumtaxat quod res aliqua consonantia est, est etiam anima, sed ex eo quod certo modo disposita. Certum huiusmodi dispositionis modum concinnitas ipsa non ex sui natura haurit, quia esset in qualibet concinnitate. Igitur aliunde, ab extrinsecone principio? Immo vero. Ceterum extrinsecum istud non sufficit. Non enim movet et temperat assidue et naturaliter harmoniam, quod extra ipsam est. Latet igitur in humorum consonantia vis quaedam praestantior, corporalis consonantiae temperatrix, quae in viventium corporibus suo modo humores contemperans, ipsorum concinnitatem reddit certam et ab aliis corporibus differentem. Quae propria consonantia vitalis harmonia est, a vivifico spiritu interius latente progenita.

: XI :

Eleventh proof: there is a harmony in every compound body.

In every body compounded of multiple parts there is some harmony of the parts through which they exist in mutual accord. So if soul were the harmony, all compound bodies would be alive and flourish. You may perhaps claim that soul is indeed a harmony, in the sense of an accord or consonance, but not any sort of harmony, just one tempered in a particular and proper way. Now you can see that the rational principle of soul and of harmony is not the same, because it is not just by dint of being a harmony that some thing is also a soul, but because it is ordered in a certain way. The harmony does not derive this special way of being ordered from its own nature, because then the order would exist in any harmony. So it derives it from elsewhere. From an external principle? Well yes, but this external principle is not sufficient. For it does not move and temper the harmony continually and naturally, because it is outside it. So some greater power lies hidden within the harmony of the humors which tempers the corporeal harmony. It tempers the humors in the bodies of the living in its own way and restores to their bodies a certain harmony which differs from that of other bodies. This proper harmony is the harmony of life, and it is begotten by the life-giving spirit hidden within. 1

: XII :

Duodecima ratio: harmonia intellegitur aut compositio ipsa membrorum aut aliqua compositionis ratio.

1 Quando animam esse consonantiam asserit aliquis, duo quaedam posse illum arbitror intellegere: aut compositionem ipsam humorum membrorumque aut compositionis ipsius aliquam rationem. Anima profecto non est compositio, quia oporteret[37] quamlibet animae partem esse partium aliquarum corporis compositionem, quod plane quomodo fiat assignare non possumus. Compositio quidem corporis physicis manifesta est; anima vero ignota. Et quomodo ex suis viribus, scilicet intellectu, sensu, appetitu et reliquis, componatur, difficile cognitu. Difficillimum rursus, quomodo vires singulae componantur. Praeterea compositio nihil est aliud quam unio plurium; plura vero non uniuntur nisi ab uno — ab uno, inquam, quod insit pluribus, ut ab intimo coagulo conglutinentur. Illa igitur una vis insita membris, a qua unio fit membrorum, anima ipsa est potius quam unio inde profecta. Neque etiam compositionis ipsius est ratio. Cum enim diversis corporis membris diversae insint compositionis rationes atque proportiones, singula membra singulas animas possiderent; aliam quippe animam os, aliam nervus, caro aliam, similiterque de ceteris, siquidem membra ista sunt diversa inter se proportione composita. Unilus vero animantis vitam unam assignare nequaquam poterimus, nisi unicam illi formam, motorem unicum[38] atque rectorem, id est unam animam tribuerimus.

: XII :

Twelfth proof: harmony is understood either as the composition itself of the body's parts or as some rational principle of the composition.

When someone says that soul is harmony, I believe we can understand it in two ways: harmony either means the composition of humors and parts, or some rational principle underlying the composition. Certainly soul is not the composition itself, because any part of it would have to be the composition of particular parts of the body, and we are quite unable to specify how this would come about. The body's composition is well known to the natural philosophers, but the soul is unknown. And it is difficult to understand how soul could be composed from its faculties, the intellect, sense, appetite, and so on. Hardest of all to understand is how the individual faculties could be composed. Moreover, a composition is nothing other than the union of many parts; but the many are not united except by the one — by the one, I say, that is present in the many, such that they are cemented together by some inner bond. So this one power implanted in the parts, from which comes the union of the parts, is the soul rather than the union which proceeds from it. But soul is not even the rational principle of composition itself. Since different rational principles and proportions of composition are present in the different parts of the body, the individual parts would possess individual souls: the mouth would have one soul, the muscles another, the flesh another and similarly with the rest, seeing that these parts are compounded according to different mutual proportions. But we could never ascribe one life to one living creature, unless we granted it a unique form, a unique mover and ruler: in other words a single soul. 1

2 Cernimus etiam consonantiae rationem qualitatibus corporis magis quam animae convenire. Sanitas, humorum consonantia; robur, consonantia ossium atque nervorum; pulchritudo quodammodo membrorum atque colorum; sensus autem et intellectus, qui actus simplices sunt, nescio quales et cuius sint harmoniae. Quando substantiam rei cognoscimus, facile inde possumus de accidentibus iudicare. Igitur quia cognita humorum membrorumve proportione facile de his iudicamus quae ad sanitatem, robur et pulchritudinem attinent, patet tria haec in illorum proportione consistere. At vero quia tali quadam proportione inventa nondum tamen vires, affectus, actus, habitus animae clare discernimus, constat substantiam animae in ea proportione nequaquam consistere. Quis enim illa reperta statim sentiendi et intellegendi naturam reperisse inde se iactet?[39] Cognoscit horum naturam Aristoteles melius quam Hippocrates; illorum vero proportionem diligentius Hippocrates considerat.

: XIII :

Tertia decima[40] ratio: harmonia humorum nihil capit absque materia.

1 Quicquid aliquid efficit, eo quod ab ipso fit esse debet praestantius. Quo quid a materia liberius est, eo est et sublimius. Quare semper debet causa esse a materia liberior quam effectus. Nullus itaque effectus potest esse a materia quam causa sua liberior. Vis nutriendi a materia admodum libera est, quae plurima et super et

We see too that the rational principle of harmony is more compatible with the body's qualities than with the soul's. Health, for instance, is a harmony of the body's humors, strength a harmony of its bones and muscles, beauty a kind of harmony of its parts and colors. But as for sense and intellect, which are simple acts, I have no idea what kind of harmonies and of what they could be. When we know a thing's substance, we can easily make judgments about its accidents. Therefore, because we can easily make judgments about what pertains to health, strength and beauty, once the proportion of the humors or parts is known, it is obvious that these three do in fact consist in the proportion of the humors and parts. But because, having found such a proportion, we still do not see clearly yet the powers, acts, and habits of the soul, it follows that the substance of the soul does not consist in such a proportion. For who can boast that, having discovered these, he has immediately discovered the nature of perceiving and understanding? Aristotle knows more about the nature of the powers than Hippocrates; but Hippocrates treats the proportion of the humors and parts with greater care.[14] 2

: XIII :

Thirteenth proof: the harmony of the humors sustains nothing without matter.

Whatever produces an effect must be superior to that effect. And the more independent it is of matter, the more sublime its status. So the cause must always be more independent of matter than the effect. Thus no effect can be more independent of matter than its cause. The nutritive power [of the soul] is quite independent of matter, and, as I have shown elsewhere, it does many things above 1

praeter ordinem elementorum operari demonstrata est alias. Vis sentiendi etiam magis est a materia libera, quia in ipso suo sentiendi actu formas rerum accipit absque rerum ipsarum materia. Non enim visus colorem parietis cum pariete simul accipit, sed coloris attingit imaginem spiritalem. Multo magis intellegentia idem facit, ut in sequentibus apparebit. Quoniam igitur hae vires animi multum sunt a materia liberae, nequeunt ab ea causa proficisci, quae sit materia vel immersa materiae.

2 Humores omnino corporales sunt. Quamobrem nullo modo humores possunt sua quadam mixtione vel consonantia vires huiusmodi procreare, multo minus animam ipsam virium huiusmodi fontem. Quippe si anima in humorum qualitatibus substantiam habeat, quicquid capiet, per humorum affectiones suscipiet. Per eas vero formae solum corporales suscipiuntur, siquidem per caliditatem siccitatemque non ignis imaginem spiritalem accipiet, sed ignis substantiam corporalem. Rursus, per frigus siccumque ipsam accipiet terram. Ipsa quoque terra, quoniam similiter accipiet atque anima, similiter sentiet. Idem faciet lapis et reliqua.

: XIV :

Decima quarta ratio: quae magis concinit, magis est harmonia.

1 Harmonia ita in plurium concentu consistit ut magis concinentibus fidibus magis sit harmonia, minus concinentibus vero minus. Anima nequissimi hominis minime concinit secum ipsa. Dissentit a ratione sensus, pugnant quoque invicem appetitus. Anima probi

and beyond the order of the elements. The sensory power is even more independent of matter, because in its act of perceiving it receives the forms of things without their matter. For sight does not at the same time receive the wall's color along with the wall: rather it comes into contact with the color's spiritual image. Understanding does the same but to a far greater extent, as will become apparent in what follows. Therefore, because these powers of the rational soul are to a high degree independent of matter, they cannot proceed from that cause which is matter or is immersed in matter.

The humors are entirely corporeal. So through their particular 2 blend or harmony they cannot produce these powers in any way, much less the soul itself which is their source. Indeed, if soul were to have its substance in the qualities of the humors, then it would acquire whatever it perceives through the affections of the humors. But only corporeal forms would be acquired through these affections, since from heat and dryness it will acquire not the spiritual image of fire but the bodily substance of fire; again, from cold and dryness it will get actual earth. And earth too, in receiving as soul receives, will perceive as soul does; and stone will do the same, and so on.

: XIV :

Fourteenth proof: the more concordant something is, the more it is a harmony.

Harmony consists in the concord of many [sounds], so that the 1 more the lyre is in tune, the more the harmony, and the less in tune, the less. Now the soul of a wicked man is by no means in harmony with itself. His sense disagrees with his reason, and his appetites are at war with each other. The soul of an upright man is

hominis concinit undique. Si anima sit harmonia, anima probi viri quae concinit magis, magis est harmonia; igitur et anima magis. Anima vita quaedam est; ergo et magis vita. Vivacior itaque, audentior et robustior erit probi viri anima quam latronis. Neque concoquet cibum latronis anima perinde ut iusti viri, neque generabit prolem, neque corporis membra sustinebit vibrabitque, neque acute inveniet, firmiter reminiscetur, loquetur eleganter, aggredietur audacter, neque diu spirabit et reliqua.

: XV :

Quinta decima ratio: harmonia nihil admittit dissonum.

1 Harmonia vera, ut rectius procedamus, nihil admittit dissonum, dum permanet harmonia. Si harmonia est, consonat; sin dissonat, non est harmonia. Animam vero nostram nonne videmus assidue dissonantibus opinionibus et affectibus distrahi, et nihilominus veram animam permanere atque aeque vitalem? Neque obiicias quod affectuum discordia licet non perimat animam, discordia tamen elementorum humorumque perimit. Porro si non potest animus propria intimaque dissonantia perire, alia nulla potest. Propria animi humani et intima dissonantia illa est, quae soli et omni animo convenit, id est opinionum affectuumque dissensio, quae corpora vita carentia non attingit et omnis[41] mortalium pulsat animos. Dissensio talis eos e vitae sensusque statu non deiicit, multo igitur minus humorum discordia, quae ab animo alienior est, animi ipsius naturalem habitum dissipabit, qui certe humoribus

everywhere in harmony. If soul were a harmony, the soul of an upright man, which is more in tune, would be more of a harmony and therefore more of a soul; and, since soul is a life, so more of a life too. Accordingly the soul of the upright man would be livelier, bolder, and stronger than that of a thief. The thief's soul would not digest food as a just man's does, nor beget children, nor sustain the different parts of the body, nor set them quivering into motion, nor invent as cleverly, nor remember as well, nor speak as eloquently, nor attack as boldly, nor live as long, and so on.[15]

: XV :

Fifteenth proof: harmony does not admit anything dissonant.

To come directly to the point, harmony, so long as it remains harmony, admits no dissonance. If it is harmony, it is not dissonant; if it is dissonant, it is not harmony. And yet don't we see our soul constantly being pulled in different directions by dissonant opinions and emotions, and yet remaining a true and no less active soul? You cannot retort that the discord of the emotions is not allowed to destroy the soul, while the discord of the elements and humors does destroy it. Besides, if the rational soul cannot perish because of its own internal discord, then it cannot perish because of some other discord. The internal discord proper to the rational human soul is that proper to each and every rational soul, that is, the discord of opinions and feelings, which does not affect bodies lacking life but assaults all the souls of mortals. Such a discord does not expel these souls from the state of life and sensation. Much less then will the discord of the humors, which is further removed from the soul, disrupt the natural condition of the rational soul which would certainly be destroyed by even the slightest 1

vel paululum[42] dissonantibus dissiparetur, si in eorum concentu consisteret. Quamobrem nihil obstat quin partes animi corporisque longe dissonent et anima nihilominus vera vitalisque anima perseveret. Id harmonia non patitur. Igitur errabit qui dixerit animam harmoniam.

discord of the humors if it consisted in their concord. So it is perfectly possible for the parts of the rational soul and the body to be in considerable discord and yet for the soul to remain a true living soul. Harmony could not endure this. So anyone who says that soul is a harmony will be wrong.

LIBER OCTAVUS[1]

: I :

Anima est forma individua ubique tota et nullam trahit originem a materia, ideoque immortalis est, ut ostenditur per intellegendi virtutem. Animus per quattuor gradus ascendit ad spiritum. Prima ratio.[2]

1 Tertiam nunc disputationis partem aggrediemur, quae propositum nostrum ostendit per intellegendi virtutem, si[3] prius exposuerimus quo pacto animus noster secundum Platonicorum sententiam per quattuor gradus cognoscendo a corpore ascendit ad spiritum, quorum est postremus intellegentia.

2 Ascendit enim per sensum, imaginationem, phantasiam, intellegentiam. Per sensum quidem videt Socrates Platonem, ubi incorporale Platonis simulacrum absque Platonis materia attingit per oculos, ea tamen conditione, ut oculus Platonem non videat aliter quam corpore ipso Platonis praesente. Deinde, etiam absente Platone, per internam imaginationem Platonis cogitat colorem figuramque quam viderat, item Platonis suavem illam quam audiverat vocem et reliqua, quae per quinque sensus acceperat. Surgit huiusmodi imaginatio supra materiam magis quam sensus, tum quia, ut cogitet corpora, praesentia illorum non indiget, tum quia ipsa una facit quicquid quinque sensus omnes efficiunt. At enim non omnino pura est, quia nihil aliud sapit quam[4] quod sensus accepit sive concepit. Sensus quidem circa corpora, imaginatio circa imagines corporum per sensus acceptas sive conceptas sese volutat.

BOOK VIII

: I :

Soul is individed form, everywhere complete and in no way does it take its origin from matter. It is therefore immortal as its power of understanding demonstrates. First proof: rational soul ascends to spirit through four degrees.

We shall now embark on the third stage of our discussion, which demonstrates our proposition through the power of understanding, but only if we have first described how our rational soul according to the Platonists ascends in knowing from body to spirit via four degrees of which understanding is the last.[1] 1

For it ascends by way of sensation, imagination, phantasy,[2] and understanding. Socrates sees Plato through sensation, when he acquires through the eyes an incorporeal image of Plato without Plato's matter, with this proviso however, that the eye does not see Plato except when Plato's body is itself present. Next, even when Plato is absent, Socrates thinks about him through his inner imagination: the color and shape which he had seen, the gentle voice he had heard, and everything else he had perceived through the five senses. This imagination rises above matter higher than sensation does, both because in order to think about bodies it does not need their presence, and also because as one faculty it can do whatever all the five senses do. But it is not entirely pure because it can only know what sensation perceives or conceives. Sensation is concerned with bodies, imagination with the images of bodies perceived or conceived through the senses. 2

3 Paulo post Socrates per phantasiam de hoc universo Platonis simulacro, quod per quinque sensus imaginatio ipsa collegerat, sic incipit iudicare: 'Quis hic tam procero corpore, ampla fronte, latis humeris, colore candido, glaucis oculis, elato supercilio, naso aquilino, ore parvo, voce suavi? — Plato hic est homo pulcher, bonus, discipulus dilectissimus'. Cernis quantum excellat imaginationi Socratis phantasia. Imaginatio ipsa talem quidem collegit Platonis effigiem, sed quem designaret et qualem effigies illa non novit. Phantasia iam discernit eam esse effigiem hominis huius qui Plato vocatur, effigiem pulchram viri boni atque amici. Ergo in his sensum aliquem[5] habet iam substantiae, ut quidam putant, et pulchritudinis bonitatisque et amicitiae. Platonici tamen substantiam a phantasia cognosci revera negant, quoniam rationem substantiae non agnoscat.[6] Imaginatio neque substantiam rei suspicatur quidem, sed rei superficiem exterioremque picturam. Phantasia substantiam saltem auguratur,[7] dum pronuntiat: 'Obvius ille homo aliquis est et Plato'. Atque etiam res incorporales quodammodo somniare videtur, dum Platonem iudicat pulchrum, bonum, amicum, discipulum. Pulchritudo enim, bonitas, amicitia, disciplina incorporalia sunt, neque sensibus, neque imaginationi patentia. Huiusmodi quidam conceptus phantasiae incorporales quodammodo corporum intentiones vocantur.

4 Verum nondum super materiam prorsus animus evolat, tum quia phantasia intentiones huiusmodi esse incorporeas non agnoscit, tum quia huiusmodi Socratis phantasia inspicit proprie hominem hunc, Platonem scilicet, hoc in loco et situ, in hoc tempore et hora diei, hanc pulchritudinem, hanc bonitatem et reliqua eodem pacto, ubi Platonem sub eisdem conditionibus in se ipsa depingit, quibus extat et in materia. At enim dum phantasia circa singulares hominis huius conditiones vagatur, intellectus communes concipit

Shortly thereafter Socrates begins via his phantasy to make the following judgment about the general likeness of Plato that the imagination had assembled via the five senses: "Who is this man with such a noble body, ample brow, broad shoulders, fair complexion, sparkling eyes, raised eyebrows, aquiline nose, small mouth, and gentle voice? This is Plato, a fine-looking, good man, and a most cherished disciple." You see how much Socrates' phantasy excels his imagination. The imagination assembled the image of Plato, but it did not know to whom or to what kind of man the image applied. The phantasy now discerns that it is the image of this man called Plato, a handsome image of a good man and a friend. So in this it now possesses, as some suppose, a sense of the substance of beauty, goodness, and friendship. Yet Platonists deny that the phantasy can really know substance, since it has no knowledge of the rational principle of substance. The imagination has no idea at all of the substance of a thing: it sees only its surface and external representation. The phantasy has at least an inkling of substance when it declares: "That is a man over there and it is Plato." And it even seems to be dreaming of the incorporeal when it judges Plato to be beautiful, good, a friend, and a disciple. For beauty, goodness, friendship, and the discipline of discipleship[3] are all incorporeal, not evident to the senses or the imagination. These particular concepts of the phantasy are called as it were the bodiless intentions of bodies.[4] 3

Even so, the rational soul has not yet completely soared beyond matter, first because the phantasy does not realize that these intentions are incorporeal, and next because Socrates' phantasy is effectively seeing this one man, Plato, in this place and situation, at this time, and at this hour of the day. It is seeing this beauty, this goodness, and the rest likewise when in itself it pictures Plato under the same conditions as he exists in matter. But while the phantasy roves around the particular conditions of a specific person, the intellect conceives of the common rational principles, and 4

rationes et uterque simul suum opus exequitur. Sic enim intellegentia ratiocinatur. Qualis homo est Plato, talis ferme Antisthenes, talis est et Xenophon, effigie similes, pulchri aeque et boni, amici, discipuli eodem modo. Ergo in his tribus una est communis humanitas per quam aeque sunt homines, una pulchritudinis natura, una etiam bonitatis, per quas aeque pulchri sunt et aeque boni. Humanitas ipsa quae his communis est, innumerabilibus quoque aliis qui sunt, fuerunt eruntve, quocumque in tempore et quocumque in[8] loco nascantur, communis existit; similiter pulchritudo et reliqua: sed quod loquor de humanitate, de reliquis etiam dictum puta. Si ergo humanitas singulis personis, locis, temporibus se aequé communicat, nulli est astricta personae, nulli loco, nulli etiam tempori. Natura huiusmodi singulas conditiones corporum videtur transcendere. Est ergo secundum se ipsam quodammodo incorporea, et quia corporibus singulis se infundit, ex quo et in alio est et in multis, et super id quod in alio est, esse oportet id quod in se ipso manet, et super illud, unum quod est in multis, esse oportet unum ipsum quod in se ipso consistat.

5 Idcirco super corpora omnia extat ratio quaedam ideaque humanitatis ipsius, cuius participatione quadam vel similitudine homines fiunt quicumque sunt homines, siquidem natura illa quae personis singulis est communis, neque contingit casu, quia semper similiter ordinatur, neque per se subsistit, cum nequeat in se subsistere; eget enim materiae fundamento. Fit ergo a causa quadam. Non tamen fit a materia quae se ipsam non format; non a persona una quae non potest operari in omnes quaeve quicquid agit proprium agit, reliquis non commune; non ab omnibus personis, quae quantum inter se differunt, non commune aliquid faciunt sed diversa, quantum conveniunt, per hanc ipsam naturam conveniunt,

both faculties are doing their work at the same time. The understanding reasons like this: Antisthenes is more or less the same sort of man as Plato, and so is Xenophon: they are similar in appearance, equally beautiful and good, friends and disciples in the same way. So in all three there exists one common humanity via which they are all equally men, and one nature of beauty and one of goodness via which they are all equally beautiful and equally good. The humanity which is common to them is also common to innumerable other people who exist or have existed or will exist in whatever the time or place of their birth. Similarly with beauty and the rest; and assume that what I say about humanity I have said about them too. So if humanity communicates itself equally to all individual people, in every place and time, it is not attached to any one person, in one place or at one time. This common nature seems to transcend bodies' individual conditions. So in itself it must be in a way incorporeal. [But] because it pours itself into individual bodies and hence is in another and in many things, then above this which is in another, there has to be that which remains in itself; and above the one which is in the many, there has to be the one which stands firm in itself.

It follows accordingly that above all bodies exists some rational principle or idea of humanity itself, by whose particular participation or likeness all who are men are made men. And this is because the nature which is common to all individuals neither occurs by chance, since it is always and similarly ordered, nor does it subsist through itself, since it cannot subsist on its own but needs matter as a basis. Therefore it is made by a cause. But it is made neither by matter, which does not form itself, nor by one single person, who cannot act on all the others and does what he does on his own and not in common with the rest. Nor is it made by all the individuals collectively, who, insofar as they differ among themselves, do nothing in common but rather different things; and insofar as they agree, they agree in this nature, or rather they 5

immo per eam consistunt: tanto illis priorem quanto est ipsa simplicior. Quippe ipsi tamquam priori proprietates variae superveniunt ad personas constituendas. Fit tamen ipsa ab una quadam forma, postquam una est, quae forma sit super multitudinem personarum, ne illa quoque fiat ab alia atque alia rursus ab alia sine fine.

6 Sic ad divinam ideam ascendimus, quae necessario est super omnes, ut aeque agat in omnes et communi natura conciliet. Si a parte quae sub toto est ad totum, ab hoc ad id quod super totum surgendum est, merito a singulis personis quae in partibus loci temporisque sunt, ad naturam illis secundum se communem surgimus, quae quasi per omnem locum sit totumque tempus, ab hac ad rationem, quae super locum totum tempusque existat, quam Plato vocat ideam. Ipsam deinceps divinam ideam suscipit intellectus, sive apud se ipsum sive in divino lumine existentem. Ratio enim dictat species naturales, quia sempiternae sunt, a causa mobili esse non posse; alioquin per motionem factae quandoque deficerent. Factae tamen sunt, quia partes sunt universi, quod est aliunde compositum, et a causa una omnes sunt, siquidem ita ordinatae sunt invicem, ut in una natura in unum opus finemque conducant. Hinc intellectus humanus concludit super mundum mobilem in mente immobili, motrice mundi, esse species specierum naturalium exemplaria, non in natura corporea vel animali (mobiles enim forent) sed intellectuali, immo intellegibili; intellegibilia enim a summo intellegibili sunt collocanda.

exist because of it, for being simpler than they are, it is to that extent prior to them. The various different properties for constituting individual people are added to this nature as to something prior to them. Yet it comes from a single form inasmuch it is one; and this form must be above the multitude of individual people, otherwise it too would come from another form, and another again from another *ad infinitum*.

In this way we ascend to the divine idea, which must be above all individuals in order for it to act on them all alike and to reconcile them by means of a common nature. If we have to ascend from the part which is below the whole up to the whole, and thence to what is above the whole, it seems reasonable that we should ascend from individual people, who exist in parts of space and time, up to the intrinsic nature they share, which exists as it were throughout space and through all of time; and then up from that nature to [its] rational principle, which exists above all space and time and which Plato calls an idea.[5] At this point the intellect receives the divine idea itself, which either exists on its own or in the divine light. For reason dictates that all the natural species, being eternal, cannot come from a mobile cause; otherwise, being products of movement, they would at some point cease to exist. Yet they are products, for they are parts of the universe which has been assembled from elsewhere; and they all come from a single cause, being mutually so arranged that in a single nature they contribute to a single product and end. Hence the human intellect concludes that above this world of movement species exist in the unmoving mind, the source of the world's movement, species which are the paradigms of the natural species and which do not exist in the corporeal or animal nature (for they would be mobile), but in the intellectual, or rather I should say, the intelligible nature; for intelligibles must be located together in the highest intelligible thing. 6

7 Non tamen talis argumentatio necessaria est ut intellectus rationes rerum communes attingat. Immo sicut phantasia suapte natura de rebus iudicat singulatim, ita intellectus vi naturali statim absque ulla discursione, simul ac depicta est singularis imago illa Platonis in phantasia — subito, inquam, dimisso certo hoc homine — humanam illam communem omnibus tum naturam tum ideam excogitat. Picta illa pulchritudine et bonitate, illico universalem pulchritudinis et bonitatis cogitat naturam rationemque in nulla[9] certa materia, nullo proprio situ vel tempore positam, sed vel in omni materia vel absolutam a materia in se ipsa simpliciter subsistentem. Quapropter sensus circa corpora versatur, imaginatio circa simulacra corporum, phantasia circa singulas simulacrorum intentiones, intellectus circa singularum intentionum naturas communes ac rationes penitus incorporeas.

8 Meminisse vero oportet intellectum non universalem modo naturam, sed particularem quoque cognoscere; alioquin non posset utramque invicem comparare, cognoscere insuper vires infra se omnes actusque ipsarum, quando omnes comparat ad se ipsum. Prius tamen universalem quam particularem naturam ab ipso cognosci paene omnes consentiunt, siquidem pro natura formae intellegibilis in primis agit. Ea vero, cum abstractione quadam concipiatur, absoluta est; unde naturam in primis refert universalem. Quam quidem vim a virtute intellectus in quo et a quo est adipiscitur, quasi intellectus ipse sit absolutus. A simulacro vero quod in phantasia est, particulare solum repraesentatur, quod quidem particulare ab intellectu solum secundo quodam actu atque reflexo prospici, tum Platonici tum Peripatetici plurimum arbitrantur, quatenus intellectus postquam subito rectaque via per speciem

However, a process of argument like this is not necessary for the intellect to reach the rational principles common to all. Or rather, just as the phantasy is naturally able to make judgments separately about objects, so the intellect has a natural power which enables it to proceed instantly and without a process of argument, just as soon as the particular image of Plato has been pictured in the phantasy — to proceed instantly, I say, having rid itself of the notion of this particular individual, to ponder both the nature and the idea that are common to all men. When this beauty or this goodness are pictured, it immediately ponders the universal nature and rational principle both of beauty and of goodness, a principle not located in any particular matter, place, or time, but either present in all matter, or independent of matter and subsisting absolutely on its own. So sense is concerned with bodies, imagination with the images of bodies, phantasy with the individual intentions of the images, and intellect with the common natures and entirely incorporeal rational principles of the individual intentions. 7

One must remember that the intellect has knowledge not only of the universal nature but of the particular as well; otherwise it would not be able to make comparisons between them or to know all the faculties inferior to itself and their functions when it compares them all to itself. However, almost all would agree that the universal nature is known to the intellect before the particular nature, since it acts in the first instance by virtue of the nature of the intelligible form [or species]. But the intelligibile form, since it is conceived by a process of abstraction, has been abstracted or freed and hence refers primarily to the universal nature: it acquires this power [to be freed] indeed from the power of the intellect in which and from which it exists, as though the intellect itself were free. But from the image which is in the phantasy, only the particular is represented. Both the Platonists and the Aristotelians think for the most part that this particular is seen by the intellect only in a second and reflective act. This is to the extent that the intellect, 8

universale intuitus est. Inde discursu quodam per actum speciemque in simulacrum, quo incitante species concepta fuerat, sese reflectens, particulare iam prospicit. Ideo motus ad incorporea absolutaque maxime naturalis est menti, quandoquidem primo, subito, recte ad ipsa se confert, ubi apparet intellegendi virtutem esse prorsus incorporalem.

9 Si ergo per opera nutriendi atque item per opera sentiendi, quorum prima in corpore fiunt, secunda per corpus et circa corpora, ostendimus animam non esse divisam in corpore, quanto magis putandum est idem quoque per opera intellegendi patere? Atque illud insuper: animam scilicet neque ducere originem a materia neque esse mortalem, siquidem ipsa per se intellegendi opus exsequitur, in quo materiam relinquit omnino atque ad incorporales ascendit et perpetuas rationes. Age itaque, videamus qua via possimus quod quaerimus per opera et affectus intellegentiae invenire.

: II :

Anima alitur veritate. Secunda ratio.[10]

1 Alimentum ea ratione assumitur ut in substantiam eius quod alendum est transeat, sicut comeditur panis ut caro efficiatur. Ideo cibus cognatus admodum esse debet illi quod est alendum, ut possit in eius naturam facile pertransire. Ita aquatica aquaeis alimentis, terrestria terrenis, aerea pascuntur aereis. Similiter corpora corporalibus, incorporea incorporeis nutriuntur. Non enim corpus transit in spiritum neque spiritus migrat in corpus, quia non sub-

after it has suddenly and directly seen the universal through the species, then returns in a discursive process through the act and species back to the image (by the prompting of which the species had been conceived) and now sees the particular. Thus movement towards things incorporeal and immaterial is the most natural to the mind in that it turns to them primarily, immediately, and directly. And from this it is clear that the faculty of understanding is entirely incorporeal.

9 If then we have demonstrated that soul is not divided in body by way of the works of nutrition and sense-perception, the first of which occur in the body and the second via the body and with regard to bodies, how much more should we suppose that the same is obvious for the works of understanding; and suppose furthermore that the soul does not originate from matter and is not subject to death, insofar as it performs on its own the work of understanding wherein it takes leave of matter completely and rises to the rational principles which are incorporeal and eternal? Come then, let us see, by way of the works and affects of the understanding, how we might be able to find what we are seeking.

: II :

Second proof: soul is nourished by truth.

1 The reason for taking nourishment is so that it may change into the substance of what is being nourished, just as bread is eaten so that it may become flesh. Food must be closely akin therefore to what is being nourished, so that it can easily cross over into its nature. That is why aquatic creatures feed on watery foods, terrestrial on earthy foods, and aerial on airy foods. So too bodies are nourished by corporeal foods and incorporeal entities by incorpo-

est illis communis materia, per quam et in qua[11] invicem se committent.[12] Constat animam corporibus non nutriri; constat incorporeis ali; constat igitur eam esse incorporalem.

2 Si aliquibus anima vesceretur corporibus, illis maxime vesceretur quibus et corpus suum. Nam cum istud maxime animae congruat, alimenta etiam sua inter omnia corporalia congruent maxime, dummodo alimenta illa adeo tenuentur atque purgentur, ut corpusculo illi subtili, quod vulgo anima esse putatur, conveniant. Erit igitur in corpore pingui validior anima quam in tenui, acutior ad inveniendum, ad reminiscendum firmior, promptior ad agendum, ad pervincendas turpes corporis illecebras continentior. Magnanimitas in grandi corpore; in parvo pusillanimitas. Crescente corpore adolescet animus, etiam si nihil discat, si nullo studio rerum exerceatur. Decrescente per aetatem corpore et viribus eius debilitatis, sapientia, iudicium constantiaque perdentur. Post epulas et vina acutius erit ingenium et sublimius.

3 Omnia haec acciderent, si animus cibis corporalibus coalesceret. Horum vero nunc contraria[13] fiunt. Animus igitur corporalibus non pascitur alimentis. Quid ergo? Nullis? Ita erit aeternus, si nulla alimonia indigebit, quod nos maxime cupimus. An forte spiritalibus vescitur epulis? Immo vero aliis nullis omnino, quod sapienti viro non est dubium, qui talibus alitur saepenumero.

4 Neque assentiendum est Epicureis opinantibus animam cum corpore coalescere, quia maiores vires sint[14] in pueris grandiusculis quam infantibus, atque inde adolescentes in dies viribus praestent, virique similiter, donec rursus senescente corpore minuantur. Si-

real. For body does not cross over into spirit, nor spirit into body, since no common material underlies them through which and in which they would be joined to each other. It is generally agreed that the soul is not nourished by bodies but by things incorporeal; it must be accepted then that the soul is incorporeal.

If the soul did feed on any corporeal foods, it would most likely 2 be on the same foods as its body does. For since that body is most closely suited to the soul, its foods would be the most suitable among corporeal foods, provided of course that the foods were so refined and purified as to make them suitable for the rarified little body the soul is popularly supposed to be. So the soul in a fat body would be stronger and cleverer at finding out than that in a thin body: its memory would be more reliable, it would be quicker to act, and it would exercise greater control in conquering the evil lusts of the body. A large body would possess magnanimity, a tiny one pusillanimity. And the rational soul would develop as the body grew, even if it did not learn anything or train itself by studying anything at all; and as the body declined with age and its faculties grew weaker, the soul would lose its wisdom, its judgment, and its self-possession. After feasting and wine, its wits would be sharper and more elevated.

This is what would happen if the rational soul were to flourish 3 on corporeal foods. But what actually happens is the opposite. Therefore the rational soul does not feed on corporeal foods. On what then? On nothing? It would be eternal if it had no need of food at all; and that is what we most desire. But perhaps it feeds on banquets of the spirit? Indeed, it never feeds on anything else, as the wise man, who has so often taken such nourishment, knows full well.

Nor should we assent to the Epicureans' view that the soul 4 grows with the body because its powers are stronger in older children than in infants, and that young men and grown men similarly daily excel in the use of these powers until they start to grow

quidem ea est animae ad membra comparatio, quae artis ad instrumenta. Ars autem saepe eadem permanens atque similis, modo facilius instrumenta movet, modo difficilius, quoniam haec alias aptiora sunt, alias ad motum ineptiora. Sic quamvis eadem semper vis sit in anima, membra tamen propter nimiam aut mollitiem aut ariditatem neque constant aeque neque flectuntur. Atque ipsa vis, quae videtur in corpore esse, non tam[15] carnis sequitur pondus quam proportionem membrorum naturalem conformationemque artificiosam, quae duo ad spiritum potius pertinent quam ad molem. Vis etiam quae inest animae, non corporis acquiritur incremento, quod patet in iis[16] qui torpent ignavia, in quibus crescente corpore nihil proficit animus, sed ex ipsa animi industria comparatur, ingenio, usu, affectu. Quis neget tempore vires corporis comparari? Animo autem saepe momento fortitudo praestatur, quando vel ratio aliquid monstrat imperatque magnificum, vel 'furor arma ministrat', et saepe pusillus homo superat grandiorem, et qui non crescit corpore, crescit tamen saepe virtute animi. Immo dum decrescimus corpore, saepe animo crescimus. Scientiam magnanimitatemque saepissime acquirit subito animus; corpus autem neque dare quicquam potest neque accipere nisi tempore.

5 Denique virtus animi est aequalitas quaedam, ut Magi tradunt, per quam animus et sibimet et ipsi vero bonoque consonat. Si quo pacto quadrangularis quaedam linea circularis efficiatur, perfectior evadet, non tamen quod longior fiat, sed quod aequalior. Rursus, si temperetur lyra, perfectior erit, non quod grandior fiat, sed consonantior. Ita cum adolescens aliquis virtute adolescit, tunc anima non quantitate crescit, sed spiritali quadam aequalitate et consonantia proficit.

weaker as the body ages.[6] For the relationship of the soul to the limbs of the body is that of an art to the instruments it uses. But often the art, while remaining the same or similar, moves the instruments now with more ease, now with more difficulty, since some are more apt for motion, others less so. So although the strength in the soul may always be the same, yet because of excessive softness or dryness the limbs are not equally strong or agile. And this strength, which seems to be in the body, comes not so much from the weight of the flesh as from the natural proportions and artful fashioning of the limbs, both of which pertain more to spirit than to corporeal bulk.[7] So too the strength present in the soul is acquired not from bodily growth, as is obvious in the case of those who wallow in idleness in whom bodily growth in no way profits the rational soul; but rather it is procured from the soul's industry, natural ability, practice, and disposition. But who will deny that the body's powers are acquired over time? Often, however, the soul displays courage in a twinkling, when either reason points the way and commands an heroic deed or "fury provides the weapons."[8] Often it is the puny man who overcomes the mightier: though he does not grow in body, he often grows in strength of mind. Or rather, as our bodily strength wanes, often we wax in soul. The rational soul most usually acquires knowledge or magnanimity instantly, but the body can neither give anything nor receive it except over time.

Finally, the power or virtue of the rational soul, according to the teaching of the Magi, is a sort of symmetry through which the soul keeps in tune both with itself and with the true and the good. If in some way a quadrangular line is made circular, it becomes more perfect, not as it becomes longer, but as it becomes squarer. If you tune a lyre, it would be more perfect not because it is bigger but because it is more harmonious. So too when a young man increases in virtue, his soul is not increasing in quantity but acquiring a certain spiritual symmetry and harmony. 5

6 Neque obiiciat quisquam ita, quod, quando corpus neque gravatur epularum nimio pondere neque fame languescit, sed mediocriter alitur, tunc animus similiter enutritur fitque in eo statu validior; aliter autem contra. Nam id quidem verum est, animum in eo hominis statu valere quam plurimum. Non tamen hoc inde provenit, quod similiter alatur ut corpus, sed quia animus natura regit corpus, et quando ipsum aegrotat gravaturque, animus adeo in eo curando atque regendo occupatur, ut ad inquirendam veritatem non sit intentus. Quieto autem corpore, expedite mens speculatur et tunc maxime propriis vescitur alimentis.

7 Escam vero animi, quam esse dicemus aliam praeter illam quam esurit semper et sitit, qua parta gaudet summopere, qua sumpta crescit, impletur? Omnis animus tum in omni aetate, tum continue veritatem prae ceteris appetit. Quam in omni arte quaerunt artifices et in qualibet re; quid de re ipsa sit verum, etiam infantes interrogant curiose, neque semel aut bis aut ter singulis diebus, ut corporis escam, sed momentis singulis verum in omnibus negotiis investigant. Proinde veritatis acquirendae studio alimoniam corporis praetermittimus saepenumero, neque tempori neque pecuniae parcimus neque laboribus. Enervamus corpus, quo enervato animus fit nervosior. Hanc veritatem animus ipse cupit, non corpus. Haec enim corpus non auget, sed obest plerumque illius studium corpori. Quinetiam propter se ipsum expetit illam animus, non propter corpus. Quid enim corpori conferat? Quod si quando videatur veritas conducere corpori, non propter ipsam veritatem id evenit, sed propter aliquod commodum corporale quod cognita veritate contingit. Immo vero animus, etiam si nihil inde sequatur

Let no one raise the objection that when the body is neither surfeited with the weight of overeating nor languishing with hunger, but is being fed in moderation, then the rational soul is similarly nourished and in that condition waxes stronger, but otherwise the reverse. Now it is in fact true that the rational soul is at its strongest when a man is in the state of moderation. Yet this does not derive from its being nourished in the same way as the body, but because the soul naturally governs the body; and when the body is sick or ailing, the soul is so preoccupied with looking after it and keeping it in order that it cannot concentrate on the search for truth. However, when the body is at peace, the mind can let its thoughts range without hindrance, and it is then that it most feeds on its proper foods. 6

But what shall we call the soul's food other than that for which it always hungers and thirsts, something that when procured brings it utmost joy and when consumed gives it increase and plenitude? Every rational soul at every age unceasingly desires truth before all else. This is what artisans and artists seek, whatever their art; and even little children never stop asking questions, wanting to know the truth about every single thing. And it is not just once or twice or three times a day, as with the body's food, that they seek the truth, but at every single instant, whatever they are doing. Hence we often neglect the nourishment of the body in our eagerness to acquire the truth, while we spare neither time, money, nor effort in its study. We weaken our body, and with it weakened, our rational soul becomes stronger.[9] The soul seeks this truth, not the body. For truth does not increase the body: rather its pursuit most often harms the body. And the soul desires it for itself, not for the body. For what can truth contribute to the body? Whenever truth seems to benefit the body, the ensuing benefit is not because of the truth but because of some bodily advantage which happens when the truth is known. Indeed, the soul avidly hunts for the truth even when no practical advantage results; and 7

utilitatis, veritatem studiose perquirit et pleno cibis suis corpore esurit sititque adhuc animus veritatem; qua inventa exultat non ad tempus, sicuti propter corporis usus, sed perpetuo gaudet, illuminatur, adolescit, evadit magnificus, adeo ut illi prae magnitudine sua minima videantur illa, quae solent esurienti animulae videri quam maxima. Hac etiam alimonia fit invictus, temperans, iustus, hominum gubernator et dominus, excelsior caelo, par angelis, deo similis.

8 Quis igitur ambigat ulterius quin veritas humanae mentis naturalis sit esca? Eandem escam omnes appetunt mentes, eandem quaeque mens semper. Quae quidem consensio stabilis appetendi significat mentes inter se mirifice convenire et quamlibet mentem in natura sua stabilem permanere, quandoquidem appetitus earum non ita variatur mutaturve[17] ut appetitio sensuum, quae pro diversitate corporum diversa est et ad mutationem corporis permutatur, quasi sensus corporum mutationem sequantur, mens divinorum stabilitatem. Odit namque corporis alimenta atque eodem cibo vescitur, quo caelestes et sempiternae mentes. Hic cibus est veritas.

9 Veritas autem non est corporea; alioquin rebus incorporeis non inesset. Nunc autem inest deo angelisque et numeris, quae et incorporalia sunt et vera. Et quoniam incorporalia, tanto veriora sunt corporibus quanto puriora firmioraque sunt, fit ut veritas in illis sit potius quam corporibus. Atqui quod maius est, non est proprie veritas in corporibus. In his enim duo sunt: materia et forma. Non est veritas in materia, nam per eam nihil vere in specie aliqua rerum est: non homo revera per eam aliquid est, non equus et reliqua. Neque tamen in forma corporis iacet veritas, cum vera forma non sit cuius virtus inficitur in materia.

with the body full of its food, the soul still hungers and thirsts for truth. When truth is found it rejoices, not just for a period of time, as with bodily activities, but with a joy that lasts for ever: it is filled with light, it waxes in strength, it becomes so magnificent that in the presence of its [new] greatness the things which seemed so important when it was a poor, starving, little soul seem unimportant to it now. On such a diet it becomes incorruptible, tempered, and just, the captain and master of men, more exalted than the heavens, equal to the angels, like unto God.

Who then can doubt any longer that truth is the natural food of the human mind? All minds desire the same food, and each mind desires it all the time. This unchanging consensus of desire shows that minds harmonize to a wonderful degree, and that each mind remains firm in its nature insofar as the desire of minds does not vary and change like the appetite of the senses, which is as varied as the diversity of bodies and changes when the body changes. One could say that the senses follow the changeability of bodies, whereas the mind follows the unchanging nature of things divine. For the mind shuns the body's food and dines on the same fare as the heavenly and eternal minds. This fare is the truth. 8

Truth is not corporeal, however, for then it would not be present in incorporeal entities. But it is present in God, in angels, and in numbers, which are both incorporeal and true. And since incorporeal entities, to the degree that they are more pure and long-lasting than bodies, are accordingly more true, it follows that the truth dwells in them rather than in bodies. More importantly, there is no truth strictly speaking in bodies. For bodies contain two things, matter and form. There is no truth in matter, for nothing is truly in any particular species because of matter: a man is not truly anything because of matter, neither is a horse, nor the rest. Nor does truth reside in the body's form, for the form whose power is corrupted in matter is not the true form. 9

10 Testantur hoc et mathematici qui veras figuras in corporibus non reperiunt. Verus quippe circulus, locatus in vero plano, assidue volvitur. Hoc fieri ratio cogit, cum circulus ille planum tangat in puncto; in puncto autem corpus quiescere nequeat. Nemo haec in corporibus vidit umquam. Non insunt igitur verae figurae corporibus, quia forte neque vera principia figurarum, saltem quantum spectat ad sensum, qualia sunt puncta, lineae,[18] superficies. Ratio quidem ostendit verum punctum longitudine carere debere, veram lineam latitudine, superficiem veram profunditate. Talia vero in materia nusquam sensu reperiuntur. Cum ergo alicubi sit[19] veritas et a corporibus sensuque absit, est procul dubio in spiritibus, est igitur incorporea.

11 Idem ex eo patet, quia ibi maxime consistit veritas, ubi scientia. Haec vero in rationibus rerum universalibus revera versatur, ceu cum quis cognoscit quid bonitas ipsa sit, quid iustitia, singulis bonis et iustis actionibus officiisque communis atque similia. Rationes vero huiusmodi incorporales sunt, quoniam in nullo particulari corpore concluduntur, sed sunt ad multa communes. Ratio corporis vel circuli tota in minimo corpore vel circulo sicut in maximo reperitur, ratio longitudinis vel latitudinis vel profunditatis tota in minima linea, superficie, altitudine, sicut in maxima. Denique ratio quantitatis ipsius tota adaequatur toti rei cuiuslibet quantitati. Quapropter rationes corporis, figurae, dimensionis atque ipsius etiam quantitatis corporales et extensae non sunt; multo minus rationes aliae corporales et extensae esse possunt.

12 Praeterea, rationes rerum immutabiles sunt, nam aliter se habere non possunt; omnia vero corporalia mutabilia sunt. Quapropter scientia, cum in his versetur, est incorporea; igitur et veritas incorporea. Quo fit ut de ipsa veritate rerum quid sit, qua ratione constet inveniaturque, quid ipsi sit propinquius quidve remotius,

One could take the evidence of mathematicians who cannot find true figures in bodies. A true circle set on a true plane revolves perpetually; and reason requires this to happen because this circle touches the plane at a point. Yet a body cannot come to rest in a point. No one has ever seen these figures in bodies. So no true figures exist in bodies, perhaps because they do not have the figures' true principles — in regards at least to the sense — such as points, lines, and surfaces. Reason demonstrates that the true point must be without length, the true line without breadth, the true surface without depth. But nowhere in matter are such things discovered by the sense. Thus, since truth is somewhere, but it is not in bodies or the sense, it is doubtless among spirits and therefore incorporeal. 10

This is clear too from the fact that truth exists principally where there is knowledge. The true concern of knowledge is with the universal rational principles of things, as when someone would know what goodness itself is, what justice, the principles that are common to particular good or just actions or offices, and so on. Such rational principles are incorporeal, since they are not contained within any particular body but are common to many. The principle of a body or a circle is just as wholly present in the smallest body or circle as in the largest; the principle of length or breadth or depth as wholly present in the smallest line, surface, or elevation as in the largest. And the rational principle of quantity itself is totally applicable to the total quantity of any given thing. Thus the principles of body, figure, dimension, and even quantity are not corporeal nor do they possess extension; much less can other principles be corporeal or extended. 11

Again, the universal rational principles are unchangeable, for they cannot be other than they are. But all corporeals are changeable. Knowledge, because it deals with such principles, is therefore incorporeal; therefore truth is incorporeal too. Consequently judgments about the truth of things — what it is, how it comes about 12

non sensus ullus, immo sola ratio iudicet, et tunc potissimum quando sese a sensuum corporumque fallacia sevocat. Est ergo veritas incorporea. Talis est autem maxime veritas et scientia divinorum, qua praecipue animus oblectatur et alitur. Quo igitur modo animus potest corporalis esse, qui corporalibus cibis offenditur, spiritalibus alitur, quandoquidem veritate omni, praesertim divinarum rerum veritate delectatur, alitur, augetur? Aut quo pacto mortalis erit, si veritate pascitur immortali, cum neque corruptibilis venter cibum incorruptibilem cupiat aut capiat, neque cibus incorruptibilis in corpus transeat corruptibile? Sane si immortalis est veritas atque est continuus animi cibus, ut certe est, sive ipsa convertatur in animum, sive animum in se ipsam convertat, eum efficit immortalem. Quoniam vero dum familiari hoc vescitur cibo, ea voluptate perfunditur, quae neque molestiam habet admixtam neque in fastidium vertitur vel dolorem, constat mentem neque fatigari umquam neque turbari contrarii alicuius occursu neque in contrarium aliquid posse corrumpi. Rursus, quia menti nihil natura optabilius est quam veritas, veritas autem per separationem quandam a rebus mortalibus comparatur, nihil menti, qua ratione mens est, magis est naturale familiareque quam a mortalibus segregari. Ex eo vero quod maxime naturale est, non remissio vitae sequitur, sed intensio. Quapropter tunc vivet mens praecipue, cum hinc abierit.

13 Hanc vero argumentationem nostram argumentatione quadam Olympiodori Platonici confirmare possumus, quam partim Pythagoricis, partim Platonicis mysteriis a *Phaedone Gorgia*que acceptis sic ille contexuit. Mens naturali veritatis aviditate continue tum se a corpore, tum formas a materia separat cupitque ita atque conatur separata vivere, quamvis quotidie in contrarium corpus sensusque detorqueant. Separatam vero illam a caduco corpore vitam

and is discovered, what is close to it or far from it — are made not by any of the senses but by reason alone, and particularly when it removes itself from the illusions of the senses and of bodies. So truth is incorporeal. And especially so is the truth and knowledge of things divine which gives the soul special delight and nourishment. So how can soul be corporeal when it rejects bodily food and feeds on the spiritual, and seeing that it draws delight, nourishment, and increase from all truth and especially from the truth of things divine? And how can it be mortal, if it feeds on immortal truth, since a corruptible belly has no appetite or stomach for food that is incorruptible, and incorruptible food does not transform itself into corruptible body? Indeed, if truth is immortal and the rational soul's perpetual food (as it most surely is), then, whether it transforms itself into the soul or transforms the soul into itself, it makes the soul immortal. Since, however, while the soul feeds on this familiar food, it is filled with a pleasure which is not mingled with pain and does not turn into disgust or sorrow, we are agreed that the mind is never wearied, nor troubled by contact with something contrary to itself, nor able to be corrupted into something contrary. Again, since nothing is more naturally desirable to mind than truth and truth is achieved by a sort of separation from what is mortal, then nothing can be more natural or familiar to mind qua mind than to be set apart from what is mortal. From what is most natural, however, comes not the weakening but the intensification of life. So the mind will be most alive when it is far from here.

We can reinforce our present argument with an argument of the Platonist Olympiodorus which he wove together from mystical teachings taken in part from the Pythagoreans and in part from Plato — from the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*.[10] The mind, naturally hungry for the truth, continually divorces both itself from body and forms from matter; and longs and strives to live separated in this way, although the body and the senses daily compel it in the opposite di- 13

naturaliter appetit tamquam naturaliter, id est revera bonam, praesertim cum vita sit omnino dedita veritati atque bonitati. Vita eiusmodi si bona est, ergo et possibilis est; quod enim impossibile est, idem quoque inutile. Bonum vero inutile non est dicendum. Item, si impotentia ad malum pertinet, ad bonum potentia pertinet. Ergo bonum omne natura sua possibile est. Hinc efficitur ut naturalis appetitio boni sit possessionis possibilis appetitio. Ac si etiam quod apparet bonum est possibile, certe et ipsum revera bonum potentissimum est, et vera bona vere beneque quaerentibus possibilia sunt.

: III :

Tertia ratio: virtus animae, quia indivisibilis est, corporis qualitas esse nequit.

1 Quod indivisibile est corporis qualitas esse nequit. Nam si qualitas eius esse ponatur, ita interrogabimus, numquid tangat partem aliquam divisibilem corporis an punctum aliquod corporis indivisibile? Si conceditur primum, profecto qualitas huiusmodi divisibilis erit, cum modo divisibili tangat, atque ita non indivisibile divisibilis ipsius erit qualitas, sed alicuius divisibilis divisibile. Si secundum conceditur, certe illa qualitas puncti illius quod attingit solum qualitas est, non corporis, quamobrem quod individuum est corporis qualitas numquam erit. Individua vero virtus animae humanae est qualitas. Igitur anima non est corpus.

2 Sufficiens quidem putabitur huiusmodi demonstratio, si duo illa planius ostenderimus, videlicet et virtutem esse animae qualitatem et hanc ipsam virtutem individuam esse. Primum cuique est evidentissimum, quandoquidem per virtutis praesentiam talis ac

rection. But it naturally desires that life apart from the mortal body as the life that is naturally, that is, truly good, especially since it is the life entirely dedicated to truth and goodness. If such a life is good, then it is possible; for what is impossible is also useless. But we cannot say that what is good is useless. Again, if weakness pertains to evil, strength pertains to good. Therefore everything good is by its very nature possible. Consequently the natural appetite for the good is the appetite for something it is possible to have. But if even what just seems to be the good is possible, certainly what is truly the good is the most powerful of possibilities[11]; and the true goods are possible for those who seek truly and well.

: III :

Third proof: the power or virtue of soul, being indivisible, cannot be a quality of body.

What is indivisible cannot be a quality of body. Suppose it were its quality, then the question arises, Does it touch some divisible part of the body or some indivisible point of it? If we grant the first, then such a quality would certainly be divisible, since it makes contact in a divisible manner, and thus it would not be the indivisible quality of the divisible part but the divisible quality of something divisible. If we grant the second hypothesis, then the quality would be a quality only of the point it touches and not of the body; and thus what is indivisible would never be a quality of the body. But the virtue or power of the human soul is an indivisible quality. Therefore soul is not body. 1

This argument will be deemed sufficient if we clarify two points, first that virtue is a quality of soul, and second that this virtue is indivisible. The first is obvious to anyone, since it is 2

talis anima fit, et dicitur sapiens, prudens, iusta, fortis et temperans. Atque abesse virtus ab anima potest, anima remanente. Huiusmodi vero est conditio qualitatum.

3 Secundum praeterea illud, videlicet virtutem esse indivisibilem, sic ostendimus. Virtutum duo sunt genera, aliae in intellectu, in appetitu vero sive rationali sive irrationali aliae. Illae speculativae vocantur, istae morales. Illae speculativae, quia speculando comparantur et comparatae versantur in speculando. Istae morales, quia more et consuetudine acquiruntur atque acquisitae in moribus et operum usu consistunt. In eo genere sunt divinorum sapientia, scientia naturalium, civilium prudentia, ars operum humanorum. In hoc sunt iustitia, quae suum cuique tribuit; fortitudo, quae ad opera honesta promptior, abicit a nobis timoris impedimentum; temperantia, quae libidinis mollitiem, quod alterum honestorum impedimentum est, repellit. Hae quidem sunt apud Platonem virtutum descriptiones.

4 Si qua esset in iis[20] virtutibus corporea magnitudo, quo quisque grandior est, eo sapientior iustiorque fieri posset, neque possent exigui homines grandes virtutibus superare aut aequare. Rursus scientia, quae maximorum corporum notitia est, amplior et clarior esset quam scientia quae minorum. Cognoscimus autem multa quorum non valemus magnitudinem adaequare, totusque animus et aeque et ita rem magnam percipit sicut parvam.

5 Summatim vero quid aliud speculativa virtus est, nisi claritas intellectus? Quid aliud moralis, nisi fervor stabilis appetitus ab intellectus claritate succensus? Claritas illa non paulatim fit, licet ad eam pedetentim perveniamus. Sicut post longam per vestigia multa investigationem subito lepus aspicitur, ita quisque in se ipso

through the presence of virtue that soul acquires a particular character, and is described as wise, prudent, just, brave, or temperate. And virtue can be lacking from the soul even as the soul remains. But this is the characteristic of qualities.

Now to prove the second point: that virtue is indivisible. There are two kinds of virtues, those in the intellect and those present in the appetite, whether rational or irrational. The first are known as the speculative virtues, the second as the moral. The first are speculative because they are acquired through speculation, and once acquired are used in speculation. The second are moral because they are acquired by custom and habituation, and once acquired they govern our moral conduct and what we do. In the first category are the understanding of things divine, the knowledge of things natural, prudence in political matters, and the art and skill that produces human artifacts. In the second are justice (which gives to each his own), courage (which prompts us to noble actions and rids us of the obstacle of fear), and temperance (which keeps us from self-indulgent sensuality, another obstacle to noble actions).[12] These are how the virtues are described in Plato.[13] 3

Now if any bodily size exists in these virtues, the bigger a man grows the wiser he could become or the more just, and it will be impossible for small men to become equal to or to surpass big men in virtue. Furthermore, the knowledge which is concerned with the largest bodies will be ampler and clearer than that concerned with smaller bodies. But we know about many things which we cannot match in size, and our whole soul perceives a large object just as, and just as much as, it does a tiny one. 4

In short, what is speculative virtue if not the intellect's clarity, what is moral virtue if not the unchanging flame of desire lit by the intellect's clarity? That clarity does not come gradually, though we reach it by a gradual process. We may have been tracking down a hare a long time but when we see it, we see it suddenly. Similarly, from one's own experience everyone knows after a long 5

animadvertit[21] post diuturnam indaginem se momento, quid verum sit ea de re quam quaesiverit, intueri. Subito veritatis lumen, ut Plato inquit, effulget in animo, non subito excussum a rebus, sed longa quadam discussione, ut ex lapide saepius colliso scintilla. Similiter diuturna consuetudine iuventus ad mores disponitur; donec paululum quid ad accendendum stabilem illum rationalemque appetitus ardorem deficit, nondum sufficienter accenditur, nondum virtus moralis habetur. Saepius inspirando, subito tandem flagrat aestus appetitus sufficiens ad virtutem. Quid plura? Verso ad solem speculo, in speculo lumen momento refulget; supposita illi speculo lana, statim ut parata est, in ipsa ignis accenditur. Quare et repentinus splendor in speculo fit, et repentinus ignis in lana. Non aliter subita in intellectu claritas veritatis, subita inde in appetitu flagrantia.

6 Resume iterum hoc pacto: Virtus speculativa est quaedam cognitio veritatis. Si gradatim confletur, pars nunc quidem habebitur, pars deficiet et quaeretur. Quatenus pars veritatis habebitur, sciemus quidem. Quatenus pars deerit, etiam nesciemus. Ita eandem rem et sciemus[22] simul et nesciemus. Quod ne ebrius quidem aliquis somniaret. Quapropter speculativa virtus non gradatim a parte sui in aliam sui partem progreditur, sed tota simul e vestigio lucet. Virtus quoque moralis est voluntas quaedam constans quodcumque ratio dictaverit eligendi. Si partes habeat multas fiatque sensim, pars huius voluntatis inerit, pars adhuc aberit. Quantum pars inest, volumus. Quantum pars abest, etiam nolumus. Sic eandem rem simul per eandem vim animae volemus pariter atque nolemus: quod est monstro persimile. Quoniam igitur virtus fit momento indivisibili, est ipsa quoque indivisibilis — si modo natura cuiusque propriam originem sequitur — praesertim cum finem habeat indivisibilem. Cuius autem ortus et finis individuus est, cur non sit ipsum etiam individuum?

search that one intuits in a flash what is true about the object of one's inquiry. The light of truth, says Plato, suddenly blazes out in the rational soul, not sparked by things themselves but by a prolonged discussion, like a spark from a stone struck many times.[14] Likewise a young man is disposed to moral behaviour through long habituation. As long as some little thing is missing to ignite that unchanging and rational ardor of the appetite, then it is not sufficiently inflamed and he does not yet possess moral virtue. Keep blowing on it and at last the appetite's flame, sufficient now for virtue, flares up suddenly. What more is there to say? If you turn a mirror towards the sun, the light is reflected in the mirror instantaneously; now place some wool before that mirror, and as soon as it has been there long enough it will straightway catch fire. So the light in the mirror is sudden and the fire in the wool is sudden. The clarity of the truth in the intellect is equally sudden, and the flame in the desire that springs from it is sudden.

Let us address the point again in the following way. Speculative virtue is a knowledge of the truth. If it is put together in stages, then part will be present and part will be missing and looked for still. So we will know to the extent that part of the truth will be there; but we will not know to the extent that part will be missing. So we will know and not know the same thing at the same time. Not even a drunkard imagines this. So speculative virtue does not proceed stage by stage from one part of itself to another, but blazes forth wholly and suddenly. Moral virtue too is an unwavering will to choose whatever reason dictates. If it has many parts and comes into being gradually, then part of the will will be present and part still absent. In that a part is present, we will [something]; in that a part is absent, we do not. So through the same force of the soul we will equally both want and not want the same thing simultaneously. But this is monstrous. Therefore, because virtue comes into being at an indivisible moment of time, it is also indivisible itself (this is presuming that the nature of each thing 6

7 Quis virtutis finis? Moralis quidem finis, animam a corpore divisibili purgare atque seiungere; speculativae autem incorporeas universalesque rerum rationes a dividuis corporibus procul positas comprehendere. Cernis finem utriusque virtutis, sicut et ortum, esse individuum aliquid, ideoque virtutes ipsas oportere individuas iudicari.

8 Ostendunt utraeque virtutes huiusmodi quandam sui naturam, in eo quam maxime, quod multae scientiae simul in intellectu sunt, multae virtutes morales simul in appetitu, neque sese sua numerositate confundunt, sed augent potius et lucidant. Atque unius scientiae conceptionem in nobis seorsum ab alia pervidemus, ita ut sine consideratione alterius possimus alteram cogitare. Proinde tales habemus artificiorum ideas in mente: unitas, inquam, pariter et distinctas usque adeo ut possimus ad unius ideae exemplar loqui et fabricare aliquid ipsi proprium, etiam si nihil ad alterius conceptionis exemplar agamus. Corpora esse nequeunt tales intellegentiae, quae ita in eodem manent animae gremio, ut neque sese detrudant pellantque, neque se mutua mixtione confundant. Eadem est de moralibus virtutibus ratio.

9 Quinetiam cum multae sint in anima sapientis intellegentiae, unaquaeque illarum tota in singulis invenitur. Profecto, qui in geometria sive theologia peritus est, propositionem aliquam habet facultatis illius primam, habet secundam tertiamque et reliquas, atque ex cognitione unius in alterius cognitionem progreditur. Si prima docet secundam, secunda tertiam, et quisquis docet aliquid, possidet in se ipso quod docetur, sequitur ut in qualibet praece-

conforms to its own origin), and especially since it has an indivisible end. But why isn't what has an indivisible beginning and end also indivisible?

7 What is the end of virtue? The end of moral virtue is to purify and divorce the soul from the divisible body; the end of speculative virtue is to comprehend the incorporeal and universal rational principles of things which are far removed from divisible bodies. You see that the end of both kinds of virtue, like their beginning, is something indivisible and therefore that the virtues themselves must be deemed indivisible.

8 Both these virtues display a nature of their own principally in that many different branches of knowledge are simultaneously in the intellect, and many moral virtues simultaneously in the appetite; yet they do not confound themselves in their multitude, but rather wax stronger and shine forth. We discern that our conception of one branch of knowledge is different from another such that we can think about the one without considering the other. Likewise, we have in our mind the ideas of the different products of art united and distinguished equally to the extent that we can speak about the model of one idea and fashion something proper to it, even if we do nothing about the model of another conception. Such conceptions cannot be bodies, for they all so abide in the same bosom of the soul that they neither push nor shove themselves about nor confound themselves in mutual confusion. The same argument pertains to the moral virtues.

9 Moreover, though many conceptions exist in the soul of a wise man, every single one of them is found complete in separate men. An expert on geometry or theology certainly possesses some proposition about his discipline which is prime; he also possesses the second, the third, and the rest, and from the knowledge of the first he proceeds to the knowledge of the second. If the first proposition teaches the second and the second the third, and if whoever teaches anything possesses what is being taught in himself, then it

dente propositione sequentes omnes contineantur. Quin immo et in qualibet sequente insunt similiter praecedentes. Quippe solemus sequentium indiciis praecedentia saepe rimari. Neque id iniuria, siquidem in effectibus lucent imagines causarum. Hac rerum serie fit ut vir sapiens, una quavis propositione excogitata, velocissime percurrat in multas, atque ita multas, immo omnes in una conspiciat. Est ergo quaelibet intellegentia in qualibet, et unaquaeque tota continetur in singulis.

10 Idem in virtutibus moralibus accidit: nam acquisita illarum una, statim omnes habentur. Quis enim iuste distribuet, si aut timeat minas aut libidini serviat? Quisnam metus fortiter superabit, si demolliatur[23] libidine? Quis domabit cupiditates, si formidini succubuerit? Denique quis honeste vitam aget, nisi per prudentiam optimum vitae finem statuerit et vias ad finem elegerit rectiores? Aut quis prudenter inspiciet, si mentis acies caligine vitiorum obnubiletur? Sunt ergo virtutes istae ita connexae invicem, ut in una sint omnes et quaelibet virtus tota comprehendatur in singulis, sicut et tota geometriae facultas in praecipua eius propositione, immo in qualibet delitescit, cum per sollertis ingenii sagacitatem ex qualibet propositione omnes eliciantur. Non potest autem divisibilis qualitas tota simul rebus multis inesse. Profecto in una sola est, id est corpore uno, et alias sui partes per alias corporis partes extendit, neque tota eius quantitas singulis corporis partibus inest; ideo intellegentiae illae moresque omnino indivisibiles sunt.

11 Quamobrem anima neque corpus neque forma divisa per corpus esse potest, siquidem ipsa est subiectum indivisibilium quali-

follows that all subsequent propositions are contained in whatever proposition precedes them, and furthermore that the preceding ones are similarly present in whatever follows. It is often customary to explore what comes before for evidence of what comes after. This is quite reasonable since the images of causes are reflected in their effects. This universal linkage is such that a wise man can proceed at lightning speed from thinking about a single proposition to many others in such a way that he sees many, indeed all of them in one proposition. Thus any one understanding is present in any other, and every single one is wholly contained in each separately.

The same thing happens with moral virtues: once one of them 10 is acquired you immediately possess all the others. For who will make a just distribution, if he is afraid of threats or a slave to lust? Who will bravely overcome his fears if he is sapped by lust? Who will master his sensual desires if he is a prey to fear? Who, finally, will live an honorable life unless he has the practical wisdom to set himself the best goal in life and to choose the straightest routes to that end? Or who will look at things circumspectly if his mind's eye is dimmed by a cloud of vices? So the virtues are so closely tied together that they are all in one; and each virtue is contained complete in every separate virtue, just as the whole discipline of geometry is hidden away in its chief proposition, indeed in any of its propositions, since all of them can be elicited by the cunning of a trained mathematical intelligence from any one of them. But a divisible quality cannot be present in its entirety in many different things at the same time. It is in one thing only, that is, in one body, and it extends its different parts through the body's different parts; but its whole quantity is not present in the individual parts of the body. Hence these conceptions and moral virtues are entirely indivisible.

Soul therefore can be neither body nor form divided through 11 body, since it is the subject of indivisible qualities. Hence, just as it

tatum. Ergo sicut delirat qui aut quaerit quanta sit scientia vel iustitia aut putat geometriam corpore geometrae esse minorem, ita desipit qui aut interrogat quanta sit anima aut eam opinatur corpore minorem esse, quandoquidem nullo modo corporalis est. Non solum enim[24] incorporalia suscipit, verum etiam multa in se ipsa facit incorporalia, dum species rerum rationesque et habitus concipit, praesertim cum definitiones incorporalium fabricat. Quis autem eam, quae incorporalium causa est, esse dixerit corporalem aut eam mortalem, quae subiectum est virtutum, cum virtutum officium sit repugnare mortalibus, siquidem speculativa virtus illa fugit, moralis fugat? Non potest autem qualitas subiecto proprio repugnare. Immo immortale est illud necessario, quod naturale receptaculum est qualitatum earum, quarum proprium est adversari et imperare mortalibus. Vis autem rationis huius in eo consistit maxime, quod anima non modo subiectum est talium qualitatum, sed et principium. Ideoque naturam illam mortalibus repugnantem sortiuntur ab anima.

: IV :

Quarta ratio: species conceptioque intellegibilis suscipi non potest a corpore.

1 Id sentiunt graeci omnes Platonici. Idem possumus ita Platonicorum Arabum sententia confirmare. Intellectus rem aliquam, puta hominem, non intellegit, nisi formam quandam universalem hominum significatricem adipiscatur, quam intellegibilem formam et speciem nominant. Hanc adeptus, quid sit hominis natura, ita iudicat: homo est animal rationale. Iudicium hoc tum conceptus et

is an insane person who inquires how large knowledge or justice is or who supposes that geometry is smaller than the geometer's body, so it is a fool who asks how big the soul is or who supposes it tinier than the body, since it is in no way corporeal. For not only does the soul receive things incorporeal, it also produces many incorporeals in itself when it conceives the species of things, their rational principles and acquired characteristics, and especially when it forges the definitions of incorporeal things. But who will maintain that the cause of incorporeals is corporeal, or that the subject of virtues is mortal, when the function of virtues is to oppose what is mortal, since speculative virtue flees mortal things and moral virtue puts them to flight. But quality cannot be in conflict with its own subject. Or rather, that receptacle is necessarily immortal which is the natural receptacle of those qualities whose property it is to fight against and to dominate mortal things. But the force of this argument consists mainly in the fact that the soul is not only the subject but the principle too of such qualities. And hence they are allotted by the soul that nature which opposes things mortal.

: IV :

Fourth proof: the species or intelligible concept cannot be received by body.

Such is the opinion of all the Greek Platonists. We can confirm it by referring to the following argument of the Arabic Platonists. The intellect does not understand anything, let us say a man, unless it acquires a universal form, the general signifier of men, which they call the intelligible form or species. Once it acquires this form, it makes a judgment about the nature of man: Man is a 1

conceptio mentis vocatur, tum rei cognoscendae ratio et definitio, quam etiam solemus scientiam appellare. Si intellectus a corporis latitudine protendatur, tam forma intellegibilis quam conceptio latitudini corporis adhaerebit. In hac ipsa latitudine duo considerantur, punctum scilicet et extensio latitudinis. Igitur formae illius conceptionisque sedes erit vel solum punctum aliquod corporis vel extensio. At vero si neutrum concedi debet, ut demonstrabimus, sequitur ut intellectus in corpore minime protendatur. Ostendamus prius punctum sedem talem esse non posse.

2 Primum quidem animadvertendum est punctum non existere per se ipsum, sed esse mensurae corporis sic affixum, ut semper eius sit terminus. Si pro natura sua rem capit, certe numquam accipit nisi terminum aliquem magnitudinis alicuius, quae in illa corporis mensura suscipiatur, cuius terminus est punctum, ita ut sicut corporalis mensura suscipit rei advenientis magnitudinem, sic talis mensurae terminus terminum suscipiat magnitudinis. Quare quicquid puncto corporis suscipi dicitur, non est a magnitudine liberum. Ideo si formae intellegibilis receptaculum sit punctum, fieri non poterit quin ea species divisibilis sit et terminum suum in puncto corporis habeat; reliquas vero partes in corporis latitudine. Eam tamen indivisibilem esse probabimus in sequentibus.

3 Praeterea, si dicatur punctum ita formam illam capere ut solum ipsum sit eius sedes et fundamentum atque illa per hoc maneat a corporis latitudine segregata, oportet punctum quoque esse disiunctum a latitudine, praesertim cum nihil sit proprium accidentis alicuius subiectum nisi quod proprie existit actu. Punctum huiusmodi erit a linea separatum, neque erit lineae aliquid neque terminus latitudinis, et linea per aliud quoddam punctum huic proximum terminabitur. Rursus, aliud illud punctum similiter

rational animal. This judgment is called sometimes a concept or conception of the mind, sometimes the rational principle and definition of the object to be known, which we usually refer to also as knowledge. If the intellect is extended by the extension of the body, the intelligible form like the conception will adhere to the body's extension. There are two aspects to consider in this extension: a point and the extent of the extension. So the seat of the form and conception will be either some single point of the body or its extension. If neither of these is admissible, as we shall prove, then it follows that the intellect is not extended in the body. Let us first show that a point cannot be such a seat.

The first thing to note is that a point does not exist on its own, 2 but is so attached to the measure of the body that it always constitutes a limit of it. If the point accepts something in accordance with its own nature, it certainly never accepts it unless it is a limit of some magnitude which is received in the body's measure (whose limit is a point); and accepts it such that, just as the corporeal measure receives the magnitude of something being added to it, so the limit of such a measure receives the limit of the magnitude. So whatever is said to be received in a point of the body is not free from magnitude. Therefore, if the seat of the intelligible form is a point, it could not become a seat without that form being divisible and having its limit in the body's point but having the rest of its parts in the body's extension. Yet in what follows we will prove that the form is indivisible.

Furthermore, if a point were said to receive the form such that 3 it alone were the seat and foundation of it, and the form stayed separated via this point from the body's extension, the point too would have to be separated from the extension, especially since nothing is the proper seat or subject of some accident unless it exists properly in act. Such a point will be separate from a line, and not be a part of a line or limit of extension; and the line will be ended via some other point, the next closest to it. Again, that

proprio existet actu quo possit et ipsum accidentis formae sedes fieri eritque ipsum quoque seiunctum a linea, praecipue cum sit eadem punctorum omnium ratio. Quo efficitur ut aut nullum sit punctum in linea — quo[25] nihil est dictu stultius; terminis namque careret — aut lineae longitudo conficiatur ex punctis, quod etiam dictu ridiculum, quia punctum puncto additum non auget longitudinem.

4 Quod ea ratione conspicitur, quoniam si tria puncta cogitentur sibi invicem succedentia, interrogabimus numquid punctum illorum medium cogat duo extrema puncta inter se ita distare, ut se invicem non contingant,[26] aut non impediat extremorum concursionem. Si distare cogat, certe non eadem sui parte tangit eorum unum qua tangit alterum, alioquin non[27] disiungeret invicem. Quod si altera parte sui unum extremorum respicit, altera alterum, ipsum duabus partibus constituitur nec est punctum, siquidem est divisibile. Quare cogimur confiteri punctum medium non impedire aliorum concursionem. Itaque erunt in omnibus omnia, neque ullam suo concursu efficient longitudinem, quando per punctum medium nullum inter alia puncta noscitur intervallum. Si non constat ex punctis aliqua corporis longitudo, nullum reperitur in ea punctum, quod per se quandoque ita possit actu fieri, ut fiat intellegibilis formae subiectum.

5 Dixerit forte quispiam punctum non actu, sed potentia esse in corpore, et per eam ipsam potentiam fieri intellegibilis formae subiectum. Quamvis id iam fuerit confutatum, sic tamen iterum confutatur.

6 Puncta huiusmodi, tum quia potentia sunt, non actu, tum quia sunt infinita, nulla ratione ita invicem distinguuntur, ut aliud illo-

other point will similarly exist in its own act whereby it can become the seat of the accidental form and also be separate from the line, especially since the rational principle of all points is the same. The result of this will be either that no point is in a line (and no claim could be more stupid, for then the line would lack limits), or else that the line's length is made up of points (which is equally ridiculous because we do not increase length by adding a point to a point).

4 This becomes clear from the following argument. If we think of three points coming one after another, our question will be whether the point in the middle forces the two at either end to keep so far apart that they do not touch, or whether it does it not prevent them from coming together. If it forces them to keep apart, obviously it does not touch one of them with the same part of itself as it touches the other, otherwise it would not be separating them. But if it looks to one of the extremes with one part of itself, to the other with another, it is constituted of two parts and, being divisible, is not a point. So we are obliged to admit that the point in the middle does not prevent the two other points from coming into contact. In that case all would be in all, and they would never produce length by coming into contact, since no interval is created between the two other points via the middle point. So if the length of a body is not made up of points, then it is impossible to find a point in that length which could ever bring itself into act in order to become the seat or subject of the intelligible form.

5 Someone could perhaps contend that a point does not exist in body actually but potentially, and that through this potentiality it becomes the subject of the intelligible form. Though this contention has already been refuted, the following will refute it a second time.

6 Such points, both because their existence is potential and not actual, and because they are infinite, cannot be rationally distin-

rum potius quam aliud formam illam capiat. Omnia itaque illam[28] capiunt. Quocirca intellectus aut infinitas simul rei cuiusque intellegendae formas accipiet actu aut infinite simul per infinita puncta rem eandem intelleget. Utrumque impossibile est, tum esse formas infinitas actu, tum esse simul intellegentias infinitas. Per haec manifestum est punctum corporis intellegibilis speciei sedem esse non posse.

7 Sed numquid ipsa punctorum continuatio corporisve extensio[29] sedes erit? Nequaquam. Omnis enim forma quae divisibili subiecto[30] recipitur fit dividua, quemadmodum nivis albedo nivis divisione dividitur. Itaque si a corporis latitudine species illa suscipitur, lata fit[31] et dividua. Talem vero illam fieri impossibile est, quod sic ostendam. Si species secatur in partes, aut partes illae dicuntur omnino similes esse aut dissimiles. Sed horum neutrum est admittendum. Non est admittendum quod similes sint omnino, quia si ita similes sunt ut in quavis parte ratio integra sit speciei totius, sicut in singulis aquae guttis integra ratio totius aquae servatur, certe intellectus in qualibet parte inspiciet totum atque una speciei pars ad totius rei intellegentiam satisfaciet, superfluae erunt ceterae.

8 Praeterea per talem speciem, quae undique sibi ipsi persimilis est et tali similitudine decipit intellectum inde ductum ad cognoscendum, confundetur prorsus iudicium intellectus in partibus discernendis a toto, tum in qualibet re ex partibus constituta, tum vel maxime in re illa quae ex naturis variis est composita. Neque poterit partes vel a partibus vel a toto discernere. Alia tamen revera ra-

guished from each other in such a way that one of them rather than another might receive that intelligible form. So they all receive the form. In that case, for understanding each object the intellect will either accept an infinite number of forms in act and simultaneously, or it will infinitely and simultaneously understand the same thing through an infinite number of points. Either of these propositions — that the forms are infinite in act and that infinite acts of understanding occur simultaneously — is impossible. Obviously, then, a body's point cannot be the seat of the intelligible species.

But surely the unbroken continuity of points or the extension of body is not going to be the seat either? Absolutely not. For every form that is received in a divisible subject itself becomes divisible, just as the snow's whiteness is divided by the snow's division. So if that form is received by the body's extension, it becomes extended and divided. However, it is imposssible for it to become such a divisible form, as I shall straightway prove. If the form were cut up into parts, people would call those parts either completely identical or different. But neither of these alternatives is admissible. We cannot allow the parts to be entirely identical, because, if they were so alike that the rational principle of the whole form or species were wholly present in every part (as the principle of all water is wholly preserved in every single drop of water), then the intellect would certainly see the whole in every part; and one of the species's parts would suffice for an understanding of the whole, and the other parts would be unnecessary. 7

Moreover, by way of such a divisible species (which everywhere totally resembles itself and by this resemblance deceives the intellect thence summoned to understand it), the judgment of the intellect would be utterly confounded in distinguishing the parts from the whole, both in the case of anything comprised of parts, but principally in the case of an object compounded from various natures. Nor would it be able to distinguish parts from parts or 8

tio partis est ut pars est, totius alia ut est totum, et hoc semper per mentis iudicium affirmatur, cum neque ipsum totum pars esse valeat neque pars totum. Negandum igitur arbitramur speciei partes omnino similes esse, ob eam maxime rationem quia, cum mens rei partes intellegat ut partes sunt, et intellegat totum ut est totum et totum vere distinguat a partibus, neque possit vere distinguere nisi aliqua sit in ipsis distinctio naturalis, sequitur ut partes intellegibilis speciei, si modo partes habet, tam invicem quam a toto naturali aliqua discrepent varietate.

9 Accedit et alia ratio. Nempe partes quae inter se et ad totum similes sunt omnino, quando totum aliquod mutuo congressu conficiunt, non aliter perficiunt totum, quam per numeri vel magnitudinis augmentum, quod in tritici granis et aquae guttis aspicimus. Ubi enim forma non variatur, et tamen aliqua intrinsecus fit mutatio, incrementum ibi quodammodo fit vel decrementum. Itaque illa mentis species, si talibus concrescit partibus, numerus aliquis erit, vel aliquid numerosum, aut cumulus, vel continuum aliquid. Ergo per illam numeros solum et numerosa aut magnitudines quasdam intellegemus sive figuras; eritque species ad imaginationem et phantasiam pertinens potius quam ad mentem.

10 Ex his concluditur formam intellegibilem in partes inter se similes minime dividi. Num forte secatur in partes dissimiles, sicut animalis corpus in ossa, carnes et nervos? Nullo modo. Nam per hanc formam mens quid rei substantia sit cognoscit, ut diximus. Substantia rei definitione maxime comprehenditur. Definitio genere constat et differentia, ut hominis definitio animali constat et rationali. Animal genus est per quod homo cum ceteris animalibus

parts from the whole. However the part qua part is logically different from the whole qua whole; and this is always affirmed by the judgment of the intellect, since the whole cannot be the part nor the part the whole. We must therefore, I believe, reject the notion that the parts of a divisible species are completely alike, principally on the grounds that, since the mind understands a thing's parts qua parts and the whole qua whole and distinguishes the whole from the parts, and that it could not truly distinguish unless some natural distinction existed among them, it follows that the parts of an intelligible species, were it to have parts, would differ both from each other and from the whole by some distinction in nature.

There is another reason as well. Parts which are completely like each other and like the whole, when by mutual aggregation they assemble some whole, perfect it only through an increase of number or size (as we see with grains of wheat or drops of water). For where the form does not change but nevertheless some kind of inner alteration occurs, the result in a way is increase or decrease. So this species of the mind, if it were aggregated from such parts, would be a number or some sort of plurality or an accumulation or a continuum. With it, therefore, we would understand only numbers and pluralities or certain magnitudes or figures: it would be a species pertaining more to the imagination and phantasy than to the mind. 9

This leads one to conclude that the intelligible form is not internally divided into similar parts. Is it perhaps divided into dissimilar parts, like an animal's body into bones, layers of flesh, and muscles? Certainly not. For, as we have already pointed out, it is by means of this form that the mind learns what the substance of a thing is. A thing's substance is understood first and foremost in its definition. The definition consists of genus and differentia, the definition of man for instance is that he is an animal and rational. Animal is the genus through which man shares the general charac- 10

communiter convenit. Rationale differentia per quam differt ab animalibus carentibus ratione. Quare si qua sit in ea forma diversitas partium, haec erit potissimum per genus et differentiam. Sint hae duae, si vis, intellegibilis formae partes; sint extensae per latitudinem corporalem. Quid hinc sequatur, audi.

11 Quia partes corporis dividi possunt in infinitum, idcirco una cum illis tam genus quam differentia absque fine secabitur, eruntque in definitione una innumerabilia genera et innumerabiles differentiae. Nec erit re vera definitio, quia non comprehendetur ab intellectu si infinita fuerit, neque suis finibus terminabitur[32] et, quod absurdius est, vel infinite eadem genera easdemque differentias replicabimus vel a genere resolvendo ascendemus in genus in infinitum, a differentia similiter dividendo descendemus in differentiam. Ascensus talis atque descensus impossibilis est, quia ratio vera tandem ad prima rerum genera et ultimas differentias pervenit, ultra quae non liceat progredi, siquidem substantia supremum genus est in homine, quod in genus aliud non resolvitur. Certa vero discurrendi potentia est ultima differentia, quam non licet in aliam differentiam coarctare. Auget errorem illum hoc prae ceteris, quod si genus et differentia in re aliqua sunt infinita, talia erunt effectu. Quae enim ad rei essentiam conducunt et ad ordinem pertinent naturalem effectu ac revera existunt in natura, non cogitatione finguntur humana. Esse autem multitudinem aliquam talem re ipsa sive effectu innumerabilem natura non patitur, praesertim in corpore. In quo tamen esset innumerabilis multitudo, si genera innumerabilia et innumerabiles differentiae per partes corporis pariter secarentur; totidem[33] namque essent etiam ipsius corporis portiones.

teristics of the rest of the animals. Being rational is the differentia which sets him apart from the animals lacking reason. So if any distinction of parts existed in that form, it would be first and foremost in terms of genus and differentia. Just suppose that these two are the parts of the intelligible form and that they are extended across the extent of the body. Attend to the consequences.

Since the parts of a body can be infinitely divisible, both genus and differentia would be split up infinitely with them, and in one single definition would be infinite genera and infinite differentiae. It would not be a real definition, because it could not be comprehended by the intellect if it were infinite, nor would it be limited by its own terms; and—what is even more absurd—we would either replicate to infinity the same genera and the same differentiae, or ascend by the process of resolution from genus to genus *ad infinitum,* or similarly descend by the process of division from differentia to differentia. Such an ascent and descent is impossible, because true reason must eventually arrive at the prime genera in objects and at the ultimate differentiae, beyond which one is not at liberty to proceed, since substance is the highest genus in man, and this cannot be resolved into another genus; but the ultimate differentia is a particular capacity for discursive thought, which cannot be narrowed down to another differentia. What preeminently compounds this error, however, is that if the genus and differentia in some object were infinite, such objects would effectively exist. For the things which contribute to the essence of an object and belong to the natural order and exist effectively and truly in nature are not figments of human thought. Nature however does not allow such an infinite plurality actually or effectively to exist, especially in body. Yet an infinite plurality would exist in body if infinite genera and infinite differentiae were equally distributed through the body's parts; for then there would be an equally infinite number of the body's parts too. 11

12 Rursus, percunctamur Epicureos, qui speciem dividunt in intellectu velut formam in corpore, et partem eius unam in una mentis parte locant, verbi causa genus in parte dextera mentis, differentiam vero sinistra: cur dextra pars potius congruat generi, differentiae vero sinistra? Nonne quaelibet pars mentis aeque mens est, ne ex partibus amentibus fiat mens? Quaelibet igitur particula mentis aeque utrumque tam genus quam differentiam respicit, ideo quaelibet capit utrumque. Quod si quaelibet ambo suscipit et in utraque sunt ambo, fit ut illa non sint invicem separata. Verum, ut Epicurei volunt, casus efficit ut duorum illorum alterum in dexteram cadat, alterum in sinistram. Sed respondeant nobis illi utrum sic deinde distincta permaneant, an invicem misceantur. Si dent primum, sequitur ut inde scientia non nascatur. Nulla enim fit definitio ex genere et differentia invicem separatis. In neutro illorum seorsum posito perfecta habetur de re ipsa scientia. Misceantur oportet in unum ut una scientia de re una ab una mente per definitionem unam in uno tempore possit haberi. Oportet profecto utrumque in tota mente esse ut vere intellegatur, nam quod in parte mentis est, nondum integre intellegitur. Actio enim rei totius est, non partis. Fateantur[34] ergo oportet illa[35] misceri.

13 Sed unde miscentur? Numquid casu vel mente? Casu inquiunt. Nimium hoc dictu nefas. Nam rarissima fieret mixtio talis, et quando fieret, tunc demum concederent illa sic unita incorporalia esse, quod ipsi volumus. Concedent denique illa a mente misceri. Ex hac concessione duo statim nos inferemus. Primum, mentem esse incorporalem, si acceptas formas ducit ad habitum incorporeum, quae sententia Epicureis adversatur. Secundum, mixtionem

Again, let us question the Epicureans who divide up the single species in the intellect like the form in the body, and locate one part of it in one part of the mind, the genus, for example, in the right part and the differentia in the left: let us ask them why should the right part be more suited to the genus and the left to the differentia? Surely every part of mind is equally mind, otherwise mind would be made up of parts lacking mind? Therefore every particle of mind pertains equally to genus and to differentia, and so receives both. If every part receives both and both are in each, then they are not separated from each other. But actually, the Epicureans claim, chance causes one of them to fall on the right part, the other on the left. But let them tell us whether the two then continue to remain distinct or do they intermingle? If they maintain the first, then it follows that they are not the source of knowledge. For no definition emerges when genus and differentia are separate from each other. Perfect knowledge of the object in question cannot exist in either of them when separated. They must be combined into one for a single mind to be able to have a single knowledge of a single object by means of a single definition at a single point in time. For each has to be present in the mind as a whole if each is to be truly understood, for what is in a part of the mind is not yet wholly understood. For action proceeds from the whole of something not from a part. The Epicureans must admit then that the two are intermingled. 12

But what causes the mixing? Is it the result of chance or mind? It is by chance, they say. But that is an impious assertion. For such a mixing would be extremely rare. And when it did happen they would then concede that the components joined in this way are incorporeal—and that is what we ourselves wish to prove—and concede at last that they are mixed by mind. From this concession we can immediately draw two conclusions: first that the mind is incorporeal if it leads the forms it receives into an incorporeal condition or habit—and this view is opposed by the Epicureans; and 13

illam a mente factam non aliter fore veram nisi in rebus ipsis talis quaedam sit unio. Quod enim a mente praeter naturam rerum fabricatur figmentum est potius quam scientia. Omnino autem oportet genera et differentias natura coniungi invicem vel disiungi, non mentis figmento vel situ. Si enim figmento mentis id fiat, erramus, non discimus. Si autem situ, ita ut genus in parte mentis dextra sit, differentia in sinistra, sane, quia licet menti communia haec resolvere, illa mens dividet. Per hanc ipsam divisionem modo corporeo secabuntur et dimidium generis unum in parte dimidia dextrae partis relinquetur, dimidium alterum relinquetur in altera. Idem accidet differentiae. Licebit partiri iterum. Hinc dilaniatio sequetur, non resolutio,[36] et dum communia discerpemus, scientiam disperdemus. Quod si per divisionem non lacerentur communia illa, sed genus in quavis sui parte supersit integrum, et similiter differentia, iam non erunt amplius corporalia, quia certa quantitate non indigent. Ac etiam innumerabilia genera totidemque differentias, qui ita secabit, inveniet. Atque horum multitudo non natura constabit, sed mentis machinatione nascetur.

14 Forsitan Epicurei, ut has obiectiones devitent, non dabunt amplius speciem illam intellegibilem ex genere differentiaque componi, sed partibus aliis. Nos autem quaeremus, numquid speciei pars, qualiscumque illa sit, a tota specie differat, necne? Si non differat, sane neque pars erit illa quae a toto non differt, sed erit totum, neque species illa erit composita, si nihilo differt a partibus, quia sic partium caret diversitate. Ergo differre speciei partem a specie fatebuntur. Nos autem ab illis, quomodo differat, sciscita-

second that this mixing brought about by the mind is not a true mixing unless such a union exists in the objects themselves. For what is invented by the mind over and beyond the nature of things is fiction rather than knowledge. But genera and differentiae must be either wholly mixed together or wholly separated in nature and not in a mental fiction or location. For if the mixing stems from a mental fiction, then we are erring and not learning. But if it comes from a mental location such that the genus is in the right part of the mind and the differentia in the left, then, since the mind is allowed to divide or resolve these general concepts, it will divide them. In this division they will be dissected in a corporeal way and one half of the genus will be permitted to remain in one half of the mind's right part, and the other half, in the other half. The same will happen with the differentia. Then further division will become possible. The result will be dismemberment not resolution: in tearing apart the general concepts, we will destroy knowledge. But if the general concepts are not torn apart through division but the genus remains in every part of itself complete, and the differentiae likewise, then they will no longer be corporeal, because they do not need any particular quantity. Certainly, anyone who is going to tear apart in this way will find innumerable genera and innumerable differentiae; and yet the multitude of these will not exist in nature, but be born from the mind's contrivance.

To avoid these objections the Epicureans perhaps will no longer grant that the intelligible species consists of genus and differentia, claiming instead that it comes from other parts. But we will inquire whether a part of a species, whatever it is, differs from the species as a whole or not. If it is does not differ, then obviously what does not differ from the whole will not be a part but the whole; and the species will not be compounded if it does not differ from its parts, since in this case it will contain no diversity of parts. So they will confess that a part of the species differs from the species. But we will inquire of them in what way does it differ. 14

bimur. Si non tamquam genus differentiave a specie, ut ostendimus, num saltem tamquam a specie species, ceu a colore figura? Sed hoc admitti non potest. Non est enim species talis intra speciem. Non continetur sub colore figura. Pars tamen intra totum est et continetur ab illo.

15 Forsitan ut speciem illam conceptionemque mentis habere partes convincant quae sub illa contineantur, ad numeros confugient atque inferent speciem a suis partibus discrepare, sicut quattuor a duobus, ab uno duo. Nos autem, licet id supra confutaverimus, rursus tamen ita refellimus. An volunt partes illas speciei conceptionisque quam scientiam vocant esse scientias? Si nolunt, creabunt scientiam ex inscitiis, ac si albedinem constituerent[37] ex figuris.[38] Si volunt, sic eos arguimus. Constat apud philosophos quamlibet scientiam habere obiectum suum in quo versatur, quod scitum vocant. Declarent nobis isti, siquidem scientiae illae quae sunt unius scientiae partes obiecto carere non debent, numquid idem sit scitum[39] proprium cuiusque illarum atque totius an aliud. Si idem esse respondeant, tunc nulla illarum pars erit, sed unaquaeque totum, postquam aequatur toti. Ubi enim aequantur obiecta, scientiae quoque aequantur. Sin aliud fateantur, rursus id sequetur absurdum, quod scientia ipsa totius sciti[40] praeter partium scientiam erit, neque ex partium cognitione cognoscetur totum, ubi non concurrunt scientiae singulae in scientiam universam.

16 Verum sic iterum procedamus. Mens ut plurimum intellegit rationem ipsam rerum et unam et universalem, ut puta, bonitatem

If it does not differ as the genus or differentia differ from the species, as we have demonstrated, then does it at least differ as one species differs from another or as color from shape? But this is inadmissible. For such a species is not within the species; nor is shape included under color. Yet the part exists within the whole and is contained by it.

15 To prove that this species and conception of the mind has parts which are included under it, they will perhaps resort to numbers and infer that the species differs from its parts as four does from two or two from one. Despite our having refuted this point above, we will do so again as follows. Do they wish the parts of the species and conception which they call knowledge to be themselves branches of knowledge? If they do not, they will be creating knowledge out of things without knowledge, as though they were fashioning whiteness out of shapes. If they do, then we will deploy the following argument against them. Philosophers are generally agreed that every branch of knowledge has its own object with which it is concerned, and this they call the thing known. Now let our adversaries tell us, given that the branches of knowledge that are parts of one knowledge ought not to lack an object, whether the proper object of each of the branches of knowledge is the same as, or different from, that of the whole of knowledge. If they retort that it is the same, then none of the branches will be a part, but each will be the whole since it is equal to the whole. For when their objects are equal, then the branches of knowledge are equal too. But if they say the proper object is different, then the same absurdity follows, for the knowledge itself of the whole of the thing known will be beyond the knowledge of the parts. The whole will not be known from knowing the parts when the individual branches of knowledge do not concur in a whole or universal knowledge.

16 But let us take up the question again. Mind for the most part understands that a rational principle of things is one and univer-

ipsam, multis bonis aeque communem. Ratio huiusmodi, quantum una et universalis est, est et simplex. Ratio quoque dei sive angeli, quotiens vere cognoscitur, tamquam indivisibilis iudicatur. Hae rationes essentiae intellegibiles appellantur; eas nostra mens numquam cognosceret, nisi formas earum haberet in se velut imagines. Nam si cognoscendo agit aliquid, nec agit nisi sit actu, nec agit aliter quam actu sit. Actu vero fit per formam; numquam essentias contemplatur, nisi earumdem formis ornetur. Formae tales, licet quandoque intellegibiles appellentur, proprius tamen intellectuales dici debent; essentiae vero intellegibiles. Haec enim est veterum Platonicorum consuetudo. Si forma quaedam talis, essentiae talis imago in nostra mente, spargatur in partes, tunc partes illae aut ita se habent ut nulla illarum essentiam ipsam respiciat, aut alia respiciat quidem sed non alia, aut omnes. Si primum detur, tunc forma illa tota essentiam nullo modo respiciet, cum nullus sit respectus in partibus. Sicut enim tota forma constat ex partibus, sic totius respectus ex partium respectibus congregatur. Quod si nullo pacto essentiam aspicit, non erit eius imago, neque ad eius intellegentiam conferet. Si detur secundum, pars quae non respicit essentiam, nihil attinet ad intellectualem formam, postquam ad essentiam non spectat intellegibilem. Si autem tertium concedatur, statim interrogabimus utrum quaeque pars eundem habeat aspectum, an aliae potius alium. Si eundem habere respondeantur et habere eundem non possunt aliter quam si quaeque referat essentiam totam, profecto nulla earum pars formae intellectualis erit, sed quaelibet erit tota. Una ad cognoscendum sufficiet, supererunt aliae, quae etiam innumerabiles erunt actu, si corporis divisione secantur, et conducunt ad actionem. Si autem aspectum

sal, just as goodness itself is common to many good things. In that it is one and universal, such a rational principle is also simple. The rational principle of God or angel, whenever it is truly known, is adjudged as indivisible. These rational principles are called intelligible essences, and our mind would never know them if it did not have their forms in itself as images. For if in knowing mind acts at all, it neither acts unless it is in act, nor acts in any way other than in act. But it is brought into act by form: it never contemplates the essences unless it is adorned with the forms of these same essences. Such forms, though they are sometimes called intelligible, ought more properly to be called intellectual and the essences called intelligible.[15] For this was the practice of the ancient Platonists. If an intellectual form, the image in our mind of an intelligible essence, is split into parts, then those parts are such that either none of the parts regards the essence itself, or one part does indeed regard it but not another part, or all of them do. If we grant the first alternative, then the form as a whole will not regard the essence in any way, since in the parts there is no regarding it. For just as the whole form consists of parts, so the regard of the whole is aggregated from the [separate] regards of the parts. But if the form does not look to the essence, then it will not be its image, nor contribute to [our] understanding of it. If we grant the second alternative, the part that does not regard the essence will never attain the intellectual form because it is not looking at the intelligible essence. If we grant the third alternative, we shall immediately ask whether each part has the same view or different parts have a different view. If the answer is that they have same view, and if they cannot have the same view unless each part turns back to the whole essence, then obviously none of them will be just a part of the intellectual form but each and every one will be the whole form. One of the parts will be sufficient for understanding; the rest will be superfluous and even be infinite in act if they are split up by the body's division and contribute to action. But if different

habeant alium atque alium, nec aliter hoc fieri potest quam si partes singulae formae totidem aspiciant[41] essentiae partes, quandoquidem intellectuale intellegibili oportet aequari, sequitur ut essentiae illa sit divisibilis, quam tamen ratio vero esse simplicem concludebat. Neque posset simplicem iudicare nisi aspectu simplici eam intueretur. Multiplici autem aspectu partium diversarum multiplicem iudicaret.

17 Opinamur autem eos in hunc errorem propterea incidisse quod scientias nonnullas in rebus compositis versari considerabant. Qualis est scientia de homine, qui ex animali rationalique componitur, tamquam genere suo et differentia. Qualis est scientia de septenario et denario numerisque aliis qui ex numeris vel unitatibus congregantur. Nos autem putamus hominem, quantum homo est, unum quid esse et simplex, quia una eius est forma. Huius signum est, quod in plures homines non dividitur. Sive enim secundum speciem dividas ipsum in genus et differentiam, neutrum illorum homo est, sive secundum singula in caput, pectus et femur, illorum nihil est homo. Corpus quidem secas, quia discerpis in membra quae corpora sunt; non secas hominem, quia non secas in homines. Quod autem tale quiddam est in se ipso, et in plura talia non dividitur, illud certe quantum est tale, individuum est et simplex. Denarius quoque, quantum est[42] denarius, non dividitur, nam una species est dumtaxat et una forma quam in plures denarios partiri non possumus. Quod si partiamur, numerum quidem partimur, quia partimur in numeros; denarium non partimur, quia non distribuimus in denarios. Neque obstat quod in specie genus et differentia videatur includi. Non enim in ea sunt duae formae, sed una. Nam licet aliud sit in rerum ordine animal esse, aliud esse rationale, in homine tamen est idem et, ut platonice loquar, ipsa

parts have different views, and the only way this can happen is if the form's individual parts view the essence's corresponding parts (seeing that the intellectual must be equal to the intelligible), then it follows that the essence is divisible, whereas true reasoning has concluded it is simple. True reasoning could not adjudge the essence simple if it did not view it with a simple glance. With the multiple glance of the various parts, however, it would adjudge it multiple.

We believe that the Epicureans fell into this error because of 17 their view that some branches of knowledge are concerned with composite objects. An example would be the knowledge of man, who is compounded of animal and rational as his genus and differentia; or the knowledge of the number seven and the number ten and other numbers which are compounded from numbers or units. It is our view however that man qua man is something one and simple, since his form is one. The proof of this is that man cannot be divided into many men. For if you divide man by species into genus and differentia, neither of them is man; on the other hand, if you divide man by parts into head, chest, thigh, none of these is man. You are cutting up the body, because you are chopping it into limbs which are in fact bodies, but you are not cutting up man, because you are not cutting man into men. But what is such and such in itself, and is not divided into a number of such, is clearly, insofar as it is such, simple and indivisible. The number ten as such is not divisible, for it is a single species and a single form which we cannot divide into many tens. If we do divide it, we are dividing a number because we are dividing into numbers; but we are not dividing ten because we are not dividing it into tens. The fact that genus and differentia seem to be included in the species does not constitute an objection to this. For there are not two forms in the species but one. For although to be an animal is one thing in the order of things, to be rational another, yet in man it is the same, and, to put it Platonically, man's

hominis natura rationalitas quaedam est. Rationalitas autem nihil est in homine aliud, quam animalitas ipsa in actum rationis educta. Talis autem forma simplex, esse simplicis fundamentum, species est quae non dispertit[43] se ipsam in singulos homines, sed totam singulis se communicat. Per hanc singuli unum sunt; differunt autem per alia quae extrinsecus adiacent, ad speciem minime pertinentia. Quod quidem speciei simplicitatem significat, quae ex eo quoque non parum significatur, quod species magis minusve non suscipit et in quodam certo consistit gradu naturae, cui nihil addi potest, nihil demi, quin species ipsa mutetur.

18 Testantur hoc species numerorum. Septenarius species quaedam est numeri. Adiunge huic unum, novam creabis speciem, scilicet octonarium. Subtrahe unum, senarium habes, novam rursus numeri speciem. Quoniam vero scientia non de singulis vel generibus proprie, sed de speciebus habetur (singula enim quia innumerabilia sunt mutanturque, neque comprehenduntur neque firma tenentur; genera vero propter confusionem in se perfecte non discernuntur) — quoniam, inquam, de speciebus scientia est, species vero sunt simplices, scientia quoque illarum est simplex, si modo scientia veritatis adeptio est. Veritas autem est rerum cum mentibus adaequatio. Neque nos turbet aut multitudo vocabulorum aut cogitationum multiplicium varietas, ex quibus conflari scientia forte videtur. Praeparationes quidem hae sunt ad scientiam sive pedissequae. Scientia actus est unicus sive habitus. Actus[44] inquam, simplex simplicis formae, individuus individuae veritatis intuitus, subitum intellegentiae lumen.

19 Sed ex hoc eorum error evidentius redarguitur, quod multae sunt scientiae de rebus procul dubio individuis. Quis enim dividat unitatem? Quis item simplicitatem et puritatem? Quis dividat esse

nature is a certain rationality. But rationality in man is nothing other than "animalness" itself led forth into the act of reason. But such a simple form as this, the basis of a simple being, is a species which does not divide itself up into individual men, but communicates itself to them individually as a whole. Through this species the individuals are one, but they differ through other, external accretions which have nothing to do with the species. This shows the species' simplicity. Another, not unimportant demonstration of this simplicity is that the species does not admit of more or less and has a fixed place in the order of nature where nothing can be added to it and nothing taken away without the species itself changing.

The species of numbers are evidence of this. Seven is a species 18 of number. Add one to this and you create a new species, namely eight. Take one away and you have six, again a new species of number. But since knowledge properly is not of individuals or genera but of the species (for individuals, being innumerable and changeable, are neither understood nor grasped as certainties, and genera, because of the confusion in themselves, are not perfectly distinguished) — since, I say, knowledge is of the species and the species are simple, then the knowledge of them is also simple if knowledge is in any way the acquisition of truth. But truth is the equating of things with minds.[16] Neither the multitude of words nor the variety and number of thoughts from which it seems knowledge is perhaps produced ought to trouble us. These are the preparations for or attendants on knowledge. Knowledge is a unitary act or habit, the simple act of a simple form, the undivided intuition of the undivided truth, the sudden light of the understanding.

The error of the Epicureans is manifestly refuted by the fact 19 that there are many branches of knowledge about things which are indisputably indivisible. Who for instance can divide unity? or

ipsum simpliciter? Porro quicquid dividimus, in partes dividimus toto priores. Haec vero ex nullis partibus praecedentibus componuntur. Hominem quippe in animal et rationale resolvimus, animal in corpus et sentiendi naturam, corpus in substantiam et quantitatem, substantiam in esse et sufficientiam subsistendi. Esse vero ipsum in quas partes resolvamus ignoro, nisi forte in unitatem et multitudinem Plotinus Proclusque resolvant; at vero unitatem ipsam ulterius non resolvent. Nemo unitatem resolvet in numeros, nemo punctum in magnitudines, nemo formam rei ultimam in aliam formam, aut primam materiam in materiam, nullus denique simplices illos mentis nostrae conceptus, qui de scientiarum principiis semper intra nos lucent, in conceptus aut notiores referet aut priores. Ubi resolutio cessat, cessat divisio, ubi divisio desinit, perfecta simplicitas possidetur.

Quamobrem concludendum est primos conceptus mentis simplices esse et illa quae inde noscuntur, partim talia esse ut, quamvis dividi videantur, ea tamen ratione noscantur qua minime dividuntur, ideoque notionem eorum esse indivisibilem, partim esse talia, ut penitus simplicia sint, et propterea simplicem esse eorum perceptionem, si modo intellegentia rebus intellectis aequatur. Si conceptus, notio, perceptio simplices sunt, formae quoque intellegibiles unde nascuntur ista sunt simplices. Si ita est, mens quoque est simplex, quae simplicium est subiectum. Et quoniam quo quid simplicius est, eo est magis indissolubile, mensque summum simplicitatis attingit gradum, ut diximus, in cognoscendo, summum quoque gradum naturae indissolubilis assequitur in vivendo. Intellegentia enim est vitae reflexio in se ipsam. Ideo si per intellegentiam quae vitam sequitur, simplicitatem summam attingit quae

simplicity and purity? Who can divide simple being? Whatever we divide, moreover, we divide into parts prior to the whole. But these indivisible things are not made from any prior parts at all. We resolve[17] man into animal and rational, animal into body and sentiency, body into substance and quantity, substance into being and a sufficiency for subsisting. But I really have no idea into what parts we can resolve being itself into, unless perchance Plotinus and Proclus would resolve it into unity and the many; but in fact they cannot resolve unity itself any further. Nobody can resolve unity into numbers, or resolve a point into magnitudes, or the ultimate form of an object into another form, or prime matter into [other forms of] matter. And nobody can take those simple concepts of our mind, which shed light unceasingly on the principles of the branches of knowledge among us, and refer them to better known or prior concepts. When resolution stops, division stops, and when division stops, perfect simplicity is attained.

We should therefore conclude that the prime concepts of the mind are simple, and that the things which are learned from them are partly such that, although they may appear to be divided, nonetheless they are recognized by the reason as if they were not divided and therefore our notion of them is indivisible; and partly such that they are absolutely simple, and therefore our perception of them is simple, if only our understanding is matched or equated with the things known.[18] If concept, notion, and perception are all simple, then the intelligible forms whence they are born are also simple. If this is so, then the mind too is simple, being the subject of such simple forms. And because the simpler a thing is the more indivisible it is, and since the mind attains the highest level of simplicity, as we said, in knowing, then it also attains the highest level of indivisibility in living. For understanding is the turning back of life upon itself. Thus, if through understanding, which succeeds life, the mind attains the highest level of simplicity, which precedes 20

naturam antecedit indissolubilem, multo magis per vitam intellegentia priorem assequitur indissolubilem gradum simplicitate ipsa posteriorem.

: V :

Quinta ratio: si mens est corpus, tangendo intellegit et currendo.

1 Si mens est corpus aut forma diffusa per[45] corporis magnitudinem, duo quaedam in se habet, ut alias indicavimus, punctum videlicet et latitudinem, atque eisdem conditionibus mancipatur quibus et corpus. Ideo non aliter res intellegendas comprehendet quam tangendo illas, seque per illas amplificando, et instar corporis transcurrendo. Aut igitur tangere dicetur puncto solo[46] ut intellegat aut sola latitudine aut utrisque. Si solo utitur puncto et ad cognoscendum indiget tactu,[47] rerum magnitudines non cognoscet, quippe per punctum puncta attingit, non magnitudines. Atqui etiam si attingeret, numquam tamen totum[48] aut totas eas agnosceret,[49] nam puncta in eo sunt infinita, infinita quoque in magnitudine. Illorum omnium cumulus est intellectus; horum quodammodo cumulus est magnitudo. Infinita pertransire non licet. Ergo neque mens ipsa tota intelleget umquam nec totam intelleget magnitudinem. Igitur non solo utitur puncto.

2 Num sola utitur latitudine ad tangendum? Nequaquam. Sola namque illa cognosceret quae latitudine ipsa tanguntur. Haec vero ea sunt tantum quae et ipsa latitudine distenduntur. Nunc autem praeter haec alia multa cognoscimus. Confugient ad hoc nonnulli,

indivisibility, then *a fortiori* it attains through life, which precedes understanding, the level of indivisibility which succeeds simplicity itself.

: V :

Fifth proof: if mind is body, then it understands by making contact and moving around.

If mind is body or is form spread through the body's magnitude, then it has two aspects, as we indicated elsewhere, point and extension; and it is enslaved to the same conditions as body. So the only way it will understand intelligible objects will be by contacting them and by spreading itself through and traversing them after the fashion of a body. To understand them, therefore, it makes contact, we will say, either by a point alone, or by extension alone, or by both. If it uses a point only and it needs contact for knowing, it will not know the magnitudes of things; for it is making contact through a point with points, not with magnitudes. Even if it did make contact with magnitude, it would never get to know the whole or the wholes; for points are infinite in a whole and infinite also in a magnitude. The accumulation of all the points is intellect, but the accumulation of the magnitudes is in a way magnitude. It is impossible to traverse infinite points. So the whole mind will never understand, and it will never understand the whole magnitude. Therefore it does not use a point alone. 1

Well then, does it use its extension only for making contact? Certainly not. For it would only know things contacted by its extension. But these are only the things which are extended in its extension. In reality, however, we know many other things besides these. Some will have recourse to arguing that the mind uses both 2

ut mentem confiteantur ambobus uti ad cognoscendum: puncto quidem ad simplicia, ad alia latitudine. Verisimile istud apparet, non tamen est verum. Primo quidem per punctum simplicia illa attinget solum quae corpori applicantur ut punctum; formas vero solutas aut numeros non attinget. Deinde per latitudinem suam percurret totam cognoscendi corporis magnitudinem, ut intellegat totam. Non potest autem latitudo aliqua totum aliquod transcurrere spatium magnitudinis, nisi qualibet sui parte in longum quamlibet spatii illius percurrat partem. Ergo mens singulas ipsius partes cuique parti corporis cognoscendi discurrendo per ordinem admovebit, admovendo cognoscet. Admovebit autem partes quodammodo infinitas. Tot enim partes mens habebit, si latitudo corporalis exstiterit. Itaque brevi tempore quasi innumerabiliter quamlibet illius corporis portionem intelleget, et ipsum corpus secundum particulas paene infinitas innumerabiliter cognitas, infinitis, ut ita loquar, vicibus innumere apprehendet.

3 Sed hanc argumentationem nobili quadam Plotini nostri sententia breviter concludamus. Quaecumque intelleguntur aut sua natura simplicia sunt aut saltem, dum per resolutionem simplicia fiunt, intelleguntur. Quia vero individua solis individuis capiuntur,[50] vis illa in nobis quae capit talia est individua. Si ergo mens esse dicitur corporalis, non tamen latitudine sua capiet illa, sed aliquo potius impartibili. Si solo hoc capit, solo intellegit. Solum igitur hoc eius impartibile revera mens erit. Quid reliquis opus est partibus, ut sit intellectus, quando non opus est aliis ad intellegendum, postquam unum illud impartibile sufficit? Unum igitur hoc mens est. Hoc retine; segrega cetera: mentem simplicem es adeptus.

4 Cuius simplicitas etiam hinc apparet, quod accipit sine longitudine punctum, sine latitudine lineam, superficiem sine profun-

for knowing: a point for simple things, extension for the rest. This may seem plausible but it is not true. In the first place, through a point it will only contact simple objects which are attached to the body like a point: it will not make contact with independent forms or numbers. Secondly, through its extension the mind will traverse the entire magnitude of the body in order to know it completely. But any extension cannot traverse the full extent, whatever it is, of some magnitude unless, with every part of itself, it fully traverses every part of that extent. So the mind will conduct its own individual parts toward each part of the body it wants to know by traversing them in order, and, in so doing, it will come to know them. But it will be conducting parts which are more or less infinite. For the mind will have infinite parts if it exists as a corporeal extension. So it will understand, measurelessly as it were, every portion of that body in an instant. And it will apprehend the body itself according to the almost infinite particles known in this measureless way, and apprehend it measurelessly, in infinite changing conditions as it were.

Let us briefly conclude this discussion with a notable opinion of our Plotinus.[19] All things understood are either naturally simple or at least understood when they are made simple through the process of resolution. But since indivisibles are only grasped by indivisibles, the power in us which grasps such indivisible things is indivisible. So if the mind is held to be corporeal, it will grasp them not with its corporeal extension but rather with something indivisible. If it grasps them with this alone, it understands them with this alone. So only this indivisible part of it will truly be mind. To be the intellect why require other parts, when others are not needed for understanding, since that one indivisible part is enough? So this one part is the mind. Hold onto it and set the rest aside: you have attained the mind in its simplicity. 3

The simplicity of the mind is also evident from the fact that it understands the point without length, the line without breadth, 4

ditate, numeros absque situ, pulchritudinem sine turpitudinis mixtione. Sic enim seorsum ista discernit considerando, neque considerat aliter quam accipiat. Forma vero corporalis non omnino sic accipit ista seorsum. Si animum esse simplicem individuumque illud liquido ostendit, quod simplicia et individua comprehendit, multo liquidius hoc declarat, quod quaecumque secundum se simplicia vel individua forent, et tamen quia cum aliis iunguntur, composita dividuaque evadunt, animus segregat ab oppositis redditque simplicia prorsus et individua. Non posset autem illis restituere simplicem individuamque naturam nisi ipse esset simplex et individuus. Denique si infectis restituit puritatem, ipse est extra et super infectionem.

: VI :

Sexta ratio: intellectus accipit secundum se totum quicquid capit; quod non faciet, si fuerit corporalis.

1 Nullum corpus aliquid in se continet, nisi per eam quantitatis adaequationem, per quam se toto totam rem comprehendat, partem vero parte atque maiore sui parte maiorem rei contentae partem, minore minorem. Intellectus non[51] hoc pacto res ipsas capit, nam se toto capit quicquid accipit. Eodem quippe modo capit quo intellegit. Intellegit autem se toto quicquid intellegit.

2 Nempe si quis dixerit intellectum duas partes corporales habere, quarum una quidem capiat rem et intellegat, alia minime, re-

the surface without depth, numbers without place, beauty without any taint of ugliness. For in its consideration it discerns them thus separately; and it does not consider them in any way other than it receives them. But corporeal form does not receive these things separately at all. If the rational soul's simplicity and indivisibility is clearly shown by the fact that it understands things that are simple and indivisible, then it is shown even more clearly by the fact that it takes things which in themselves would be simple and indivisible and yet being joined with others emerge as composite and divided, and separates them from their opposites, restoring them again to their utter simplicity and indivisibility. But it would not be able to restore their simple and indivisible nature to them unless it was simple and indivisible itself. Finally, if it restores purity to what are polluted, it is itself above and beyond pollution.

: VI :

Sixth proof: intellect receives whatever it receives in accordance with its whole self; it would not do this if it were corporeal.

No body contains something in itself except by way of being adequately adapted for quantity by virtue of which it can include the whole object in the whole of itself: a part in a part, a larger part of the included thing in a larger part of itself, a smaller part in a smaller. This is not the way in which the intellect takes hold of things; for whatever it receives it grasps with its whole self.[20] And it grasps in the same way it understands. But it understands whatever it understands with its whole self. 1

Suppose someone were to say that the intellect has two corporeal parts, one of which grasps a thing and understands it, the 2

darguemus eum, asseverantes intellectum revera esse partem illam quae rem capit atque intellegit, siquidem ab intellegendo dicitur intellectus; illam vero quae non intellegit, intellectum non esse. Quapropter natura illa quae revera intellectus est, se tota rem quamlibet intellegendam capit atque cognoscit. Quando ergo intellegit hominis corpus, intellegit et corporis illius membra: se toto cognoscit totum corpus humanum; se toto cognoscit quodlibet eius membrum. Nam qui membrum quodlibet ad quodlibet comparat et membra quaelibet ad totum refert, necesse est ut idem tam singula membra cognoscat quam corpus totum. Neque duas ponere debes partes in intellectu, quarum una unum cognoscat membrum, altera alterum. Per neutram enim[52] illarum posset illa comparatio fieri.

3 Si ut cognoscit, ita et capit, se certe toto capit tam totum corpus quam membra corporis singula. Nullum vero corpus nullaque forma corporea hoc pacto potest aliquid capere, neque potest corpus unum omnibus pariter aequari corporibus. Quomodo corpus canis corpori formicae, equi, elephantis, solis aequabitur? Mens autem corporibus omnibus tam maximis quam minimis pariter adaequatur, cum omnia intellegendo similiter comprehendat. Neque iis solum, verum etiam quodammodo summae se aequat aequalitati, dum res omnes minus magisve aequales per accessum ad aequalitatem summam recte metitur. Ubi mens inter res quaslibet aequalitatis ipsius participes et ipsam aequalitatem se inserit mediam. Quod si summae aequalitati proxime adaequatur, nulla inaequalium qualitatum iniquitate pulsatur.

other of which does not, then we would refute him by insisting that the intellect is really the part that grasps and understands, since from understanding it is called the intellect; but the part that does not understand is not the intellect. So that nature which is truly intellect grasps anything to be understood and comes to know it with its whole self. Thus when it understands the human body, it understands too the members of that body: it comes to know the whole body with its whole self and it comes to know each of the body's parts with its whole self. For he who compares one member to another or any member to the whole must have knowledge of the individual members and the whole body alike. Nor should you posit two parts to the intellect, one to know one member, the other another. For via neither of these parts could that comparison be made.

If the mind grasps a thing in the same ways as it knows it, then 3 clearly it grasps the whole body with the whole of itself as well as the body's individual members. But no body and no corporeal form can grasp anything in this way; nor can any one body measure up to all other bodies. How will the body of a dog measure up against that of an ant, a horse, an elephant, the sun? The mind on the other hand does measure up to all bodies, the largest and the smallest equally, since it includes all alike in its understanding. And besides measuring up to them, it is even in a sense equal to absolute equality when, through its access to absolute equality, it correctly measures all things as more or less equal. Mind is here inserting itself as intermediary between everything that participates in equality itself and absolute equality. But if it comes closest to equalling absolute equality, it is not at all disturbed by the inequality of unequal qualities.

: VII :

Septima ratio: intellectus accipiendo rerum formas non amittit suam, corpora contra.

1 Solent corpora quando corporum aliorum formas accipiunt, suas amittere. Quomodo enim aqua igneam caliditatem induet, nisi frigiditatem suam exuerit? Quod si quando aliena accepta remanet etiam propria, fit imperfectior, ut quando remanet dulcedo in vino, etiam aqua illi infusa fit dulcis, sapor inde debilior. Mens autem rerum omnium accipit formas, dum omnes agnoscit et cognitas in se ipsa volutat; neque illas accipiendo formam propriam amittit aut debilitat. Quippe cum ex operatione semper cuiusque formae habitus designetur atque operatio intellectus intellegentia sit, sequitur ut forma intellectus sit ipsa, ut ita dixerim, intellectualitas naturalis, quae tunc perfecta maxime iudicatur quando operatio eius, intellegentia, perfectissima est. Haec autem tanto est perfectior quanto plures rerum formas attingit. Sublimior enim fit, velocior et lucidior.

2 Quamobrem intellectus, corporum omnium formas accipiendo, non modo non amittit aut non remittit suam, sed (quod est contra naturam corporis) summopere perficit. Penetrat eorum substantias et cuncta in singulis conspicit, dum in simplicibus per compositionem videt mixta, in mixtis per resolutionem simplicia intuetur. Ergo mens ita esse videtur in omnibus, ut in singulis ipsa sit cuncta. Rursus, est extra et supra omnia corporalia, alioquin non posset haec ab incorporeis secernere et illa ab iis discernere. Si est

: VII :

Seventh proof: intellect does not lose its own form when it receives the forms of objects; the opposite is true of bodies.

It is normal for bodies when they take on the forms of other bodies to lose their own. For how will water assume the heat of fire unless it lays aside its own coldness? And if ever, having accepted an alien form, its own form also remains, it becomes very imperfect, as when the sweetness remains in a wine after water has been added to it and itself becomes sweet, but the resulting taste is very bland. But the mind receives the forms of all objects when it understands them all and ponders in itself the forms it understands. But by receiving them it does not lose or weaken its own form. Since the habit of any form is always indicated by its activity, and since the activity of the intellect is understanding, it follows that the form of intellect is itself a natural intellectuality — if I may use the expression — which is judged to have reached its full perfection when its activity, understanding, is at its most perfect. The more the forms understanding attains to, the more perfect it is, for it becomes loftier, swifter, and brighter. 1

So the intellect, in receiving the forms of all bodies, not only does not lose or weaken its hold on its own form, it actually brings it to full perfection — which is the contrary to the nature of the body.[21] It penetrates into their substances and sees all things in each individual thing when by way of composition it sees things mixed in things simple, and by way of resolution things simple in things mixed.[22] Thus the mind appears to be in all things such that it is all things in each individual thing. Again, it is above and beyond all things corporeal, otherwise it would not be able to distinguish them from things incorporeal and distinguish the incor- 2

in omnibus corporalibus omnia,[53] atque etiam extra omnia, omnibus imperat per naturam. Quapropter nullius corporis violentia e suo statu deiicitur.

: VIII :

Octava ratio: forma est in mente universalis; talis in corpore esse non potest.

1 Corpus et forma per corpus extensa adeo, ut ita loquar, materialia sunt ac particulari situi temporique astricta, ut universalem vim nullam habeant. Quo enim quid corporali materiae propinquat, magis eo angustius est; quo discedit longius, eo fit amplius. Quamobrem si intellectus esset corpus vel forma diffusa per ipsum, formae omnes ab eo susceptae, etiam si in se ipsis essent universales, in eo saltem particulares omnino materialesque evaderent. Nam formae in subiecto, quod est astrictum materiae passionibus, nullam vim retinent ad universale quicquam repraesentandum. Ita intellectus quicquid cogitaret, per formam materialem singularibusque conditionibus astrictam excogitaret. Cum vero operatio rei cuiusque formam rei operantis sequatur, intellectus per talem formam operans, id est excogitans, singulariter solum operaretur. Qualis autem operatio est, tale semper est opus. Ideo intellectus singulariter cogitans, sola singularia cogitaret neque commune quicquam et universale cognosceret. Unum quidem hominem, puta Socratem vel Platonem, in se revolveret; humanam vero naturam illis aeque communem minime. Neque regulam in moribus et artibus ad plura universalem statueret, neque legem conderet umquam multos hominum actus respicientem.

poreal from them. If it is all things in all things corporeal, and is also beyond all things, it must naturally rule over them all. Thus it cannot be dislodged from its habitual condition by the violence of any body.

: VIII :

Eighth proof: form in mind is universal; such cannot exist in body.

Body and form that is extended through body are so material and so much restricted to a particular place and time that they have no universal power. The closer a thing gets to corporeal matter, the more restricted it is; the further away it gets, the ampler it becomes. So if intellect were body or form diffused through body, all the forms received by it, even if in themselves they were universal, in it would turn out at least to be completely particular and material. For forms contained within a subject that is tied to the passivities of matter retain no capacity for representing anything universal. Thus whatever the intellect thinks it would think in terms of a material form, limited to particular conditions. But since each thing's activity follows on the form of the thing doing the acting, the intellect acting through such a form (that is, thinking) would only think in terms of particulars. But the character of the activity always determines the result. So intellect, thinking in terms of particulars, would be thinking about particulars alone and have no knowledge of anything general and universal. It would ponder one particular man, say Socrates or Plato, but not the human nature equally common to them both. It would not establish a general overall rule for moral conduct or the arts, and never establish a law governing men's many activities.[23] 1

2 Si mens etiam sine electione et usu quotidie in se ipsa formas parit universales, fit ut ipsa fons earum naturalis sit et receptaculum naturale. Formae huiusmodi propriae alicui materiae minime astringuntur. Neque mens igitur materiae alligatur, neque corrumpetur umquam. Corruptio enim ex materiae insidiis provenit.

: IX :

Nona ratio: mentes se invicem complectuntur; corpora nequaquam.

1 Duo corporea se invicem mutuis amplexibus continere non possunt. Quod enim per quantitatem aliud continet, maius est illo quod continetur. Non potest autem unum corpus alio quodam uno corpore amplius esse simul atque angustius. Sic Saturni sphaera Iovis sphaeram ambit et continet, non e converso. Alia vero mens aliam continet et ab eadem pariter continetur. Mens quidem mea tuam considerat, tua meam. Itaque nostrae mentes se invicem considerando vicissim se capiunt, capiendo intellegunt, complectuntur intellegendo. Et quod maius est, una mens amplectitur omnes, quando mentium omnium naturam[54] considerat. Quare si quaeque mens mentem quamlibet intuetur, quod potest quidem si animadvertat, quavis mente mens quaelibet clauditur. Non potest autem quodlibet corpus quolibet corpore claudi.

2 Si quaelibet rerum species est immortalis, consequens est ut singularis substantia quae speciei suae se ipsam aequat, sit immortalis. Mens autem quaelibet quaslibet, si contingat, introspicit, et

If the mind gives birth to universal forms in itself every day even without choosing to and without practice, it must be their natural source and natural receptacle. Such universal forms are not attached to any particular matter of their own. Neither is the mind then tied to matter, nor is it ever corrupted; for corruption results from being ambushed by matter. 2

: IX :

Ninth proof: minds mutually embrace each other but bodies do not.

Two corporeal objects cannot contain each other in a mutual embrace. For what contains another quantitatively must be larger than what is contained. But no one body can simultaneously be both larger and smaller than another single body. The sphere of Saturn surrounds and contains the sphere of Jupiter but not the reverse. But one mind does contain another mind and is equally contained by it. My mind thinks about yours, yours about mine. So our minds, in thinking mutually about each other, grasp each other in turn; and in doing so they understand, and in understanding, enfold.[24] And more importantly, a single mind embraces all minds when it thinks about the nature of all minds. So, if each mind gazes upon any mind (which in fact it can do if it focuses its attention), then any mind at all is encompassed by any other mind. But for any body at all to be encompassed by any other body is impossible. 1

If any species of things at all is immortal, it follows that a particular substance that compares or equates itself[25] to its own species must be immortal. But any mind looks within, peradventure, at other minds; and it sees in the individual minds the species of 2

in singulis cunctarum conspicit speciem, ubi suae speciei per actum reflexum, qui cognitio est, se aequat. Ergo et per actum rectum, qui est vita, prius se aequavit eidem. Si ita est, sequitur ut vel quaelibet mens semper fuerit futurave sit, sicut ipsa mentium species, vel saltem futura sit semper ut illa.

: X :

Decima ratio: mens per omnia corpora operatur et supra corpora.

1 Quoniam forma operandi principium est, res quaeque secundum genus suum agit. Ex quo omnia prolem sibi similem, modo possint, in specie generant, ultra vero genus suum nihil agit. Sed neque etiam haec inferiora ultra speciem operantur (numquam enim canis generat ovem) et multo minus aliquid supra suam speciem operantur. Nam quo pacto canis hominem procreabit? Quo fit ut corpus agendi vim suam nec ultra proprium genus et multo minus supra naturam suam possit extendere. Numquam igitur attinget, assequetur, producet aut quodlibet corpus aut incorporalia. Intellectus si corpus esset, certum quoddam corpus esset in specie aliqua corporum. Ex hoc duo sequerentur absurda.

2 Primum, quod multorum corporum formas neque susciperet neque conciperet. Corporum quidem ipsius similium formas non caperet, quoniam iam haberet; quomodo enim ignis formam alterius ignis accipiat? Dissimilium vero corporum formas nequaquam conciperet aut pareret; quaelibet enim natura sibi simile parit. Ad

them all; and it does so when, through the reflective action which is knowing, it compares or equates itself to its own species. Therefore also through the direct, non-reflective action[26] which is life, it has, prior to knowing, [already] compared or equated itself to the same species. If this is so, it follows either that any mind always did and will exist, like the species itself of minds, or at least that it always will exist as the species does.

: X :

Tenth proof: mind operates through all bodies and above bodies.

Since form is the principle of activity, everything acts in accordance with its own genus. That is why all things, if possible, produce an offspring like themselves in their own species; nothing acts in a manner foreign to its own genus. Not even lower beings act outside their own species (a dog for instance never gives birth to a sheep), and much less does anything act above its species. How for instance would a dog produce a man? If follows then that the body cannot extend its capacity to act beyond its own genus, much less above its nature. So it will never make contact with, take hold of, or produce either any body or bodiless entities. If intellect were a body, it would be a particular body in a particular species of bodies. This would lead to two absurd consequences. 1

In the first place it would not accept or conceive of the forms of many bodies. It would not grasp the forms of bodies like itself because it would already possess them; for how can fire receive the form of another fire? And it would not conceive or give birth to forms of bodies unlike itself; for every nature gives birth to something like itself. But in order for it to understand something, it 2

hoc autem quod intellegat, oportet ut rei intellegendae formam accipiat primum, deinde ex illa definitionem rei rationemve concipiat, tunc demum perficitur intellectio. Perpauca igitur corpora intellectus cognoscet, si corpus fuerit, cum nullius corporis similis accipiat formam, nullius dissimilis corporis formam concipiat, et intellegere nequeat, nisi et accipiat pariter et concipiat. Quod si quomodo fieri possit, ut corporalem aliquam formam accipiat vel concipiat, profecto non aliter quam secundum naturam propriam hoc efficiet. Si accipiet aliunde formam, in naturam trahet suam. Si concipiet ex se ipso, secundum naturam suam parturiet. Ergo per formam quamlibet ab ipso susceptam vel etiam conceptam, semper certam quandam speciem corporis sibi convenientem et congruam apprehendet, neque corporalium generum diversitatem considerabit. Nunc autem videmus mentem non modo quaecumque corpora sunt animadvertere, sed alia infinite plura et varia prout libet effingere.[55]

3 Secundum vero sequeretur absurdum, si intellectus esset corpus, quod videlicet ordinem corporum non transcenderet, cum corpora ferme numquam ultra suam speciem, certe numquam supra suum genus aliquid operentur. Mens igitur numquam cognoscet incorporalia. Utrum horum praestantius arbitraris: substantiamne an actionem? Substantia certe, quae ipsius actionis est causa. Cavendum itaque ne operationem aliquando substantia sublimiorem confiteamur. Esset autem mentis operatio sublimior quam substantia, si substantia quidem eius certum corpus esset solummodo, intellegentia vero eius et corpora quaeque et incorporea comprehenderet. Quapropter non est corpus, quandoquidem ultra corpora quaelibet apprehendit etiam incorporea.

4 Atqui neque etiam est forma aliqua mixta corpori, nam forma mixta sicut per corporis divisionem fit dividua, sic fit qualis per corporis qualitatem. Ideoque certam quandam mens sibi contraheret qualitatem a corpore, per quam ipsa ad certam speciem corpo-

must first accept the form for understanding it, then conceive of its definition or reason from the form; and then only is understanding complete. So the number of bodies the intellect would know if it were a body would be very small, because it would not accept the form of any body like itself, or conceive of the form of any body unlike itself; and it would not be able to understand unless it accepted and conceived equally. If there were any way for it to accept or to conceive of some corporeal form, it would obviously do so only in accordance with its own nature. If it were going to accept the form from elsewhere, it would assimilate it to its own nature. If it were going to conceive it from within, it would give birth to it in accordance with its own nature. Through any form that it receives or even conceives, therefore, it would always apprehend a certain species of body which is compatible or congruent with itself: it would not contemplate the range of corporeal kinds. But in actual fact we do see the mind not only paying attention to all existing bodies, but also imagining at will an infinite number of various others.

The second absurd consequence is that if intellect were body, it would not rise above the rank of bodies, since bodies hardly ever do anything outside their own species and certainly never above their own genus. So mind would never know incorporeals. Tell me, which do you think superior, substance or action? Obviously substance which is the cause of action itself. So we must be careful never to argue that action is more excellent than substance. The mind's activity would be superior to substance, however, if its substance were merely a particular body and yet its understanding understood both all bodies and incorporeals. So intellect is not body, since over and beyond all bodies it also apprehends incorporeals.[27] 3

Nor is it some form mingled with the body, for just as a mingled form is divided via the body's division so is it qualified via the body's quality. Thus the mind would collect from the body a particular quality for itself, and through it, having become bound to a 4

ralium rerum determinata, certam speciem corporalium cognosceret solum, sicut visus per oculum ad colores contrahitur et formas simillimas non caperet, ut diximus, neque etiam dissimillimas. Atque haec Aristotelis sententia est Platonicis comprobata. Sed addunt Platonici quod mens, si mixta esset, neque caperet incorporea, quia quod mixtum est sincera non comprehendit, neque affectaret attingere aliquid a corpore separatum, alioquin affectaret a corpore separari atque dissolvi. Neque aliter cognosceret quam moveatur, sicut materialis potentia solet. Nunc autem non ut movetur sed ut ipsa sibimet efficit species, sic abstrahit, discurrit seque in se quasi absque fine reflectit.

5 Neque obstrepat hic nostris auribus Epicureus aliquis, negans intellectum incorporalia capere. Sane et cupit illa semper et capit sola summa cum voluptate tamquam ipsi simillima. Neque solum illa cupit et capit, sed etiam procreat. Quid enim nos aliud modo in his disputationibus nitimur, nisi rem aliquam mentis nostrae, ut ita loquar, manibus fingere a corpore alienissimam? Quam finximus iam et fingimus atque iis ipsis mentis manibus attractamus et, antequam effingeremus, prospeximus effingendam. Nempe cum primum statuimus animam monstrare incorporalem esse, videbamus iam aliquem alicubi incorporalis naturae gradum, ad quem perducere animam volebamus. Quid quotidie facimus disputando? Quotiens esse rem aliquam asseveramus, quae existat quidem, nullam vero habeat longitudinem, latitudinem, profunditatem vel qualitatem aliquam vel figuram, tunc certe spiritum quendam mente creamus supra corpus et corporis passiones. Ibi profecto nostra mens est, ubi parit. Parit, inquam, prolem sibi persimilem nullo modo substantia sua sublimiorem. Igitur mens nostra corpora et conditiones corporum supereminet. Quamobrem neque

particular species of corporeal objects, it would only know that particular species of corporeal objects (vision is similarly restricted through the eye to colors); and it would not grasp forms either most like [itself], as we said, or even most unlike. This view of Aristotle's is upheld by the Platonists. But the Platonists add that if mind were mixed it would not grasp incorporeals, because what is mixed does not understand the things that are pure; and it would not yearn to attain something independent of body, lest it were yearning to be separated from the body and destroyed; nor would it know unless it were moved (as is the case with a material power). But in point of fact it is not insofar as it is moved but insofar as it makes species for itself that it abstracts, discursively reasons, and almost endlessly reflects upon itself.

And let our ears be spared some obstreperous Epicurean denying that the intellect can grasp incorporeals. For incorporeals are what the intellect always longs for and grasps only with the greatest delight as most like itself. Nor does it only long for and grasp them, it also brings them into being. What else are we trying to do in this present argument but with the hands so to speak of our mind mould something at the furthest remove from body? We have fashioned it and we are now fashioning it; we are kneading it with the very hands of the mind. But before fashioning it, we saw a picture of what required fashioning. As soon as we decided to prove that the soul is incorporeal, then we were already envisaging somewhere a degree of incorporeal nature and wanting to lead the soul up to it. What do you suppose we are doing daily in discussion? Every time we say that something exists which does indeed exist but has no length or breadth or depth or any quality or shape, then we are creating in the mind some spirit which is superior to body and the body's passions. Our mind certainly exists where it is giving birth. It is giving birth, I say, to offspring like itself and not in any way superior to its own substance. So our mind transcends our bodies and their conditions. So it is not 5

loco clauditur neque temporum limitibus circumscribitur. Ubique igitur esse potest et semper. Idcirco nihil prohibet illam fore perpetuam.

: XI :

Undecima ratio: mens statu proficit, corpus motu.

1 Numquam corpus formam novam accipit nisi per motum. Nam per alterationem, ut aiunt physici, forma inducitur in materiam. Mens autem neque per motum accipit formas neque accipiendo movetur. Quae quanto magis ab omni perturbationum et negotiorum motu quietem agit, tanto magis proficit[56] speculando. Ubi etiam apparet eius aeternitas, quia suapte natura solam speculationem veritatis affectat atque ideo statum, sine quo non perficitur speculatio. Proficit autem corpus motu, quod per motum natum est. Quod ergo stando proficit, ex statu dependet, ideoque stabilem habet substantiam atque perpetuam.

: XII :

Duodecima ratio: quae in materia sunt contraria, non sunt in mente contraria.

1 Formae contrariorum elementorum dum sunt in materia, contrariae inter se sunt, quia pellunt se invicem et interimunt. In mente non sunt contrariae, quia ibi non modo non pellunt se invi-

bounded by space or circumscribed by temporal limits. So it can exist everywhere and forever. Thus nothing prevents it from being eternal.

: XI :

Eleventh proof: mind benefits from rest, body from motion.

1 Body can never receive a new form except via motion. For it is by means of what the natural philosophers call alteration that form is introduced into matter. Mind, however, neither receives forms via motion, nor is it moved by receiving them. The more tranquil it becomes away from all the motion accompanying passion or business, the more progress it makes in contemplating. This is further evidence for the mind's immortality, since it yearns in its own nature for the contemplation alone of truth and consequently for the repose without which contemplation is impossible. But body benefits from movement, for through movement it was born. So what benefits from being at rest has its source in rest, and therefore has an unchanging and eternal substance.[28]

: XII :

Twelfth proof: opposites in matter are not opposites in mind.

1 The forms of contrary elements are contrary to each other as long as they are in matter, because they repel and destroy each other. But in mind they are not contraries, because there they not only

cem, sed et iuvant. Simul quidem nostra mens habet contrariorum elementorum formas, quando simul elementa considerat. Simul quoque comprehendit bona et mala, utilia et inutilia, pulchra atque deformia, lucem et tenebras, vocem atque silentium, dulce et amarum et reliqua, atque ex cognitione alterius contrarii sincerius iudicat alterum. Non igitur est corporea neque etiam proprie corruptibilis. Quippe quod corrumpitur, ut plurimum, corrumpitur a contrario. Quid autem esse potest menti contrarium, quae tantam habet super contraria potestatem ut ab ipsis auferat contrarietatem et sua pace conciliet inimica? Neque rursus corruptibilis est, quod a suis conservatoribus disiungatur; nam si aliena et contraria alienis contrariisque conciliat, multo magis se suis tum causis tum servatoribus admovet.

: XIII :

Tertia decima ratio: mens accipiendo formas non mutatur.

1 Corporis cuiusque forma, quando vere ab alio corpore capitur, tale reddit omnino illud quod suscipit ipsam quale est corpus illud[57] a quo forma tribuitur,[58] veluti quando flamma ignis a ligno suscipitur, lignum facit calidum atque igneum. Flamma vero illa in speculo longe distante resplendens, speculum non reddit calidum aut igneum, quia non vere ab illo suscipitur, cum propter distantiam ad veram ignis flammam non sit paratum. Immo vero nullo modo flammula illa, id est, imago illa flammae, cum spiritalis sit, in speculi corpore figitur sed in spiritali solis lumine, quod ambit speculi

do not repel, but help each other. For our mind simultaneously contains the forms of contrary elements when it thinks about them together. It also simultaneously understands things good and bad, useful and useless, beautiful and ugly, the light and the dark, speech and silence, the sweet and the bitter and so on, and it judges the one more clearly because of its knowing the other opposite. So it is not corporeal or properly speaking corruptible. For what is corrupted for the most part is corrupted by its opposite. But what can be opposite to the mind which has such power over opposites that it can deprive them of their contrariety and can reconcile foes with its own harmony? Nor on the other hand is it corruptible in that it is disjoined from its conserving principles; for if it can reconcile things alien and opposite to things alien and opposite, *a fortiori* it directs itself to its own causes and conserving principles.[29]

: XIII :

Thirteenth proof: in accepting forms, mind is not changed.

1 The form of a body, when it is properly received by another body, makes the body which receives it entirely like that body from which the form is received, as when a flame of fire is caught by a piece of wood and the wood becomes hot and ignites.[30] But if the flame is reflected in a mirror some distance away, the mirror does not become hot or catch fire, because the flame is not in fact received by it. Because of the distance, it is not ready for the real flame of fire. Or rather, that little flame, the image of the original flame, since it is spiritual or immaterial, is not attached in any way to the mirror's body but to the spiritual light of the sun which surrounds the mirror's surface. Images of this sort do not come from

superficiem. Fiunt autem huiusmodi rerum imagines non a corporibus his quorum imagines sunt (corpus enim non procreat aliquid incorporeum), sed a lumine spiritali corporibus circumfuso. Lumen quoque ipsum a solis globo non nascitur sed a solis anima, cuius lux cum intra se sit invisibilis, effusa longius fit visibilis;[59] in qua ipsa quoque anima fit conspicua. Nam ut placet Orphicis et Heraclito, lumen nihil aliud est nisi visibilis anima, unde per hoc omnia reviviscunt; anima vero lux invisibilis.

2 Sed ne longius digrediamur, formae vel imagines corporum non vere[60] sunt in speculis. Mens autem corporum accipit omnium formas, quando de corporibus iudicat. Num accipit vere? Vere profecto. Nempe ut accipit, ita iudicat. Vere iudicat, vere igitur accipit. Accipit, inquam, a se ipsa, ut Platonici opinantur, quando corporum simulacris excitata, formas quae in mentis abditis[61] latent promit in lucem. Accedit quod ubi perfectior forma est, ibi est verior. Quanto vero perfectior sit[62] forma corporum in mente quam in ipsis corporibus, et alias declaravimus declarabimusque. Et hinc patet quod humana natura in Platone vel Socrate solius Platonis est et solius Socratis propria. Humana autem natura illa, quae mente concipitur, quando sub una hominis definitione hominum conditiones considerat, ad singulos homines habet vim, siquidem omnes complectitur.

3 Praeterea, si veritas rei cuiusque in pura integritate consistit vel integra puritate, atque forma in materia vim suam integram non retinet propter passionis admixtionem et extraneis accidentibus circumfunditur, verior res quaeque invenitur in mente, ubi rei ipsius idea naturaliter insita notionem rei parit, necessaria quidem includentem omnia, supervacua vero penitus excludentem. Mens

the bodies whose images they are, for a body does not produce anything incorporeal: they come from the spiritual light that surrounds the bodies. And that light too is not born from the sun's sphere but from the sun's soul, whose light, though it is invisible within itself, when radiated afar becomes visible; and in this very light the soul too comes into view. For in the opinion both of Orpheus' disciples and of Heraclitus, light is nothing other than visible soul (whence all things come to life again because of it) and soul is invisible light.[31]

But let us digress no longer. We were saying that the forms or images of bodies are not really in mirrors. Mind on the other hand receives the forms of all sorts of bodies whenever it makes judgments about bodies. But does it truly receive them? Yes, it truly does. For as it receives, so does it judge. It judges truly, so it truly receives. It receives, I should add, from itself, as the Platonists suppose, when, awakened by bodies' reflections, it brings the forms which are hidden in its own recesses into the light. Moreover, where the form is more perfect, the truer it is. We have demonstrated elsewhere, and will do so again, how the form of bodies is much more perfect in the mind than in bodies themselves. It is evident also from the fact that human nature in Plato or Socrates belongs to Plato alone or to Socrates alone; whereas human nature that is conceived in the mind, when it considers the conditions of men under the single definition of man, applies to all individual men since it includes them all. 2

If the truth of an object consists in its pure integrity and in its integral purity, moreover, and the form in matter does not retain its integral power because of the admixture of passivity, and is surrounded by external accidents, then each thing is found to be truer in the mind. For in the mind the idea of the object itself is naturally innate and gives birth to the notion of the object which includes everything that is necessary and omits everything completely that is superfluous. So the mind truly receives bodies' 3

igitur usque adeo vere corporum capit formas ut verius etiam eas habeat quam materia corporum. Igitur si ipsa sit aliquid corporale, talis reddetur omnino, qualia corpora. Fiet ergo aqua cum aquam intelleget, cum ignem intelleget, ignis. Et quia simul intellegit calorem atque frigus, fiet contraria simul. Nunc autem formas accipit omnium, neque e suo statu deiicitur, immo perficitur capiendo.

4 Hinc apparet intellectum non esse corporeum. Apparet etiam non esse mortalem. Ille siquidem eo modo quo est accipit quicquid accipit. Esse suum intellectuale est dumtaxat. Non ergo accipit quicquam aliter quam intellegendo. Per huiusmodi susceptionem non modo non deficit sed et proficit. Nihil ergo suscipit aliunde, quod ipsum mutet et perdat et, quod maius est, tantum in omnibus formis suscipiendis lucratur ut lucrari etiam videatur in malis. Si tanto perfectior evadit quanto cognoscit plura, certe perfectior est, si rerum privationes, defectus et mala discernit, quam si ignorat. Quae ergo in se ipsis mala sunt et noxia, in mente fiunt bona atque salubria. Multum abest ut ea natura a malis noxiisque rebus interimatur quae ita mala convertit in bona ut ipsi bona sint omnia.

: XIV :

Quarta decima ratio: operatio corporis tendit ad rem compositam, mentis ad simplicia.

1 Operatio cuiusque rei esse ipsum rei semper sequitur, ita ut illius sit operatio cuius esse et modus operandi idem sit qui et essendi, et opus ad quod terminatur operatio sit simile operanti. In rebus

forms to the extent that it has them even more truly than bodies' matter has them. So if mind itself were a corporeal entity, it would become entirely whatever bodies are. Thus it would become water when it understands water, and fire when it understands fire. And because it simultaneously understands heat and cold, it would become these opposites simultaneously. But in point of fact mind receives the forms of everything without being dislodged from its own condition, or rather by receiving them it is perfected.

Hence it is clear that the intellect is not corporeal.[32] It is equally 4 clear it is not mortal. For it receives whatever it receives in accordance with its mode of being. Its being is only intellectual. So the only way it receives anything is by understanding. By receiving in this way not only does it not lose, it gains. So it receives nothing from outside which would change or destroy it. What is more, it gains so much from receiving all manner of forms that it seems to benefit even from receiving evils.[33] If the more it knows, the more perfect it is, it is clearly more perfect if it discerns privations, weaknesses, and evils than if it is unaware of them. So things that in themselves are evil and harmful become in the mind good and beneficial. It is impossible for things evil and harmful ever to destroy that nature which so converts the bad into the good that for it all things are good.

: XIV :

Fourteenth proof: the activity of body aims at something compound, the activity of mind at things simple.

Each thing's activity always follows on its very being, such that it is 1 the activity of that being, and its mode of acting is the same as its mode of being, and the product which is the goal of its activity re-

ex materia et forma corporali compositis esse non est materiae proprium aut formae, sed totius compositi ex utrorumque coniunctione confecti. Igitur et compositi ipsius proprie operatio est. Quare et modo composito operatur et opus producit compositum. Hoc in elementis, plantis, animalibus intuemur, quae quidem opera composita, sicut ipsa sunt, generant. Si intellectus corpus aliquod esset ex materia et forma compositum, cum eius operatio intellegentia sit, haec ipsa intellegentia semper ad aliquid compositum terminaretur; unde numquam aliud praeter res compositas intellegeret. Nunc vero nostra mens usque adeo naturalem excellit compositionem ut corpora composita in materiam resolvat et formam, et cogitet utrumque seorsum. Utrumque vero per se est simplex. Atque in hoc maxime excellentia eius aspicitur, quod illa quae in materia quodammodo falsa sunt tamquam vera comprehendit, sicut figuras et principia figurarum. Quae in materia sunt impura, discernit ut pura. Qualitates enim quae sunt in materia mixtae invicem et infectae contrariis, ipsa secundum proprias diiudicat rationes. Quae in se multa sunt conspicit tamquam unum, ceu sub una specie homines infinitos. Quae in se mobilia sunt tamquam stabilia speculatur, quando temporis partes quae in se ipsis fluunt simul colligit et praesenti annectit praeteritum et futurum. Quae in se distantia sunt tamquam unita saepissime contuetur, quando totum orbem videt in puncto. Neque temporum intervalla neque locorum spatia mentis intuitum cohibent. Quae, ut ita loquar, mortua tamquam viventia, siquidem lapides, qui vita carent, mens vivos intra se possidet, quando ad primam a qua facti sunt comparat vitam. Quae corruptilia[63] tamquam perpetua, quando singula corpora, quae loco subiiciuntur et tempori, mens intuitu suo a locis et temporibus eximit.

sembles it as its producer. In objects composed of matter and bodily form, being belongs neither to the matter nor to the form but to the whole compound resulting from the union of the two. So the activity too properly belongs to the compound itself. So it acts in a composite way and its product is composite. We can see this in the case of elements, plants, and animals; they generate products that are composite like themselves. If intellect were some body compounded from matter and form, and given that its activity is understanding, this understanding itself would always result in something composite. Thus it would never understand anything except composite objects. But in actuality our mind is so far above the compositeness of nature that it resolves compound bodies into matter and form and ponders them separately.[34] But each on its own is simple. The mind's superiority is particularly evident from the fact that it understands as true things which in a way are illusory in nature, for example, figures and the rational principles of figures. What is impure in matter it discerns as pure. For qualities which are mingled together in matter and tainted by opposites it distinguishes according to their proper reasons. Things which in themselves are many it sees as one, an infinite number of men for instance in a single species. Things which in themselves are mobile it observes at rest when it takes the parts of time which in themselves are fluid, gathers them together, and links the past and future to the present. Things at a distance from each other it most often sees as united, as when it sees a whole circle or disk in a point. Neither the intervals of time nor those of space constrict the mind's gaze. What are dead in a way it sees as living; for stones which are lifeless the mind possesses within itself as living when it compares them to the first life by which they were created. And what are corruptible the mind sees as everlasting when it takes individual bodies which are subject to place and time, and with its intuitive gaze frees them from places and from times.

2 Ex omnibus his colligitur intellectum neque esse corporeum aliquid, cum longe aliter quam corpora operetur, neque esse impurum, infectum, dispersum, mutabilem, corruptibilem, quippe cum illa etiam quae talia sunt sua quadam vi ab huiusmodi liberet passionibus.

: XV :

Quinta decima ratio: actio mentis finitur in actione, actio corporis in corpore.[64]

1 Nullius corporis actio in ipsam actionem proprie desinit, sed in exteriorem transit materiam. Nam si in actionem desineret, actio illa in operante restaret ubi in se ipsum operaretur, puta, ignis se ipsum calefaceret. Quod non potest a corpore fieri quia, si corpus non agit ex se, etiam non agit in se. Rursus, si quicquid corpus agit movendo agit, certe, cum movere se nequeat, in se ipsum agere nequit. Videmus autem mentis operationem, ipsam scilicet intellegentiam, in se ipsam desinere, neque quicquam per se extrinsecus facere, nisi forte quandoque moveat voluntatem, quae motis brachiis opus aliquod extra producat, quale fuerat cogitatum. Sensum autem dicimus quodammodo extra se fluere, quia aliunde movetur, prospicit aliena, externi finis gratia operatur, neque sui ipsius est conscius. Mens contra movetur libere, se suaque inspicit, sui gratia operatur. Ideo essentia apud Platonem status dicitur quia, si sine vita sit, torpet; vita motus, quia iam exit in actum; mens reflexio, quia sine hac, vita in externum opus efflueret. Sed mens sistit vita-

One concludes from all this that intellect is not a corporeal object, as it operates in a manner very different from bodies, nor is it impure, polluted, dispersed, changeable, or corruptible; for even things which are such can be liberated from these imperfections by the particular power the intellect possesses. 2

: XV :

Fifteenth proof: an action of mind has the action as its end, an action of body ends in a body.

Strictly speaking a bodily action never ends in the action itself, but 1 passes over into external matter. For were it to end in the action, the action would remain in the agent and then the agent would be acting on itself, fire for instance would be heating itself. This cannot happen with body, because if body does not act of itself, then too it does not act on itself. And again if whatever body does it does by moving, certainly, since it is incapable of moving itself, it cannot act on itself. We can see, however, that the activity of mind, understanding itself, does come to an end in itself, and does not of itself do anything externally, unless perchance it moves the will at some point; and the will by moving the arms produces externally such a work as was first conceived. But we describe sense-perception as in a way a flowing outside itself, because it is moved from outside, it looks at what is outside, and it acts for the sake of some outside goal without being conscious of itself. Mind to the contrary is moved of its own free will, it gazes at itself and its own belongings, and it acts for its own benefit. That is why in Plato essence is called a state of rest, because if it exists without life it is inactive. But life is called motion, because life is issuing already into act; and mind is called reflection or turning back, since, but

lem essentiae motum in semetipso, reflectit ipsum in essentiam quadam sui ipsius animadversione. Trahit quoque cetera omnia ad se ipsam, prout res, potius ut ipsa mens est quam ut res extra existunt, considerat. Vocatur etiam reflexio infinita, quia in operationem suam non modo semel mens hominis terminatur, verum etiam innumerabiliter, cum se aliquid intellegere animadvertit, et quod animadvertat agnoscit, et cum aliquid velle se vult, et vult quod velit se velle, atque eadem ratione deinceps, ubi vel operatio alia in infinitum terminatur ad aliam vel eadem[65] in se replicatur innumere.

2 Hinc patet[66] intellectum non solum esse incorporeum sed etiam immortalem, siquidem per se ipsum operatione sua se format semper et perficit,[67] semper intellegendo atque volendo. Hoc autem nihil est aliud quam se ipsum vel facere vel servare vel renovare continue, quod quidem quotidianae renovationis nomine Paulus apostolus appellavit. Quo fit ut numquam a suo perfectore vel servatore desciscat et absit, cum nequeat abesse umquam a semetipso, atque ideo formetur semper atque perficiatur.

3 Quinetiam si naturalis generationis finis immortalitas quaedam est, multo magis intellectualis generationis finis est immortalitas. Sed quia natura prolem extra se gignit, immortalitas eius expletur in successione nascentium. Quia vero mens generat in se ipsa tum se tum alia, quantum et sui et aliorum omnium concipit rationes quando aut se intellegit aut alia, sequitur ut immortalitatis huius virtus in mente ipsa genitrice servetur.[68]

4 Hic etiam latet argumentatio quaedam huiusmodi. Praestantius est bene esse quam simpliciter esse. Quisquis igitur bene esse sibi praebet, multo magis potest sibi esse praebere. Intellectus sibi dare

for this turning back, life would flow out into some external work.[35] But mind halts the essence's living motion in itself, and reflects the motion back towards the essence by a sort of reflection on itself. It also draws everything else to itself in proportion as it considers things, not as they exist externally, but rather as it exists itself as the mind. Reflection is called infinite because the human mind finds its end in its own activity; and not just once but on numberless occasions when it realizes that it understands something, and recognizes that it realizes; and when it wants to want something, and wants what it is wanting itself to want, and so on by the same reckoning. Here either one action comes to an end in another *ad infinitum*, or the same action is infinitely replicated in itself.[36]

Clearly, then, the intellect is not only incorporeal but immortal too, since it always forms and perfects itself through itself by its own activity, forever understanding and willing. But this is nothing other than making, or preserving, or continuously renewing itself, what St. Paul called "the renewal day by day."[37] Hence it never takes leave of, or is absent from, its perfecter and preserver, since it can never be absent from itself; and hence it is forever being formed and perfected. 2

Moreover, if the goal of natural generation is a sort of immortality, *a fortiori* the goal of intellectual generation is immortality. But because nature produces its progeny outside itself, nature's immortality is realized in a succession of births. However, because mind generates internally both itself and other things (insofar as it conceives of the rational principles both of itself and of all others when it understands either itself or others), it follows that the power to produce this immortality is preserved in the mind itself as mother. 3

A further proof is concealed here. Well-being is superior to simply being. So whoever gives himself well-being is even more capable of giving himself being. Intellect seems to give itself well- 4

bene esse videtur, quando format perficitque se ipsum tum speculatione tum moribus. Quapropter esse quoque sibi potest secundum formam ita praestare ut numquam desinat esse. Mitto quod Proclus ait animam, cum sit generationis principium, ita se ipsam gignere atque vivificare ut essentiam habeat a se ipsa. Atque summatim de omni indivisibili substantia in sua essentia existente affirmat tum producere tum continere se ipsam; de omni autem substantia divisibili, etiam de ipso caelo, dicit necessario aliunde produci atque contineri. Sed hoc ipse viderit.

5 Latet praeterea alia quaedam talis argumentatio. Quando intellectus operationem suam primo atque inde vim suam et substantiam comprehendit et amat, tunc procul dubio in se ipsum agit, igitur et per se ipsum. Nihil enim inter intellectum atque ipsummet medium interponitur. Adde quod quemadmodum corpus quia ex se non agit, ideo non operatur in se, sic intellectus quia in se operatur, idcirco ex se operari censetur. Si ex se in se agit, igitur et per se ipsum. Si enim utrique in eo actionis termini sunt, igitur et medium. Quid ergo prohibet intellectum a corpore separatum operari et vivere, praesertim cum operatio ipsius, quae ex se, in se ipsum, per se expletur, necessario fiat et resideat in se ipso?

6 Sed hoc ita planius explicabitur. Si mentis operatio proprie in ipsam mentem finitur, mens ipsa quodammodo suae operationis est finis. Idem vero est rei cuiusque finis ac[69] principium, cum omnia originem suam appetant et tamquam sui motus finem sibi illam proponant. Igitur substantia mentis est operationis suae principium. Per se igitur operatur, quod Plato noster appellat per se moveri. Ut operatur, ita vivit; vita enim est interior operatio. Vivit itaque per se ipsam. Ut vivit, ita etiam est, nam vita est primus existentiae actus. Est ergo similiter per se ipsam. Quid impedit

being when it forms and perfects itself both by contemplation and by moral habituation. Therefore it can by way of form so give itself being too that it never ceases to be. Proclus says—and I just mention it in passing—that soul, since it is the principle of generation, gives birth to and animates itself such that it possesses essence from itself.[38] In general, with regard to every indivisible substance existing in its own essence, he affirms that it both produces and preserves itself; whereas with regard to all divisible substance, even in the case of the heaven itself, he says that it is necessarily produced and preserved by another. But let him look to this argument himself.

Yet another proof is hidden away here. When intellect grasps and loves first its own activity and then its own power and substance, without a doubt it is acting on itself, and thus through itself. For no intermediary is interposed between the intellect and itself. Furthermore, just as the body does not act on itself because it does not act out of itself, so the intellect, since it does act on itself, therefore acts, one assumes, out of itself. If it acts out of itself on itself, then it is through itself too. For if the action's termini are both in it, the middle is too. So what prevents the intellect when it is separated from the body from acting and living, especially since its activity, which is out of itself, on itself, and accomplished through itself, necessarily is created and located in itself? 5

Let me explain this more clearly. If the activity of mind comes to its proper end in the mind itself, then the mind is in a way the end of its own action. In fact, the beginning and end of each and every object are identical, for all things seek their origin and propose it to themselves as the goal of their motion. So the substance of mind is the beginning of its activity. So it acts through itself, or what our Plato refers to as being moved through itself.[39] As it acts, so it lives, for life is internal activity. So it lives through itself. As it lives, so it exists, for life is the first act of existence. So it exists similarly through itself. Since it is the cause of itself, what is to 6

eam esse semper, quandoquidem sui ipsius est causa? Causa, inquam, non efficiens sed formalis, cuius virtute esse tribuitur et servatur.

7 Qualitas et vita, cuius operatio omnis in alia effluit, necessario secundum naturam suam quattuor ex partibus deficit. Primo, quia effluendo vacillat, alieno indiget sustentaculo. Secundo, diffluendo debilitatur. Tertio, dum influit aliis, ab extraneis inquinatur. Quarto, propter indigentiam, debilitatem inquinationemque a natura sua quandoque defluere cogitur. Si ita est, sequitur ut rationalis vita, quae relabitur in se ipsam, se ipsam sustineat, non debilitetur, non inquinetur, non defluat. Merito sicut vita, quae omnino profluere cogitur extra se ipsam, dum discedit a vita, tendit consumiturque in mortem, sic vita quae redundat in semetipsam, adolescit et consummatur in vitam.

8 Denique, si uberior motus vitae uberioris indicium est, vita rationalis, quae universum motionum genus exercet, implet et terminat, universum quoque genus implet vivendi. Ideoque ipsi neque privatio vitae miscetur neque conditio ulla obnoxia morti. Exercere autem ipsam omnes species motionum in corpore, implere motionum omnium exemplaria in se ipsa, terminare motum omnem in se ipsam suumque principium per mentis ipsius reflexiones alias declaravimus.

prevent it from existing for ever? And by "cause" I mean not the efficient cause but the formal cause, by whose power being is bestowed and preserved.

The life of quality, all of whose activity flows out into others, is necessarily and naturally deficient in four ways. Firstly, because it wavers in its outpouring, it needs an external support. Secondly, it becomes weak by flowing away. Thirdly, in the process of flowing into others, it becomes polluted by external things. Fourthly, as a result of its needing support and of the weakening and the pollution, it will be compelled at some point to ebb away from its own nature. If that is the case, it follows that rational life, because it flows back into itself, can sustain itself without being weakened or polluted or ebbing away. Just as the life, which is compelled to flow entirely outside itself, when it departs from life, moves towards and is destroyed by death, so the life which flows back into itself grows stronger and is perfected in life. 7

Finally, if more abundant motion is the sign of a more abundant life, then rational life which deploys all the kinds of movement, bringing them to their completion and goal, also brings to completion all the kinds of life. And hence no absence of life is commingled with it nor any condition liable to death. Elsewhere we have shown that it deploys every species of motion in the body; that it brings the models of all the motions to completion in itself; and that through the mind's reflections it ends all motion in itself and in its own principle. 8

: XVI :

Sexta decima ratio: forma corporalis non habet vim infinitam; mens habet.

1 Constat apud physicos formam corporalem, praesertim elementalem,[70] esse usque adeo terminatam ut nullo modo vim aliquam infinitam indefessamque possit habere. Mens autem absque termino pervagatur, neque fatigatur umquam. Principio in se ipsa quasi est sine termino; intellegit enim se ipsam. Ideo intellectio eius profecta ab ipsa mentis substantia, in eandem[71] revolvitur. Revolutio infinitus est motus. Ad nullum enim terminum proficiscitur extrinsecus acquirendum, quo parto quiescat, sed propriam ambit substantiam, sui ipsius avida. Sui vero ipsius aviditas numquam extinguitur. Substantia igitur quae suimet cupiditate coepit semel sibi undique fieri obvia, et circumeundo se ipsam undique contueri, eadem cupiditate perpetuo instigante, semet ipsam perpetuo similiter pro arbitrio amplectetur. Motus igitur intellectus, quoniam orbicularis est, in se ipsum circumvolutus, quatenus intellectualis est, est utique sempiternus.

2 Caret etiam fine, ut diximus, ob eam causam quod infinite intellegentia replicatur. Potest enim qui aut se aut aliud quodvis intellegit, sicut rem ipsam intellegit, sic suam intellegentiam intellegere, itemque aliam et aliam sine fine, dum et rem cognoscit, et quod cognoscat illam animadvertit. Rursus, quod sic animadvertat, ipsum non latet, et similiter absque termino. Talem intellegentiae cursum comitatur rationalis appetitio illa quam nuncupant voluntatem. Haec sane se ipsam vult aut quodvis aliud, et vult se velle, et rursus vult quod velit, similiterque deinceps.

: XVI :

Sixteenth proof: bodily form does not possess infinite force, but mind does.

Natural philosophers are agreed that bodily form, especially elemental form, is subject to such limits that it cannot have any power that is in any respect infinite and inexhaustible. But mind ranges without limit and is never exhausted. To begin with, it is in itself without limit as it were,[40] for it understands itself. Thus its understanding, having set out from the substance itself of mind, circles back to the same point. This circular movement is an infinite movement. For it does not set out to attain some goal outside itself in order to rest once it has acquired it; but it circles round its own substance, eager for itself. But this eagerness for itself is never stilled. The substance, accordingly, once it has begun out of desire for itself to make contact everywhere with itself and by circling around to gaze everywhere upon itself, then, with the same desire goading it perpetually, of its own choice it likewise perpetually embraces itself. Thus the movement of the intellect, because it is circular and revolves upon itself, and seeing that it is intellectual, is obviously everlasting. 1

It also has no end, as we said, precisely because the understanding is replicated infinitely. For anyone who understands either himself or something else, just as he understands the object, so he is able to understand his understanding, and so on *ad infinitum*, as long as he both knows about the object and realizes that he knows about it; and again realizes that he so realizes, and similarly to infinity. The rational appetite which they call the will follows the same course as the understanding. It wants either itself or something else, and it wants itself to want and then it wants to want, and so on. 2

3 Quinetiam corpora dividit in partes plurimas partiumque particulas. Numeros auget supra numeros absque fine. Figurarum modos mutuasque illarum proportiones atque etiam numerorum comparationes innumerabiles invenit. Lineam supra caelum ultra terminum undique protendit. Tempus in praeteritum absque principio, in futurum absque fine producit. Neque solum ultra omne tempus aliud antiquius cogitat et prolixius, verum etiam ultra omnem locum alium semper cogitat ampliorem. Innumeros quoque effingit gradus in singulis qualitatibus.

4 Accedit quod non uno quodam rerum genere mens, sicuti sensus, contenta est. Non solis coloribus[72] ut visus, non solis vocibus ut auditus, sed currit per omnia—per omnia, inquam, non modo quae sunt, sed quae fuerunt eruntve; neque id solum, sed per illa etiam quae neque sunt, neque fuerunt umquam aut erunt. Multa enim excogitat quae forte esse possent, non tamen fiunt umquam, et multa, quae esse forsitan numquam possunt, ipsa fingit. Quamquam non minus in rerum natura esse videntur quae mens per se pingit in se ipsa quam quae per linguam in aere vel per manum pingit in pariete. Novas quoque semper rerum facies vi propria et quodam ordine fabricat et rursus innovat alias. Nonne etiam postquam gradatim per mundi sphaeras ascendit, gradatim quoque angelos ita considerat ut alium videat semper alio altiorem, neque tam sublimem reperit umquam quin possit alium uno saltem gradu et alium rursus alio gradu invenire maiorem? Atque id tamdiu facit, quamdiu finitum esse angelum quemque pronuntiat, ex quo quolibet finito spiritu invenit alium altiorem. Atque ita sine termino progrederetur, nisi ipsamet sibi modum imponeret con-

Moreover, the mind divides bodies into a large number of parts and particles of parts. It adds numbers to numbers without limit. It discovers the modes or limits of figures, and their mutual proportions, and also the numberless relationships of numbers. It everywhere limitlessly extends the line above the heavens. It extends time backwards into the past with no beginning, forwards into the future with no end. It thinks not only about a time that is older or lasts longer than all other time, but also about a place that is vaster than any other place.[41] It devises in individual qualities too numberless degrees. 3

Furthermore, the mind is not satisfied like the sense with one particular class of objects. It ranges not only through colors like the sight, not only through sounds like the hearing, but through all things; and by all I mean through those not only that are but that were or will be; and not just those alone, but through all those too that do not exist, and never did and never will. For it considers many things which could perhaps exist but have never come into being, and it imagines many things which could perhaps never exist at all. And yet the objects the mind imagines of itself and in itself seem to have as real an existence in the nature of things as those it fashions in air with the tongue or paints on a wall with the hand. With its own power too and in a particular order it is always fashioning anew or renewing the aspects of things. After it has ascended by degrees up through the world's spheres, doesn't it also consider the angels by degrees in such a way that it always sees one more exalted than another, and never comes upon one so exalted that it cannot find another at least one degree higher and then another higher by yet another degree? And it does this as long as it declares that each angel is finite, for above any finite spirit it finds another more sublime. And so it would proceed without end, if it did not impose on itself measure or limit, and conclude that there is an infinite spirit who excells 4

cluderetque esse spiritum aliquem infinitum, qui omnem angelum et qui esse et qui cogitari potest, innumeris gradibus superet.

5 Quis infinite progreditur? Quis infinitum progressum quodammodo terminat? Quis terminum illum progrediendi infinitum assequitur? Mens certe haec facit. Mentis igitur quodammodo infinita virtus. Quae in eo quoque apparet quod non modo reperit infinitum actum, qui deus est, verum etiam potentiam infinitam, quae est materia subdita deo atque ad innumerabiles formas inde capiendas idonea. Hinc etiam infinitam invenimus generationis vicissitudinem, quae potest per infinitum tempus ab actu infinito fundi in potentiam infinitam.

6 Apparet rursus ex eo quod universales rerum rationes capit. Sub quolibet[73] autem universali seu specie sive genere innumerabilia continentur. Innumerabiles sub humana species homines successione perpetua itemque sub aliis infinita individua colligit in unam speciem, species multas in genus unum, multa genera in unam essentiam, essentiam unam in divinam unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem. Vicissim ab hac una gradatim descendit in multitudinem infinitam. Mira profecto virtus, quae infinita reddit unum, unum reddit infinita. Huic ferme non proprius in natura gradus est ullus, quatenus sursum deorsumque[74] penetrat omnes. Non situs est proprius, quatenus nusquam sistitur. Non certa, ut ita dicam, et terminata potestas, quatenus ad omnia aequaliter operatur.

7 Illud quoque mihi videtur vim mentis, ut ita loquar, interminatam prae ceteris demonstrare quod ipsam infinitatem esse invenit quidve sit et qualis definit. Cum vero cognitio per quandam mentis cum rebus aequationem perficiatur, mens cognitae infinitati aequatur quodammodo. Infinitum vero oportet esse quod aequatur infinitati. Ac si tempus, quod successione quadam metitur

by numberless degrees any angel that exists or can be thought to exist.

Who proceeds to infinity? Who sets a limit in a way to infinite progress? Who reaches this infinite limit to progressing? Indubitably the mind does these things. So the power of mind is in a way infinite. This is evident too from the fact that it not only discovers infinite act, which is God, but also infinite potency, which is the matter subject to God, the matter capable of receiving from Him numberless forms. From mind too we learn about generation's infinite variousness which can be poured forth through infinite time from infinite act into infinite potentiality. 5

The same point emerges from the fact that the mind grasps the common rational principles of things. But numberless individuals are included under any universal category whether it is a species, or a genus. Mind takes the numberless human beings in the human species in their endless succession, and likewise the infinite individuals in other species, and gathers them up into one species, and gathers the many species into one genus, and the many genera into one essence, and the one essence into the divine unity, truth, and goodness. In turn it then descends step by step from this unity to infinite plurality. It is a wonderful power that restores infinites to something one and something one to infinites. No one degree in nature belongs to the mind exactly in that it penetrates every level from top to bottom.[42] It has no place of its own in that nowhere does it come to rest. It has no power that is, one might say, specific and determined in that it acts on everything alike. 6

Demonstrating above all, it seems to me, that the mind's power is as it were undetermined is also its discovery that infinity itself exists, and what it is and of what kind. But since knowledge is perfected through some sort of equating of the mind with the objects known, the mind is equated in a way with the infinity it knows. But what is equated to infinity has to be infinite. If time, which by a sort of succession measures motion, has to be infinite 7

motum, infinitum esse oportet (si modo motus fuerit infinitus), quanto magis infinitam esse oportet mentem, quae non modo motum tempusque stabili notione sed infinitatem ipsam quoque metitur, cum necesse sit mensuram ad id quod ipsa metitur habere proportionem, finito vero ad infinitum sit nulla proportio.

8 Idem quoque evidenter ex eo monstratur quod a non esse considerando transit in esse atque e converso. Esse autem et non esse immenso inter se discrepant intervallo. Immensam vero oportet esse virtutem quae spatium percurrit[75] immensum. Currere autem illud quis negat, quando creationem quae ex non esse fit ad esse et interitum qui fit contra, certissimis rationibus comprehendimus atque utriusque extremi naturam describimus et ipsius esse communis vim intellectu consequimur, quae rebus eius progressione nascentibus per innumerabiles essendi modos <se> communicat?

9 Denique, ut summatim dicam, infinitam quodammodo esse in mente virtutem illud nobis testimonio esse poterit, quod fames corporis sitisque et somnus cito et re paucula satiantur, mentis ardor numquam extinguitur, sive humana respiciat, sive divina. Si avet humana, quis divitiarum cumulus, quae imperii amplitudo hunc terminat? Si divina, nulla rerum creatarum finitarumque scientia impletur. Merito quiescit numquam, nisi infinitum deum capiat, qui capacitatem eius ab ipso manantem impleat infinitam. Quae si finita esset, aliqua re finita vel impleretur vel saltem sitis eius tepesceret. Nunc vero per quorumlibet finitorum adeptionem non modo non extinguitur sed flagrat ardentius, quoniam quo magis plura capiendo deo infinito quadam praeparatione propinquat, eo ardet magis igni suo facta propinquior atque eo currit rapacius infinito sui motus fini iam proxima. Quod et ignis elementum fa-

(given that motion is infinite), then *a fortiori* the mind, which measures not only motion and time by means of motionless thought but infinity itself, has to be infinite, since the measure has to be proportionate to what it measures, but no proportion links the finite to the infinite.

8 The same point obviously emerges from the fact that in consideration mind can proceed from not-being to being, and the reverse. But being and not-being are separated from each other by an immense gulf. Immense indeed has to be the power that spans this immense gulf. But who denies that the mind spans it, a) when we understand in terms of very precise rational principles both creation which proceeds from not-being to being and destruction which does the reverse; b) when we describe the nature of these two extremes; and c) when we grasp with the intellect the power of the common being which imparts itself to the things being born from its progression through the numberless modes of being?

9 Finally and to sum up, for us the evidence that in the mind exists a power that is in a way infinite could be that the body's hunger, thirst, and sleep are quickly assuaged and with very little, but that the ardor of the mind is never extinguished whether it looks to things human or divine. If it longs for things human, what hoard of riches, what breadth of empire sets a term for it? If for things divine, by no knowledge of created beings or finite objects is it fulfilled. Deservedly it never rests until it grasps the infinite God who satisfies its infinite capacity, emanating as it does from Him. If the power of the mind were finite it would be satisfied with something finite, or at least its thirst would be quenched. But in point of fact in the acquisition of finite objects, not only is it not extinguished but it burns the more fiercely. This is because the more, in knowing more, it approaches the infinite God in a sort of preparation, the more it burns, closer now to its fire, and the more greedily it advances, closest now to the infinite goal of its motion. This indeed is what the element of fire does when it returns to its

cit, quando in propriam sphaeram se recipit. Facit idem lapis etiam manifestius, quando descendit ab alto, qui quo terrae fit propinquior, eo vehementius defertur in terram.

Quis dixerit mentem elementale corpus esse vel corporale quicquam, si vim possidet infinitam? Vim, inquam, tum perseverandi et capiendi, tum ambiendi percurrendique, sive se ipsa hanc habeat, sive, ut verius loquar, quadam amplificatione divina. Quatenus videlicet absoluta infinitas dei mentibus animabusque proxime ab ipsa pendentibus intellectualem vitalemque infinitatem inserit servatque continue atque ab infinito principio ad finem revocat infinitum. Si enim solet ubique ab absoluta qualitate manare similis aliqua communicata qualitas, quid mirum ab absoluta infinitate talem quandam alicubi aut talem infinitatem effluere? Imprimis autem in mentes et animas, per quas Platonici putant in mundo quoque temporis generationisque successionem procedere infinitam. Quis igitur adeo demens erit ut velit mentem habituram aliquem in perduratione sua terminum, cum in virtute, saltem adeo amplificata, et operatione non habeat, quasi possit habere extra se terminum quem in se ipsa non habet? Si vita origine antecedit intellegentiam[76] et intellegentia pretio vitam excedit atque humanus animus tanta est dignitate donatus ut concessa sibi fuerit infinita quodammodo virtus intellegendi ac volendi, multo prius magisque concessa eidem fuisse debet virtus infinita vivendi.

own sphere. A stone does the same even more obviously when it falls from on high: the closer it gets to the ground, the more violently it hurtles towards it.

Who will declare that the mind is an elemental body or something corporeal, if it possesses infinite power, the power of persevering and grasping and encircling and traversing, whether it has this power from itself or, if the truth be known, from a sort of divine abundance. This is insofar as the absolute infinity of God implants in the minds and souls directly dependent on it an infinity of intellect and of life, and continually preserves it and leads it back from the infinite beginning to the infinite end. For if from an absolute quality everywhere there emanates usually some similar imparted quality, is it a wonder that from absolute infinity somewhere there flows a similar or like infinity; and that it flows especially into minds and souls, through which, the Platonists believe, the infinite succession of time and generation proceeds in the world too? Who would be such an idiot as to suppose that mind will have some limit to its duration when it has no limit in its power, at least thus augmented, and none in its activity, as though it could have a limit outside itself which it does not have within itself? If life precedes understanding in origin, and if understanding exceeds life in value, and if the human soul has been endowed with such dignity that it has been granted in a way an infinite power of understanding and of willing, then ceded to this same soul still earlier and still more must have been the infinite power of living.

Notes to the Text

ABBREVIATIONS

A	the *editio princeps,* Florence, 1482, with printed corrigenda as noted below
L	Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, MS Plut. LXXXIII, 10, the dedication copy written for Lorenzo de'Medici
Marcel	the text of Raymond Marcel (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964–70).

CAPITULA

1. quum *AL, Marcel*

BOOK V

1. Platonicae theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber quintus incipit *L*
2. *Omitted in L*
3. *A omits* Si enim — numquam *before correction*
4. *A omits* facere *before correction*
5. in rationales *A*
6. *A reads* Qui *before correction*
7. *A omits* si *before correction*
8. agendum] angelum *before correction in A*
9. a medio *before correction in A*
10. *Omitted in L*
11. istuc *before correction in A*
12. quidem *before correction in A*
13. ordinet *before correction in A*
14. quo? *A*
15. a deo *AL:* adeo *early edns. and Marcel*
16. dividua tangit — per partem sui *transposed to the previous sentence, after* parte, *by Marcel*
17. a furore *before correction in A*
18. igni *A*
19. *Marcel corrects silently to* producit, *perhaps correctly*
20. vero] non *before correction in A*
21. -rentur *L*
22. ipsamet et *Marcel*
23. et *before correction in A*

24. *Omitted by Marcel*
25. primo ponatur] proponatur *before correction in A*
26. *Omitted in L*
27. illud *L*
28. Ac *A, Marcel*
29. simile *Marcel*
30. referetur *Marcel*
31. est] in *before correction in A*
32. ipsius *L*
33. formitem *Marcel*
34. informis *L*
35. Atqui *A*
36. Asserit *Marcel*
37. a *AL:* ac *Marcel*
38. *A omits* -que *before correction*
39. ostendemus *A*
40. *A transposes* cuiquam *after* ipsum bonum
41. solutas *L*
42. Decimatertia *Marcel*
43. accommodetur *Marcel*
44. an omnes *before correction in A*
45. potentiae *before correction in A*
46. *Omitted by Marcel*
47. *Omitted in L*
48. constat *before correction in A*
49. subest deo] sub deo est *L*
50. operis *A, Marcel*
51. forme *read erroneously by Marcel in the corrigenda of A*
52. *Omitted by Marcel*
53. sua *Marcel*
54. frigidus *A, Marcel*
55. venientem *L*
56. animam *L*
57. Epicure *Marcel*
58. haerere videntur] haerent *before correction in A*
59. irrationalem *Marcel and early edns.:* in rationalem *AL*
60. Xenocritas *sic A*
61. nostra *A, Marcel*
62. confirmavimus *L*
63. perfecto *Marcel*
64. vero *Marcel*
65. corpora *before correction in A*
66. incorporali *Marcel, following Augustine*
67. *Added in the corrigenda of A*
68. *Omitted in L*
69. qui cogendi ius, nisi per subditi cupiditates non habet *Augustine*
70. his *L*
71. *Omitted in L*
72. animi *L*
73. loci *Marcel*
74. naturale *Marcel*
75. *Spelt as* summit, *etc., throughout this passage, possibly for the sake of wordplay*

BOOK VI

1. Marsilii Ficini Platonicae theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber sextus incipit *L:* Marsilii Ficini Florentini liber sextus Theologie de immortalitate animorum *A*
2. Citticus *AL, Marcel*
3. corde *A*
4. Critolausqui *(sic) before correction in A*
5. nostri *Marcel*
6. *L omits* Ea siquidem—respondebit
7. talis *L*
8. a corpore *L*
9. corporalibus *L*
10. carnes *L*
11. *From* Magnum quidem *to the end of VI.2.6 Ficino follows the text of an earlier letter, Ep. I.110 (ed. Gentile, p. 194); variants from this letter are noted below*
12. reperire *Ep. I.110*
13. quasi *after* suam *in Ep. I.110, Marcel*
14. quidem *after* Quod *Ep. I.110*
15. perspicere] prospicere potes *Ep. I.110*
16. corporea tam incorporea *L, Marcel*
17. spirituales *Marcel*
18. *Ep. I.110 omits* cum et situ—qui spiritales sunt
19. autem corporalis *after* Magnitudo *Ep. I.110*
20. non habeat *after* terminum decrementi *Ep. I.110*
21. Animadvertant *Marcel*
22. ipsa *L*
23. spiritualium *L*
24. providere *before correction in A*
25. *VI.2.14–15 are repeated from Book VI [48] of Ficino's* Letters *(ed.* Opera *1576, I, pp. 838–39, dated 3.XII.1480); variants from this letter are noted below*
26. cervicem *A, Ep.VI [48], Marcel*
27. moverique *Ep. VI [48]*
28. imposita] in opposita *Ep. VI [48]*
29. respicere *before correction in A*
30. *Omitted in Ep. VI [48]*
31. diuturnumque *Marcel*
32. noctu *Ep. VI [48]*
33. noctu *Ep. VI [48]*
34. *Ep. VI [48] omits* neque se ipsas umquam
35. quaelibet *Ep. VI [48]*
36. cogemur *L*
37. *Ep. VI [48] has* hallucinarique et *after* caecutire
38. *Ep. VI [48] omits* et
39. amentiam *Ep. VI [48]*
40. effundetur *before correction in A*
41. quantum *Ep. VI [48]*

42. solutam *Ep. VI [48]*
43. patiturque *A, Marcel*
44. igneique *before correction in A*
45. vere *L, before correction in A*
46. alicubi *L, before correction in A*
47. iudicabimur *before correction in A*
48. videmus *Marcel*
49. inanime *Marcel*
50. ipsam *L: omitted by Marcel*
51. rationes *before correction in A*
52. requirendum *Marcel*
53. -que *omitted by Marcel*
54. partes *L*
55. animae *before correction in A*
56. nititur *L*
57. particula *L*
58. perveniret *before correction in A*
59. aliquid *before correction in A*
60. tale, *L, Marcel*
61. his *early edns. and Marcel*
62. per *Marcel*
63. *corrected by Marcel:* illam *AL*
64. indiget *L*
65. se movere] semovere *L*
66. *Omitted before correction in A*
67. non *L*
68. aliquantulum *L*
69. *Corrected by Marcel:* productivae *AL*
70. cuiusquam *Marcel*
71. indiget *L*
72. medias causas *Marcel*
73. corporalia *before correction in A*
74. *Marcel adds* ergo *after* Similiter
75. equidem *before correction in A*

BOOK VII

1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae de immortalitate animorum liber septimus incipit *L*
2. hac *L*
3. sua *Marcel*
4. magnitudinis *Marcel*
5. speculo *L*
6. aut *A*
7. *Marcel adds* enim *after* Sint
8. vulpis *A*
9. divinus *L*
10. imagine *L*
11. *Omitted by Marcel*
12. atque *A*
13. Atqui *Marcel*
14. quod *Augustine*
15. viva *Augustine*
16. *Marcel adds* enim *after* Vivunt, *following Augustine*
17. fit *Marcel*
18. perpensio *L*
19. sit *before correction in A*
20. primum *L*
21. *Corrected by Marcel:* instructa *AL*
22. *Omitted by Marcel*

23. *Marcel adds* in *after* quam
24. sentimus *Augustine*
25. inest — corporale] inest tamen instrumentum est corporis *Augustine*
26. *Marcel emends to* anima: agit haec anima *Augustine*
27. ea *Augustine*
28. quae sunt in animali] quae insunt *Augustine*
29. familiari] quasi familiari *Augustine*
30. cesserunt *Augustine*
31. exserit *Augustine*
32. atque *Augustine*
33. Anima *Marcel*
34. hic *L*
35. nec *Marcel*
36. extiterint *A*
37. oportet *Marcel*
38. unum *A, Marcel*
39. iacet *Marcel*
40. Decimatertia *A, Marcel*
41. *Marcel emends to* omnes *following the 1576 edn.*
42. paulum *A*

BOOK VIII

1. Marsilii Ficini Theologiae de animorum immortalitate liber octavus incipit *L*
2. *Marcel places* Prima ratio *before* Animus
3. sic *Marcel*
4. qui *before correction in A*
5. *L omits* aliquem
6. *Corrected by Marcel:* agnoscant *AL*
7. introspicit *after* auguratur *before correction in A*
8. *Omitted in A*
9. illa *L*
10. *Marcel places* Secunda ratio *before* Anima
11. quam *L*
12. commutent *Marcel*
13. contrario *before correction in A*
14. sunt *L*
15. tamen *before correction in A*
16. his *L*
17. -ve] –que *L*
18. linea *Marcel*
19. fit *L, before correction in A*
20. his *L*
21. animadverterit *Marcel*
22. sciemus quidem *L*
23. *Corrected to* emolliatur *by Marcel*
24. *Omitted before correction in A*
25. Quod *Marcel*
26. contigat *L*
27. nos *before correction in A*
28. illa *L*
29. *Omitted by Marcel*
30. subiectu *L*
31. sit *before correction in A*
32. terminatur *L*
33. totidemque *L, Marcel*

34. Fateamur *L*
35. illam *L*
36. dissolutio *L*
37. -erunt *Marcel*
38. *Marcel emends to* nigris
39. situm *before correction in A*
40. siti *before correction in A*
41. aspicient *Marcel*
42. *Omitted in A*
43. dispartit *before correction in A*
44. *Emended to* actus *by Marcel:* Tactus *AL*
45. *Omitted before correction in A*
46. solum *A*
47. actu *before correction in A*
48. *Marcel corrects to* totum: totus *AL*
49. cognosceret *before correction by the scribe of L*
50. capientur *Marcel*
51. in *before correction in A*
52. *Omitted by Marcel*
53. *Marcel conjectures* supra *before* omnia
54. natura *A*
55. effingere] effici gerere *before correction in A*
56. perficit *L*
57. aliud *Marcel*
58. attribuitur *before correction in A*
59. *Marcel emends to* visibilis: invisibilis *AL and early edns.*
60. *Omitted by Marcel*
61. *Marcel's emendation:* aditis *LA*
62. si *Marcel*
63. corruptabilia *L*
64. *The title of this chapter was evidently corrected by Ficino in the Capitula librorum to:* operatio mentis finitur in operatione; operatio corporis in opere.
65. eandem *before correction in A*
66. apparet *L*
67. proficit *before correction in A*
68. versetur *Marcel*
69. atque *L*
70. praesertim elementalem *omitted before correction in A*
71. eadem *before correction in A*
72. odoribus *before correction in A*
73. qualibet *before correction in A*
74. -ve *A*
75. percurrit] currit per *before correction in A*
76. -tia *L*

Notes to the Translation

ABBREVIATIONS

Avicenna, *Opera*	*Auicene peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera* (n.pl., 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1961).
Bidez-Cumont	Joseph Bidez and Franz Cumont, *Les mages héllenisés: Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1938).
Collins	Ardis B. Collins, *The Secular Is Sacred: Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's Platonic Theology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
Des Places	Édouard Des Places, ed., *Oracles Chaldaïques, avec un choix de commentaires anciens* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1971).
Diels-Kranz	Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1906–1910).
Ficino, *Opera*	Marsilio Ficino, *Opera omnia* (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576; repr. Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1959).
Hörmann	Wolfgang Hörmann, ed., *s. Aurelius Augustinus: Soliloquiorum libri duo; De inmortalitate animae; De quantitate animae.* Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. 89 (Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1986).
Kaske-Clark	Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark, eds., *Marsilio Ficino: Three Books on Life* (Binghamton, NY: Renaissance Society of America, 1989).
Marcel, *Banquet*	Raymond Marcel, *Marsile Ficin: Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon* (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1956).

Marietti	Petrus Marc, ed., *Thomas Aquinas: Liber de veritate Catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium qui dicitur Summa contra gentiles*, 3 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1961).
PG	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graeca*, 161 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857–1866.)
PL	Jacques-Paul Migne, ed., *Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina*, 221 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1844–1891).
Quandt	Wilhelm Quandt, ed. *Orphei Hymni*, 4th ed. (Dublin: Weidmann, 1973).
Saffrey-Westerink	Henri-Dominique Saffrey and Leendert Gerrit Westerink, eds., *Proclus: Théologie Platonicienne*, 6 vols. (Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1968–97).
Schiavone	Michele Schiavone, ed., *Marsilio Ficino: Teologia platonica*, 2 vols. (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1965).
Stählin	Otto Stählin, ed., *Clemens Alexandrinus*, 3rd ed., 4 vols. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960–1980).
Tambrun-Krasker	Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker, *Oracles chaldaïques, recension de Georges Gémiste Pléthon* (Athens: Academy of Athens, 1995).
Wachsmuth	Curtis Wachsmuth and Otto Hense, eds., *Ioannes Stobaius: Anthologium*, 2nd ed., 5 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1958).

For Ficino's debts to Aquinas we have noted below two kinds of parallel passages from the *Summa contra Gentilies* assembled by Collins in *The Secular Is Sacred*, those indicating either "almost verbatim copying" or "a close similarity in thought" (p. 114). A third category, consisting of similarities "not marked enough to justify any conclusion about the presence of Thomistic influence," has been ignored. We follow Collins throughout in citing the paragraph numbers from the 1961 Marietti edition of the *Summa;* thus, in the citation 1.43.363, "363" refers to the paragraph number of the Marietti edition.

BOOK V

1. That is, third in the order of the five hypostases: the One, Mind, Soul, Quality, Body.

2. This attribuition to Pythagoras has no obvious source, pace Marcel, despite echoes of Aristotle's discussion of circular motion in his *Physics* 8.8.261b27 ff., 264b9 ff., 8.9.265a28 ff. See Christopher S. Celenza, "Pythagoras in the Renaissance: The Case of Marsilio Ficino," *Renaissance Quarterly* 52.3 (1999), 667–711 at 682–684.

3. Plato, *Timaeus* 50D-51B.

4. That is, every rational soul as part of Soul shares in the supremacy of Soul over Matter.

5. Aristotle, *Physics* 2.3.194b16 ff., 7.198a14 ff.

6. Is Ficino referring to the etymology of *anima* from the Greek *anemos* (wind)?

7. *Timaeus* 41D.

8. Ficino's understanding of the distinction between essence (which Augustine had equated with substance) and existence (the act of being) was indebted to Aquinas. Predictably, however, he read Thomas' elaborations back into Aristotle (its ultimate source) and into the Platonic tradition.

9. The *complexio* is the particular mix in an individual of the four humors as set forth in Galenic medical theory. It is fully analyzed in Book 7, Chapter 9 below.

10. *Generatio et corruptio . . . ab aliis differentem:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1.26.242 (Collins, No. 39A).

11. *Quapropter quicquid esse desinit . . . a se non separatur:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1298 (Collins, No. 39B).

12. *Quod alicui per se convenit . . . et per se esse:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1299 (Collins, No. 40).

13. *Sicut generatio fit . . . non est in anima:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1298 (Collins, No. 42A).

14. *Sed rationem hanc latius . . . tamen essentia remanet;* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1300 (Collins, No. 42B).

15. *Quod etiam inde constat, quod . . . Semper itaque vivit:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1302 (Collins, No. 42C).

16. For the arguments of this twelfth chapter, Collins (No. 43) adduces Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1301, 1310.

17. Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.2.1, Proclus, *Elements* 190–194 (ed. Dodds, pp. 166–171); Pseudo-Dionysius, *Divine Names* 4.1 (693B-696A); Origen, *Contra Celsum* 2.8.9, 5.27.34; and Augustine, *De duabus animis contra Manichaeos*, passim. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.21, 2.87.

18. *Anima est forma ita simplex . . . Dei solius est proprium:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.87.1718 (Collins, No. 44).

19. *Nam ex ordine operum ordo . . . Deus est causa:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.15.925 (Collins, No. 45A).

20. *Essendi vero hoc aut illud . . . quidem virtute Dei:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.66.2412 (Collins, No. 45B).

21. *Esse quidem illud quod post . . . secunda vel tertia:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.21.972 (Collins, No. 45C).

22. *Profecto quod naturae alicuius . . . in materia tali:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.21.976 (Collins, No. 46A). For Ariston, see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 3.1.

23. *Quoniam vero quantum pertinet . . . egeat fundamento:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 3.66.2413 (Collins, No. 46B).

24. *Praeterea, tam ars quam natura . . . in esse perducit:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.20.966 (Collins, No. 47).

25. Plato, *Timaeus* 28A-29A.

26. Plato, *Timaeus* 41D, 69C ff. See Kristeller, *Philosophy* pp. 364–388; Allen, *Platonism*, pp. 76–77.

27. I.e. Life as a Platonic idea, absolute Life.

28. *Chaldaean Oracle* No. 12.2 (ed. Tambrun-Krasker, p. 2 [ed. Des Places, frg. 96]; cf. p. 9 with Pletho's commentary, and pp. 84–88 with editorial commentary).

29. Strato of Lampsacus (*fl.* 287–269 BC) was head of the Peripatetic school; see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.3.58–64.

30. Elsewhere Ficino will argue, following Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.7.14, that it is immortal like the higher rational soul. Speusippus (407–339 BC) suc-

ceeded Plato, his uncle, as head of the Platonic Academy and was in turn succeeded by Xenocrates. Numenius was a leading Pythagorean of the second century AD. Porphyry (232/3-c.305) was Plotinus' biographer, a polymath, and a leading Neoplatonist, perhaps the one best known to Augustine.

31. Empedocles *apud* Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 8.2.77 (Diels frg. 117); Timaeus, *De mundo* 46.99E-100A (ed. Marg, p. 139); Origen, *De principiis* 2.8.3–2.9.7; Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1.32, 3.76, 5.49; and Plotinus, *Enneads* 3.4.6.

32. Cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 3.3.4 (ed. Hörmann, pp. 103.13–106.2). The rest of this last chapter of Book 5 consists of sustained reference to, paraphrasing of, and direct quotation, with adaptation, from this early and sometimes difficult Augustinian treatise, which supplied Ficino with his subtitle for the *Platonic Theology*. Augustine seems to use *anima* and *animus* indifferently though the burden of the argument is concerned with the rational soul; *animus* has usually been translated accordingly.

33. *Intentio* is a technical scholastic term with a number of meanings, among them the mind's intellectual conception or representation (as here), and the will's intention or purpose.

34. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 8.13 (ed. Hörmann, p. 114.12–18) — adapted.

35. Ibid. 8.15, the concluding sentence (ed. Hörmann, p. 117.14–16) — adapted.

36. Ibid. 9.16–10.17 (ed. Hörmann, pp. 117.17–119.2) — adapted. The notes are henceforth keyed to the beginning of each of the (conventional) sections of Augustine's treatise.

37. Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus were both Pythagorean philosophers from the fourth century BC. The Pythagorean theory that the soul is a harmony is discussed by Socrates in the *Phaedo*.

38. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 10.17 (ed. Hörmann, p. 119.3–14).

39. Cf. ibid. 4.5 (ed. Hörmann, pp. 106.2–107.2).

40. Ibid. 13.20 (ed. Hörmann, p. 122.3). The remainder of this chapter

reproduces, with adaptation, Augustine's chapters 13, 14, 15 and the first half of 16.

41. Ibid. 13.21 (ed. Hörmann, p. 123.1).

42. Since only a soul can have desire in the sense of *cupiditas,* were it to become body, it could not desire at all.

43. Augustine writes "by a soul which does not have the right of compelling except by way of the desires of the subject soul."

44. Ibid. 13.22 (ed. Hörmann, p. 123.18).

45. Ibid. 14.23 (ed. Hörmann, p. 124.11).

46. Ibid. 15.24 (ed. Hörmann, p. 125.13).

47. Augustine's argument is different here and goes, "But body would take a form of the corporeal order even if it did not take its form through soul. For if nothing intervened it would still take a form in this order."

48. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 16.25 (ed. Hörmann, p. 127.4–21) — breaking off in mid-sentence.

BOOK VI

1. With the customary pun on the laurel and Lorenzo: *sub lauro* can therefore mean "when the bay was flourishing" or "in the time of Lorenzo."

2. Giovanni Cavalcanti (1444–1509), a Florentine nobleman, statesman and distinguished diplomat, was probably Ficino's closest friend, receiving over forty letters from him, more than any other correspondent. He owned a villa at Regnano.

3. Cristoforo Landino (1424–1498), another close friend, was tutor to Lorenzo de' Medici and his brother Giuliano. In 1458 he was appointed to the chair of rhetoric and poetry at Florence's university, and in 1467 became the chancellor (secretary) of the Guelf party. He lectured and commented extensively on Dante, Virgil and others and wrote three philosophical dialogues, and notably the *Disputationes Camaldulenses* and *De vera nobilitate* where Ficino and others appear. Ficino submitted his Plato translations to him and to Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, Poliziano,

Bartolomeo Scala, Chalcondyles and Boninsegni (see nn. 5, 23, 28 below) during the 1470s for their advice and correction.

4. Another friend, Bernardo Nuzzi was a secretary of the Florentine Chancery from 1486, and, like Landino, professor of rhetoric and poetry at the university; he was well known as a speaker and as a lecturer on Horace.

5. Giorgio Antonio Vespucci (1434–1514), the uncle of Amerigo Vespucci, the navigator, was a collector of Greek and Roman manuscripts, and a distinguished private teacher and philologist. Ficino thanked him and others for their help in the preface to his 1484 *Platonis Opera Omnia* (see nn. 3 above, and 23, 28 below). After 1482 he was a fellow canon of the cathedral and one of the witnesses to Ficino's will. He too appears as one of the speakers in Landino's *De vera nobilitate*.

6. Schiavone, p. 336 ad loc., notes that Ficino must have confused this Hipparchus with the Hippasus of Metapontum mentioned by Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a5, and Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.76. These two works, along with various notices in Diogenes Laertius' *Lives*, obviously underlie much of this doxography.

7. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives*, 9.9.57.

8. Aristotle's *De anima* 1.2.405b5 maintains, however, that Critias had said the soul was blood not air.

9. Aristotle's *De anima* 1.2.405b2ff. and *Metaphysics* 1.3.984a3 both refer to a Hippo, not a Hippias, as someone who believed in the soul's watery nature and argued against those who said it was blood.

10. For Hesiod, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.4.984b23, 8.989a10. Pronopides is unknown.

11. This is Boethus Sidonius, an unorthodox Stoic philosopher of the second century BC; see Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.76.

12. Ibid. Presumably to be identified with Xenophanes of Colophon, who is mentioned three paragraphs later.

13. *Complexio* here as elsewhere is a technical medical term meaning a commixture or tempering, especially of humors in the animate body. Ficino analyses it further in Book 7, chapter 9 below.

14. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 7.1.139, 156–159 (*Life of Zeno*), has a similar list.

15. Ibid. (Ironically Diogenes' *Lives* 7.7, the actual *Life of Chrysippus*, has nothing relevant).

16. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.4.17 (*Life of Archelaus*).

17. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.76.

18. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.5.986b21 ff.; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.2.18–20 (*Life of Xenophanes*).

19. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 1.76.

20. For Ficino this succession list of six *prisci theologi*, originating in Zoroaster and culminating in Plato, is the gentile counterpart to the books of Moses and the Prophets. See Hankins, *Plato in the Italian Renaisance*, pp. 460–464, and Allen *Synoptic Art*, ch. 1. For the mysterious Aglaophemus Ficino was entirely dependent on two brief mentions of his name in Iamblichus' *De vita pythagorica* 146 and Proclus' *Theologia Platonica* 1.5.

21. Bernardo Bembo (1433–1519) was an eminent Venetian statesman, ambassador, bibliophile, and orator, the father of the important humanist Cardinal Pietro Bembo and later a frequenter of Aldo Manuzio's circle in Venice. He had many friends in Florence too, and was very close to Ficino from whom he received more letters than anyone excepting only Cavalcanti and Lorenzo. Ficino dedicated the fifth book of his letters to him.

22. Antonio Vinciguerra Cronico (†1502), Venetian diplomat and humanist, author of a satire on divine love, met Ficino during diplomatic missions to Florence during the 1470s and became one of his correspondents. Pico della Mirandola refers to him as a man "of immense learning" towards the close of his *Oratio de dignitate hominis* (ed. Garin, p. 160).

23. Demetrius Chalcondyles, an émigré Byzantine professor who wrote a defense of Aristotle and of Theodore Gaza in the 1460s (no longer extant), was one of six scholars Ficino thanked for their help in the preface to his 1484 *Platonis Opera Omnia* (see nn. 3, 5 above and 28 below).

24. Angelleri or Angiolieri (1414–1486) was a local priest and theologian with whom Ficino discussed his entering the priesthood in 1473.

25. Arduini (died 1498) taught natural philosophy and theology at the university of Pisa and participated in the Camaldolese dialogues described by Landino.

26. Naldi (c.1435–1513), another of Ficino's friends, was a professor of poetry and philosophy at the university of Florence from 1484, and a prolific and celebrated poet.

27. Fonzio or Della Fonte (1445–1513) was priest, poet, and orator who became professor of rhetoric and philosophy at the university of Florence in 1481, though he taught for a time at the court of King Matthias of Hungary. The unique surviving manuscript of Ficino's *Ricepte contro alla peste* is in his hand and was written at Ficino's dictation. He was a close friend of Boninsegni (see n. 28 below).

28. Giovanni Battista Boninsegni (1453–1512) was an accomplished Hellenist and statesman who translated two of Plutarch's essays into Latin. In the 1470s Ficino turned to him and to five others (see nn. 3, 5, 23 above) as readers for his great Latin Plato translation.

29. Pierleone da Spoleto (d.1492) was a doctor, astrologer, and bibliophile, learned in Latin and Greek, who lectured on Manilius's *Astronomicon* at the university of Florence and was twice professor of medicine at the university of Pisa. He was a close friend of Ficino and Lorenzo, and in 1492 became Lorenzo's personal physician during his last fatal illness (accused of misdiagnosing it, he then threw himself or was thrown down a well!).

30. *Magnum quiddam es . . . non habeat terminum incrementi;* this passage of 28 lines or so repeats (with variations) the second half of a curious letter in Ficino's first book of *Epistolae,* "Marsilius Ficinus hominum generi salutem . . ." (*Opera,* pp. 659.2–660).

31. *Republic* 7.514A-518D.

32. *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a27–993b11.

33. Plato, *Phaedo* 67C-69D.

34. Avicenna, *Liber de anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus,* vol. 1, pars prima, cap. 1, lines 49–68 (ed. van Riet, pp. 36–37).

35. A paraphrase of *Republic* 7.514A-518D; cf. Ficino, *Opera,* 1:838–9.

36. Ficino is reproducing the reference in the *Republic* 516A7 to "reflections" or "images" "in water" (*en tois hudasi . . . eidola*)": accordingly *in aqua* is thrice translated here as "in reflection."

37. Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.734 (a much quoted line).

38. Heraclitus, frg. 118 (ed. H. Diels-W. Kranz, 1.177.4–5), a much quoted aphorism that Ficino probably first found in Hermias, *In Phaedrum* 27.28 (ed. Couvreur).

39. *Corpus naturale ex materia . . . Est igitur anima forma:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.65.1427 (Collins, No. 49).

40. *Quod si ipsa quoque . . . solum est forma:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.57.1339 (Collins, No. 50).

41. Collins (No. 51) compares the argument in this chapter to Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.65.1429.

42. *Quod autem ubique in corpore . . . unitur et singulis:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.72.1484 (Collins, No. 52).

43. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.7.5; Porphyry, *Sententiae* 35 (ed. Lamberz).

44. Body only naturally rises or falls, depending on whether it is light or heavy: circular and lateral movements are certainly not natural to it. Hence circling planets, or animals moving in any way, must consist of something other than bodies for them to move as they do.

45. Or possibly "discourses through itself" since *discurrere* is the technical term for describing ratiocination, the *ratio*'s inner motion working out a problem or through an argument (in contrast to the intuition of the *mens*).

46. Soul is always moving in a vital sense in that anything living must be in motion, whether that motion is manifest in circulation and growth alone (as in the case of plants), or in locomotion (as in the case of higher animals). In humans motion may also occur in an intellectual sense, but such is not essential to the soul.

47. Ficino proceeds to use *natura* in several different ways to signify the soul's substance, the irrational soul that governs corporeal life and that is equated at the beginning of chapter 2 with what the Aristotelians call "the vegetative power," perhaps even Nature in the sense of the world's life. In general, see Kristeller *Philosophy*, pp. 107–108, 174–179, 369–377.

BOOK VII

1. Cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 5.9 (ed. W. Hörmann, p. 141.15–27, *Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum*, v. 89 [Vienna, 1986] = *PL* 32.1040).

2. Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.7.6.

3. Though indebted to Aristotle's *koine aisthesis*, Ficino's *communis sensus* is usually identifiable with the imagination as distinct from the phantasy (see Kristeller, *Philosophy*, p. 369).

4. *Nempe anima cuilibet . . . pertineat animam:* cf. Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* 16.25 (ed. Hörmann, p. 128.5–20)—paraphrased.

5. Augustine, *Letters* (*De origine animae hominis liber*) 166.2.4 (*PL* 33.722)

6. Cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 32.68 (ed. Hörmann , p. 216.2–6 = *PL* 32.1073).

7. "Lucifer" literally means "light-bearer," traditionally the designation of the planet Venus.

8. Cf. Speusippus, *De Platonis Definitionibus*, tr. Ficino (*Opera*, p. 1964): "Nomen: dictio simplex significativa eius quod secundum essentiam praedicatur."

9. For the notion of *punctum* see the title of Chapter One above.

10. Augustine, *De musica* 6.5.10 (*PL* 32.1169); Plotinus, *Enneads* 1.1.1, 3.6.1–2 , 6.1.20 (?).

11. Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 5.3b25–28 and 8.10b12–17.

12. *Complexio natura quaedam est ex contrariis . . . est perfectum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.63.1418 (Collins, No. 53).

13. Aristoxenus of Tarentum (fl. c. 340 BC) was an important musical theorist with Pythagorean interests and also a pupil of Aristotle (in fact

expected to succeed him as head of the Lyceum). But it is Cicero, *Tusculanae* 1.10.19–20, who tells us that he regarded the soul as a "tuning" (*intentio* or *harmonia*) of the body, a Pythagorean argument that is discussed at length in Plato's *Phaedo* 85E-86D (by Simmias, the pupil of Philolaus) and 91C-95A (by Socrates).

14. Hippocrates is the famous Greek physician (fl. c. 500 BC) who transmitted the theory that the human body was composed of four humors: blood, choler, black choler, and phlegm.

15. With the implication that this is absurd.

BOOK VIII

1. A reference to the simile of the divided line in the *Republic* 6.509D-511E.

2. Ficino does not invariably distinguish as here between the imagination and the phantasy; see Kristeller, *Philosophy*, pp. 235–238, 369.

3. With a play on *disciplina* as the discipline to which a *discipulus* submits.

4. An *intentio* is a scholastic concept signifying, broadly, the relationship between the power of cognition and the cognized object or the will and the willed object; for Ficino, here, it is the rudimentary concept of a thing formed by the phantasy, for which see Aristotle, *De anima* 3.3.427b14–429a9.

5. *Timaeus* 51D-52D (?)

6. Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 3.337–338, 445–448.

7. Cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 21.35–36 (ed. Hörmann).

8. Virgil, *Aeneid* 1.150.

9. Or, if there is an analogy with a stringed instrument, "We unstring our body to render our rational soul better strung."

10. The commentary has in modern times been attributed to Damascius, an early sixth-century Neoplatonist, rather than Olympiodorus; the passage in question is based on Damascius' *Commentarius in Phaedonem* 1.179, ed. Westerink, p. 110, which cites Plato, *Phaedo* 70A and *Gorgias* 469C.

11. With a play on *possibilis,* "what is able to be done" and *potentissimum,* "what is able to do it most," both derived from *possum.*

12. *Virtutum duo sunt . . . est, repellit:* quoted in Ficino's letter to Antonio Calderini in his first book of *Letters* (*Opera,* p. 657.1; no. 106 in the edition of S. Gentile, pp. 184–185).

13. Ficino is probably referring, not to Plato generally on the virtues (as Marcel's note supposes), but to the specific definitions of courage, temperance and justice in the *Republic* 4.429A-435C.

14. *Seventh Letter* 341CD. Ficino is punning on *discussio* from *discutere* meaning to strike or hammer.

15. This important distinction between what is knowing (intellectual—in Greek *noeros*) and what is known (intelligible—*noetos*) was introduced into Neoplatonic metaphysics by Iamblichus. But Ficino read it back into the works of Plotinus, Plato and the ancient theologians he revered; see Allen, *Platonism,* pp. 116 ff.

16. *rerum cum mentibus adaequatio* is an allusion to the Thomistic definition of truth as *adaequatio rei et intellectus,* conformity of the intellect to the object of cognition. The latter in this case is the intellectual (or intelligible) species, i.e., the way objects appear to the mind or the intelligible aspect of a thing, as the following argument makes clear.

17. Resolution is the dialectical procedure Plato calls *diairesis;* see especially the *Sophist* and the *Statesman.*

18. See n. 16 above.

19. *Enneads* 4.1–4.3.3.

20. *Nullum corpus aliquid . . . se toto quicquid intelligit:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1248 (Collins, No. 54).

21. *Solent corpora quando . . . summopere perficit:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1249 (Collins, No. 55).

22. Composition or *synagoge* is the contrary dialectical procedure to *diairesis* (see n. 17 above).

23. *Corpus et forma per corpus extensa . . . actus respicientem:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1250 (Collins, No. 56).

24. *Duo corporea se invicem . . . complectuntur intelligendo:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1253 (Collins, No. 57).

25. See n. 16 above.

26. Ficino is contrasting *actum reflexum* with *actum rectum,* the bending back and returning action of thought with the straight action of life; the contrast between the circular motion characteristic of divine things (including the human intellect) and the straight motion manifested by sublunar substances is basic to Aristotelian cosmology. Following Proclus, Ficino elsewhere Platonizes Aristotle by reducing rectilinear motion to circular motion, for example in his *Commentary on the Timaeus* (*Opera* 2.445).

27. *Secundum vero sequeretur absurdum . . . etiam incorporea:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1251 (Collins, No. 58).

28. *Numquam corpus formam . . . atque perpetuam:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.50.1266 (Collins, No. 59).

29. *Formae contrariorum elementorum . . . servatoribus admovet:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.50.1265 (Collins, No. 60).

30. *Corporis cuiusque forma . . . atque igneum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.50.1263 (Collins, No. 61A).

31. Heraclitus frg. 118 (ed. Diels-Kranz, p. 177.4–5) "A gleam of light is the dry soul, wisest and best" (cf. Ficino's earlier ref. at the end of 6.2 to this same frg.). The Orphic ref. may be to the "Hymn to Helios" 11–14 (ed. Quandt, p. 8). Cf. Macrobius, *In somnium Scipionis* 14.19.

32. *Mens autem corporum accipit omnium . . . esse corporeum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.50.1263 (Collins, No. 61B).

33. *Apparet etiam non esse . . . in malis:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.55.1305 (Collins, No. 62). Schiavone, p. 410 ad loc., argues that *in malis* must refer to evil forms, incorrectly in our view.

34. *Operatio cuiusque rei esse ipsum . . . utrumque seorsum:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.50.1262 (Collins, No. 63).

35. *Sophist* 248E-249D, 250B-D, 252A, 254D; cf. Ficino, *In Sophistam* 30–31, 34, and *In Philebum* 2.2.

36. *Nullius corporis actio in ipsam . . . replicatur innumere:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1255 (Collins, No. 64).

37. 2 Corinthians 4:16.

38. *Elements of Theology* prop. 189 (ed. Dodds, p. 164).

39. *Phaedrus* 245C-246A; *Laws* 894B-896A; cf. Ficino, *In Phaedrum* 5.

40. *Constat apud physicos . . . sine termino:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1252 (Collins, No. 65A).

41. *Quinetiam corpora dividit in partes . . . cogitat ampliorem:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1252 (Collins, No. 65B).

42. *Apparet rursus ex eo quod universales . . . penetrat omnes:* cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 2.49.1252 (Collins, No. 65C).

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